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United Service Institution of India

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
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
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A LYSANDER AIRCRAFT

(By courtesy of "The Aeroplane.")

Army Co-operation Squadrons in India are being equipped with these aircraft.

FOR REFERENCE

Not to be taken out

The Journal

OF THE

United Service Institution of India

Vol. LXX

JANUARY 1940

No. 298

The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official, and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

EDITORIAL

War Aims The subject of war aims has already achieved some prominence in the press and in parliament. It was discussion of this question, particularly in Germany, that first ruffled the unity which had manifested itself on the outbreak of the last great war and which was later to be one of the main causes of controversy in the politics of the Central Powers.

The war aims of the democracies have been well expressed in Mr. Chamberlain's words:

"We are seeking no material advantage for ourselves. We are not aiming only at victory, but looking beyond it to laying a foundation of a better international system which will mean that war is not to be the inevitable lot of each succeeding generation."

While it is necessary for the nation's efforts to be directed towards some specific goal, it is not necessary, even if possible, to express the aim in terms of territorial frontiers. It is supposed by some that abstract ideas are incapable of assimilation by that large percentage of the British people whose mental processes are conditioned by an elementary education and by the popular press. This overstates a partial truth. An ideal expressed in abstract terms can have inspiring effects. It was a comparable ideal, rather than exasperation, which led the United States of America into the last war, which gave that

nation's war effort its peculiar quality, which encouraged the allies, and which deeply shook the resolution of the Central Powers. Such an ideal was needed to give direction to the British nation since the events of last March.

This is not to maintain that an ideal in itself is enough and that it is unnecessary to decide, to the extent possible at any given time, on the steps required to achieve it. It was largely because the Americans gave up the struggle to achieve it soon after the fighting was over that the American ideal of 1917 and 1918 was not achieved. Though exact definition is impossible, the practical methods by which the aim is to be realised do require consideration unless victory itself is to be regarded as the end without reference to what may come after.

We must have ideas about what we are to do as well as about what we are to undo, on peace aims as well as on war aims. There has been discussion on the latter point, one extreme maintaining that we are fighting the present rulers of Germany only (as was the case in the last war) and that we have no quarrel with the German people as a whole; others, that it is practically the whole race which requires a lesson that will change its heart. The truth, as usual, lies between these views, though the latter and less optimistic is probably nearer to it. In a nation in which youth has been systematically regimented and brutalised from the earliest possible age, there are certain to be successors to the country's present rulers. A change of heart in the greater part of the nation will be necessary and this will require a definite defeat: an easy peace would be a short one. On the other hand it is not necessary to assume that German intellect, culture and kindliness are for ever eclipsed, nor to repeat the treatment given to Germany in the years immediately following 1918. What we can resolve is to do our utmost to oppose the rise to power of another upstart.

* * * *

The final settlement cannot be foreseen in detail at present; but it can be seen in principle. It has been
Peace Aims generally admitted that the future of European civilisation lies in the acknowledgment of some power to which individual states will surrender sufficient of their sovereign rights to end international anarchy. Are we to continue to assume that this is impracticable in the immediate

future? Can our efforts not be directed to that end from now on? If this is the determination, it is not necessary to assume that the 1937 frontiers of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria must of necessity be restored, nor to make any such definite pronouncement. Some sort of union or federation, not necessarily embracing the whole continent in the first instance, seems essential. Into this, Germany will have to be fitted. After reading the white paper containing reports of conditions in German concentration camps and after considering the country's record in international affairs, the political education of the Germans may seem an impossible task. In external as in internal affairs they respect brutal force as their law, and Germany in its present form could not be fitted into any society without trying to dominate it.

Union under the hegemony of one nation is not the type of union required, and Great Britain has twice, at least, intervened to prevent it. But it has to be realised that something more positive is needed. After the Napoleonic wars and again after the last war, we were unwilling for long to forgo isolation and to become a part of Europe. We supported the League; but the League was not European and, although the greatest nation outside Europe stood aloof, it had too wide a membership and attempted to deal with affairs beyond its practicable scope. It is not quite clear at the moment whether the supposition is true that air power has deprived Great Britain of any advantages attached to being an island. It seems, however, that our frontier is likely to remain about the Rhine. It is more necessary for Great Britain to concern herself closely in the affairs of Europe if Europe is to survive than it is for the United States of America to intervene in international affairs for the present world civilisation to be maintained. It will be necessary for us to reconcile our obligations to the British commonwealth of nations with those to the continent of which we are a part and to continue to make sacrifices after peace has been concluded. There must be no hasty disarmament.

There may be hope for Germany in freeing her from the domination of Prussia. Provided it does not entail the establishment of more mutually suspicious, economically independent, intolerant entities, there would be much to be said for a return to the old federation of principalities, where all that used to

be associated with German culture and intellect flourished and which were no worse than their contemporaries in international morality.

* * * *

Sir Neville Henderson's final report, issued on September 20th, is easy to read and worth reading. It gives a brief and clear account of the last fortnight of his stay in Berlin and traces events from that March day which showed that thenceforth no small nation in Europe could regard itself as secure and that Herr Hitler would remain true neither to his spoken word nor to his theories of racial purity.

Sir Neville does not deny the achievements of the Nazi regime. If much of these were obtained through the complete subordination of the individual to the state, if the union of greater Germany which could so much better have been achieved by reasonable means was precipitated by violence, and even if a mediæval barbarism subjected the Jews and the Christian churches to inhumane persecution, nevertheless the world was prepared to acquiesce rather than plunge into what seemed the even greater evil of war. But "revolutions are like avalanches, which once set in motion cannot stop till they crash to destruction at the end of their career." Herr Hitler was driven on until he finally overstrained that acquiescence.

In the meantime he has brought up the youth of his nation in his philosophy. A state has been organised for war to the neglect of all the arts of peace. That nation has to be reformed and provided with honest leaders if peace is to be established in Europe. Those leaders will be hard to find: Nazi education is not of a sort to have produced them. As Sir Neville Henderson remarks: "The tragedy of any dictator is that as he goes on, his entourage steadily and inexorably deteriorates," all but yes-men are eliminated.

A curious similarity can be traced between the circumstances of 1914 and of 1939. There is the same autocratic ruler with a sinister influence in his foreign office: the same contempt for "scraps of paper:" the same belief, in spite of far more definite assurances, that Great Britain was not prepared to fight: and the same pressure from a mobilised military machine with every passing day reducing the remaining period of campaigning weather.

The German campaign in Poland must be acknowledged to be a creditable military achievement even after due allowance has been made for great superiority in numbers, armament, aircraft, and mechanised formations: for the suitable nature of the terrain; for the kindness of the weather; for the absence of more than a few weak and isolated fortifications; and for the over-confidence of the Poles. Initial resistance was quickly overcome and mechanised columns then pushed boldly and rapidly past the bodies of Polish troops which remained fighting with the utmost gallantry, but which possessed neither the mobility nor the striking power to dislocate the German lines of communication. The plan followed the customary German pattern. Two pairs of thrusts first cut off the corridor and south-western Poland. In the difficult country of the Carpathians, the German advance northwards from Slovakia was slow; but elsewhere, except for a short pause about the 10th September when heavy rain fell in many parts, the advance was creditably rapid. The pairs of thrusts then became the two wings of an enveloping advance which met at Wladava on the Bug about one hundred miles east of Warsaw by the 22nd September, three weeks after the crossing of the frontier. At the same time a rapid advance eastwards on Lwow forestalled Polish attempts to withdraw south-east. The training of the German army is believed to have been specially designed for this type of warfare and to have stressed the need for maintaining momentum without excessive consideration for security. The advances into Austria, the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia must have provided useful undress rehearsals.

The German air force contributed greatly to the success of the operations. It was directed first against the Polish aerodromes which were quickly rendered unserviceable. Complete air superiority was thus enjoyed from the start and enabled the air force to interfere seriously with the concentration of the Polish army and to prevent the formation of reserve divisions. It is worth noting that the immediate objectives of the air force were purely military. Only after they had been achieved, was it considered desirable to spare aircraft to attack the civil population. Once the purely military objectives had been secured, however, the full weight of the German air force was turned ruthlessly against open towns and villages. There is no doubt

that in comparison with the results obtained against military objectives the attack on the civilian population achieved little.

Soviet troops crossed the whole length of the frontier in considerable force early on the 17th September. Practically unopposed, they were able to advance at an average rate of some thirty miles a day with their mechanised formations, a surprising achievement of Russian organisation which could probably not have been maintained for very much longer. After changes in the original line of demarcation between the Soviet and German portions of the conquered state a partition was arranged which gives Germany all the objectives which were included in her original ostensible aim: Danzig, the Corridor, the German minorities in Poznan and the industrial areas and railway junctions of Silesia. The majority of the Polish oil fields fell to Russia who also cut off Germany from a common frontier with Rumania.

The Poles have not accepted defeat. Their navy is still at sea and their army will fight again. The sympathy which the world feels for a nation that has been the victim of such cruel treachery and which is now suffering the hardships imposed by a conquerer is equalled by admiration at the gallantry with which a hopeless defence was conducted and the determination which persists to restore the nation once again.

* * * *

A contributor has suggested a solution to what is one of the main problems of to-day: what is Russia going to do? Russia's foreign policy, he suggests, is a continuation of that pursued by the Empire under the Tsars: it is one of expansion and imperialism. Faced with the possibility of Poland ceasing to exist as a nation and coming under the domination of another power, it was thus natural for Russia to ensure that what once belonged to her should become hers again. It is certain that Russia is unlikely to be handicapped by any altruism or indeed by any kind of scruple. It is in keeping with this that she has taken advantage of the pre-occupation of the rest of Europe to take what no doubt constitute in her intention the first steps in the absorption of the Baltic States. It is clearly to Russia's interest, also, to prolong the war as far as possible without entering it herself, and we may expect her to do all she can to bolster up Germany's

resistance by supplying her with such commodities as she can succeed in transporting, even if Germany may not be able to make prompt cash payments.

There are perhaps two other aspects of the Russian problem for which clues may be sought from Tsarist days.

It is not new for the more popular type of military critic to make our flesh creep with descriptions of Russia's might. A number of writers have recently told us of the numbers and efficiency of the Red army and the excellence of its mechanised formations, while the Red air force is constantly extolled as second to none. Russia's air force is undoubtedly capable of doing considerable damage and, in areas where prepared lines of fortifications do not exist and where flanks can be turned, her mechanised formations are doubtless formidable. But modern forces need more efficient command, administration and maintenance than Russia has so far succeeded in producing. The Red army has not given evidence of any superlative qualities in its clashes with the Japanese. In spite of the faith in Russia's military powers which was often expressed in Tsarist days, Russia has never encountered a first class military power with success.

Secondly, it has been shown that a sustained attack on a suitable point on Russia's circumference can be sufficient to force her to sue for peace. Anyone faced with the problem of hostilities with Russia would now, as in the time before the revolution, be confronted by a country seemingly impossible to attack. Russia has industries on which she is dependent; but with the exception of those in the Ukraine which are themselves well protected by distance, most of the main industries required for war have been so sited as to be virtually inaccessible. The vast extent of territory, numbers, natural resources, climate, industry and discipline of Russia appear to render her invincible. And yet she has twice found the strain of attempting to defend a single and seemingly not vital area too much for her. It is possible that to-day when Russian industry and agriculture is kept working at high pressure the increased demands of a general mobilisation and the consequent reduction in the labour force would render the pressure too great.

In this respect the campaign against Finland is likely to affect Russia more seriously than her almost unopposed march

into Poland. Nevertheless, Russia has plenty of spare troops and aircraft and she appears so formidable that she may achieve some further gain by mere threats. The Russian press has begun to adopt towards Rumania a tone somewhat similar to that used before against Poland, Estonia and Finland: but it is doubtful if mere threats will achieve anything in the direction of south-eastern Europe which also provides a field of activity for surplus German forces and in which Italy has declared herself to be interested.

The problems of that area were not eased by the outbreak of war. Towards the end of August mobilisation appears to have been fairly general. The Italo-Greek agreement at the end of September quieted Greece's apprehensions about the Albanian frontier and later troops were withdrawn from both sides of the border between Hungary and Rumania. The approach of winter must have helped to lessen suspicion and it is to be hoped that it will be realised that the danger is a common one. Much depends on the continuance of the correct attitude hitherto displayed by the Bulgarians.

Italy would not remain indifferent to interference in south-eastern Europe. She may count on the war having relieved her to a certain extent of German rivalry there, and she would not welcome an extension of Russian influence. What action she would be prepared to take to resist it is uncertain. Russia may decide that she can count on this being done; but she is unlikely to take any hurried action which might lead to war in the Black Sea.

* * * *

The treaty of mutual assistance between Turkey, France and Britain was signed at Ankara on the 19th October. The treaty provides for all the aid and assistance in the power of France and the United Kingdom to be given to Turkey if a European Power attacks her, or if an act of aggression should lead to war in the Mediterranean area in which Turkey is involved. Similarly, Turkey will "collaborate effectively . . . and will lend them all the aid and assistance in its power" in the event of France or the United Kingdom being involved in hostilities in the Mediterranean area as the result of aggression by a European Power or in fulfilment of their guarantees made to

The Three-Power Treaty.

Greece and Rumania earlier in 1939. If France or Great Britain are attacked elsewhere by a European Power, the treaty provides for consultation and the observance by Turkey of at least benevolent neutrality. Consultation is also provided for in the event of aggression by a European Power which menaces the security of one of the contracting parties or is directed against any state which one of the contracting parties has with the approval of that state undertaken to assist. The Treaty is concluded for fifteen years and is renewed by tacit consent for a further five unless notice of termination is given six months before the end of those periods. A protocol provides that the obligations undertaken by Turkey cannot compel that country to take action involving armed conflict with the U.S.S.R.

The treaty has been generally welcomed in Turkey and in the near east and has had a reassuring effect in Egypt and Iraq. It was equally welcomed by the democracies as a further instance of Turkey's adherence to the old-fashioned code of behaviour among nations. The fact that its signature followed the breakdown of the Soviet-Turkish talks has tended to obscure appreciation of the existence of the protocol mentioned above. Turkey's understanding with Russia is an old one, and not to be easily upset particularly at a time when the western democracies are pretty fully engaged elsewhere. This is perfectly natural and need in no way detract from our satisfaction that a leading nation in the Moslem world and one wielding considerable influence in the near east should have thus linked herself with the democracies.

* * * *

The war has been true to form in opening in a manner very different from that predicted. London **Aircraft and Armour-
ed Fighting Vehicles** and the other principal cities and industrial areas were not bombed before or immediately after the declaration of war. The movement of the British expeditionary force took place without interference as did the concentration of the armies on the western front. Up to the present the western front appears at least as stable as it did in 1915 and the infantry and artillery are the main arms on the ground. The war at sea is taking a generally similar course and bombs have not so far rendered capital ships useless.

Military critics would be able to claim that the authorities have once again prepared for the wrong type of warfare by training for the extensive movement of mechanised forces rather than for siege warfare whose routine and tactics have now to be learnt and for which specialised equipment will, as in the last war, have to be designed and produced. The British army is not, of course, in a position to specialise in peace time. In peace time, it is the military critic who insists that the army is out of date and busies itself with preparing for the last war, instead of for the war to come—which by a process of wishful thinking is represented as one of movement in which opportunities for generalship will at last be provided. Until realisation began to come a few years ago, it was represented that the tank provided an answer to barbed wire and machine-guns, and that the reliance of modern armies on industry and the increased number of men now needed behind the line to maintain one man in it, would prevent armies reaching the sizes of 1914—18, thereby making outflanking or penetration a possibility. Somewhat similarly, the last great war was to open with mass movements of cavalry and the effects of field fortifications, barbed wire and small arms fire were conveniently ignored although they had been evident wherever in the Russo-Japanese or Balkan wars approaches were restricted and frontal attacks necessary.

The fact is that most wars open very much where the last one left off and armies which can afford to specialise might well base their training accordingly. During peace time the energy of inventors and scientists and the money required to encourage them and for experiments are directed to the demands of peace rather than to those of war. Revolutionary changes in warfare are unlikely to take place except during war itself. If weapons are developed in peace it is rarely that the full advantages to be derived from them in use can be deduced by theory. Given similar theatres and similar circumstances, therefore, very similar conditions are likely to appear.

The remarkable progress made by the Germans in Poland was equivalent to that achieved by General Allenby in Palestine in the similar circumstances of numerical superiority, complete command of the air, suitable weather and terrain and better equipment. It can be explained as much by the above factors, the wide fronts and the absence of continuous fortifications as

by the powers of aircraft or of armoured fighting vehicles which do not appear to have been successful against prepared defences. The major part played by aircraft might have been much less if there had been effective defence.

The Spanish, Abyssinian or Sino-Japanese campaigns cannot be drawn upon for arguments either for or against armoured fighting vehicles or aircraft because the attackers did not possess them in the quantity or quality of the great Powers of Europe and because the defenders have been even less well equipped with antedotes. But it does appear that against a properly organised and equipped defence the tank is not likely to revolutionise warfare. No one can pretend that the development of aircraft has not provided new problems; but for the present the effect of the air weapon seems to be less than was at one time supposed. The surprise of this war may well be some entirely different weapon.

* * * *

The opening stages of the war *have* been unusual, however, in the absence of the customary salutary reverse and in the fact that precautions have been taken before they were too late or even, apparently, absolutely essential. The evacuation scheme in Great Britain imposed a great deal of unavoidable inconvenience to large numbers of people not all of whom have borne it philosophically in the absence of air raids.

In India, precautions which have appeared irksome to some are the series of measures taken to ensure an adequate supply of officers for India's defence services even before those services have begun any considerable expansion or to suffer casualties. Among these measures was the prompt return to India of the majority of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers and of those on the Special Unemployed List, so that staffs and units in India and formations which had been sent overseas are now well up to strength. At the same time, restrictions were placed on the departure from the country of those who might be required as officers in due course. These, prevented from returning to England to join the fighting forces there and at the same time unable to find an opportunity in this country, deserve sympathy. They have behaved with exemplary patience.

Restrictions have now been eased and a small number of commissions granted. The first fifty officers are under training

at the Officers' Training School at Belgaum. The problem of providing officers for the armed forces of India which became so acute during the last war is thus fortunately simplified.

At the moment of the outbreak of war we were faced with the possibility of hostilities closing the Mediterranean route and of India being called upon to provide forces for service overseas to supplement those which had already been sent. Those forces might also have found themselves engaged in active operations and suffering casualties which would have had to have been replaced. Prompt action had, therefore, to be taken to avoid the difficulties of 1914 when some ten per cent. of the officer strength of the Indian Army were detained in England for employment under the War Office and when the Indian Army Reserve of Officers totalled not more than forty. To make good deficiencies and to meet expansion which increased the officer strength of the Indian Army fourfold in four years, officers were drawn from England and the Dominions and also from the Indian Civil Service, the Public Works Department, the Indian Police and those in business or professions in India. There are now fewer Europeans in India than in 1914, both in government service and outside it, and many of these are likely to be more useful in their present capacity than in the armed forces. India seems likely to become an important source of supply and it is necessary that eagerness to serve should not be allowed to dislocate manufacture or administration, however irksome restriction may be to the individual. The officer situation is not at present serious: but it may become so, and most of those who are eager to serve will no doubt get their opportunity in due course. In the meantime the register of the European community with the assistance of the European Association's National Service Advisory Committees should assure that essential men are not withdrawn from key posts and that square pegs find their way into suitable holes.

* * * *

Since the disbandment of the 1st and 11th Light Tank Companies of the Royal Tank Regiment in November, there are no longer any units of that distinguished corps left in India. A number of officers, non-commissioned officers and men remain, however, to assist in the training of other units now mechanising.

**The Royal Tank
Regiment**

Units of the Royal Tank Corps, as it then was, first came to India in 1922. There were three Light Tank Companies and five Armoured Car Companies. Withdrawal was decided on in conjunction with the mechanisation of cavalry regiments: the 8th and 10th Companies were disbanded in 1937, the 2nd and 9th in 1938, the 6th last March and the remaining three this autumn.

The record of these units in India is one of which their regiment may be proud. They have taken part in all the major operations on the frontier since their arrival in the country. Their value has not been obscured by the extravagant claims which were at first made by some as to the way in which armoured fighting vehicles would revolutionise frontier warfare. On the other hand, they have proved the error of those who doubted their ability to move over frontier country. The crossing of the Nahakki Pass in 1935 and the advance to the Sham Plain in 1937 are two examples of ability to cover difficult ground which have been repeated almost daily. The peculiar circumstances of the frontier have resulted in armoured fighting vehicles being employed in small detachments far from workshops or other maintenance facilities: they have been continuously employed wherever the situation was, or was likely to be, most critical: and a breakdown has generally been liable to have serious results. Most of us will have marvelled at the way in which their ancient armoured cars used to escort convoys day after day often over the most elementary tracks and at their performance across nullah-seamed country when accompanying columns.

The last units to leave have earned a rest which it seems unlikely that they will get: nor from what one knows of them would they ask for one. They have been relieved on the frontier by the 13th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers and the Scinde Horse, the first regiments of Indian cavalry to be mechanised. These two regiments have completed conversion from horsed to armoured units in well under the scheduled period, a result which could only have been achieved by hard work and keenness. They can be relied upon to maintain the high standard which has been set for them and to continue to prove to be pessimistic those who maintained that the supposedly simple Indian farmer would find the intricacies of the internal combustion engine more than he could cope with.

* * * *

OBITUARY

SIR JOHN MURRAY EWART, C.I.E., I.P.,

Director, Intelligence Bureau, Government of India

The death of Sir John Ewart deprived India of a distinguished police officer and the holder of a post of great importance at the beginning of a war. It was also a loss to the Institution. Sir John Ewart served on the Council and was Chairman of the Executive Committee for the last two years. He took a keen interest in the affairs of the Institution which prospered under his guidance. In the North-West Frontier Province where he spent most of his service, in the Punjab and in the Sudan he must have appreciated the value of united services. He had expert knowledge of the people of northern India. Members of the Institution will sympathise with Lady Ewart in her sad bereavement.

CLOSE SUPPORT BY AIRCRAFT ON THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER

By A. I. L. O.

Although much has been written in the Service Journals at Home on low flying attack and the close support of troops from the air, little has appeared in print on this subject in India.

In the many articles which have been published in this Journal, both on the recent operations in Waziristan and on future mountain warfare tactics, little or no reference has been made to the value of aircraft.

The Manual on Frontier Warfare, India, contains much interesting and important information on the use of aircraft for "close support," but, as is often the case with service manuals, this information is found in various parts of the book and many officers have neither the time nor the inclination to search for it.

In view of the proved value of close support, further details of this form of air co-operation as carried out in Waziristan since 1936 should be of interest. The object of this article, therefore, is to supplement the principles laid down in the Frontier Warfare Manual.

History of Close Support.—In India the term "close support" by aircraft has come to mean any offensive action taken in support of a regular or irregular force or post engaged with hostile tribesmen. The use of the air for this purpose was, for a while, the cause of some controversy and has been described by its opponents as "a misuse of aircraft" and "turning valuable reconnaissance aeroplanes into mobile machine-guns."

It is true that to use fast long-range bombers for close support in Waziristan, or even to employ Army Co-operation aircraft which might be engaged in important reconnaissance, would be a misuse. But close support on the North West Frontier is the duty of Army Co-operation Squadrons, in a country where tactical reconnaissance in the accepted sense is generally of little value. This being so, what better form could Army Co-operation take than that which increases enemy casualties and lessens the difficulties of our own troops?

Low flying attack against troops is by no means a recent innovation. Aeroplanes were used for "ground strafing" in France in 1918, but suffered severe losses from an enemy equipped with, and trained in the use of anti-aircraft weapons. In Waziristan, in 1919, at the battle for the Ahnai Tangi, two aircraft inflicted heavy casualties on the Mahsuds. In Iraq, also, air attack against tribesmen was most effective. More recently in the Spanish civil war, the close support of infantry and low flying attack against partly trained troops was on occasions decisive. The conclusion drawn, that this type of attack will be successful against an enemy ill prepared to meet it, points to its use on the North West Frontier.

Though the tribesmen are not equipped with anti-aircraft weapons, they are adept at taking cover, and are, except from low altitudes, extremely difficult to see from the air.

In 1936, certain far-seeing officers realised that the best way to overcome this difficulty would be for troops on the ground to point out the enemy to the pilot above. A simple ground strip intercommunication code was accordingly evolved and practised on manœuvres the same autumn. This code, now known as the "X V T Close Support Code," was used for the first time in the warfare which broke out in Waziristan in 1936 and has been continued there with increasing success ever since.

The Close Support Intercommunication Code.—By means of the close support code, troops can signal to the pilot of an aircraft their own positions and the presence or not of hostile tribesmen in the vicinity. This is done by displaying two ground strips in the shape of either an "X," a "V" or a "T." But it should be noted that the code here described is merely the one in use at the present time on the North West Frontier of India. The symbols and their meanings are not hard and fast, but can be changed by mutual arrangement between the army and the air force at any time if circumstances make it desirable.

"X" shows the position of the picquet or troops nearest the enemy and means "All is well!"

"V" signifies that enemy are in the direction in which the apex of the V is pointing.

"T" is an S.O.S. signal. A call for help when a picquet is likely to be overwhelmed or a sign that the enemy are following up a withdrawal so closely that it is impossible to get away. It should, therefore, only be used on rare occasions. It is put out with the top of the "T" pointing towards the enemy.

The great advantages of this code over previous methods, such as the Director Arrow and Popham Panel, are its speed and simplicity. When using the code the following are the main points to be borne in mind:

The ground strips must only be displayed by troops nearest to the enemy, or to the direction of the enemy, if no contact has been made.

Troops when they halt, or a picquet when it reaches its position must put out strips immediately. These must be placed where they can be seen at all angles from above: and on the reverse slope of the hill or in some place under cover from hostile fire, so that they can be changed as necessary.

A "V" is displayed if the advance is opposed and troops are held up or if a picquet comes under fire and the place and directions from which the fire is coming is known. On enemy opposition being overcome or when hostile fire ceases, the "V" is immediately changed back to an "X." The pilot can then leave that particular area and see how other picquets are faring. If, on the other hand, opposition increases and troops are in extreme danger, the "V" should be changed to a "T." As soon as the danger is over the "T" is changed back to a "V" or an "X," depending on whether or not the enemy have left the area.

In the withdrawal it is most important that ground strips remain out until the last troops leave. As soon as the "X" has gone, the pilot knows that all troops have withdrawn and any men seen on the position are hostile.

Ground strips are required at the scale of two per picquet or platoon. They should be made of a strong white material and be kept reasonably clean. The usual size is 9 feet by 18 inches. They can be carried either rolled up under the haversack flap or over the shoulder on a webbing sling. When put out they should be weighted down with stones and examined periodically.

Although the close support code is simple in the extreme human nature being what it is, mistakes will happen. The following occurred, both during operations and in training, when troops, who were not familiar with the code, first commenced to use it:

Ground strips have been left behind in camp.

They have been put out on the forward slopes of picquet positions and under the shadows of rocks and bushes. The wind has blown them over so that an X has looked like a "V"

and the pilot wasted his time searching for a non-existent enemy, whilst the picquet slept peacefully.

On one occasion two picquets forgot to pick up their ground strips when they withdrew. The next day a mystified pilot dropped a message asking if it was correct that "Vs" were pointing at "Xs." On getting a reply by Popham Panel that enemy were near the "Xs" he took action. What had actually happened was that tribesmen had occupied the features where the "Xs" had been left and were, probably, hoping to safeguard themselves thereby from air attack. This incident brings out well what should be done in the very likely possibility of tribesmen making their own ground strips in order to deceive the air. Once the pilot knows that they are enemy strips, his task of carrying out an attack is simplified.

One of the commonest mistakes is that of pointing a "V" at our own troops. This is due either to troops not knowing how to put out a "V" correctly, to troops not nearest the enemy using strips, or to a party carrying out a flanking movement getting in the line of a "V." See diagrams.

Another fault is the unnecessary use of the "T." One unit during its first day's fighting never used a "V;" it was always either an "X" or a "T."

Units which at first made some or all of the above mistakes soon settled down, however, to using their strips correctly.

Action by the Pilot of a Close Support Aircraft.—Before carrying out a close support "sortie," a pilot is given instruction by the Air Intelligence Liaison Officer, who informs him:

- (a) The time his "sortie" begins and ends.
- (b) Where the column is going, and where he may expect to find column headquarters, picquet positions and advanced and rear guards.
- (c) Information about the enemy and any special areas to watch.
- (d) Details with regard to "call signs" and intercommunication.

He also reminds him of the action he can take on a "V" or a "T." A pilot may not, on any pretext whatsoever, take action against a village, even though troops are being heavily fired at from towers and houses, unless the village is in a proscribed area and the inhabitants have been duly warned.

On arriving over his area, the pilot relieves the previous sortie and informs column headquarters that he has done so. He then circles over the column at a height of two to three

thousand feet, watching the country about two miles on each side of the route. As the picquets put out their "Xs" he notes their position on his map, and if all is well he reports at half-hour intervals to column headquarters. Hostile movement is reported as soon as possible. On seeing an "X" change to a "V," the pilot flies in the direction in which the "V" is pointing and searches any likely areas where tribesmen might be concealed. On discovering them he attacks with bombs and machine-gun fire. This is known as the V.B.L. (Vickers, Bomb, Lewis) attack and is carried out as follows:

The pilot dives from a height of about two down to one thousand feet, using his front gun and pulling off one, two or three bombs. The number depends on the nature of the target. As the aircraft pulls out of the dive, the air gunner fires his Lewis gun, to cover the get-away, or at any enemy who may have been flushed by the attack.

These attacks are continued as long as the "V" remains out and any enemy can be seen. The difference in the attack when a "T" is displayed is that the pilot comes down much lower, thus endangering himself and his aircraft. As the loss of an aircraft and its crew through enemy action will tend to encourage the tribesmen and possibly have other undesirable repercussions, the reason for only using the "T" when absolutely necessary can be well understood.

V.B.L. attacks are made, as far as possible, parallel to and not directly over a picquet position. At times, of course, mistakes are made, especially by young and inexperienced pilots. The greatest fault is that of overeagerness to take action. Instead of searching carefully for the enemy and making quite certain that no mistakes have been made on the ground, pilots have been known to attack immediately they see a "V" or a "T" and bombs have been dropped on our own troops.

The "T" of the Popham Panel, also, has been mistaken for the S.O.S. sign. Irregulars, who could not be distinguished from the enemy owing to lack of ground signs, have suffered likewise. For this reason close support should not be used when khassadars are working in front of troops or by Irregular forces unacquainted with the close support code. Errors in map reading, failures to see tribesmen even though a "V" may be correctly directed at them, and carelessness in close support procedure all occur when pilots first commence flying in mountainous country having just come out to India after completing

their army co-operation course under modern warfare conditions on Salisbury Plain.

Orders to the R.A.F.—The general plan and details of air co-operation are arranged at a preliminary conference at which the Squadron Commander, his A.I.L.O. and the R.A.F. liaison officer who is accompanying the column as well as the military commander and his staff are present.

When planning the air side of the operation the following various ways of employing close support are considered:

Aircraft can be used to break up or hinder the advance of hostile lashkars. They can assist in the protection of picquets covering the line of march, during their establishment, tenure of occupation and withdrawal. They can participate in battle as a supplementary support weapon and can press the pursuit of a retreating enemy.

Close support action is the corollary of tactical reconnaissance for, without careful search, it is unlikely that a pilot can carry out any of the above tasks. But it will rarely be possible for one aircraft to carry out the dual rôle of close support and tactical reconnaissance in any but a very small area, because, once having become involved in close support attacks, the tactical reconnaissance tasks ordered by the commander tend to be neglected. So, although close support aircraft will report any enemy seen, it is better to allot a separate "sortie" for any special reconnaissance tasks which a commander may require if they involve flying at any distance from the column.

Close support can be either continuous from time of start to time of reaching camp, or for a part of that time or else aircraft can be kept on the landing ground ready to fly out at very short notice.

Nowadays, the tribesmen realise the dangers of air attack, and, if aircraft are in evidence, move in small parties exposing themselves as little as possible. The employment of continuous close support, therefore, often prevents a concentration of any size and may lessen the chance of tribesmen making a determined stand. On the other hand, if no aeroplanes are visible, the tribesmen may move more boldly in the open and aircraft called up after opposition has been encountered or to deal with a party attacking a picquet often obtain surprise effect and good targets.

This latter method has the advantage of being economical in flying hours; but to achieve results the landing ground must

be close to the scene of operations and communications between the column and the R.A.F. must be good.

Owing to the difficulties of intercommunication, once a column has left its base camp, daily operational orders sent to the R.A.F. will of necessity be short. The points which should be included are:

The time and nature of the close support required, either "continuous" or "in readiness."

The objectives and the route the column is taking with a rough picquetting plan. Any information known about the enemy and any special areas to watch.

This message should reach the Air Force as early as possible in order that the flying programme can be arranged and orders issued to Flights. Owing to poor communications, orders for the first sortie to take off at 05-00 hrs. have been received as late as four o'clock the same morning. One can imagine the state of mind of a battalion commander if he was to get orders to be Advanced Guard one hour before a dawn start; and yet the R.A.F. have just as many arrangements to make before flying commences.

Intercommunication and Liaison.—As in most combined operation of war, the success of close support tactics depends largely upon reliable means of intercommunication and good liaison between the two Services. Without these, co-operation will suffer and misunderstandings and even bad feeling may arise. It is essential that a commander who issues orders to the Air Force is in communication both with the landing ground and the pilot in the air.

Communication between the column and the landing ground is the responsibility of the army. It is usually W/T and should be direct. Communication from air to ground is either by W/T or message dropping and is entirely an Air Force matter. Ground to air communication can be W/T or R/T, Popham Panel, ground strip codes and message picking up.

R/T and W/T are the responsibility of the R.A.F. and, when used, two Air Force operators with a pack wireless set are attached to the headquarters of the column, who arrange for their rations and accommodation. The other methods are worked by army personnel.

Experience has proved that for close support duties, the quickest and most reliable methods of intercommunication are message dropping and the Popham Panel and ground strip codes.

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Wireless has not been successful owing to atmospherics in the mountains and time wasted in winding aerials in and out before and after taking action. For tactical reconnaissance and when aircraft are escorting M.T. convoys W/T is, however, essential.

It is not often that a commander has to send orders to a close support aircraft, and messages of this nature are kept to a minimum and as short as possible as they take the pilot away from his main task of search and attack. If a commander wishes to send important information, a smoke candle is lighted to draw the attention of the pilot, who, on seeing it, leaves his task and flies over to read the message. The Popham Panel Code is most comprehensive and if studied carefully beforehand, almost every message that it might be necessary to send can be signalled without having to resort to many single-letter groups.


In addition to the "XVT" Code there are certain other ground strip signs used only by headquarters controlling sorties. These are the Formation call sign and the following code letters for frequently used messages:

K.T. = "The withdrawal is about to, or has commenced."

On reading this the pilot concentrates on the rear guard and the forward slopes of picquet positions about to be withdrawn.

C.I. = "You may go home, as no more aircraft are required."

This is often forgotten when a column reaches camp earlier than was expected.



= Sometimes called the "Closed H" or "the gate."

This means "You may take action against anyone within two miles of the forward troops or picquet positions." This sign is only allowed to be used in areas where the political authorities have previously warned the tribesmen that any area within two miles of troops who are engaged by hostiles will be considered an area of hostilities. Further, to enable any friendlies to evacuate the area, the sign may not be displayed by troops until after they have been in contact with the enemy for more than half an hour.

F. = "Your message found" or "Yes" in answer to a question dropped by the pilot.

N. = "Your message not found" or "No."

Liaison is maintained by army officers attached to Army Co-operation Squadrons, known as "A.I.L.Os.," and by R.A.F. liaison officers who accompany column headquarters. The duties.

of the former in connection with the instruction of pilots have already been mentioned. In addition, they act as operational Staff officers to the Air Force commander, deal with demands for air photographs and send out daily air intelligence summaries. The R.A.F. liaison officer is not included in any establishment, but one is invariably sent out with every column. He advises the commander and his staff on the issue of orders to the air and assists in the working of communications on the lines laid down in the preceding paragraphs. At the same time he gains valuable knowledge of mountain warfare tactics and keeps an eye on the work of his brother pilots, noting any points for improvements.

Conclusion.—A brief description of the air side of the Kharre operations is given as a fitting conclusion to this article.

In the words of the official report: "This operation was one of the most successful examples of co-operation between land and air forces on the North West Frontier."

It was carried out in July, 1938, by the Razmak Column, the 3rd Indian Infantry Brigade, several platoons of Tochi Scouts and No. 20 (A.C.) Squadron, Royal Air Force. The object was the destruction of the headquarters of the Faqir of Ipi in the Kharre cave area, North Waziristan. This threat to their leader caused a large number of his supporters to make a determined stand, with the result that they suffered heavy casualties from ground and air attack. Prior to the move of the columns from their permanent camps the following were ordered: air photographs of the tracks which the columns might use; air reconnaissances for water; and continuous close support for both columns during their move to the concentration area. No particular air plan was made at so early a date.

On 12th July, all the troops taking part had concentrated at Degan. The Squadron Commander and his staff proceeded there with a supply convoy and the air plan for the move to Kharre was formulated. It was arranged that both columns would be given continuous close support during their advance to the objective and withdrawal and that separate aircraft would deal with any tribesmen approaching the column after the "Closed H" had been displayed. In addition, a reserve would be kept on the landing ground at ten minutes' notice ready to relieve those who had exhausted their ammunition or for any emergency. The same afternoon the two Brigade Commanders were flown over their objectives from Miranshah, returning to camp

in armoured cars. On 14th July all went according to plan. Numerous "Vs" accurately displayed gave excellent targets to the air. In the withdrawal a "T" was put out when some fifty tribesmen tried to rush a small party and after the resulting V.B.L. attack several bodies were seen lying out until dark. In the evening, as soon as it was obvious that the force would have to bivouac for the night in their battle positions, the number of close support aircraft was increased to four. These watched the nullahs and approaches to the picquet positions until dark and prevented concentrations gathering to attack at nightfall.

The following day the tribesmen did not follow up the withdrawal closely, though aircraft were able to locate parties of long-range snipers by means of well directed "Vs."

The valuable assistance rendered, and the excellence of the results obtained by air attack were mainly due to careful planning, good co-operation and the fact that both troops and pilots had worked together and had gained considerable experience of the close support code throughout the summer. The units who took part have by now left Waziristan and the majority of the pilots have returned to England. Those who replace them can only maintain the same high standard by training on the lines which achieved success.

DIAGRAMS.




Fig. 1. V. Correctly displayed.




Fig. 2. V. Incorrectly displayed.




Fig. 3. Use of ground strips by troops not nearest to the enemy.

THE VOYAGE OF THE "BRITANNIC"

BY THE SHIP'S ADJUTANT

At the beginning of July, 1939, three of us were having a long cold drink as we admired the best view of Bombay harbour. One of us remarked, "Well, chaps, we're off and we ought to get home, but I wonder how much of our furlough we will spend there." Little did we think that in less than three months' time we should be delighted to get the first view of Bombay from the bow of a ship, and the ship a hired transport.

The weather in the early part of the Summer of 1939 at home was dreadful, but after the bank holiday a period of perfect English weather set in. Unfortunately, as the weather improved, the political situation deteriorated and everywhere the one and only topic of conversation was "Will there be war?" The majority, especially those old enough to have experienced the last war, were optimistic and right up to the day that Germany invaded Poland the man in the street hoped and thought that war would be avoided somehow.

The Government of India were evidently not optimistic and the last week-end of August must have been a very busy one for the Staff at the India Office. On August the 28th, all Indian Civil Service officers, Indian Police officers, Army officers and warrant officers and many civilians on leave from India woke up to find instructions ordering them to report in four days' time at various concentrating stations to return to India. In addition to those on leave, many on the reserve and on leave pending retirement, and even a few already retired were ordered to return; the major proportion of these were the officers of the Special Unemployed List of the Indian Army. Many were the "hard luck" yarns that were told as to the effect of the receipt of these orders with the necessity for selling businesses, packing up houses, selling motor cars, arranging for one's family et cetera, "but that is another story."

We collected at three concentrating stations; in some cases no choice was given, in others officers were allowed to report at the station most convenient for them. The arrangements for reception, accommodation and despatch at these stations varied considerably. At one station they were excellent and there was no unnecessary waiting; the credit for this goes to an officer of the Indian Army, who with some volunteer assistants improvised an office from which all instructions were issued quickly and

smoothly. At the other stations the arrangements were not up to this standard. At the station where the greater number reported accommodation was very limited and in spite of doubling up and a number of fellows sleeping on floors and sofas, late arrivals in cars had to go as far as fifteen miles outside the city to obtain a bed for the night. However, no one was terribly depressed and the odd wife helped to cheer the party up. One overheard conversation such as, "Hello, I didn't know that you were home." "Shurrup! I got to Town on Saturday and my kit hasn't arrived yet." "What bad luck! I—, oh come and have a drink."

To the port of embarkation we were sent off in two special trains, one starting at 10-30 p.m. and the other at 7-30 a.m. The whole country-side was blackened out and as soon as the first train left the station (after everyone had got in once only to be told to get out again to have the role called!) all lights were put out. No one knew our destination but after an all-night journey we arrived at a large estuary in which were anchored a number of large ships of various hues and colours; their bright peace time colours were all being painted grey by their crews.

We embarked on a tender, where they served excellent bacon and eggs, and were taken alongside our home for the next three-and-a-half weeks, the motor vessel "Britannic," a liner of 28,000 tons belonging to the Cunard and White Star Line. No rolls of passengers had been received and accommodation was, therefore, allotted by the ship's purser as we arrived. The ship had understood that they were to have four hundred officer passengers and a thousand troops, whereas in actual fact we eventually turned out to be over a thousand first-class passengers and four hundred troops. Tenders continued to arrive alongside at odd intervals for two days until the ship was more or less full according to the Board of Trade certificate. The total numbers finally embarked were:

Naval officers	...	40
Military officers	...	701
Naval ratings	...	319
Army warrant officers and non-commissioned officers	...	108
Draft of R.A.M.C.	...	44
Draft of Royal Corps of Signals	...	90
Civilian passengers	...	254
Total	...	1,556

General "Q" arrived on board the first evening and discovered that no O.C. Troops had been appointed, so being the senior officer on board he assumed that appointment. He then had to appoint a ship's staff. The author of this article was woken at 11-15 p.m. the first evening and given the glad tidings that he was to be ship's adjutant and was to get on with the job first thing the next morning; Major "S" was to be ship's quartermaster.

The next few days were hectic. The ship's crew had been reduced from 433 to 296, whereas the number of passengers was more than double that carried on the last trip across the Atlantic before the ship was taken over by the Admiralty. There was a mass of baggage on the promenade deck and many tons of stores and drinks to be loaded from lighters; the ship had been ordered to leave her home port before she was fully loaded for the voyage and the stores still unloaded had therefore been sent by special goods train over 400 miles to meet the ship at our port of embarkation. However, things were soon put to rights. Volunteers were called for from passengers and the baggage was sorted out; passengers removed their own cabin baggage and the remainder was put into the hold. The stores were stowed by parties of naval ratings and the two Army drafts.

Then there was the question of an office. We discovered a number of personnel of the Indian Army Corps of Clerks on board so the formation of an orderly room staff was easy. But when we wanted to start work it was another story, as there were no regulations, stationery, nominal rolls, pens, et cetera. The only documents we received were a District Court Martial warrant (fortunately never required) and the rolls made out in various waiting rooms at concentrating stations. We were fortunate to be able to borrow amended copies of King's Regulations and the Manual of Military Law from a conscientious candidate working for the Staff College. Later a representative of the Command Paymaster arrived and presented us with an imprest of £1,350, which the O. C. Troops promptly asked to be increased by £1,000, as many officers had had no time to make any financial arrangements and required advances. The last arrival was a sergeant who reported as ship's orderly room sergeant and brought two typewriters with him; as, however, he had no experience of office work on board a transport and was not one of the world's best sailors he did not prove a tremendous asset. Finally as the ship's office could not possibly supply all our needs of stationery, the O. C. Troops paid out £10

from the imprest and an officer was sent ashore to purchase that amount's worth of stationery, paper, et cetera, in the local shops.

When the last man arrived on board, we proceeded to work out how many were in the ship. The "waiting room" lists did not agree with the purser's lists, but this was not entirely due to the lists being inaccurate. The early arrivals on board were asked by the purser if they wished to share a cabin with any one ("Are you travelling alone, sir?") and several passengers gave the names of friends whom they had met *en route* but who had not come off in the same tender; unfortunately, in several cases the friends were sent to another ship. After numerous checks there was a discrepancy of twenty-six, so it was decided that every passenger should fill in a card with full particulars regarding his rank, service, occupation; it says much for the co-operation shewn by all on board that only two passengers failed to hand in their cards at the first request. From these cards we obtained firm figures and the preparation of nominal rolls was easy. These rolls in conjunction with the ship's printer became the ship's passenger list. These passenger lists were in great demand but, unfortunately, owing to a shortage of paper, only eight hundred could be printed; two thousand could have been sold with ease.

As soon as the Quartermaster and Adjutant became known we were continually accosted with remarks such as "I say, old boy, I know that you are frightfully busy but about my cabin... I'm Major Snooks and I'm in a four-berth cabin on 'C' deck and I know of a number of fellows junior to me who are on 'A' and 'B' decks." Similar requests were also being made by the civilian passengers. It was no one's fault but with the prospect of a voyage of at least three weeks in front of us something had to be done. The allotment of accommodation to military officers by ranks presented no difficulty; it was decided, therefore, to form a committee of civilians to grade all civilian passengers according to military ranks. Cabins were then re-allotted on the general basis of Lieutenant-Colonels and above and their equivalents to "A" deck, Majors and their equivalents to "B" deck, Captains and their equivalents to "C" deck and Subalterns and their equivalents to "D" deck. This readjustment provided some of the brains of the Army with one of the best problems ever set either in or out of the Staff College and necessitated over four hundred moves. The moves were carried out the third day at sea and passengers had to hump their own baggage. On

the whole this general post gave satisfaction although there were naturally a few who considered themselves unfairly treated.

Other appointments had also to be made to the ship's staff and most of them fell to previous acquaintances of the Adjutant and Quartermaster. Special mention must be made of two not still young officers of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps who took over the baggage. With the aid of volunteers they sorted all the baggage in the hold—no mean task under the circumstances—and thereby saved endless confusion and delay at our port of disembarkation.

The degree of discipline to be enforced presented a pretty problem. There appeared two alternatives—a Prussian system enforcing all orders as for private soldiers or a more gentlemanly method of treating all first-class passengers as ordinary passengers on a liner. In view of the fact that many people's nerves were rather on edge, that the majority fully appreciated the necessity for obeying implicitly all instructions issued for the safety of the ship, and that although it was unlikely in the circumstances there might be difficulty in enforcing military discipline with so many civilians on board, the O. C. Troops decided on the second alternative. At first many passengers did not agree with this policy and wished very much stricter discipline enforced, but later the majority came round to the view of the O. C. Troops. The proof of the pudding is in the eating and during the whole voyage only one officer was put under arrest and he was ultimately disposed of as a medical case. A number of officers, however, were interviewed by the O. C. Troops for various minor misdemeanours; his remarks on these occasions clearly conveyed his ideas as to future behaviour and on his instructions these ideas were passed on to their friends by the offenders. This peaceful penetration had a tremendous influence for the good discipline of the ship and yet was entirely unknown to the majority. Certain civilian passengers had interviews with the Captain for various reasons! The discipline of the warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men was of the highest standard.

At the start of the voyage the wearing of uniform tunics at breakfast and lunch was insisted on for disciplinary reasons. On leaving the Atlantic, as the majority were in possession of serge uniform only, the hot weather necessitated the relaxation of this order. On all other occasions mufti was worn.

Duties were kept to the minimum. Extra look-outs for submarines were provided by naval ratings; this not only saved

passengers from carrying out duties for which they were not trained but also gave a pleasant feeling of security. One officer was detailed with each ship's watch for duty on the bridge to maintain liaison between the Captain and the O.C. Troops in the event of emergency. Senior officers were detailed from dusk till 11-30 p.m. for each deck to ensure that no lights were visible and that there was no smoking on deck; naval officers and civilians voluntarily took their share of these duties. For emergency boat stations one senior officer was appointed to command each side of the promenade deck, from where the boats would be loaded; they in turn detailed other officers to supervise the embarkation into the boats in co-operation with the naval officers detailed to each boat. Two officers were made responsible for the decks being cleared of chairs at sunset; the actual shifting of the chairs was done by passengers who happened to be on deck at the time. This was the limit of the duties demanded of first-class passengers.

It soon became apparent, however, that the stewards were unable to deal with the requirements of so many passengers. Assistance was, therefore, given in a number of ways. The number of courses and alternatives at meals was reduced. No drinks other than water were served in the dining saloons. Volunteer waiters were enrolled to pass drinks in the lounges and bars. The entire sale of tobacco and cigarettes was taken over by passengers. Afternoon tea was served by volunteer waiters. Later in the voyage the demands on the troops for helping the stewards generally became so heavy that volunteer working parties brought up the full barrels and bottles from the hold to the bars and removed the empties; this was also done by the warrant officers for their sustenance. As the number of books in the ship's library was inadequate five senior officials formed a library pool from books loaned by passengers; a small fee was charged for each book and by this means a sum of £23 was handed over to the Red Cross. Yeoman service was also given voluntarily in the painting of the ship and the making of a protective screen of sand-bags on the bridge; the former task kept a number of passengers amused for several days, although it may not have been beneficial to their clothes.

Before the ship was taken over by the Admiralty the short-wave wireless sets in the passenger accommodation were removed, only the broadcasting apparatus being left. Before we sailed a very public-spirited officer went ashore and purchased two wireless receiving sets; they were fitted to the broadcasting

apparatus and proved absolutely invaluable. Apart from a few days in the Indian Ocean we had the latest B.B.C. news at regular intervals throughout the day. The sets were bought from this officer by a shilling subscription from all first-class passengers and were handed over to the Captain for use in the ship so long as she is employed as a transport or a hospital ship.

The promulgation of orders to such a large number of passengers presented difficulties. These difficulties were solved to a large extent, however, after the first few days by a ship's daily broadcast at 11-30 a.m. when all notices and instructions apart from daily duties were announced. By this arrangement not only were some really amazing rumours nipped in the bud, but passengers were more likely to know of, and comply with, the various requests and announcements than if they had been posted on a board.

The queue complex developed rapidly in the majority of passengers. It was germinated at the concentrating stations and grew steadily throughout the voyage. It even became so highly developed that if anywhere on the ship one passenger stood behind another those in the immediate vicinity would stand up and form a queue and then someone would say, "What's this queue for?" By the end of the voyage we were all so well queue disciplined that any jumping of places was unknown.

Gradually the convoy collected until there were ten ships, all over 20,000 tons; a number of destroyers were also anchored in the estuary. Our original time of sailing was postponed on account of fog, but we eventually sailed one evening at 5 p.m. It was an unforgettable sight to see all these large ships in single line ahead with the destroyer escort on the flanks and in front steaming into the setting sun.

The realities of war had been brought home by the sinking of the *Athenia* and emergency boat stations were held daily for the first week and later at longer intervals. At night darkened ship was the order and we found that all scuttles and windows had been painted with A.R.P. paint, double curtains had been fitted over all doors leading on to decks and smoking was forbidden on deck. The ship was fitted with an excellent bulkhead door system but to increase the chances of the ship remaining afloat in the event of her being torpedoed, the Captain ordered that all scuttles on C and D decks were to remain closed. Scuttles on A and B decks were allowed to be open provided that no light was visible; this was made the responsibility of the

passengers concerned and carelessness in this respect resulted in more than one rude message from the 'Gay Duchess' in which the Commodore of the convoy was posted.

The great excitement of the voyage was when two escorting destroyers suddenly turned about and dropped a number of depth charges one morning about 11-30. By late that night a number of passengers had definitely seen one if not two periscopes, but we had to rest content with the official message that "It is possible that a submarine was sunk." A certain amount of excitement was caused by an amateur semaphore expert, who intercepted the message being sent by the destroyer to the Commodore but did not start reading the letters until after the word 'that' had been signalled.

The weather was kind to us and we had a very smooth passage. Eventually we steamed past Gibraltar one morning into the Mediterranean, where under normal conditions the trip would have been ideal. With all the scuttles on C and D decks permanently closed, however (the two dining saloons were on C deck), the atmosphere was beginning to get unpleasant. It was therefore decided that smoking should be forbidden in the dining saloons and in cabins on C and D decks; this was certainly an improvement although to a minority it was an unpopular order. To make things more difficult the ship was fitted for service on the North Atlantic and not for the heat of the Orient; fans were fitted in the cabins on A and B decks but there were very few in the cabins on C and D decks, and for some technical reason they could not be transferred from the upper to the lower decks; there were no fans in any of the public rooms apart from a few small corner fans in the dining saloons; the blower system was for ventilating purposes and did not function like the blower system on ships normally serving the East. The atmosphere can better be imagined than described.

The evenings presented the main difficulty. An officer suggested that to reduce the 'fug' a kind of inverted coffin should be fitted in one of the windows of the card room, which was situated forward on the promenade deck; the object of this was to suck a strong draft of fresh air into this room to help to dispel the foul air. Unfortunately it worked the other way and the bad air went out of the coffin instead of the fresh air coming in; however every little helped! Another suggestion produced excellent results; the fitting of a screen aft of the smoke room provided a through draft and thereby helped to clear the atmosphere inside the public rooms. We tried putting

out all lights in the lounge and having the windows open; passengers were allowed to smoke provided that struck matches were screened from the open windows. Unfortunately whenever the Captain took his evening stroll certain passengers seemed to forget this precaution and the Captain on these occasions was decidedly peeved. However, as a result of shrieks from other passengers, whenever anyone offended in this way our habits improved. Later the card room was blackened out and all the windows looking on to the forward deck opened; this was beneficial as long as we had a head wind.

Another problem presented itself as we approached the Eastern end of the Mediterranean, namely, the provision of topees. The use of the ship's wireless was forbidden, so we could not discover whether we were going to be allowed to land at Port Said. There were many passengers without topees, so orders for Bombay bowlers were registered before we arrived. Some money was advanced from the imprest and as soon as we anchored permission was given for the topee party of four officers to land. This party purchased over four hundred and fifty topees and on their return set up branches of Mr. Woodrow and Mr. Scott on the promenade deck where the topees were sold to those requiring them. Surplus and misfits found willing purchasers among the crew.

During our stay at Port Said and the trip through the canal all scuttles were opened and the ship was thoroughly aired; it was also a pleasant change to have the lights on for one night. The trip through the Red Sea had been dreaded by the majority of passengers and although the greatest optimist could scarcely describe it as a pleasure cruise it might have been very much worse; fortunately there was ample space for sleeping on deck. The doctors fitted up a heat stroke station and this proved a god-send to several members of the crew; the whole crew was European and the temperature in the galleys and washing-up places was terrific. Altogether twenty-two cases of heat exhaustion were treated, of which eighteen were crew personnel; fortunately only one case proved fatal. A short stop at Aden relieved the monotony and when we turned the corner into the Indian Ocean the weather became pleasantly cool.

Mails provided one of the main topics of conversation, both as regards their possible receipt and their despatch. Apart from a lucky few who found letters waiting for them at Bombay, no one got any letters. We got no orders regarding censorship till we arrived at Port Said and so all letters posted before our

arrival there were posted uncensored by the ship. For the mail to be posted at Suez, senior officers, civil and military, were appointed censors. A few letters were returned as unpassed for giving too much information and two for criticising the administration; it might have been good for the ship's staff to have read these two latter, but they didn't! All mail at Bombay was posted ashore and was therefore uncensored by the ship.

To make up for the absence of the fair sex on board we had various diversions to help to pass the time. A sports committee very wisely decided not to have organised games, the bane of many an otherwise pleasant voyage; the usual deck games were available and could be booked for reasonable times. Bridge provided amusement for many at all times of the day and some of the poker parties in the stifling atmosphere of the smoking room would have done credit to the wildest west picture. A number of talks on interesting every-day subjects were given through the loudspeakers and an excellent concert was staged by some enthusiasts by moonlight on the boat deck in the Red Sea. The outstanding turn in the concert was a monologue entitled 'A Naval Occasion' à la Sam and Albert; this was composed and recited by a naval doctor and described the submarine incident. It has since been printed and has enjoyed a wide private circulation.

And so one fine morning after twenty-two days sailing we approached Bombay and, without casting any aspersions at a very noble shipping company, few passengers were sorry to see the first of Bombay from the bow of a ship. The arrangements for dispersal at Bombay were well nigh perfect. Posting orders for all civilian and military passengers were issued within two hours. All civilian passengers left Bombay the same day as trains for the following days had been earmarked for military passengers. Those military passengers leaving Bombay the next day slept on board, the remainder being accommodated in hotels at very moderate rates. Customs inspections and import duties were limited to fire arms and the arrangements for clearing baggage and loading it on to the trains provided no worries for the individual passenger. We all owe a deep debt of gratitude to the Railway and Embarkation authorities for their excellent organization. The terrors of prohibition were even avoided by the establishment of officers' messes in the Taj Mahal and Majestic hotels; these two hotels must have made as much profit in two nights as they normally make in two months since the introduction of prohibition.

It was a memorable voyage and it is certain that for years to come many a yarn in a smoking room of a ship plying to India will start with—"Well I went out to India in the Britannic on the outbreak of (whatever they decide to call it) war and" For the ship's staff it was an unique experience, which was made comparatively easy by the amazing co-operation of everyone. The ship's officers could not have done more and they invariably agreed to every suggestion made for the comfort of the passengers so long as the safety of the ship was not affected. In spite of all the queer orders, demands and requests one had to make from time to time, never once did one receive a rude retort from a passenger either civilian or military. The grouchers were few and let us presume that they did not realise that there was a war on! If any one of us experiences no worse discomfort by the end of this war than he had to put up with in the Britannic, he will be either in a very soft billet or amazingly fortunate. How many times before peace is signed will the remark be made—"Oh for a glass of the Britannic's iced lager."

HOW DOES A JOURNALIST GET HIS NEWS?

*A Lecture given before the United Service Institution of India,
at Simla, on July 6, 1939.*

BY JOSSLEYN HENNESSY

Sir John Ewart, C.I.E., in the chair.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—I have paid you the compliment of preparing a serious lecture for you. A few days ago, however, I met a distinguished personage who said he hoped my lecture was not too dry. "You won't have a very intelligent audience; be funny," he said and added as a gloomy afterthought, "If you can." But a brief glance at you convinces me that my informant libelled you all. Intellect and a lively perspicacity shine on every brow and I feel that I need not apologise for a serious lecture to so serious an audience.

I ought to say that all the solid parts of this lecture are directly lifted from that most excellent document, "The Report on the British Press," published in 1938 by the Political and Economic Planning Group. No more authoritative or detailed account of all the business and editorial ramifications of the press has ever been published and I warmly commend it to anyone anxious to understand the problems and social significance of the press.

Finally, I ought to emphasise that, although I am an official of the Government of India, nothing that I shall say to-day has the authority of, or reflects the views of my employers. I speak purely in my private capacity.

* * * *

How does a journalist get the news for you? Let us first ask ourselves what news is; the simplest definition is "Some fresh event about which a large number of people want to read."

In principle, news should be true; but in fact anybody who has ever tried to tell the whole truth about any subject has found it impossible; this may seem a surprising statement; but you will probably agree that if six members of this audience were asked to write an account not exceeding 750 words (the length of a popular newspaper column) of what I said, you would get six quite different accounts. My lecture covers about 7,000 words; to summarise it in 750, you would have to decide what you thought were its essential ideas and only those who have written a news story and then compared their effort with those of half a dozen other people can really appreciate how entirely different six honest accounts of the same thing can be.

Only too frequently, especially with the activities of governments, it is impossible to ascertain the whole truth or to express it with completeness and accuracy until it has ceased to be news; that is to say, by the time that public interest has forgotten all about it and is absorbed in other matters.

The press is, therefore, constantly working against time to produce the best practicable synthesis of news and truth.

Although anything that happens is potential news, if nobody connected with a newspaper hears of it, it is still-born. Even if it reaches a newspaper, it may be impossible or inadvisable to print it, or it may be crowded out by more important news. Again, why is it that so many would-be tellers of stories become known as Club bores? Because they do not realise that both technique and art are required to tell a story, however simple; likewise news may be so badly written up that the sub-editor spikes it impatiently.

Although some news is read by nearly everybody, what is news for one paper is not necessarily news for another. Papers which cater for restricted localities, trades or professional groups, naturally attach more importance to news concerning those localities, trades and groups than do the national dailies, and even these place different values on the same item of news. The journalist's problem is to present his news in such a way that it will interest readers. Some readers are better educated than others; news about the splitting of the atom, for example, presented in a form suitable for a reader of *The Times* would probably be unintelligible to the average reader of the *Daily Express* or *Daily Mirror*.

A London newspaper receives every day about 1,500,000 words of news in its office; this is about twenty times more than the space available in a twenty-four-page popular paper, which is 70,000 words. *The Times* finds room for about one-tenth, i.e., 150,000 words.*

The consequent intensive condensation leads to a selective discrimination that sometimes results in the same event giving rise to different stories in different newspapers and even in different editions of the same newspaper. In criticising journalists for inaccuracies, it should be remembered that the sub-editing of a newspaper is carried out under the greatest pressure against time, frequently in a room reverberating with the

* Since the outbreak of war newspapers have been about halved in size owing to the increased cost of newsprint.

roar of neighbouring printing presses, buzzing with typewriters, punctuated by shouts for messenger boys and by the ringing of a score of telephones; the tension is usually so great that the wonder is rather so few mistakes are made.

The popular English newspaper caters for a public the majority of which finishes its education at the age of fourteen. At that age interest in abstract ideas or in intellectual matters which every graduate of a good university takes for granted as elementary, does not exist. The uneducated man is interested in *people* and the only way to get him to understand an abstract idea is to explain it to him in terms of a person; hence the greater stability of a monarchy, with its humanly interesting Royal Family, than of a republic; hence the power of Congress through the human appeal to the masses of Mr. Gandhi's striking personality; hence the human interest treatment of news.

News may be spontaneous or worked up, predictable or unpredictable, general or specialised.

Spontaneous news comprises a mass of events, from the assassination of a Dictator to a contest between singing mice, whereas worked up news consists of matter that is dug out on the initiative of a newspaper, such as an interview with Bernard Shaw, or a survey of the economic situation in Scandinavia.

Predictable news consists of such events as coronations, cattle shows, and the return of cricket teams from Australia. These will be noted in the News Editor's diary and planned for in advance.

Unpredictable news, such as crimes and railway calamities, call for adjustment in the News Editor's plans when they reach him unexpectedly over the tape or telephone.

Specialised as opposed to general news is that dealt with by the City Editor, Sports Editor, Fashion Editress, etc.

A newspaper, then has to give a highly condensed account of news and to relate it to the outlook and experience of its readers. Some events, such as great catastrophes, are news to everyone almost regardless of presentation; others may appear to a given editor not to be news for his readers unless they are treated from a special angle. *The Times* will summarise the possibilities of a social revolution in France in abstract terms and with plentiful references to political theory and constitutional history; the *Daily Express* will discuss the same problem by explaining who Colonel de la Rocque is, what colour of ties he wears and what chances of success *he* has; references to the

theories of such unknown people as Spinoza or Jeremy Bentham would be cut out.

A great deal of news comes from regular sources: it is important for the Editor to arrange that his reporters shall be in regular touch with the police, hospitals, fire brigades, the secretaries of political parties, trade unions, and other institutions.

Much news is found buried in the publications of Government and scientific institutions. Parliaments, local authorities, law courts, conferences of various societies, Government Publicity Officers, the B.B.C., the London Passenger Transport Board, private companies, all these are regular sources of news, either given unofficially and verbally or in a communiqué.

Such news is far from invariably used, partly because it may not be of sufficient news value, partly because it may contain "puffs" and most often because the sender chooses such an unsuitable time or form for communicating it that its news value is lost before it can be used. Valuable news is frequently offered to journalists by the disgruntled parties to a conference.

The "Date Line" on a news item usually shows the channel by which it has reached the paper, that is to say, "From Our Correspondent" means that it comes from a local resident correspondent who is shared by several newspapers, English or Foreign. "From Our Own Correspondent" means that it comes from a salaried staff man appointed as the paper's permanent representative in the town or country. "From Our Special Correspondent" means that a correspondent has been sent specially to some centre to cover a particular event. "From a Correspondent" means that it comes from a "free lance." It should be noted that these terms are, however, far from strictly used in the Indian press.

A large proportion of predictable and spontaneous news comes from the news agencies. It is impossible as well as uneconomic for a newspaper to send its own correspondents to cover masses of ordinary news such as meetings of Parliaments, local authorities, hospitals, etc.

The covering of routine news is left to the news agencies. Their news is subscribed for by all newspapers and is, therefore, common to all; a newspaper summarises agency items and reshapes and headlines them, according to its policy and to its estimate of their news value. Where a News Editor considers that an agency message contains the raw material of a special

story for him, he will send out one of his own correspondents to work this up. For example, where a news agency may have reported briefly an accident which may have happened to the Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, the *News Chronicle*, being a Liberal paper, would probably consider it of greater interest to its readers and send its own correspondent to get a column story with photographs.

A news agency is for the national dailies a form of insurance that enables them to concentrate their star reporters on what they consider important to them. The smaller the paper, the greater proportion of its news emanates from news agencies.

Government officials and scientists frequently complain that information which they give the press is hopelessly distorted. I do not say that these complaints are necessarily unfair, but I think that the majority of them arise from lack of understanding of the facts of the newspaper industry. An educated person realises that the chemical industry, for example, has its specialized problems of science, manufacturing, distribution, sales and relations between employers and employed; the way in which these problems are being solved is doubtless open to criticism, but few people I imagine would venture to write a letter to the *Times* criticising aspects of the chemical industry, unless they had previously taken trouble to acquaint themselves with the facts. But when the newspaper industry is concerned, it appears that any fool can criticise without firsthand knowledge.

In handling serious news, it must be remembered that the British journalist is not writing for a scientific audience but for the reader whose education was completed at the age of fourteen.

The daily circulation of the six popular London national dailies is over 12,000,000 while the circulation of the serious *Times* and *Daily Telegraph* combined is less than 1,000,000; these figures do not include the millions who read the scores of provincial papers, of which only one or two can be termed serious. The average newspaper reporter in London has himself missed the advantages of a university education; consequently he is usually unable to grasp scientific facts and regards scientific exposition as academic and incomprehensible; this much may legitimately be charged against the newspapers; but the widespread success of popular handbooks on every kind of serious subject—a glance through the list of books on weighty topics

published by the Penguin Library will show what I mean—proves that if trouble is taken, serious subjects can be popularly explained. And here it is usually that the Government official and the scientist must share the blame for newspaper inaccuracy.

When a Government wants publicity, the press is, usually, quite willing to give it, provided there is news interest in the story; but too many departments are highly suspicious of journalists. In other words, Governments regard publicity as their own prerogative, and when a newspaper seeks to throw a search-light on any department's activities, the characteristic reaction is too often that the newspaper cannot be up to any good, comments the P. E. P. "Report on the Press." Thus a vicious circle is set up. Newspapers do not find it worth their while to send their best men along to Whitehall because experience has shown that Publicity Officers can seldom persuade the departments which they represent to disgorge good copy, and civil servants disclose as little as possible because they distrust the irresponsible or unqualified reporters who come for information.

In recent years, politicians have been forced to recognise that in a democratic country it is essential to keep the public informed about the plans and activities of Government. *Unless Government can inform the public of its policies and achievements, the Opposition will be happy to explain that they do not exist.* Hence has sprung up that unpopular hybrid, who gets the worst of both the official and the newspaper worlds—the Government Publicity Officer.

The Government Publicity Officer has got to understand both the services' and the newspaper points of view. But he can rarely hope to persuade newspaper men that he is anything but an obstructive official, and civil servants, that he is anything but a nosey parker.

To the press he has to explain only too frequently that the reply to a particular question is (1) that the department has not got the information; (2) that the disorganisation of ordinary work involved in getting it would be out of proportion to its value, (3) that although it exists, it must remain confidential for reasons of State or cannot be disclosed pending its announcement in Parliament.

To the civil servant, the Government Press Officer must explain that if none of the foregoing legitimate reasons for

refusing to answer the question exist, it is in the interests of the department itself to help the journalist because:

- (1) Sooner or later the department will itself need to secure publicity for one of its activities, and if journalists have met with rebuff after rebuff in the previous months, they are not likely to co-operate when their help is sought.
- (2) If no official information is forthcoming, a journalist is forced to rely solely on rumour or on sources hostile to Government and what he writes may therefore be seriously damaging to Government and may indeed necessitate an official denial which, in most cases, only confirms the average newspaper reader in his belief that what is denied must be true.

When I was a foreign correspondent in Paris, Robert Dell, the famous *Manchester Guardian* correspondent, coined a phrase which became a proverb amongst Paris newspapermen.

In his squeaky, slightly effeminate voice, he used to say: "It *must* be true because the Quay d'Orsay denies it!"

Another unpopular duty of the Government Press Officer is the hopeless task of endeavouring to persuade officials that in most cases you cannot suppress news; sooner or later one of the persons affected by a decision of Government or by an occurrence which it is sought to suppress will gossip or even go out of his way, if disgruntled, to inform newspapers.

Yet another unpopular duty of the Government Press Officer is to persuade the head of a department that there has been no leakage when he sees a column in the *Statesman* revealing matters which he regards as confidential. It must be remembered that a professional newspaperman spends his whole time following the course of events in a manner for which persons who have their daily bread to earn in other professions simply have not the physical time.

When I was a foreign correspondent in Paris, I read and card-indexed as a matter of routine, every speech made by all members of the Cabinet, by the leaders of the Opposition, by the chairmen of Parliamentary Committees, all the official White Papers, leading articles by newspapers known to represent particular interests, important speeches from all parties, and I spent hours chatting with politicians in the lobbies of the Chamber. It would have been impossible for any stock broker, Government official or Company Manager to have found

time to do this. The result was that, in general, I was able to form a fairly sound idea of the likely course of Cabinet policy on any important subject, or to reduce the possible alternatives before the Cabinet, as well as the reactions of the Opposition, to a manageable minimum.

Consequently if the Foreign Minister announced that he was discussing *A* with his British opposite number, it was frequently possible to know with almost mathematical certainty that *B* and *C* must have already been decided in a limited number of ways. If there were any doubt, there were a score of ways of checking up without specifically asking for information on *B* and *C*. As soon as *A* had been announced in a communiqué, I could go to a leading politician whom I met in the lobby and, without mentioning *B* and *C* discuss at length the implications of *A*. It was rarely that I was not satisfied as to the general lines of *B* and *C*. On this basis I was frequently enabled to publish decisions which had not yet been disclosed or to forecast trends of policy, and I dare say that harrassed Government officials put the Intelligence Service on to find out where the "leakage" was!

You all of you have recently read accounts of the disaster to the submarine "Thetis." It might interest you to know that the bulk of the news which you read appears to have been obtained from unofficial sources. There is complaint to-day at what is described by Fleet Street as the negative attitude of both the Admiralty and the submarine's builders. If it was thought that by saying nothing, the press would only be able to publish exactly what it suited the authorities to let the public know at the end of the efforts to save the trapped crew, a miscalculation was made. This attitude merely puts the press on its mettle to get the public the news that it wants; if attempts at secrecy were made, how laughable they were can be seen from the following account given by the *World's Press News*—a weekly professional paper—of how easily Fleet Street got you the detailed news:

"At the *Daily Mail* office, directly the news broke, it was decided that the story would have to be gathered from at least six centres—Liverpool Bay, Birkenhead, the Admiralty, Gosport, Devonport and Liverpool.

On duty at the time was Richard Jones, Night News Editor. He communicated with the Night News Editor of the Manchester edition, and found what reporters were available on

the spot. After a hurried telephone conference, it was decided to rush W. F. Hartin to Liverpool to be ready at dawn to get to the scene of the wreck as soon as the spot was established.

Meanwhile, Jones sent H. K. Ferguson, Brighton correspondent, to Gosport to assist the local man. Reporter M. Wiltshire was sent to rush any news from the Admiralty.

Eldred Reeve, Manchester News Editor, was back at the office sending Manchester reporters Kenneth Bolton and John Starr to help Alexander Kenworthy, Liverpool staff reporter, already at Birkenhead.

Stanley Hickes, Leeds staff reporter, was brought to Manchester to lend a hand.

Thus, when the *Thetis* was located at 8 o'clock on Friday morning, the news team was properly positioned. Hartin, with photographer, J. Tuson, was flown to Conway to board a fishing boat, already chartered by Reeve; Hicks was in the air with photographer Tuson and Kenworthy; Bolton and Starr were at the Cammell Laird yard to record the scene as the relatives of the men heard the news.

Hartin was the first and only man to board the ship to get the news brought up by the survivors. So, too, was Hartin a lone and close spectator of the salvage men's valiant efforts on the jutting tail, to save the ship and those on board. Meanwhile, Hickes and photographer A. Thompson were flying overhead, recording the scene in pictures.

Sean Fielding was rushed by air to Llandudno. He was there when the lifeboat returned, from the men of which he secured one of the outstanding stories of the disaster.

Bolton was flown from Birkenhead to Llandudno and in a fast motor-boat relieved Hartin while the latter telephoned his story. Then, back to the scene went Hartin with a basket of pigeons for early morning flashes.

Similar co-operation is the keynote of the *Daily Sketch's* coverage of the story.

The Birkenhead end was covered by E. G. D. Lewis, *Daily Dispatch* reporter, J. Jerome of the Liverpool office, and F. Skinner, Liverpool office cameraman.

After a dash by road to Birkenhead they found every tug commandeered by the Admiralty and Cammell Laird; eventually they discovered an old paddle tug boat in Birkenhead docks and chartered it.

Even then there were anxious hours to wait for the tide before the three could get into the Mersey.

With only an elementary map and little information as to the position of the submarine they set out, and as daylight broke they saw what they thought was a small boat off the Great Orme.

As they approached they were hailed by destroyers, who told them it was the stern of the sunken submarine, and asked them to keep a watch-out for any men who might arrive at the surface in the Davis safety apparatus.

By several hours, Allied claim, their boat was the first on the scene and actually saw the four men come to the surface.

Lewis and his colleagues were on constant duty for thirty hours.

The shore side of the story was covered at Birkenhead by W. F. C. Campbell, in charge of the Liverpool office, who did great work for hours on end with the assistance of T. Walters.

At midnight on Thursday, Jimmy Rowe, of the *Daily Dispatch* and other Allied papers, Victor Lewis, of the *Daily Sketch*, and Bob Bremner, Allied photographer, dashed by car to Llandudno. There a fishing trawler was chartered and used as a base ship.

From early Friday morning till early Monday morning, Lewis, Rowe and Bremner worked in relays going out to the base ship in small motor boats carrying food and camera supplies, doing the best they could to change their clothes which were saturated every journey out in the small motor boats.

Rowe and Bremner worked unceasingly and did not get any sleep until late on Saturday night.

Every journey out to the trawler took two-and-a-half to three hours and, in order to get copy and plates back, the boats had to be kept running incessantly.

The Allied "fleet" was supplemented on Friday by Gannon, Southport; Evan Williams, Cowlyn Bay; Horace Tonge, Allied photographers; and Armstrong, Liverpool office cameraman, all of whom were used in the relays to and from the boats to keep watch over every move made.

Pictures were sent to Manchester for Northern editions and for wiring to London by portable telephoto."

The lesson to be drawn from all this is that wherever it is possible, the Government Press Officer should be put by the departments in a position to give guidance to a newspaper correspondent who has got to fill a column for his editor. The newspaperman in nine cases out of ten is going to publish something on the subject in any case. How much more useful is

it therefore from Government's viewpoint for the official spokesman to be allowed to discuss the matter with the correspondent, limiting his remarks, if need be, merely to points already known, in order to prevent the correspondent from publishing inaccuracies or from making forecasts which are completely off the mark and which would be damaging to Government if much publicity were given them.

Apart from official and routine sources of news, a great deal of news is obtained by correspondents who have built up personal social contacts. Sometimes these contacts have a deliberate interest in revealing information to a correspondent; sometimes they reveal it without being aware that they are doing so because they are not educated in news values, they do not think in terms of headlines and stories.

Hitherto I have been discussing the duller side of news-getting, parliamentary debates, official communiques and so forth; but life itself is the journalist's raw material and in the course of ten years of journalism I have been an eye-witness of such diverse happenings as the guillotining of the assassin of a French President, the Sarre Plebiscite, the trial of Arlette Stavisky, the beautiful widow of the swindler who rocked the foundations of the French Republic, the Catalanian revolution in Spain, the Nazi revolution in Germany, front line fighting in the Spanish Civil War, and the marriage of the Duke of Windsor.

I have heard the story of a discarded mistress of one of the two best known European dictators from the lady's own lips; I have followed a murder investigation from the finding of the body to the sentencing of the criminal; I have seen an innocent man undergoing third degree; I sailed on the maiden voyage of the Normandie; I have wandered accidentally into a king's bedroom to find His Majesty without his shirt and Her Majesty clad in nothing more (and I hasten to add nothing less) than a charming slip. All this was done in the normal quest for news and such experiences would easily be surpassed by journalists of longer standing than I.

* * * *

The lecturer then concluded by quoting three news messages of his own. The first was an eye-witness account of the battle at Irun in the early stages of the Spanish Civil War; the second, the departure of a convict ship from the island of Ré and the third a luncheon party with fifteen national representatives in a competition for Miss Europe.

CONTROL, COMMAND, LEADERSHIP.

BY MAJOR-GENERAL H. ROWAN-ROBINSON, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

The terms employed in the title of this article are intended, without, perhaps, strict etymological justification, to convey degrees in directness and immediacy of authority varying at the one extreme from the exercise of a general directive influence over preparation and strategy and at the other to the tactical conduct of troops in action.

Control may be either political or military. Political control may be either authoritarian or democratic. We may prize our democracy and enjoy the freedom it entails, but we have to acknowledge that fascism possesses many advantages over it in the waging of war. These advantages have been repeatedly catalogued. Only the most important will be mentioned here. It is that a dictator is able to make of his state a single unit and to organise it at his pleasure into a powerful instrument ready enough and strong enough to be employed for the threat of war, or even for war itself, in order to achieve the ends he may consider desirable in the national interest.

This unity of purpose and constitution transcends all other factors in military value. Easy of attainment to the totalitarian state, it is exceedingly difficult to a country governed on the party system. The British disaster at Munich may be ascribed almost wholly to lack of unity in prospective emergency. For some five antecedent years, the Government had been warned publicly and privately of the aggressive intentions of Germany and of her growing forces. Yet they were afraid to take the necessary steps to meet the danger for fear of hindrance and misrepresentation by the Opposition and of consequent adverse repercussions at the polling-booths. From such a severe political defeat the statesman must draw lessons, just as the soldier draws them from a great battle such as Austerlitz. From it emerges a problem which has to be faced by all the democracies: Party strife runs high. There is a tendency among politicians in time of peace to exalt the capture of votes above the needs of defence. Only when clouds are closing to the thunder-clap are they ready to sink dissension and coalesce. By that hour, all the immense value that derives from unity in preparation has been lost and there may lie upon the democracy concerned the blood of its ill-

equipped and ill-trained manhood and the destruction or enslavement of the state. Unless democracies can be sure of closing their ranks at such a moment as will give them ample time for preparation prior to an impending emergency or unless they form a truly national government, they will surely suffer irretrievable disaster.

A sound system of defence is the most important matter for safeguarding the continued existence of a state. Collective security, balance of power or appeasement may, indeed, be effective from time to time; but, ultimately, a nation must rely upon its own strength, for the full development of which the vital point is that the state should fight as a single unit four-square to all the winds that blow. As already stated, however, unity is difficult for democracies in normal circumstances. Its achievement may not indeed be beyond their capacity, but it certainly cannot be reached except through a resolute and positive spirit of compromise and sacrifice in all parties—a spirit which has fortunately been displayed by Great Britain in the present crisis. Unity, however, apart from its other values, is so important a military factor that every endeavour should be made to retain and cherish it as a permanent possession.

A natural direction of effort in this respect lies in the elimination of the causes of the habitual animosities of mankind which derive ultimately from disparity of property, social disparity and disparity of opportunity. It would be out of place in a military essay to go deeply into this matter; and in fact, it has been introduced only because of the vital military need of unity. It may suffice to mention what expedient, in the writer's opinion should be explored as a cure for disunity. His recipe is that of regulated industrial co-operation. This is a system which has been tried in many countries with a considerable degree of success; but it has never achieved any serious popularity because it carries no appeal either to the capitalist whose high profits it would endanger or the trades unions whose *raison d'être* it would remove, and it contains, therefore, no votes for the politician. The long-drawn struggle between employer and employee and its accentuation through the formation of employers' associations and trades unions have, however, implanted a deep discord between classes which will if we except authoritarian methods, yield to no other treatment. Given a real and fully understood interest, both regulatory and pecuniary, in the planning, working and results of business, the labourer will be happy and will compensate the employer for the curtailment of profits by an

increase of production due to the heart which he will put into his tasks and to a discard of strikes resulting in smooth operation.

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A government may, conceivably, consider that the achievement of national unity is beyond its powers of accomplishment or even the scope of its duty. It cannot, however, escape the responsibility for ensuring that it is, itself, properly organised for the efficient conduct of policy and war. In 1914, the Prime Minister in Great Britain had to handle, without intermediary, twenty-two cabinet ministers. Councils of war consisted of this unwieldy group supplemented by any other persons, military or otherwise, thought helpful. Such a method promised and actually entailed a minimum of efficiency. It was replaced some three years later by a war cabinet presided over by the Prime Minister and containing two or three ministers without portfolio—a method that worked admirably. Nevertheless, in September 1938, owing to what Mr. Churchill describes as “the confirmed unteachability of mankind,” the British Prime Minister found himself with precisely the same organisation as darkened counsel and delayed action in 1914. Instinctively and without warrant, he discarded it; and as there was nobody authorised to take its place, he settled matters through a “Big Four” which included himself, Lord Halifax and two other Ministers—the latter selected, not from any signal distinction in the sphere of control, or because they were responsible in any way for defence, but rather because they were ancient allies of his in office. Such a rough improvisation was unlikely to prove successful; and the very fact that the oldest of the democratic governments of the day should have had to improvise in two successive major crises indicates very clearly the need for reform. Reforms in the right direction have indeed been introduced since the outbreak of war. But the system now in being should be regarded not as a war measure but rather as the normal method of government. Why it should be delayed in each case until the crisis arises is not clear; for around the Government and within it are many examples of sound organisation.

In the fighting forces, for example, and in all large commercial companies, a system of decentralisation prevails. A corps commander, who controls 30 battalions, makes no attempt to deal directly with each of these units, nor does a brigade commander handle personally his 30—40 platoons. In the one case, the battalions are incorporated into brigades and the brigades into divisions so that the corps issues orders directly only to three

formations. In the other, the platoons are embodied in companies and companies in battalions, so that again the commander deals directly only with three units. The objects of such decentralisation are, in the first place, to ensure a sound and flexible articulation of the unit or formation concerned; and, in the second to afford a commander time to think by preventing him from being overwhelmed with work in dealing directly with a multitude of subordinates. Some such organisation receives unquestioned acceptance in every army in the world.

Moreover, an army commander, even though given time to think through decentralisation, considers it necessary to provide himself with a thinking staff, at whose disposal all available sources of information are placed. It is the duty of this staff not only to deal with immediate events but also to be continually looking ahead, to be considering what will be the effect of new weapons on operations and what novel types of weapons are demanded by changes in conditions. It is their duty, too, to submit, both at regular intervals as a matter of normal routine, and on special occasions when emergencies are impending, detailed appreciations of the situation on which their Chief will give the necessary decisions. Such arrangements are not, however, confined to armies. They embody principles—one might almost say laws—to which, in the conduct of all great affairs, whether of arms, industry or government, obedience must be rendered if policy is not to be purely opportunist and if satisfactory results are to be expected.

But here again the democracies are at fault. Their governments ordinarily contain no body of eminent men free from the work and cares of office and equal by character and intellect to play a leading part in the direction of policy. To await the outbreak of war before instituting the needed reform is to deny to a nation the prospects both of a consistent policy based on its ideals, its armed strength and its economic requirements and of the sound preparation of the state as a unit for defence which is the principal answer to the danger of sudden aggression.

In brief, the normal system of control in democratic governments should be such that the head of the state would have to deal direct only with a few super-ministers—say, four to eight directors of groups of ministries—who, together with a small advisory committee of two or three ministers without portfolio, would form the inner cabinet. Unless the direction is soundly organised, it is idle to expect any high degree of efficiency in the subordinate department.

All super-ministers would have to be graded as superior in rank to the members of their group, and they alone would ordinarily have direct access to the head of the state. All would have authority; but some would act only as co-ordinators and need but a comparatively small staff at their disposal. The (Super) Minister of Defence would, however, have to exercise direct control over the ministries of the fighting forces and would, therefore, require the services of a full ministry which would contain a General Staff drawn from the three services of sea, land and air. The Chief of this General Staff would advise the Minister on the assignment of money to the three ministries and would direct preparation in peace and operations in war. Neither the Minister nor the Chief of the General Staff would interfere with the internal administration of the subordinate ministries or with that of the fighting forces or with the tactical handling of the latter. Control would be exercised in the upper strata alone, chiefly in the distribution of funds, in the determination of priorities as regards the supply of equipment and man-power and in the general direction of operations. The navy, army and airforce are now so intimately bound together that, to allow three separate and untrammelled war ministries to operate independently subject only to the control of the head of the state, who would be unassisted by any responsible General Staff, would be as suicidal as it would have been in 1914 to send infantry, cavalry and artillery to battle, each under its own commander, trusting to mutual co-operation for combined action. The co-ordination of the work of the Ministry of Defence with that of other ministries would be a task for the small group of ministers without portfolio at the disposal of the head of the state.

In most cases where a ministry of defence has not been instituted, the cause had lain in the obstruction of the vested interests. Dictators have been able to sweep all such obstacles away; and France, with the memory of the two great invasions of her soil hot upon her, and threatened by yet a third, has managed, under the pressure of all her great soldiers, to do the same. But there are others who have yet to realise that, under a near and continuous menace, every interest must be subordinated to that of defence.

This brings to a conclusion the subject of the organisation of the governmental control of defence. We may now turn to the problems of command in a democratic state which, whether

political or military, are among the most urgent questions of the day.

The soldier is not by nature a democrat; and soldiering in general is a totalitarian affair. The soldier has no use for government of the soldier, by the soldier, for the soldier. On the other hand, democracy does not take kindly to leadership with its concentration of power in the hands of one man. Commanders have too often in history taken advantage of their position to enslave or otherwise degrade the masses or deprive them of hardly won privileges. Democracy recognises, indeed, that leaders are needed; but it likes to see them spring from the ranks, and to place a curb on their activities and on their advance to power.

Where, however, it insists on putting its views on this subject into practice in the military field, it is endangering its existence; for the more fettered the leader and the less his superiority over the led, the smaller will be his chances of success. A marked superiority is needed. It may be social or educational or the result of personality or of skill at arms; or it may be a combination of some or all of these qualities. Napoleon's marshals were chosen from the ranks; but, as the Emperor was anxious to widen the gap between leader and led, he made of them princes and dukes so as to create a social gulf between the general and the *poilu*. That happened, however, only after France had ceased to be a democracy.

Great Britain has hitherto drawn her officers almost exclusively from the public schools and universities. That is because she is truly democratic only in the polling booths. In the Great War, her principle leaders were picked almost without exception from those corps in which it is expensive to serve—Guards, Cavalry, etc.—or from old Etonians, from the class, that is, which has been accustomed from childhood to give orders with the expectation of their being obeyed and to take part in those field sports which form an excellent apprenticeship to war. They may not in every case have been wisely chosen; but the army was to a remarkable degree content with them.

The system, however, holds two disadvantages: the one, that the field of choice is narrow; the other, that the members of a rich class, not having to work for a livelihood, lack one of the chief incentives to professional study. So here we have, as so often in life in general as well as in war, an "option of difficulties." Broaden the area of selection and we obtain a high

level of quality but find obstacles to the creation of a sufficiently large gap between leader and led. Select from a privileged class, and a valuable gap—social and educational—is at once created, lacking, however, in the quality which springs out of selection from a numerous category of a fair order of education.

In democracies, a levelling action is in progress all the time with the enlargement of education and the widening distribution of wealth—both in themselves desirable processes. Hence it seems advisable in the interest of maintaining the gap between leader and led, in the first place, to develop leadership in every sphere in the state—in schools, games, clubs, etc., and also—and mainly—by an extension of the principle of equal opportunity which is at once a sound foundation for democracy, for unity, and for leadership; and, in the second place, to seek among officer candidates, those possessed of the qualities such as personality, courage and intelligence most desirable in a commander and to cultivate those qualities in them intensively.

Leadership implies both the capacity to lead and the willingness to obey. If one or other of these conditions is absent, there can be no leadership. Nearly everyone is ready instinctively to follow a first-class leader and is glad enough to hand over to him the responsibility for action. Born commanders, obvious as such to the senses, are, however, rare. The everyday problem of leadership lies, on the one hand, in endowing with capacity to lead the ordinary beings who find themselves entrusted with that task and, on the other hand, in creating a willingness to obey them in other ordinary men who would not in normal circumstances look to them for guidance.

The difficulty is met—in part automatically in that the sense of responsibility in a leader drives him to fit himself for that post by study, by practice and by developing his martial faculties; in part by the special training in leadership which all officers receive; in part by the inculcation of discipline—the factor by which the soldier singly and in mass learns to obey the orders of his superior.

Besides discipline, there are other aids which tend not merely towards the somewhat negative ideal of a willingness to obey, but towards a burning desire and a resolute intention—come fair, come foul—to do so. The principal of these are patriotism, a just cause, *esprit de corps* and a human relationship between officer and man, deeper though less openly expressed than the official connexion.

Thus for command and obedience there are controlling influences within and without. When both one and the other approach perfection, it becomes possible for leader and led to concentrate all their powers on the objective to be gained. It has to be recognised, however, that the problem of leadership will remain refractory in the democratic state until reforms directed towards its solution are instituted and, even then, will require continual study and attention.

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The principal qualities required for command have been much under discussion in the military press lately. They are, in the main, character, a cool head, "caution wedded to audacity," a sense of realities, balance and intellect. This paper will not continue the discussion on them but will make a few brief reflections on other less obvious or less tangible qualities needed.

The choice of a commander depends to a high degree on the nature of the task. It would hardly be sound, for instance, to choose a general who had, from long service on the Indian frontier, become a specialist in mountain warfare, for the command of a mechanised force on the Continent of Europe. And the converse is of course equally true. Then, for the rough and tumble of the soldiers' battle of Inkerman, heavy-handed, hard-swearing Pennefather was admirably suited. It was fine, the soldiers thought "even when his radiant countenance could not be seen, to hear the 'grand old boy's' favourite oaths roaring cheerily through the smoke." But such leadership, splendid as it was, might have been of less value on occasions demanding more finesse than brawn and more skill than drive. Again, where allies have to be considered, the choice of a commander would depend largely on whether or not he was possessed of tact and a readiness for compromise; and those qualities would determine the decision only if combined with dignity and strength of purpose. Haig was admirable in these respects; but in 1914, the quarrels of French and Lanrezac gravely hampered the co-operation and even endangered the security of their respective armies.

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A commander must be something of a psychologist. He must be a judge of individual man—as to his worth for a particular place in a team and of his treatment—curb, snaffle or spur, and he must know how to deal with man in the mass. The

choice of subordinates and their appointment to appropriate posts will often decide the fate of armies. Napoleon had a perfect eye for a man; but he allowed family affections to influence him with baneful results. It was to his brother Joseph almost as much as to Wellington that he owed the loss of Spain. He was a wonderful mass leader. He won and held the revolutionary armies by his resounding victories, his courage and his unparalleled endurance; and therewith he combined an intimacy of communion with the troops that made the soldier regard him as the apotheosis of himself. Hitler, prince of demagogues, employs the same artistry and arouses a similar devotion. He is the German deified. There is a whole science in the psychology of crowds which should be studied; but, to be able to sway the masses over a considerable period of time, the divine spark must be there as well as the technical skill.

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The commander neither in peace nor in war must allow himself to run in a groove. While consistency of general policy tends towards smoothness and efficiency in normal services, it must not be permitted in any serious degree to descend into routine. A certain amount of routine is, of course, unavoidable. Its toils must not, however, be permitted to tighten unduly, and an eye must be kept to a proper sense of proportion. 'First things first' is a motto which might well receive daily affirmation in any military headquarters. The mind will decay unless it is continually conceiving and creating and setting its progeny in the dry lights of discussion and test. It should be readily receptive, too, of the ideas of others. The sterilising by senior officers of youthful imagination is a common and criminal practice and a serious handicap to an army.

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The commander in peace thinks mainly of material matters: of plans, preparation, the use of weapons, administration... The moral element is absent. It cannot be rehearsed, nor can it be represented like an anti-tank gun by a green flag. Hence, at such time, it is terribly difficult to test and encourage leadership in which art the moral element plays the vital part. A partial solution only can be found for the problem. Manœuvres apply moral tests to a certain extent, especially in the reactions of commanders to surprise; but the best way of ensuring that there shall be a sufficiency of leaders in war lies, apart from

insistence as the primary need on the study and practice of the profession of arms, in the encouragement of sports that stiffen morale such as hunting, ski-ing and pig-sticking and of games definitely calculated to teach leadership—perhaps invented for that purpose.

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Anglo-Saxons are, on the whole, opportunists. They meet crises unperturbed, but also unprepared. Their high moral qualities fit them to bear the strain and a certain rough skill at improvisation has hitherto, in an age when time was not vital enabled them to ride the storm. But time is now, except, perhaps on the American Continent, the essence of the problem and can be conquered only by adequate preparation. Moreover, a succession of tempests are wearing to even the most seaworthy of vessels. The signs of the weather should, therefore, be observed and observation should be translated into thought and thought into purpose. It was because Marlborough and Washington, Nelson and Wellington possessed the long view as well as the other great qualities inherent in the blood that they rank first among Anglo-Saxon leaders.

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A general should have something of the make-up of a poker player. He must be prepared to take risks, provided they are calculated risks. Just as, subconsciously, the poker player, before he bluffs, balances his own character in its force and finesse against the characters of the other players, so does the leader in the field weigh his own personality against that of his opponent in seeking the justification of any risk he may take. Napoleon would never have dared his flank march to Piacenza against an adversary more active and venturesome than the aged Beaulieu; and it was because of Rennenkampf's known lack of enterprise that Ludendorff was able to ignore the Russian First Army and overwhelm Samsonov at Tannenberg. For long, British regulations contained the sentence—"The security of a force and of its communications is the first responsibility of a commander"—a most damning pronouncement, in that it implied a policy of safety first and the prohibition of risk taking. It is now made clear in the revised regulations that though security must be always in mind, it may best be pursued by aggression, by winning and maintaining the initiative and by concentrating on beating the enemy. But there is no doubt that the sentence quoted exercised over a long period a pernicious effect on British leadership.

A commander has of course many more chances and contingencies to calculate than the poker player. Besides the play of character upon character, he must have regard to the skill of his subordinate leaders, to the morale and training of his troops and those of his adversaries and to the weather—factors many of them not easily or wholly ponderable. Then again, he must balance the probable risks against the probable gains. There could be no greater folly than wittingly to incur grave dangers when aiming at small profit. Wellington allowed Ciudad Rodrigo to be captured under his very nose to the disgust of his troops, to the scorn of his allies, to the jeers and jubilation of his enemies and to his own inward mortification. But a commander must be a law unto himself and he has to marshal his own lonely thoughts to a decision unswayed by irrelevant influences such as sentimentality and personal bias. To the Allies, defeat, of which there was high probability, would have meant the loss of Portugal, inaction the loss only of the fortress. The possible gain was not worth the risks involved. Events were amply to justify the British commander's judgment.

Napoleon was a born gambler, but he eschewed the risks of night operations as dependent on such chances as the saving by the geese of the Capitol, and he made it a principle never to give battle unless he believed the prospects to be 70 per cent. in his favour.

Risks have to be taken, though to a less extent than in armies, in other forms of activity, especially in government and commerce. Here is an appropriate quotation on the subject from the *Economist*:

The moral is that the people will forgive the bold experimentalist his occasional errors in gratitude for his strenuous good intentions. They will never tolerate the cautious pedant who waits before moving to be sure that every last detail of his plan is approved by the orthodox and consequently seems never to move at all.

This passage might well have been written on Hannibal or Caesar. Actually, it forms part of an encomium on President Roosevelt.

A word here on orders—the means by which the intentions of the leaders reach the led. The regulations concerning them are common to all nations and embrace the wisdom of ages. They should be absorbed by all who would aspire to command.

The nature of orders hangs much on the grade of the headquarters of origin and upon the type of operations. In the higher grades—Army or Corps—and in open warfare, 'clear instructions' devoid of detail are issued. In the lower grades—Divisions, Brigades, Battalions—and in trench warfare, the general form of order capable of a fairly elastic interpretation gives place to more 'exact prescription.' Where doubt exists as to the type of order needed, it is well to issue the 'clear instruction' as that gives rein to initiative with its priceless possibilities of the furtherance of the plan through the audacity and judgment of junior leaders—that initiative which, according to the elder Moltke (who, however, had no part in the years of trench warfare) is the determining factor in war. Above all, in a sphere of activity where the unexpected is normally to be expected, rigidity of regulation is strongly to be deprecated.

Napoleon's orders, when he was present on the field, were plain, pithy, positive and unequivocal; but, when far from the theatre of operations, he sought to control his marshals by 'exact prescription' in carping, long-winded epistles on a situation often already three weeks dead. He had not enough confidence in them, brilliant on the whole as they were, to decentralise his authority to the extent of limiting himself to the 'clear instruction.' The elder von Moltke, never far from the field, exercised command by the shortest and most courteous of directives. And his system, profiting from the unity of doctrine in which commanders and staffs were trained and to the cult of the initiative, worked on the whole admirably; but it was never put to the high test of a reverse. It is desirable that orders on their way to the ultimate recipient should pass *en route* through as few hands as possible, especially if they are verbal. For example, the orders for the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava were issued by Raglan to Airey and then transmitted in succession to Nolan, to Lucan and to Cardigan suffering as a prelude to their disastrous results much misinterpretation in passage. Form is important but not vital. "Get to them, Granny" was an order lacking in formality; but it worked. It was sent during the action of Abu Tullul in Palestine by an Australian Brigadier to Colonel Granville commanding the reserve and was correctly interpreted by him in an immediate move to a decisive and successful counter-attack.

A final word on the subject of orders. A commander should never issue an order on whose execution he does not intend to

insist. Otherwise orders in general fall into a discredit dangerous to leadership. In the Great War many orders, especially those of an administrative nature were openly ignored. It was a common sight for instance to see officers and soldiers walking on a railway line past large notices to the effect that traffic by pedestrians was prohibited. This in itself was not a serious matter; but it made it very difficult for the soldier to know which orders he need obey and which he need not.

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Perhaps sufficient attention is not ordinarily paid to finesse as an essential attribute of a commander. In the study of war, we find that nearly all the Great Captains of history owed the persistent success which won them fame largely to their skill in effecting surprises. Resolution of character played its part in the execution of these feats by stimulating troops to amazing efforts such as Napoleon's passage of the St. Bernard prior to Marengo and Wellington's march through the de Oca mountains on his way to Vittoria. But the conception of such enterprises demanded imagination (which is the parent of finesse) in high degree. Is sufficient attention paid to these qualities (which are by no means synonymous with brain-power) and to the preparation and execution of surprise in military study and practice? Certainly not at manoeuvres, where the various limitations imposed by private property, harvests and a general shortage of time and space present almost prohibitive obstacles. Nevertheless, the writer has participated in two sets of manoeuvres where in each case a high degree of finesse on the part of the commander, coupled with care in preparation, brought overwhelming success. The importation of reality into peacetraining in perhaps its most important aspect need not therefore be excluded from consideration.

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What is nerve? Perhaps a compound of character, confidence and balance. The younger Moltke suffered in the opening exchanges in 1914 from lack of this quality. Joffre won the battle of the Marne because he possessed it in abundance (in superabundance according to his detractors who hinted that the direst calamity availed not to extract him from his bedroom between ten of the night and nine of the morning).

Nervousness is often, though wrongly, regarded as the opposite of nerve; but curiously enough, it is by no means wholly a disqualification for command any more than stolidity

is a necessary qualification therefor. Turenne was notoriously nervous when going into action but never failed in courage. The writer lived for a year with a gallant airman—also distinguished in the fields of mountaineering and boxing—who could never eat breakfast before flying and never entered an aeroplane without shaking all over. And he had then flown for ten years and is flying still, fifteen years on. In the same way, a friend of his, famous after pig, used to acknowledge to extreme nervousness waiting for a pig in a drive though perfectly happy after it had broken. Lloyd George, in a widely different sphere, relates that, before rising to speak on great occasions, his nervousness made him almost physically sick.

Nervousness is an emotional quality and has the advantage in this respect of a connection with imagination, ardour and self-sacrifice. There are moments in the heat of battle when the most stolid courage will not avail and when such qualities as balance and the sense of proportion normally so valuable actually imperil success. It is then that an impulse proceeding from an emotional soldier in the sudden flame of a breathless enthusiasm may snatch victory from impending defeat. Unemotional men find it difficult to rise to the heights or to inspire devotion in others. Haig failed there and Wellington before him. The Peninsular army honoured and feared the Iron Duke but did not love him, and with some reason. "By God," said Anglesey to him as the two stood together on the ridge at Waterloo, "I've lost my leg." "Have you, by God?" replied the Duke without lowering his glasses.

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In what exactly the power of a commander consists is often difficult to discern for it is usually a combination of many factors. A fine physique is an important element engendering as it does a certain bodily superiority, and its brutish force is of value not only in the rough and tumble of battle but also, on occasions, in the assertion of discipline. Botha, regarded at 35 as ridiculously young for leadership in a land where grey-beards were the insignia of rule, experienced difficulty in winning authority. He achieved it early in the campaign by knocking down a rebellious burgher at a critical moment at Spion Kop. But that was a method beyond the capacity of a Nelson or a Wolfe. Jeb Stuart, Murat and Mangin captured the imagination of their troops and lit their charges by gorgeous apparel. Ball threatened his foes in an all-red aeroplane. Pictom

died at Waterloo in a top-hat. On the other hand, Grant of the one coat, Stonewall Jackson and Pétain scorned adornment but were none the less effective. Some leaders—Napoleon, Roberts . . . insist on sharing the hardships and the fare of the soldier. Others hold that the commander must be kept fit and that he will work all the better in comfortable and undisturbed surroundings, thus giving his troops a higher prospect of victory. Age follows no rule, for Alexander conquered Asia at 20 and Napoleon, Italy at 27, whereas Moltke and Foch began victorious careers at 66 and 67 respectively. Moreover, although the value of early training and study cannot be questioned. Cæsar and Cromwell started serious soldiering after the age of 40. An even stranger case is that of Hitler. During some four years of war, the Führer managed only to reach the rank of Lance-Corporal. Yet when, at the age of 44, he entered upon his kingdom, he succeeded in gaining his ends by means which, if we exclude the question of morality, not one of the Great Captains could have bettered. According to Rauschning* he held that "in the relations of states, right and the conventions have no real existence;" and he laid down three rules for his own guidance. Rule 1.—In every enterprise the unlikely succeeds rather than what is considered possible. Rule 2.—Always keep the offensive; never allow oneself to be thrown back on to the defensive. This is the primordial rule of policy. Never allow oneself to be attacked without making an immediate counter-attack delivered at the heart of the subject and carried far beyond the ground of discussion chosen by an opponent. Don't fiddle with accessory questions. Rule 3.—Never enter into discussions when one wishes to reach some end effectively. Refusal of discussion upsets the nerves of an opponent.

Hitler's methods are those of policy rather than war; but in the latter sphere, they might be equally effective.

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It is commonly said in racing circles that horses can gallop in any shape; and it would seem from what has been written above that, similarly, men can be great leaders without necessarily being cast in one mould. There are, however, nine times out of ten, certain qualities in the one case of shape and breeding and in the other of character and capacity which mark the champion; and, when a misshapen horse or a man such as Wolfe, physically infirm and spiritless of aspect, forges ahead of his fellows, we shall surely find in a noble eye the expression of inward power. For, in every true leader, the moral rises superior to the material, giving rule to the spirit over the body.

**Die Revolution des Nihilismus*, p. 318. Quoted *Revue des Deux Mondes*.

FROM PESHAWAR TO MEERUT IN 1839

BY "ZARIF"

The First Afghan War being ended, the 16th Lancers, who had marched from Meerut to Kandahar, been present at the capture of Ghazni, ridden victorious into Kabul, and threaded the Khyber Pass to Peshawar, were on their way back to their cantonments. They had been feasted and fêted in Peshawar by Runjit Singh's Governor, General Avitabile, the "ferocious Neapolitan," and were glad to leave, for "the Fort is so unhealthy that neither European nor Hindostanee constitution can bear against it, and it appears that both nearly equally suffer."

Their march from Pabbi on the 24th November, 1839, was "over a plain extending miles and miles, a splendid area for the movement of a large force of Cavalry." How many Generals have thought so since, and have hurried home to devise manœuvres for the Risalpur Cavalry Brigade! How many reputations have been made and lost on that rolling downland! Those who won and those who lost can take pride and comfort from the fact that it was on that very ground, north of the river from Nowshera, that Maharaja Ranjit Singh, after very heavy loss, gained his victory over the redoubtable Dost Mohamed. Those who gained "bowler hats" may remember that Dost Mohamed lost an empire.

Attock.—On the 26th, the Regiment crossed the Indus. Captain Lowe, of the 16th Lancers, described the scene in a diary.

"The approach to the Indus is by a defile through some low hills which is called the Jackal's Throat. At the entrance on a commanding height there is a small fort garrisoned by Seik (Sikh) troops, and to the right of the gorge near the river, there is a much larger mud fortification at Kyrabad. We crossed the Indus, running like a mill sluice, on a bridge of 24 boats; about a mile above the town the river runs a complete rapid and must, I imagine, stop the navigation. A high stone battlemented wall surrounds the town of Attock, and is carried over a rocky hill overhanging the river; the gateways are very strong, but the town

is completely commanded from the south-east, and the fortifications may be considered as only valuable as completely commanding the river. The site of this very old Mohamedan fort is in a perfect amphitheatre of hills, and rises on the left bank of the Indus; and from the river it has more the appearance of an old Norman baronial castle than any fortification I have seen in the East."

Hassan Abdul.—On the 30th the Regiment camped at Wah, where the cement works are now. In the evening, Lowe walked back to Hassan Abdul, where he met the Political Agent.

"I accompanied him to a sacred well of the clearest water in which numbers of very fat fish are kept, which it would be sacrilege to destroy. This beautiful spot, although sanctified by a Mohamedan, is held in great veneration by the Seiks, and is esteemed by them only second to Amritsar.

The tradition is that an overwhelming mass of rock was precipitating itself down the hill and threatening inevitable destruction to the mosque of Hussain, who stretched forth his hand and instantly stopped its progress, and immediately from underneath the rock gushed the sacred spring.

I was very pleased with the scenery about Hussain Abdal; a direct road branches off northerly to Cashmeer, whence it is six days' journey. As evening drew on I went to see the ruins of the Palace of the Fairies, of which, unfortunately, little is left but the name. The water is the purest and most transparent that I have ever tasted; almost every particle of sand is distinctly visible at the bottom of the stream."

On the Regiment went, and halted for a night in Rawalpindi which Lowe describes as a good-sized town with a large, well-supplied bazaar; but he comments adversely on the outrageous number of beggars. On the 5th of December, they came to Manikiala, where that large mound of masonry stands to this day on the north side of the Rawalpindi-Jhelum road, some twenty miles from Pindi. To-day it is popularly but erroneously supposed to be the grave of one of Alexander's chargers; and the local inhabitants believe that Alexander the Great built it. In 1839 Lowe described it as being "in shape exactly like the Coliseum in Regent's Park, and from a distance

looks like a large beehive. It is three hundred and eighty feet in circumference, and seventy feet high. The masonry almost entirely round the base is still in excellent preservation, and is so on the south side nearly two-thirds up the building.

From the top, which is flat and about forty feet square, a shaft of masonry, so admirably built as to be still perfect after a lapse of two thousand years, descends about thirty feet to a chamber covered with immense slabs of rock. This chamber was opened some years ago by a French officer in the Seik service, and he discovered several coins, and an urn containing a liquid supposed to be the heart of one of the Bactrian monarchs."

Disaster at Jhelum.—On the 11th December, the Regiment arrived at Jhelum, and had to ford the river, over which in those days there was no bridge.

"Leaving the town a little on our right, we found the river immediately in front of us, fully five hundred yards broad at this point. The river was reported fordable by H—who was to act as our guide. He had been sent forward to make a reconnaissance, and had ridden across earlier in the morning; he said that there was no difficulty as the water was just up to the knee-caps of his horse.

Well, on we went for all the world as though we were about to cross a little trout stream. There were plenty of boats on the shore, but we ignored them.

The Advance Guard entered the water first, followed by the Band; then came the Regiment.

The ford ran across in the shape of a half-moon, but bending more acutely back from the centre, making the distance more than a third of a mile.

Small twigs or rods were just visible here and there above the surface, and these were to mark the ford; but no one was told that they were there for that purpose, and I for one supposed that they were marks for fishing nets.

When we had gained rather more than the centre of the river, and had to turn back against the stream, we found ourselves in deep water; some of the weaker horses, I suppose, tiring of breasting the stream, kept edging away off the actual ford until they found themselves out of their depth.

We had not turned far up when I saw the Band in difficulties, and some of the horses were quickly carried downstream. C—, just in front of me, was swept off his horse, but he swam away strongly, though he was considerably hampered by his sword, which he had failed to unbuckle.

I now found my horse off his legs. I tried to keep him up and to regain the ford; but he appeared to be wasting his powers, so I turned his head downstream and made for the nearest point which was about a hundred yards away.

I threw my stirrups across the saddle, unbuckled my sword and carried it across my holsters. My head kept perfectly cool and steady, and I felt my horse obedient to a slack rein, and swimming strongly under me. I knew I could not swim myself, and must leave it all to him. He carried me to the bank, and I was the first man up it. When I got there, such a scene was passing as I earnestly hope I may never again witness; the Regiment being in such a state of utter confusion and helplessness that there appeared no calculating the extent of our loss.

At this time I think fully fifty horses, and many of them without their riders, were being swept rapidly down the river; here and there just the top of a cap might be seen indicating that a man was sinking; and it seems wonderful that a man, who had once parted from his horse, should have escaped, considering the weight of his accoutrements.

A little above the ford, some camels were endeavouring to cross with baggage. These got adrift, and were carried through our second and third squadrons, increasing the confusion, making their loss the heaviest.

When on the bank, I saw three officers swept past; C—, who had been swimming so long with his sword on that I thought he would have been lost, managed to get to shore utterly exhausted; and so did Raymond Pelly; but poor old H—, who had been thirty-three years in the service, was soon afterwards picked up a corpse. Our loss, considering all things, has been wonderfully small: one officer, one corporal

and nine privates drowned, and we have also lost nine horses. The bodies of six of the men have not been recovered. This is a most melancholy event to have occurred at the close of our campaign, especially as a little common precaution would have prevented all accident."

The bodies of the four men were buried round the body of the officer near the bank of the river. I wonder if the site of the little cemetery is recognisable to-day?

Five days later the Regiment came to the Chenab river, which they crossed in much better style. The men and baggage were ferried across in boats, and the horses were ridden across a ford lower down the river by syces.

Lahore.—Just after Christmas, while the Regiment spent a few days in Lahore, Lowe rode out to see the famous Shalimar Gardens about four miles along the Amritsar road. The Shalimar, which was a favourite resort of Runjit Singh's, was kept in very good order; the canals which intersect the garden from north and south and east and west were full of water, and the fountains were all playing. In the marble pavilion on the eastern side of the garden, Runjit Singh frequently gave "nautches," and on these occasions the gardens were brilliantly illuminated, which enhanced the effect of the fountains and water-works.

While the force was resting at Lahore, Sir John Keane, the Commander-in-Chief, who had "not been on horseback more than twice since leaving Kabul, having suffered acutely from gout," sent a diplomatic mission to the Governor's Palace at Lahore. A gorgeous deputation called on him in return, the "Seiks" dresses being very splendid, and the elephants and horses brilliantly caparisoned.

The next day the Regiment marched twelve miles to Lakpat on the Ferozepore road. Here they found a Sikh encampment, and a review of the troops was held there. The line consisted of 45,000 men, Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery with 160 pieces of cannon of different calibre. Everyone who passed down the line commented on the improvement to the Sikh forces, and considered them to be a formidable force, as indeed they were found to be some six years later in the First Sikh War.

Horse Thieves.—Three of the officers of the 16th Lancers, who had ridden at the review, had sent their horses back to camp with their syces. On the way, the syces were robbed of the horses,

and were sent back to camp covered with bruises. Lowe tells us that representations were made to the Sikh Government, who asked for a descriptive roll of the animals.

"A descriptive roll was duly sent, with their valuation. The price of one, I think, was Rs. 2,500, and Rs. 2,000 was claimed; the second was valued at Rs. 1,600. The third, a most disreputable-looking animal, scarcely fit to mount a butcher's boy upon, was worth at the very most Rs. 150; but Colonel P—, his owner, with peculiar Irish modesty, valued it at Rs. 1,200.

This must have occasioned the Seiks a good laugh—I am sure it did all of us—when they sent back the horses the next day, to the great grief of their owners, who can never hope for another such chance of disposing of them."

It is interesting to compare the price of horse-flesh of the present day with that of one hundred years ago.

Baggage Thieves.—Lowe obtained leave from his Regiment at this point, and hurried on alone to Meerut, whence he was to gallop thirty-six miles to the Ganges and take boats for Calcutta. On his arrival at Meerut, he went to bed, but presently he was woken by his servants to say that a large party had attacked their tent, and succeeded in carrying off the trunks in which he kept his "breakfast apparatus," as he called it, and his plate.

"They said that the attacking party were fifteen or twenty in number; they had thrust spears through the tent and thrown brickbats at them as they ran out. It was a mercy that the thieves did not take the trunk containing my pay which I had been given only the day before. The next morning I ordered the two chowkidars to be marched before the Judge; but his reply was that since the robbery had taken place in Cantonments, in which he had no power, it was none of his business. I wrote to the Brigade Major, but he likewise denied any power of jurisdiction. It is rather hard, having escaped scot-free all through Afghanistan, to be robbed and refused redress in one's own station."

On the following morning he got his boats under weigh, and hoped to reach Calcutta in six week's time. Travelling in India in those days was not all Beer and Blue-Trains.

THE EMBODIMENT OF A PROVINCIAL BATTALION, I.T.F.

By MAJOR E. A. HAMLYN, 1ST BATTALION, 4TH
BOMBAY GRENADIERS

The following account of the embodiment and move from its peace station, of a provincial battalion of the Indian Territorial Force, is written to show how the difficulties, both foreseen and otherwise, were overcome.

Before commencing the story of the actual embodiment, it is necessary, for the benefit of the uninitiated, to say a few words on the composition of such a battalion, and the location of its personnel and material during the non-training season. At such a time (March till September, in the case of the battalion under consideration), the only personnel present at headquarters of the unit are the "Admincom," one clerk, one battalion quartermaster-havildar and four caretakers.

From this somewhat limited cadre, the entire battalion, consisting of four British officers, seven Senior Grade Officers, nineteen Junior Grade Officers six hundred and ninety-five Indian other ranks and forty followers, had to be produced within fifteen days of the flag falling.

Shortage of British Officers in the Indian Army generally had reduced the complement for the unit to two, excluding the "Admincom." These would, normally, have been serving with their active battalions and would have been sent off to their territorial unit immediately embodiment was announced in the Gazette. These provided the Adjutant and one company commander.

Senior Grade Officers were Indian gentlemen drawn from the legal profession and from neighbouring landholders. These furnished the quartermaster, three of the company commanders, and three company officers. One was newly commissioned and had never served with the unit. The calling up of these officers presented no great difficulty, as they were all working in well-known towns. In passing, it should be noticed that several of them had to say good-bye, for an indefinite period, to lucrative legal practices. This they did with the utmost cheerfulness.

Quite a different problem was presented by the calling up of the remainder of the battalion. These were entirely belonging

to the agricultural classes, like their prototypes of the regular army. They live for the most part in out-of-the-way villages, where the advent of the postman is something of an event. Furthermore, being in a famine area, many had migrated with the starving cattle to considerable distances from their homes.

Towards the completion of each year's training, calling up notices, including a railway pass are prepared for all men who will still be on the strength the following year. These notices are then available either for the next training or for embodiment. Dates are left blank, of course, and the notices are not signed until required.

As regards mobilization equipment. The only stores of this nature held on charge in the non-training period are the men's kits, in sealed kit-bags, a small surplus of clothing, and personal equipment (water-bottles, haversacks and greatcoat-carriers) for the whole strength.

Rifles are returned to arsenal at the end of each training and kept on charge for the unit there. Both this arsenal, and that which would provide the war outfit, were about six hundred miles away.

A certain number of articles of training equipment were kept on charge, but, beyond noticing how these added to the bulk to be moved, they are of no particular concern here.

The most important items, required with the utmost urgency, were tents, cooking pots and water tanks. The greater part of the remainder might well have been issued after the arrival of the unit at its war station. This was, in fact, suggested, but the suggestion found no favour, as the war station was served by a different arsenal.

Rations presented no great difficulty, as the nearest supply depot was only fourteen miles distant. But the number of rations to be demanded was a complete gamble, since it was impossible to foretell, accurately, how many men would be present on each day.

The factor, however, which demanded considerable thought affected the dates on which the various components of the battalion were required to arrive. Had everything and everybody, from British Officers to cooking pots, been demanded "at once," the natural sequence of arrival might have presented still further problems. There might, for instance, have been troops without tents; rations without cooking pots; rifles with insufficient personnel to open, clean and guard them.

The thought occurred, as a last-minute brain wave, that the last thing desired for the next five days after "Zero" day was for any troops at all to arrive. There could not possibly be any tents for them to live in, or any means of cooking their food. Nor did the permanent staff wish to be harassed by their personal problems.

Consequently, instead of "at once" being given as the time to report, the date of "Zero+5" was inserted in the calling-up notices. This gave a most valuable breathing space, and saved not only a few extra grey hairs on the "Admincom's" head, but also quite a considerable amount of Government money in pay and rations.

The table below will show the sequence in which personnel and the main articles of equipment were demanded:

Tentage (F. S. Scale).

Tentage (F. S. Scale).	} "At once" by passenger train. Demand sent by wire: "indent follows."
Cooking Pots.	
Water Tanks.	
One Blanket per man.	
Groundsheets.	} "At once."
British Officers.	
Quartermaster (S. G. O.).	
One S. G. O.	
Remaining S. G. Os.	} "Z+4."
Jemadar Adj. and Q. M.	
Jemadar.	
Rations.	
Remaining personnel.	"Z+5."
Rifles and S. A. A.	"Z+7."

By dint of the greatest and most broad-minded co-operation from Ordnance, everything went exactly to plan. Tentage and cooking pots arrived on "Z+3." Camp was pitched by civilian labour, which was also used for unloading and storing the rations on arrival. Rifles arrived on the exact day, by when there were plenty of men to cope with the opening and issue. Be it noted here, that rifles were not issued, for obvious reasons, to the forty odd recruits, until after the train journey to the war station was completed. These rifles were returned to their chests and entrained with the quarter-guard.

Now comes the turn to deal with the arrival of the various categories of personnel. A grave set-back was experienced here at the outset. One of the two very precious British Officers. (He was second-in-command-cum adjutant, and had done two trainings with the unit), had been employed as officiating "Q" at District during the summer. Despite the circular wire from

Army Headquarters, ordering all British Officers to report back to their battalions, and the most piteous appeals from the "Admincom," District—not unnaturally—won the day. Nothing was seen of this officer until, on arrival at the war station, he had the temerity to meet the battalion, still sporting the red armlet of desertion.

The other British officer, having been on a command "backward boys" course, was sent post haste by Command Headquarters, and arrived on "Zero" day. Needless to say, he was of the greatest value, and saved the sanity of the lonely "Admincom." He was made Adjutant in place of the truant, but combined those duties with Assistant to "Q," Mess President, and very nearly O.C. advance party! This was avoided by the posting, to all territorial battalions embodied, of a fourth British officer. A subaltern arrived on "Z+7" and was despatched as O.C. advance party on "Z+10."

All the Senior Grade Officers arrived to schedule. They were all imbued with the excellent spirit that this was the "real thing;" and it was this spirit which carried the unit through the next difficult and busy week.

The necessity of opening a mess, and reclosing it again after a very few days was obviated by the kindness of a local I. M. S. Officer, who nobly offered to house and feed the S.G.Os. until departure. Feeding on the rail journey was done from refreshment rooms, so there was no necessity to open up the mess until after arrival in the war station.

The rapidity with which the remainder of the battalion assembled was a surprise to everyone, including the "Admincom." Based on the harrowing tales of the local Civil authorities as to the length of time even mobilisation letters would take to penetrate the District, it was estimated that at least twenty days would be required to assemble the whole unit.

As the battalion was, by now, booked to move on what amounted to "Z+13," it looked as though a representative rear party would have to be left behind to bring on stragglers.

These fears proved groundless. On the actual day named ("Z+5") 485 ranks reported. By "Z+7," over 600 had arrived, and the battalion moved only 16 short on "Z+13." These vacancies could easily have been filled from recruits clamouring on the office doorstep, but it was deemed expedient to leave these places open for late arrivals. These, it was arranged, would be sent on by the recruiting authorities, so nobody was left as rear party.

As regards training, some difficulties were also encountered in this sphere.

Regular instructors are normally furnished for annual training by the active battalions of the group. These consist of two Jemadars and twelve N.C.Os. Unfortunately, the two Jemadars who had completed three trainings and knew the unit well, had finished their time. Two new ones arrived, who did their best but had had no time to learn the ins and outs of a territorial unit, nor the system of instruction.

The twelve N.C.Os. were not, at the outset, forthcoming, since mobilisation regulations allot eight N.C.O. instructors to an embodied provincial battalion, to be detailed from the Command in which the wartime station is situated. These instructors did not, therefore, report for duty until the unit had arrived in its new station, and were not available to assist before or during the move.

At the time of embodiment, the annual training season was not far off. In other words, all the territorial ranks were at their most rusty stage. This is normally competed with by two months of cadres and refresher courses for officers and N.C.Os. before the bulk of the battalion is called up. New recruits also are called up one month before the remainder of the battalion.

On embodiment, a very different state of affairs existed, as the whole unit assembled at the same time, together with the forty recruits already referred to.

It had always been accepted that all provincial battalions of the I.T.F., on embodiment for service, would receive from thirty to sixty days' intensive training before being called upon to carry out their wartime roles. The exigencies of the situation overruled the possibility of this being carried out.

In the very few days left before departure, every attempt possible was made, but the doctors stepped in with medical inspections and the inevitable inoculations and vaccinations and full working days eventually dwindled to three prior to the move.

The unit's rôle was to relieve a regular unit finding nearly two companies of duties, mostly on small detachments. One of these detachments of two platoons was to be shed from the train *en route* to the headquarters station, complete with tentage, rations, ammunition, etc. The others were to proceed by bus, likewise equipped, immediately on arrival at the destination.

This, coupled with a break of gauge *en route* would, it is considered, present quite a nice "Q" problem for a regular unit. In the case of this battalion, none of the officers, save the C.O. and Adjutant, had ever seen a troop train before. Many of the men had never seen a train of any kind.

Nevertheless, any misgivings which may have existed deep down in the breasts of the regular officers proved unfounded, since the entire operation went through without a hitch. This was, of course, due to the way in which all the territorial ranks gave of their best and strove, throughout, to maintain a standard well worthy of a regular unit.

In conclusion, may it be stressed, that this unit moved, complete in every respect, within fourteen days of the official intimation of its embodiment.

SOVIET EXPANSION

BY CAPT. G. H. NASH, 2ND BN., 16TH PUNJAB REGIMENT

1.—INTRODUCTION.

During the last decade the Soviet Government has made frequent and sometimes violent changes both in its domestic and foreign policy: large scale planning has been encouraged and later people have been shot for indulging in "Gigantism;" Criticism has been encouraged—and the critics have been liquidated as enemies of the people; the Comintern has been alternately a champion of democracy and the vanguard of a proletarian revolution; and finally, the Soviet Government has concluded a treaty with the authors of the Anti-Comintern Pact. These changes have been many, but one factor has remained constant: the Soviet Union has never lost an opportunity to expand territorially or to extend her influence beyond her frontiers. She has suffered reverses, notably in the Far East at a period when she was so feverishly engaged in her Plans that she could not have embarked on a war without industrial, political and social chaos, but in the long run increased strength internally has, with some exceptions brought with it increased influence in the Asiatic countries bordering on the U. S. S. R. and finally in Europe she now dominates the Baltic and has occupied a considerable area of Poland.

The XVIII All Union Congress of the Communist Party was held at Moscow this year (1939). Statements made at the congress and during the months which followed brought out certain interesting points indicating—to use a Soviet slogan—"Activisation of Foreign Policy." The Comintern, though hopeless as a world force, is not entirely useless as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, and at the XVIIIth Congress its supporters abroad were instructed to establish themselves, not as separate bodies, but in existing organizations in the countries in which they were working. Their first object, it seems, was to create pro-Soviet feeling abroad. The plan was not a new one, it had been used with some success in France and Spain. The Military budget was increased, and the Red army which in 1937 was "... for the defence of the Socialist state of workers and peasants," and was "... to secure in all conditions the inviolability of the frontiers and the independence of the Union of Soviet Republics," became once more the Army

of the World Proletariat, and now (October 1939) one hears nightly on the wireless how it liberated the oppressed workers and peasants of Eastern Poland.

2.—*EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA.*

In no area has the constant factor of Soviet expansion been so marked as in Outer Mongolia. This region was a sphere of Russian influence in Tsarist days and the Red army originally entered it during the Revolution in pursuit of counter-revolutionary forces. The people of Outer Mongolia had struggled against Chinese imperialism before and during the Great War and their fight for independence had hardly ended when they were subjected to a reign of terror by the White Russian forces. Mongolia had thrown off its allegiance to China in 1915 and the Soviet Government appearing in the role of a supporter for this struggling and harassed Republic had no great difficulty in embarking upon a policy which was firmly to establish it in the country.

In 1924 the Soviet authorities in Outer Mongolia, maintained a garrison at Urga. This garrison was shortly afterwards withdrawn,—not before a Mongolian army had been armed and trained by the Soviet forces. But a sympathetic Mongolian army was only a first step; Soviet "advisers" were soon to be found in every walk of life. The life of the Republic was organized on strictly Soviet lines, the princes were disinherited, the Lamas' lands were nationalized, private trading was prohibited, and transport became a state concern. Bolshevisation proceeded at such a pace that in 1932 there was a revolution and a hurried return to less original methods. But the Soviets remain; they have had the wisdom to abandon their attempt to bolshevise the country immediately. Motor roads and railways have been built and wireless stations established and Outer Mongolia has virtually become Soviet territory.

In Sinkiang Province the process of infiltration has been carried out with equal energy and success. By 1931 Soviet influence had already become very considerable and the power of Soviet "trade" agents was such that they could and did, instigate the arrest and imprisonment of people in the province hostile to the Soviet Union—particularly White Russian refugees.

In October 1931 the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs concluded a Commercial treaty with the Provincial Government. The terms were most favourable—that is for the U.S.S.R.

They gave to the Soviet Government the right to open trade agencies and offices in all the important towns and the right of unrestricted movement of Soviet citizens for purposes of trade over what virtually amounted to the whole of Sinkiang. The Soviet Government was permitted to establish wireless stations and telegraphic communication between Sinkiang and the U.S.S.R. and the road from the U.S.S.R. to China via the Turgart Pass was opened for transport. In return the Sinkiang Government was given the very doubtful advantage of sending certain goods across Siberia to Eastern China. The Soviets next took sides in the civil war which raged up and down the province from 1932 to 1934; they supported a Manchurian General, Sheng Shih-Tsai, and finally, inducing the commander of the opposing force to visit Soviet territory, they kept him there as a hostage.

Sheng Shih-Tsai was gradually surrounded by Soviet advisers and now it cannot be too much to say that the province is militarily and economically part of the U.S.S.R.

What advantages has the Soviet Union gained through the absorption of Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang? From Outer Mongolia comes a valuable supply of wool, hides, fur and cattle, also it is a potential source of mineral wealth. Strategically it protects—roughly as far East as Srietensk—the flank and communications of a Soviet force operating in Siberia. It also forms a buffer state against any thrust made by the Japanese through Inner Mongolia.

The advantages gained by the occupation of Sinkiang are chiefly economic and Sinkiang has become a dumping ground for Soviet goods.

Japan is already engaged upon a most difficult task in China; her friendship with Germany has proved worthless; she and the Soviet Union have patched up at least a truce between them, and the Bolsheviks are strongly installed in Outer Mongolia. It is fair to assume then that at least for the time being the Soviet Government need anticipate no great difficulties in East Asia.

3.—THE BALTIC.

"An alliance which is not for the purpose of waging war has no meaning and no value." Hitler's "Mein Kampf."

The Non-Aggression Pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany was ratified on the 31st August, 1939, and it was only a

matter of weeks before the full implications of the Pact became apparent—Germany had agreed to the partition of Poland and had surrendered her dominant position in the Baltic. Not without some truth had Hitler written in "Mein Kampf," "From the purely military point of view a Russo-German Coalition would be catastrophic for us." In giving the Soviets *carte blanche* on the Eastern Baltic Coast and in evacuating the Baltic Germans, Hitler has severed a connection with these lands which is more than eight hundred years old. The German city of Riga was built in the year 1200, and by the end of the 14th century the Teutonic knights and the Hansa merchants had extended their influence as far North as the Gulf of Finland.

Early in the 18th century, Peter the Great made his window onto Europe by occupying the Baltic lands; but the German land owning aristocracy continued under the Tsars to occupy a privileged position and the important Hanseatic towns of Tallinn (Reval) and Riga remained largely in German hands for hundreds of years.

It was not until the Russian Revolution that the Baltic Germans were seriously threatened, and they then appealed to the Kaiser for a union with East Prussia. This appeal met with immediate response and at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which followed, a temporary German "police occupation" of Estonia and Livonia was provided for. "Germany and Austria-Hungary," it was stated, "intended to decide the future fate of these territories..." At the end of the Great War, when the independent Baltic States were formed, the Baltic Germans owned no less than half the total area of Estonia; they were also the most important land owners in Latvia. Their lands were confiscated.

Before the Nazis came into power German relations with the Baltic States had gradually improved and by 1925 various treaties and trade agreements had been concluded between the Reich Government and these countries.

In 1923 Germany bought one fifth of the Baltic States' total exports; by 1927 she was buying well over one third. She was also Finland's principal buyer. The Nazi Government repeatedly avowed the necessity of expanding eastwards and during the period 1934-36, subversive movements organized by the Nazi Party in the Baltic States created a series of disturbances culminating in an attempt to overthrow the Estonian Government.

During the same period (1934-36), German relations with Finland were good, but later, as German aggressiveness grew, her popularity decreased, and finally, Finland joined the Oslo group of powers.

What has Germany given to the U.S.S.R. by the surrender of this sphere of influence—and potential conquest? Before the Russian Revolution the Western frontier of Russia stretched from Memel to the Black sea. After the Great War it continued as far North as Murmansk, and the armies of a major power landing in Finland and Estonia could advance eastwards, seize the Leningrad Industrial District, and turn the right flank of the Soviet frontier defences. With the Gulf of Finland held, the Port of Leningrad could be closed and the Soviet Baltic fleet bottled up at Kronstadt. Any such move could now be met at the outset by the Soviet land, sea, and air forces concentrated round the western end of the gulf of Finland.

The ice free ports of Riga and Tallinn have always been of the greatest importance to Russia, and the role of the Baltic States as transit countries has invariably formed a vital part of any agreement made between them and the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union is now in a position herself to safeguard this interest.

Finally the threat to the Ukraine has been minimised by the occupation of Eastern Poland, and with Germany at war on the Western front the Soviet Union can regard her Western frontier as secure for some time to come.

It has been said that Russia's foreign policy has remained unchanged for two hundred years and that it has been dictated by the geography of its frontiers—by the lack of ice free ports and natural barriers. The Russian policy of expansion, unification and consolidation which was so evident during the nineteenth century, certainly continues with unabated vigour under the Bolsheviks. How does this policy effect the Near East?

During the nineteenth century Russia attempted three times to become mistress of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and each time she was frustrated. In October, 1939, history repeated itself. The Turkish Foreign Minister returned from Moscow without signing an agreement with the Soviet Government and the Turkish Prime Minister stated that it was impossible to reconcile Soviet proposals with obligations incurred between Turkey, Britain and France. "On the question of the

Dardanelles," said the Prime Minister, "Turkey considered that it was essential that she should not bind herself to stipulations other than those provided under her international engagements of general order."

Relations between the Rumanian and Soviet Governments have been strained over a number of years, and their common frontier remained completely closed until 1936. Trade with the U.S.S.R. began only recently. The immediate bone of contention in this case is Bessarabia and, uncertain as to Soviet ambitions on this frontier, Rumania has recently (October 1939) strengthened her garrisons in that province. Bessarabia, which has changed hands more than once, was last acquired by Russia in 1878 and held by her till the Revolution. Should this strip of territory become Russian once again the industrial district between Odessa and Kharkov will be some sixty miles further away from the frontier and the important port of Odessa will no longer be almost on the frontier. Before the Great War the trade and railway connections of Bessarabia were with Russia, and Rumania has done little since to reorient the rail and road system. Finally the annexation of the province by the Bolsheviks would give to the U.S.S.R. a new natural barrier—the River Pruth.

Rumania feels herself threatened and has met the situation by an agreement with Hungary, which has enabled her to leave her Western frontier lightly guarded and to send more troops to Bessarabia.

4.—CONCLUSIONS.

Outer Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan have been absorbed and Russo-Japanese differences referred to a boundary commission. The Baltic has been dominated and Eastern Poland occupied. Turkey has been unsuccessfully wooed and the security of Rumania's Bessarabian Province remains a matter of doubt.

What fresh fields are there to conquer? Through nearly two thirds of its length the Soviet-Afghan frontier coincides with a natural obstacle—the Oxus River. The remaining section of the frontier is covered by a desert with a Soviet railway line running through it from Merv to Kushk Post. There is little to gain by occupying Northern Afghanistan. A stronger natural barrier would of course be the almost continuous range of mountains including the Hindu Kush in the East and the Paropamisus Range, North of Herat, in the West, but Soviet

Turkestan is not threatened by British India and there is therefore no good reason for occupying this line.

If, however, we are to believe that the Soviet policy of expansion is but the continuation of Tsarist policy, then we must accept the possibility of attempts to penetrate into Northern Iran. The U.S.S.R. is one of the natural outlets for the produce of that region and economic relations of some importance to Iran have consequently been established.

The first treaty between the two countries was signed in 1921. All treaties between Russia and other powers concerning Iran were then denounced. By 1936 three more treaties had been signed and now (October, 1939) it is reported that still another is being negotiated. The Soviet may be tempted to imagine that it can convert the present measure of economic dependence into something more complete.

The requirements of an expansionist policy are: security on frontiers and at home; fighting forces which are highly trained, well equipped and numerically equal to the task, industrial preparedness, and lines of communication which permit the deployment and maintenance of Military forces of the right strength at the right time and in the right place. How far do present conditions in the U.S.S.R. fulfil these requirements? The answer to this question must be largely a matter of conjecture. Certainly in the Far East the U.S.S.R. is more secure to-day than she has been at any time during the last decade, whilst in the west Germany has made terms with her and she now dominates the Baltic and occupies Eastern Poland. The Military High Command suffered considerably from the purge of 1937-38, but whilst it weakened military efficiency, there can be no doubt that it strengthened the existing regime and all that it stands for. As a result of the purge the Army may still be in no position to undertake a major war, but there is no reason to suppose that it could not absorb new territory in Asia in much the same way as it has recently done in the Baltic.

In 1938, military expenditure was increased by seven thousand million roubles. In 1939 further increases have been announced and judging by recent figures published in the press the peace time strength of the army alone must provide the Soviet Union with about one hundred and twenty divisions, whilst in 1937 her trained reserves were estimated as not less than six million men.

Industrially the five-year plans were largely military in conception, but lines of communication are the weakest factor in the wide range of war requirements. The most energetic steps have, however, been taken in order to deal with this problem, and judging by articles which have appeared in the Soviet Press, railway workers must now be under what virtually amounts to military discipline. The third five-year plan provides for the construction of 11,000 kilometres of new railway lines and it is claimed that the average number of trucks loaded daily has increased from 68,000 in 1935 to 102,000 in 1939.

Finally, doubtful elements are liquidated and in the Soviet Union to-day lives a grown-up generation which has known no other regime. Soviet citizens have no means of comparing their lot with that of people in foreign countries and comparisons with internal conditions of a few years ago must, on the whole produce a favourable impression. Added to this is the watchfulness of the secret police and the ceaseless propaganda through press, radio and political institutions.

From the above conclusions it is fair to assume that the U.S.S.R. is more favourably placed for a policy of expansion to-day, than at any other time during the last decade, and recent events tend to show that the Soviet Government has already embarked upon the "Activisation" of this policy.

THE BATTLE OF MAIDA

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL C. C. R. MURPHY

One of the most interesting battles in English history was that fought near the toe of the Italian peninsula on the 4th of July, 1806, and known to us as Maida, to the French as Sainte Euphémie, and to the Italians as Santa Eufemia. Maida Hill and Maida Vale in London were so named in commemoration of this popular victory.

It will be recalled that after the battle of Austerlitz, when their fever of aggression was at its height, the French had appropriated the Kingdom of Naples. Sicily, however, was not conquered, and in that island was a British force under Major-General Sir John Stuart, which at the end of May, 1806, amounted to about 8,000 men. During the summer, the people of Calabria rose in insurrection against the French invaders, and Stuart decided to send a force to the assistance of our allies, the dispossessed Bourbons. With admirable secrecy, he made a sudden descent on Calabria. He was the mainspring of the enterprise, and very few were allowed even a share of his confidence. In England, scarcely a soul knew anything about it.

The expeditionary force, consisting of about 5,500 British troops, with two companies of Corsicans and one of Sicilians, set sail from Messina towards the close of June, and was conveyed by Sir Sidney Smith with two ships and two small frigates into the Bay of Santa Eufemia. Actually, however, there was no French naval force in that part of the Mediterranean at the time.

Sir John Stuart's force was made up as follows:

Advanced Corps under Lieut.-Colonel Kempt, 81st Foot: the light companies of the 20th, 27th, 35th, 58th, 61st, 81st and of de Watteville's Regiment; flankers of the 35th; two companies of Corsican Rangers, one company of Sicilians and two 4-pounder guns.

First Brigade under General Cole: 27th (8 companies); the Grenadier companies of the 20th, 27th, 35th, 58th, 81st and of de Watteville's Regiment; and three 4-pounder guns.

Second Brigade under General Acland: 78th (10 companies); 81st (8 companies); and three 4-pounder guns.

Third Brigade under General Oswald: 58th and de Watteville's Regiment (each 8 companies), and 8 companies

of the 20th, who were detached to threaten a landing at Scilla, but were to rejoin later.

The French Division, under General Reynier, was composed of the 1st and 23rd Regiments of Light Infantry, the 42nd Regiment of the Line, two battalions of the 1st Swiss Regiment, two weak battalions of Poles, the 6th Chasseurs (cavalry), and a battery of horse artillery, the whole totalling about 6,440 men. These troops were scattered about in the Reggio promontory, mostly in cantonments at considerable distances.

According to the French official account, the Anglo-Neapolitan army consisted of 6,000 British and 3,000 Neapolitan troops, who were joined by 4,000 insurgents. That authority, however, exaggerates the forces at the disposal of General Stuart whilst under-estimating its own. Actually, General Reynier's force was slightly the stronger of the two.

The expeditionary force anchored in the Bay of Santa Eufemia on the evening of June 30th. At dawn, Kempt's light battalion, with the Corsicans and Sicilians, landed unopposed about a mile from the village of Santa Eufemia, and quickly occupied the woods fringing the beach, together with an old tower standing near the foreshore. As these men were being pushed out cautiously through the trees and scrub, there came a rattle of musketry. Immediately, the Corsican and Sicilian skirmishers fell back, having been driven in upon their supports by three companies of Poles from the French post at Monteleone. Oswald, who was in command of the landing party, steadied his men, charged the Poles, and occupied Santa Eufemia. By nightfall, the whole force was ashore and holding a defensive position from that village to the sea.

Next day, the Grenadier Battalion pushed on and seized Nicastro, five miles inland. Colonel Bunbury, the Q.M.G., says that during July 2nd and 3rd, the British "were joined by about 200 straggling Calabrese, provided for the most part with fire-arms; but they were ruffians of the lowest description."

Having received news of Stuart's departure from Messina, Reynier collected a force at Monteleone and hastened to Maida where he arrived on the evening of the 2nd, bivouacking on the heights near the town. The next morning, the British and French generals set out from their respective camps to reconnoitre each other's positions from the woods separating them, where it is said they very nearly met!

At dawn on July 4th, the British moved out from their position in two columns marching parallel to the shore. After

crossing the Ippolito they turned inland and then, having formed line, advanced to the attack in echelon of brigades from the right over the boggy ground between that stream and the Amato.

The French Division passed the night of July 3-4 in their camp by the woods at the foot of the Maida heights. In the early morning of the 4th, they debouched on to the level ground, crossed the Amato, and 'came rushing down' the valley in three main columns echeloned from the left, with their cavalry and horse artillery out in front of them. But General Compère, who was commanding the advanced guard, soon got into difficulties, for his *voltigeurs* were almost immediately driven back in confusion.

The Amato was fordable everywhere, and so Kempt sent his Corsicans and Sicilians, together with the light company of the 20th, across the stream to scour the scrubby thickets on that side and to protect his right flank. Scarcely had they entered the wood when they were met by a brisk fire, followed by a headlong charge of some two hundred French. But the 20th stood firm, and matters were set right. In the meantime, the 1st Légère were being hotly engaged by Kempt's light companies, with whom Acland's Brigade had come up into line.

The whole fate of the battle turned upon Kempt's first clash with the enemy. In the opinion of Oman, this was the fairest fight between column and line that had been seen since the Napoleonic wars had begun. 'Steady, Light Infantry,' said Kempt: 'Wait for the word. Let them come close.' Then, with remarkable deliberation, they fired three volleys, at 150, 80 and 20 yards respectively. The 42nd Regiment of the Line were received in like fashion by the 78th and 81st under Acland. The French official account alludes to the *grands ravages* caused by these volleys, which it states, put between six and seven hundred men *hors de combat* in a few moments. Their casualties included General Compère, whose arm was shattered by a musket ball. Apparently, it was the remarkable steadiness of the British soldier, almost as much as his fire, that broke up the moral of the enemy at this phase.

The 42nd Regiment fell back stubbornly, but quickly reformed and took up a fresh position. Acland, pressing forward, came in contact with its supports, namely, two battalions of Poles and one of Swiss. In spite of all the efforts of Reynier, who himself rode up to rally them, the Poles broke and fled, the 81st capturing about 250 of them. In the meantime, the 78th had become engaged with the Swiss. The latter, being dressed in

red, had for the moment been mistaken for de Watteville's Regiment of the British force, and the enemy, taking advantage of this, poured in a volley which did our men much damage. The Highlanders rallied in a spirited manner and drove the Swiss back. The French cavalry now intervened and Acland, instead of pursuing the Swiss, prudently formed square, whereupon the chasseurs withdrew out of range.

The battle now spread to Cole's Brigade on the extreme left, and that commander, though he was supported by Oswald's Brigade, soon found himself fighting a more or less detached action. Ammunition was running short, and the situation was none too secure. At this important juncture, however, the 20th Foot, which had been detached to Scilla, returned and began disembarking at the very mouth of the Amato. Their intrepid commander, hearing the heavy fusillade, and without waiting for the disembarkation to be completed, dashed off across the marsh and, coming up on Cole's left in the nick of time opened fire on the enemy at a range of fifty yards. "The effect was decisive. Surprised and wholly disconcerted by the appearance of a fresh antagonist from an unexpected quarter, Reynier gave the order for instant retreat, his battalions going off across the open plain to the east, covered by two squadrons of cavalry and four horse-artillery guns."*

Reynier now detailed the 23rd Légère to act as rearguard and right well they did it, checking the British advance and covering with great stubbornness the retreat of the broken division up the valley of the Amato. The fine conduct of Colonel Abbé, who commanded them, gained for that officer the rank of brigadier-general.

The French casualties exceeded two thousand, whilst those of the British amounted to 327, all killed and wounded. It is a remarkable fact that only one British officer was killed.

General Stuart appears to have spent the day tittuping about the battlefield, eagerly watching the fight and thoroughly enjoying himself; but whilst showing a personal disregard of danger that was wholly admirable, he did little in the way of directing operations. The real hero of the hour was Kempt, the man who was destined to win great fame in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, and to become one of Picton's most trusted brigadiers.†

* The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, by Col. H. C. Wylly.


† There is a picture of this famous man in the Waterloo Chamber in Windsor Castle. Kempt took over command of the 5th Division at Waterloo when Picton was killed, and was afterwards Governor-General of Canada.

The news of the victory spread like wildfire through the countryside, and soon bands of armed peasantry began to arrive on the scene. The tocsin sounded in the neighbouring villages, and white flags were to be seen fluttering from the clock-towers. The insurrection quickly became general; workmen left their work and shepherds their flocks to deal out reprisals. If but for a short time only, the French had to let go their hold upon Calabria.

The victory of Maida was practically the only success achieved during the Grenville ministry. Moreover, it was quite unexpected, as hardly any one at home knew that a force had been landed in Italy. It came at a time too when there was much bitterness of feeling against the French, who were everywhere regarded as the disturbers of the world's peace; for it will be remembered that during the previous year Napoleon had made great preparations for the invasion of England, and that a medal—*frappée à Londres*, if you please, to commemorate his success—was actually ready for issue. In these circumstances, the news of the victory was the signal for great rejoicings in London, and people there still hang out their flags on Maida Day. Stuart describes the battle as 'a triumph over a boasting and insolent enemy;' and the ill-feeling against the French is further indicated by an inscription on a sword, presented to Lieut.-Colonel James Moore, 23rd Light Dragoons, for his services at Maida, and now in the museum of the Royal United Service Institution* in London, which records how on that occasion 'the pride of the presumptuous enemy was severely humbled.' The actual part played in the battle by the gallant Colonel is, however, not quite clear: he must have been seconded from his regiment at that time, as only the merest handful of British cavalry was present.

After the battle was over, some of the regiments were granted permission to bathe: but whilst they were thus disporting themselves, a cloud of dust suddenly appeared in the distance which caused the alarm to be sounded. The story runs that the Inniskillings and the Grenadier Companies, skedaddling out of the water and seizing their rifles, fell in *puris naturalibus* to await the threatened attack. The cloud, however, turned out to have been caused by the enemy retreating hurriedly along the dusty road to Catanzaro.

* There is also a sword there which belonged to General Reynier.



PLAIN ENGLISH

Some Notes on Translation.

BY KARSHISH

A state of War invariably produces a considerable increase in the amount of material in foreign languages which finds its way into military headquarters and which has to be translated into English. The following brief notes, based on considerable experience, may be of some value not only to translators but also to those whose duty it is to deal with documents translated from foreign languages.

Translation means the rendering of the precise meaning expressed in one language in terms of another. This somewhat obvious definition may be amplified by saying that the language into which the matter is translated, for the purpose of this article, English, must be intelligible and "good." By "good" is meant that it should be ordinary, idiomatic English and not mutilated by extraordinary distortions of syntax and grammar which, while not entirely obscuring the meaning, make the reading of the matter tedious and irksome.

The procedure followed by the translator should be firstly, to make sure he has thoroughly understood the exact meaning of the matter to be translated, secondly, to render it literally into English either on paper or in his mind and thirdly, to turn his literal rendering into idiomatic English while retaining the meaning of the original.

The foregoing would be trite and unnecessary were it not for the melancholy fact that a large proportion of translated material falls into two extremely undesirable categories, the first being that of meaningless nonsense and the second that of a cloud of turgid and distorted language through which the meaning of the original can only be dimly discerned.

One of the few recollections which the writer preserves of an unsatisfactory and unfinished education is that of a preparatory school master who used to say, "Before you begin to write anything on paper, say to yourself, 'Come what may, I won't write bosh'." It would be a fine thing if this excellent maxim were written in letters of fire above the table of every translator. The fact seems to be that many a translator both in the examination

room and outside it seems to have either an inability to distinguish between sense and nonsense or a fine disregard for the importance of such a distinction.

Before proceeding to consider the technicalities of translation some further comment must be made on this question of sense and nonsense. When the English translation of matter written in a foreign language turns out to be nonsense, this may be due to one or more of the following reasons:

1. The original is nonsense.
2. The translator is at fault owing to:
 - (a) His defective knowledge of the original language, of English or of the subject matter.
 - (b) His inability to distinguish sense from nonsense.

When the translator is certain that his nonsense translation is due to 1, and not to 2, it is essential that he should indicate either by notes or the use of the word "sic" that he has faithfully rendered into English matter which, from no fault of his, is nonsense. Unless this is done the person for whose benefit the translation is made is at a grave disadvantage for he does not know where the nonsense has its origin. For example, a translation of an intelligence report might contain the statement: "Every soldier in the Red Army carries a portable field gun." Unless the translator comments upon this in some way, the person reading the translation does not know whether he is dealing with a stupid or worthless agent or a stupid or incompetent translator.

The example given above is of a more or less concrete statement. The danger is far greater when it is a question of more abstract matter. A translator possessing either or both of the defects noted above may still have sufficient familiarity with the conventional drone of English jargon to write down strings of words which are, so to speak, in the similitude of sense. For instance the translation of a political indictment might read "He was accused of failing to exercise the principles of actuarial representation by exposing unreliable factors." Now this is "bosh" and "bosh" of a most dangerous kind for it is calculated, either intentionally or otherwise, to drug the reader into thinking he is reading sense and the conventional drone of the language stops him from analysing it. Once a translator's work contains matter of this kind unaccompanied by any explanation, his translations either of abstract or concrete matter can no longer be trusted.

We may now pass on to the consideration of the second category of bad translation. This consists of matter which, while it contains a discoverable meaning, is written in bad or muddy English tending to obscure the sense. This sort of thing is due either to the translator being unfamiliar with English or to his failing to range in his own mind the basic ideas expressed in the original matter to be translated. The result often occupies a position mid-way between absolutely literal translation and idiomatic translation and bears a surprising resemblance to the English of the foreigner. A charming young Greek girl once submitted to the writer her translation of a Greek Army official communiqué. "A sonorous counter-attack" she had written, "has persecuted the enemy's section."—Katrina's meaning was clear but she knew very little English and had made too free a use of her dictionary. Another translation, this time from the hand of an Englishman, read, "The Government has ordered in all cases of firing on our police, the obligation of aimed fire being returned on the firers." The trouble here was that the translator had kept his eyes glued to the original only turning them away in order to consult his dictionary. Had he allowed the meaning of the sentence, once grasped, to formulate clearly in his mind he would probably have written quite simply, "Orders have been issued by the Government that all aimed fire directed against the police will be returned immediately."

It must be recognised that some languages are much more difficult to translate than others. Each language has peculiarities of which the translator must take particular note. With a view to trying to demonstrate the processes of rendering one language in terms of another, the writer has selected three passages from French, German and Urdu books and papers and has subjected them to literal and ultimately to idiomatic translation.

1. French.

La présente Instruction s'est donc efforcée de préciser, dans l'état actuel des armements:

—les conditions d'emploi des chars.

—les modalités de la défense contre les engins blindés adverses.

En ce qui concerne l'emploi des chars, on ne saurait trop mettre en lumière qu'aujourd'hui l'arme antichar se dresse devant le char comme, pendant la dernière guerre, la mitrailleuse devant l'infanterie.

This is a straight forward piece of formal French taken from a military manual. It contains no difficult words with the possible exception of "modalité." Yet it gives a good example of one of the capital difficulties of French from the point of view of the translator—the frequent use of the reflexive verb. Below are given first, a more or less literal translation which shows the plain meaning of the passage and second, an idiomatic translation which expresses the meaning of the French in terms of English.

"The present manual has, then, tried to lay down, in the present state of armaments:

- (a) The conditions of the employment of tanks.
- (b) The special features (modalités) of defence against enemy A.F.V.'s.

So far as the employment of tanks is concerned one would not be able to bring forward too much (the fact) that to-day the anti-tank gun stands in the way of the tank just as, during the last war, the machine-gun (stood in the way) of the infantry."

"Se dresser" is awkward. Mansion's Dictionary gives no meaning for it which will fit here and the translator will have difficulty in finding an idiomatic rendering unless he turns the sentence and makes "tank" the subject instead of "anti-tank gun." The meaning obviously is that the tank is "up against" the anti-tank gun in the same way as the infantry, etc. "Up against" will not, however, do in formal language. A possible translation of this passage would be:

"The present manual endeavours to lay down, having regard to the State of modern equipment:

- (a) The conditions governing the use of tanks.
- (b) The special features of defence against enemy A.F.V.'s.

As regards the employment of tanks, it is impossible to emphasize too strongly the fact that the tank is to-day opposed by the anti-tank gun in the same way as infantry was opposed by the machine-gun during the last war."

2. German.

"Daher ist es nicht sehr wahrscheinlich, dass die heutige Ministerberatung nur aus diesem Grunde zusammenberufen wurde, vielmehr leuchtet ein, dass die britischen Unterhändler ihre Kabinettskollegen vor allem auch über die Schwierigkeiten, die in der Sicherheitsfrage eingetreten sind, und zugleich über

etwa für deren Überwindung in frage kommende möglichkeiten unterrichten wollten."

On the whole German is an easier language to translate than French as it is far less idiomatic and the presentation of ideas is similar to that of English. For the translator, the capital difficulty of German is the long and involved sentences which are such a feature of the language. Properly arranged and punctuated the long sentence can be effective in English but, generally speaking, the translator is advised to split up long German sentences into two or more English ones. The extract selected is from the "Frankfurter Zeitung" and is a straightforward piece with no idiomatic difficulties. The literal translation is as follows:

"It is therefore not very probable that to-day's Council of Ministers was only summoned on this ground, rather it is apparent that the British negotiators wanted to consult their Cabinet colleagues principally also about the difficulties which have arisen in the security question, and at the same time about the possibilities which come to some extent into question for overcoming them (the difficulties)."

It is no exaggeration to say that this sort of thing is often put up by translators as the finished article. The meaning is discernible but it is not English. A possible idiomatic translation would be:

"It is unlikely, therefore, that to-day's Cabinet Meeting was on this account only. There are indications that the British representatives wished primarily to consult their colleagues concerning the difficulties which had arisen over the question of security and to discuss appropriate methods of overcoming them."

It will be observed that this translation is shorter than the literal translation or the German original. It often occurs that one language uses, in certain circumstances, redundancies which need not be translated in another. "In Frage kommende" cannot be translated literally. There is an English equivalent for the negative of this expression (das kommt nicht in Frage—that is out of the question) but not for the positive form. "Appropriate" accurately gives the meaning of the participial form. "British negotiators" is an awkward expression and "representatives" would appear in an English newspaper.

3. Urdu.

"Sar saiyid ko jo *ṣariḥ* fauqīyat aur imtiāz bā i'tibār jismānī aur dimāghī qābilīyat ke apne 'ām hamjinson men thā yih 'umdaḥ *shahādat* is bāt ki hai kih jo paiwand yā izdiwāj do ajnabī khān-dān men mutahaqqaq hota hai is se ghair ma'muli nata'ij hote haiḥ."

Oriental languages are, generally speaking, far more difficult to translate into English than European ones. There is a considerable difference in method of expression owing to difference in mentality and, in most cases, a technical difference in syntactical arrangement. The capital difficulty of Urdu syntax can be found in the use of the relative clause, a difficulty far too little indicated by writers of Urdu grammars. The passage chosen is from Hussain Hali's "Life of Sir Saiyad Ahmad" and adequately illustrates this difficulty. The literal translation runs:

"What manifest physical and mental superiority and distinction Sir Saiyad Ahmad (possessed) among the general (run) of his fellow men, this (the superiority) is an important testimony of the fact that what union or marriage is contracted among two foreign families, from this (*i.e.*, the union or marriage) extraordinary results may arise."

It will be seen that, in spite of the apparently involved syntax of this sentence, it expresses an idea which is simple and easily grasped. There should therefore be no difficulty in expressing it in plain English thus:

"The remarkable physical and mental superiority which Sir Saiyad Ahmad possessed over his fellows affords a good illustration of the fact that unusual results may emerge from a union or marriage contracted between persons of different stock."

To meet the requirements of idiomatic English the ideas here expressed in Urdu must be poured into a different mould. Once the basic meaning is properly grasped there should be no difficulty about this. It will be observed that the figure of two abstract nouns in opposition to each other, here "*fauqīyat* aur *imtiāz*" is usually conveniently translated into English by an adjective and a noun, here by "remarkable superiority." "Remarkable" also embraces the idea of "*sariḥ*"—manifest. "Mutahaqqaq" is literally "proved" or perhaps "established" but either of these words would be awkward in the English version.

One of the principal troubles of the English translator is that he is inclined to assume that foreigners are apt to express bizarre ideas which are incapable of being rendered into ordinary English. It is extremely rare to find expressed in a foreign language an idea which cannot be exactly expressed in English. Amplification or circumlocution may be necessary but if an idea is there it can be expressed in English. The position is not quite the same with isolated words. A language may have words for objects, persons or institutions which are unknown in England. It is usually safer to give the original word together with an explanation than to attempt a translation. Russian contains many of such words but there is a regrettable tendency to believe that all Russian institutions are extraordinary. In very many cases exact English equivalents exist. In other cases old words have been given new functions under the new régime. It is absurd to translate "militsya" as "militia;" it means "police." "Otryad" is no longer "a detachment" but "a force" or "troops" or, in the Russian Air Force, "a squadron." "Samolyot" once meant a "magic carpet" but it now means an "aeroplane." If some diehards were attended to it would be necessary to translate "otryad Samolyotov" as "a detachment of magic carpets" instead of "a squadron of aircraft." The B.B.C. recently announced what was evidently a translation of a French communiqué which contained the phrase "A German patrol involving strong effectives." The plain English for this is "a strong German patrol" so why in Heaven's name not say so?

By themselves words have no meaning: it is the context on which meaning depends. It is for this reason that the dictionary, widely believed to be the universal arbiter of meaning, is such a dangerous weapon in the hands of the inexperienced or inefficient translator. No dictionary ever contained or could contain the meaning of every word in every conceivable sense in which that word could be used. If a translator cannot make out the general sense of the matter he has to translate without constant reference to a dictionary it means that he does not know the language well enough. He may legitimately require a dictionary to help him with unusual or technical words but he must not rely on the dictionary for the *meaning*. The writer does not wish to belittle the vast industry which lexicographers have put into their works and he himself is the proud possessor of two dictionaries which contain words meaning "a woman with a not unpleasing moustache" and "a place where two he-goats butt each other mutually."

The perspicacious reader will by this time have realised that what the writer advocates is this: If you have grasped a concrete idea either from a foreign language or some other source and wish to write it down in English, you should do so in plain but idiomatic language unembellished with turgid redundancies and without trying to capture what you think is the atmosphere of the original. To avoid misunderstanding it must be added that no reference here is made to poetic imagery. The writer is not suggesting that Keats instead of:

"Full on this casement shone the wintry moon
And threw warm gules on Madeline's fair breast"

should have written: "The winter moon shone right on this window and made red marks on Madeline's light-coloured chest."

We are living in an age when words count and count tremendously. They count even when they have no meaning. The demagogue, party leader or dictator will pour forth words to create a smoke-screen of hysteria behind which he will deploy his forces and advance towards his unromantically conceived objective. Stuart Chase has pointed out that when a Hitler shouts:

"The Aryan Fatherland, which has nursed the souls of heroes, calls upon you for the supreme sacrifice in which you, in whom flows heroic blood, will not fail, and which will echo forever down the corridors of history. . ."

he may be, and in fact is, met with frantic applause. This is because words like "souls," "supreme sacrifice," "heroic" and "forever" are, to quote from Chase, "mere semantic blanks, which have no discoverable referent." If such a Hitler displayed his real intention in plain and ungarnished language and said, for instance,

"Every adult in the geographical area called Germany will receive not more than two loaves of bread per week for the next six months"

his reception would be quite different. Here every word counts; every word means something.

We in England can consider ourselves fortunate that we have a Prime Minister who lays no claim to any oratorical gifts but who prefers to address the country, to use his own words, "in such plain language as he has at his command." Let the translator put this by the side of the maxim about writing "bosh" and if he has no plain language at his command let him quickly acquire some or else give up translating altogether.

O'REGAN PREPARES FOR WAR

By F.M.M.

*[Being letters from 2nd Lieutenant Michael O'Regan,
the newest-joined subaltern of the 1st Bolton Irish
(Territorials) to his brother Pat.]*

MY DEAR PAT,

Our soldiering is more advanced now and consists of lectures and exercises. I hate the lectures but the exercises are grand, and why they pay the Regulars I can't understand. Why, this is the best holiday I've ever had in my life!

Yesterday we were given a lecture on the attack by our Instructor, Captain Waverley, and he explained to us that Napoleon had conquered most of the world by always attacking.

Well, having learnt all about the attack, we went out to do a defence exercise. That may seem funny to you Pat, but instructors like to make us do things we know nothing about, so that they can tell us all the things we ought to have done.

Now you start off an exercise with an Opening Situation, which is meant to tell you what you are supposed to do, but seldom does, as it is all in army language. However, the enemy gets the same kind of thing just to make things equal and eventually one just asks one of the umpires all about it.

I didn't know this until I heard the Colonel saying to an umpire, "Well, Dick, I don't know what the . . . I am meant to do, but I propose to take up a position somewhere near the Blackdene Manor inn."

"For Heaven's sake don't do that," says Dick, "Sure the enemy is coming four miles to the west of that, and you've entirely misread the paper you've been given."

Now I know the east, because it's always on your right, but the Commanding Officer gets them muddled up, and he suggested several other places before Dick said to him, confidentially, "Go to the Cock's Toes."

So we marched there and we were told to dig ourselves in as quickly as possible.

I got my men down to work, and we'd made some fine holes, when up comes the owner of the field, and his language was something awful.

I tried to explain to him that I was digging by order and that if he didn't look out he'd be charged in the rear by a tank, but he just wouldn't listen.

Just then the C. O. came up and pacified him. "Mr. O'Regan," says he, "sure I only meant you to pretend to dig and you've gone and messed up the gentleman's field entirely. Fill up those pits at once and take your platoon into reserve."

So we threw the old earth back again and retired into some long grass, where I disposed my platoon (in imaginary trenches) and went off to eat my lunch.

I was smoking peacefully, with my back to a tree (and to the enemy) when I heard someone say: "Up with your hands. You're my prisoner." I turned round and saw Jimmy Peters, who was one of the enemy. I tried to explain to him that we had a whole battalion and that he seemed to be alone. But he replied that the board he was carrying meant he was a tank (and well chosen he was for it!) and that he himself represented a whole Tank Company.

Well, there we were arguing, when Private Murphy jumps right on top of us and yells: "Halt or I'll fire."

"Don't be silly," says Jim. "I'm a Tank Company."

"That's nothing," replied Murphy. "Sure, I'm the blinking Commander-in-Chief."

Well, you know, Pat, you can't have privates talking to officers like that, so I told Murphy to be off with himself and we'd compromise and let each other go.

We were still talking of old times in Dublin when there was hell let loose all round us. The C. O. was yelling: "Where's the reserve? Positions will be held to the last round and the last man. Steady, boys, and aim just behind the shoulder." The last remark referred to a tiger which he keeps telling us he shot, but you know as well as I do that he never left Dublin until he went to Bolton!

Well, I realised that we were being attacked, so I crept back and collected my platoon and then we crawled forward until we could see the enemy closing in on our men.

The C. O. was gesticulating wildly and shouting that fourteen machine-guns and the whole of the Bolton Irish had been firing on the enemy for half an hour and that they were all dead and that the whole show was absurd and a few other things.

By then there was a grand old muddle, our men and the enemy and dozens of umpires all mixed up together. And it was then that I remembered what old Nap had said, "To yours la attack" or something like that. So I let a piercing yell and thundered forward for the honour of the Bolton Irish and to rescue the C. O.

Private Murphy was shooting blanks all over the place and the other boys' bayonets were shining in the sun fit to frighten the devil himself. That finished it and the whole outfit ran like blazes with us chasing them like flaming demons.

Remembering what you had told me about taking three lines of trenches on the Somme in 1916, I led my gallant lads on until we reached a line of bushes and it was there the tragedy occurred, Pat.

Private Murphy is so impetuous. I saw him burrowing in a bush with his bayonet and shouting "Come out you silly old . . ., or be jabbers, I'll give you the other three inches!"

A purple face rose, quickly, from behind the bush, with its mouth full of lunch, and, Patsy dear, I recognised the District Commander!

Between the muffled flow of bread and cheese, I heard him shouting for "this man's officer," and I knew he meant me.

But I went to ground like a rabbit, and when they did find me, I just told them I couldn't say a word, as I was dead.

And dead I nearly was by the time they'd finished with telling me all the things I'd done wrong. What with fixing bayonets and Private Murphy shooting off blanks at five yards range and digging up the poor man's field, I learnt a lot from that exercise.

Goodbye, Patsy. I'm glad the old sow's litter is doing well.

Your loving brother,

MIKE.

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE NOTES

It is hoped that the following few notes may be of interest to some of our readers.

War Measures.—Among other war measures taken in India are:

The mobilisation of the Royal Indian Navy whose escort vessels have come under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station.

The move to war stations of portions of the air forces in India.

The embodiment of fourteen battalions of the Indian Territorial Force and the constitution of five additional battalions.

The raising of nineteen garrison companies formed from *ex* soldiers to take over duties and free active units for training.

A number of new units have been raised.

Ordnance factories have been expanded.

Indian States Forces.—The loyalty of the Indian Princes to the Crown has again shewn itself, as it did in 1914, by their generous offers to place the entire resources of their States at the disposal of the King-Emperor. These comprise gifts of money towards the prosecution of the war, offers by Rulers of their personal services and troops including units of cavalry, artillery, sappers, infantry, and transport, also a field hospital, motor ambulances and labour corps. The War Office have already availed themselves of some of these offers. In India the situation is such that at present full advantage cannot be taken of all the offers of troops, although five Indian States Forces units have already moved into British India.

The Nepalese Contingent.—Nepal has generously offered a contingent of two brigades for service in and on the frontier of India. An advanced party has already arrived and the main body will follow in March.

Modernisation.—One of the results of the war has been to accelerate the programme of modernisation of the Army in India which had been drawn up before the outbreak of war. This

will affect a number of cavalry and artillery regiments and infantry battalions in the near future.

A wing of the Fighting Vehicles School has been formed at Kirkee.

Indian Cavalry Armoured Regiments.—The 13th D. C. O. Lancers and the Scinde Horse completed their conversion to fully trained armoured regiments in October and relieved the two remaining Companies of the Royal Tank Regiment on the frontier. The Royal Tank Regiment Companies were disbanded and the personnel sent Home with the exception of some who have remained to assist in the mechanisation of further units of the Army in India.

The Officers Training School.—Except for cadets now at the Indian Military Academy or about to enter it as the result of the October examination, no more permanent regular commissions will be granted in the Indian Army. Emergency commissions for the duration of the war and for so long thereafter as services are required will be given instead.

The Officers' Training School for young British officers has opened at Belgaum and fifty officers between the ages of twenty and thirty are now undergoing training. Subsequent pupils will enter the school as cadets and will be between the ages of twenty-one and thirty. The School will also cater for young officers of the Unattached List, Indian Army, and for junior officers of the Territorial Army on their first arrival in India.

Other Schools are being opened for officers of the Ordnance at Jubbulpore and for Engineers at the Headquarters of Sapper and Miner Corps.

The Senior Officers' School has closed down. The School of Education has moved to Pachmari.

Examinations.—Officers' promotion and retention examinations and the obligation to attend certain courses and to pass language tests have been put in abeyance until the end of the war.

The Staff College entrance examination is likewise not being held; but two short courses of about five months' duration will be given each year to selected officers to train them for lower grade staff duties.

Signals.—Considerable reorganisation of the Indian Signal Corps has taken place. Deccan District and Lucknow District Signals have been formed and other changes made.

Changes in Commands.—The term "Brigade Area" has been abolished and the equivalent command is now known as an "Area." The Poona Area has ceased to be independent and is included in the Deccan District. Jubbulpore Area has become "Independent."

Changes in Dress.—Except in cavalry and artillery units which remain horsed, or when actually mounted, all officers of the British Service in India now wear trousers or the equivalent on ceremonial parades, and on other occasions only wear breeches, boots, leggings, spurs and so forth until they are worn out.

The same rules apply to officers of the rank of colonel and above in the Indian Army. Other officers of the Indian Army retain their original order of dress when on parade with their own units; but if not on parade with their own units may either retain their original dress or conform with their senior officers or the British Service.

Recruitment of Anglo-Indians.—Recruitment in the Royal Army Medical Corps has been opened to Anglo-Indians and three hundred have so far been enlisted.

Pensions.—With effect from the 1st August, 1938, the British Army rates of pension, exclusive of Indian element, will apply to the following Indian Army officers: general officers, except in the Indian Medical Service, King's commissioned officers of cavalry, infantry or general service, Royal Indian Army Service Corps, and colonels promoted therefrom. The minimum service for pension is twenty years. "Non-combatant" officers remain under the old rules which were in force before the 1st August, 1938. Existing Indian elements are retained.

There are exceptions in the case of majors passed as fit for command who are crowded out and fail to get it. Officers of the Special Unemployed List remain under their special rules. Further details are given in Army Instruction (India) 186 of 1939.

AIR FORCE NOTES

Hitherto all pilots and mechanics for the Royal Air Force in India and all pilots for the Indian Air Force have been

trained at Air Ministry establishments in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

It has now been decided to commission, recruit, and train in India, British, Indian, and Anglo-Indian personnel for war services to fill existing vacancies in the Air Forces in India.

Training of pilots, air crews and mechanics is now being undertaken in Air Force units at two stations in India. Some mechanics have been entered into service units direct. The pilots selected for training will already have flown light aircraft in Indian flying clubs, and will only require training on service aircraft and in service subjects.

It is anticipated that, at a later date, training will be carried out by civil aviation. In this connection it is hoped to make use of the generous offer of assistance made by certain Rulers of Indian States.

REVIEWS

BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY

(*The Royal Institute of International Affairs—1s.od.*)

"Long-term trends in foreign policy are, in the final analysis, the expression of a nation's vital interests." From this premise, Mr. G. E. Hubbard, Far Eastern Research Secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, cites four British vital interests which he claims affect our foreign policy. In brief they are:

- (a) Livelihood—the maintenance of the national standards of life.
- (b) Security—safety from hostile action against British possessions and essential lines of communication and supply.
- (c) Peace—preservation from the evils of war as such with its modern potentialities of unrestricted destruction.
- (d) Political Liberty—the preservation of British liberties from the danger of submergence by antagonistic "ideologies."

In the safeguarding of these interests, the author considers that British Far Eastern policy has followed certain definite maxims.

The first of these is the doctrine of the "open door." This accords with British economic interests—for the present British standards of living are dependent on Great Britain's world-wide trade and her banking, financial and shipping interests. As a corollary to the maintenance of the "open door," British policy has aimed at preserving Chinese integrity. An independent China is the best guarantee against the danger of other Powers acquiring exclusive rights detrimental to British trade. To safeguard security, Great Britain has relied on forces for regional defence and the preservation of a balance of power to protect her position. This idea of maintaining a balance of power later evolved into the concept of collective security. As regards the general preservation of peace, Great Britain with many other nations, adopted, as a ruling principle, the support of the

League of Nations and favoured limitation of armaments and the renunciation of war, until the breakdown of the collective security system became apparent.

The threat to British political liberty is too recent a development for Far Eastern policy to have evolved a definite principle regarding it, but it has led to a linking up with nations of similar ideas and, in particular, closer collaboration with France and the United States.

The general objectives briefly described above, are traced in political action during the course of the last hundred years. The period is divided into five phases:

- (a) From 1834, when the British Government superseded the ubiquitous East India Company in the conduct of relations with the Chinese authorities, to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5.
- (b) From the Sino-Japanese War to the first Great War of 1914-18.
- (c) The period of the Great War.
- (d) From 1919 to the "Manchurian Affair" of 1931.
- (e) From 1931 to June, 1939.

Mr. Hubbard gives a masterly survey of British Far Eastern policy in this small volume. It is necessarily condensed, but it is presented extremely well and he succeeds in showing that British policy has been based on deeply founded and strongly persistent principles. The recent challenges to British policy and their environment overshadowed by force are described in some detail. Having finished the book, most readers will agree, we think, that the British policy adopted to meet the new situation has become much more comprehensible to them, and was generally in accordance with British vital interests.

A. J. M. W.

GREAT BRITAIN AND PALESTINE, 1915-1939

(*The Royal Institute of International Affairs*—2s. 6d.)

Everyone is interested in international affairs to-day, and there can be few better guides through their maze than the concise and objective statements of facts which are issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The Palestine mandate imposes the following responsibilities, amongst others, upon the British Government: To safeguard Arab rights, to establish a National Home for the Jews and to develop self-government for the joint community. The Government have declared from time to time—rather optimistically—that these objects are not incompatible, but the efforts to attain them have necessitated eight commissions of enquiry to date and extensive military operations and the problem is yet not solved. There is so much to be said on both sides. The age-old longing of the Jews to return to the Promised Land and to possess at last a homeland of their own—a longing intensified by the violent anti-Semitism of the Nazis—must be considered together with the Arab desire for self-government, and a real fear of being overwhelmed by the increasing numbers, better organisation and economic power of the Jews.

That the problem is not only a national one is clearly brought out. The two communities are not merely local entities but form part of two groups with religious and racial affinities all over the world. It concerns 16 million Jews and over 200 million Moslems of which one half are within the British Empire. The Arab States and Egypt are also concerned, and British communications are affected. The League of Nations has been closely and often critically concerned with the working of its mandate; the United States have kept close touch with all developments, and in every other country where Christianity is taught, there is deep anxiety for the welfare of the Holy Land. The problems of Palestine, therefore, take on international dimensions.

The Arabs base their claims largely on the promise of the British Government made through Sir Henry McMahon in 1915 to (the then) Sharif Hussein of Mecca regarding the areas in which Arab independence would be recognised. The pledge can be interpreted in more than one way, but most readers will agree, we think, that the Arab interpretation is reasonable, inasmuch as Palestine was not specifically excluded. On the other hand, the Jewish claims to a National Home were publicly supported by the British Government before the war was over and appear to have been tacitly accepted by the Arab leaders. Incidentally, it is of interest to note that the Balfour


Declaration was not inspired by Imperialist motives. Dr. Weizmann has stated that the British Government agreed to the Declaration on one condition: that Palestine should not be the charge of Great Britain. Some readers will rate, more highly than before, the sense of the Government of that day.

There is little doubt that the present mandate could be implemented provided the Arabs and Jews had the gift of compromise, but there has been few signs of the development of this invaluable political lubricant. The authors quote from "The Seven Pillars of Wisdom"—"The Semites had no half-tones in their register of vision. They know only truth and untruth, belief and unbelief, without our hesitating retinue of finer shades." It is the recognition of finer shades which helps many illogically organised British institutions to function smoothly and, for the most part, efficiently. Lawrence was writing of the Arabs, but the description also applies to the majority of the Jews in Palestine, and it is the absence of compromise which makes the Palestine problem—and other minority problems nearer India—so difficult to solve.

"Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939," traces the history of Palestine from the promises to the Arabs and Jews in 1915 and 1917 respectively down to the publication of the British Government's proposals in May, 1939. The problems connected with economic development, land settlement and Jewish immigration are clearly set out and the reports of the various Royal Commissions and the reactions to them are examined in detail and presented in succinct and readable form.

It is encouraging to note that since its publication the outlook has become brighter. After the declaration of war, there has been a return to more normal conditions and both Jews and Arabs have offered enthusiastic support to the British cause. It is to be hoped that the authorities responsible for the administration of Palestine and the two main communities will use the opportunity for a better understanding, leading to political and economic progress. The alternative is a bitter struggle which will postpone self-government indefinitely and prove a source of weakness to the British Commonwealth.

A. J. M. W.



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EDITORIAL

The War

The war on land, and possibly in the air too, is expected to become more active this spring. The first phase may be considered to have been in existence for about a year. During that period Germany has been engaged in extending the territory under her control and in trying, often with success, to frighten the small nations on her borders. The formal declarations of war last September affected this procedure considerably, but not so much as was expected by many. A second phase may have begun while this is being printed: the spring and autumn issues of the journal seem fated to go to press at a time when major changes in the international situation are in progress or about to take place. Both sides, however, maintain that time is in their favour, and Germany has still a variety of directions in which she may employ her forces to greater immediate profit than in the west. She has used from time to time her normal preliminary methods of threats both verbal and physical so as to remind her weaker neighbours in the Netherlands, Scandinavia and south-eastern Europe of the possibility of at least temporarily unpleasant consequences if they fail to please. In these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that the smaller neutral countries who have to suffer at the hands of the belligerents should be more inclined to protest at the inconveniences imposed by the Allies, when protests can do no harm and serve at any rate to maintain a feeling of independence, than at the indignities and losses inflicted by Germany, to whom protests would be made in vain and who might seize upon them as a pretext for the commission of further outrages amounting possibly to declared war. It is proper that the Allies should not be driven from the legitimate use of their power at sea as tended to be the case in the last war. And since we are in no position to give immediate and complete protection, we should be as patient as possible with neutrals who remain outwardly friendly with a nation which takes the lives and property of their subjects in complete disregard of humanity and the law.

We should remember that in our own history our traders have often carried on their business with nations against which the armed forces were fighting. The high profits to be made from trading during war, even with such a country as Germany, add considerably to the incentive to maintain friendly relations that is provided by threats of further unpleasantness. Germany is likely to continue to get away with a good deal, and the prospect of neutral countries retaliating by any restriction of supplies to Germany is remote.

This does not mean, however, that the Nazi leaders may not be tempted to present their people with a further easy success, or that they will not try to secure complete possession of resources of iron or oil.

* * * *

As far as the war between the Allies and Germany is concerned, the Allies are in the fortunate position of being on the defensive and yet having the initiative. This is the situation which the genius of the Duke of Wellington so successfully brought about in his tactics on the field of battle, and it is one which is supposed to be peculiarly suited to our national characteristics. It is not to be maintained entirely passively, however, and is for that reason not without its dangers. The warnings given by statesmen have been needed. We cannot assume that the war is going to be won without an effort or without a great deal of inconvenience and even hardship. Up to date the chief brunt has fallen on the navy and the coastal command of the Royal Air Force. The air force as a whole and the army have not been extended. The war has only touched the general populace by imposing a few minor restrictions and dislocations. It would be dangerous to assume that this state of affairs can continue in any sphere. In this country, in particular the victory of the Allies seems to be taken for granted. Such confidence is satisfactory up to a point. The magnificent response from the loyal citizens of British India and from the Indian States shows that many realise the need for effort as well.

It is possible that altogether too much use has been made of the word "defence." In justifying military expenditure when the popularity of disarmament reinforces the disinclination to insure, and for greater comfort to the taxpayer during peace, the

description of the navy, the army and the air force as defence services is not only politic but accurate. The British Empire does not seek to increase its prosperity or area by attacking any other nation. It seeks only to defend its heritage of freedom, the standard of living and culture of its peoples and the development of its subject races. At present, however, what the Empire is determined to defend is threatened by Germany; we are fighting for a cause which is vital to us. A purely defensive attitude would have to be maintained for a very long time at immense cost and would then have no effect. Germany must be defeated and the threat removed. Further, we are not fighting this war for ourselves alone, but to restore the independence of the Poles and Czechs and the freedom of the smaller nations and so to establish perhaps a secure and lasting peace. These objectives, too, will not be achieved without the defeat of Germany. Though we may attack at present chiefly with the economic weapon and await attack with our army and air force, we must and certainly shall attack.

It might be advisable to give our defence services some other generic term and to make Lord Chatfield Minister for the co-ordination of attack.

* * * *

The navies of Great Britain, the Dominions and France have achieved the object of their attack by driving enemy ships of war or commerce off the surface of the seas almost immediately on the outbreak of war, so that they are now only concerned with the interception of such vessels as may try to get home from the neutral ports where they have sheltered and with the protection of trade against submarines, mines and the occasional surface raider. The navies have been successful in this task. It is unnecessary to quote figures which will have changed by the time they are printed and which are available in the daily press; Germany's submarine losses have been heavy, the sinking of ships in convoy has been reduced to a very small percentage of the total sailings, and the bottling up and ignominious end of the *Graf Spee* are sufficient indications that the life of a surface raider is likely to be either ineffective or short. The submarine seems to be mastered and the mine under very fair control. There will continue to be losses, however. The protection of neutral shipping provides a difficult problem since the acceptance of protection on a large

scale would lead neutrals into further trouble with Germany. Consequently, neutral losses are heavier than Allied ones and there is a possibility that Germany may meet with some success in compelling neutrals to cease trading with the Allies. Germany is undoubtedly building submarines as fast as she can; and crews who can be ordered to sink practically every ship they see irrespective of nationality or type do not need such a high degree of training as those that are required to co-operate with surface warships and to wage war in a civilised manner. Germany has not so far launched a concerted campaign by submarine, aircraft and mine in co-operation. It may be that she has not the means or the determination to do so; but this would be a rash assumption. At sea, we have grounds for satisfaction; but not yet for complacent optimism.

* * * *

In the air it seems amply established that both our fighters and bombers are superior in quality to the opposition they have to meet. Fighters have shown that they are able to inflict heavy losses on enemy raiding our coasts. Bombers carrying out reconnaissance and dropping leaflets well over the interior of Germany have been left comparatively unmolested for some reason; but in visits to the Heligoland Bight which have been opposed by the latest type of German fighter in considerable numbers they have proved able to inflict more damage than they receive. As far as quality of machines and pilots are concerned, we are entitled to feel proud. In quantity, the six months breathing space should have enabled us to make good some of the disparity which unfortunately existed at the outbreak of war. The Allied potential for expansion of the aircraft industry was greater than that of Germany which was already working at extreme pressure. Our reserves of pilots and facilities for training with the whole Empire to draw upon should assure the supply of personnel. When Germany decides to make full use of her air force we should be in a good position to meet it and to retaliate if need be against proper objectives.

* * * *

The army has been left comparatively unmolested to raise, train and equip the numbers which had been somewhat tardily realised as necessary. The problems of industry and man-power which took so long to co-ordinate in the last war have not been

neglected. It has been realised that forces should not be put into the field until reserves of equipment are ample and supply and administrative services of all kinds are complete. In the administrative field at least the mistakes of the last war are unlikely to be repeated. The Finnish campaign has proved that numbers alone do not win battles; the available man-power is evidently to be disposed so as to satisfy the needs of industry and agriculture. Even so, the numbers available for the fighting forces are formidable. About this time last year the strength of the Territorial Army was raised to 340,000. During the summer 200,000 of the Militia were added to the Regular Army and its reserves. The subsequent calling up of batches of recruits under the National Service Act will have raised the numbers available for Home Defence, in the British Expeditionary Force and under training to above the million mark. This figure should be doubled by the end of the year. An additional reinforcement has come with the contingents from the Dominions, the Canadian division in Great Britain, the Second Australian Imperial Force and the New Zealand troops in the Near East. From these Dominions there will be more to come and India's potential is not yet exhausted. The Empire should thus be able to compete with an extension of front if necessary.

In the west it is evident that the best troops and equipment and a high standard of training will be required. Experience in France has confirmed the evidence of the Polish campaign that the German soldier is an effective fighter. The undoubted shortage of senior non-commissioned officers and officers and the general effect of the leader principle coupled with a deterioration in the educational system in Germany will be to the disadvantage of the present German army as compared with that of 1914. On the other hand there is a better feeling between officer and man than there was then, and the rank and file, though in some cases weedy, are inured to hardship and are fit. Their training has taught them field-craft from youth onwards and they have learnt that the supreme military crime is to be inactive. Reports indicate that the excessive regularity which used to be so evident in 1914—18 is no longer of assistance to the opposite side. How long the present standard can be maintained remains to be seen. The Germans have apparently already begun to use shock troops.

* * * *

**The New
Army**

The Armed Forces (Conditions of Service) Act is a comprehensive measure one of whose results was to make the British Army, like the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, virtually one large unit. A few members of the Territorial Army who enlisted under the old terms of service before 1933 and have not accepted the full liabilities now undertaken are exceptions. Otherwise, compulsory transfer from corps to corps and posting to any unit within a corps are legal. There is no distinction between the Regular Army, the Territorial Army or the Militia. This is a further step towards the mitigation of the regimental system which has been gradually progressing since 1862. It is described as a step rather than a culmination because in practice distinction between corps with different functions must necessarily remain and because at the end of the war a partial reversion to the regimental system is probably inevitable. That system has done more than anything else to make the British Army what it is. The same results could not have been achieved without it. But its fullest observance is impracticable in war and there have been many officers, principally junior ones, of the opinion that its disadvantages outweigh advantages which could in any case be secured by other means. It is certain that the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force have each their esprit de corps which inspires the service as a whole without detriment to pride in smaller units or a healthy spirit of competition. A comparison between the methods by which two army units hand over a set of barracks and two ships' companies hand over a ship in the Royal Navy will give an example of one of the failings of the regimental system.

During this war the early disappearance of the distinction between the Territorial and Regular Armies, the rapid expansion and consequent dilution which took place immediately before war was declared, and the breathing space which has meant that the members of the old Regular Army are still in existence will probably cause a bigger change in the mental and social outlook of that service than occurred as a result of the last great war or of the efforts of Mr. Cardwell or any of his successors. The Territorial Army and the Militia will have contributed a number of men in the ranks with intelligence and initiative above that of the normal level of the old Regular Army which itself had been steadily rising. A similar change may take place among the

junior officers owing to the large number of commissions obtained through the ranks and the fact that future commissions will only be obtained in that way. Whether or not compulsory military training becomes permanent, these factors are certain profoundly to affect the structure of the British Army.

The Indian Army was extensively reorganised after the South African War and again after the last war. There does not appear to be any likelihood of changes such as may occur in the British Army. The regimental system cannot even temporarily be abandoned. Fundamental changes are improbable; but the effects of mechanisation, of service abroad, of expanded numbers and of contact with other troops outside India may be considerable.

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During the last war 621,224 Indian combatants and 474,789 non-combatants served overseas and very large quantities of ammunition, equipment of all kinds, supplies, clothing, textiles, timber and raw materials were provided. By this time twenty-five years ago India had overseas: two cavalry and four infantry divisions, two cavalry and seven infantry brigades, and a mixed force equivalent to a brigade group as well as base and L. of C. troops. In addition, all but nine of the regular British infantry battalions and the bulk of the horse field and heavy artillery had been sent to Europe and replaced by Territorial Force units.

India has not been called upon to the same extent this time. The achievement which even her present contribution represents is brought home, however, by the recently published appropriation accounts for the Defence Services for the year 1938-39. In that year unexpected expenditure on operations in Waziristan and in improving conditions of service entailed a reduction in the amount allotted for reorganisation and re-equipment from Rs. 136 lakhs to an inescapable Rs. 36 lakhs including the diversion of Rs. 80 lakhs from the sinking fund and Defence Reserve Fund towards meeting normal charges. In addition, arbitrary reductions had to be made in the grants for such important items as training and relief moves. All this was in spite of savings resulting from the withdrawal of British units in advance of the modernisation measures which were to compensate for their loss, from the absence of Indian Army units on loan to the Imperial Government and from the fall in the price of foodstuffs.

In presenting his first budget to the Legislative Assembly, the Finance Member was able to refer to the mitigation of the difficulties of his task brought about by the favourable economic conditions in India resulting from the war. Temporary dislocation at the start and a shortage of freight have not seriously interfered with export trade. There is a demand for many articles which India can produce and the Finance Member was able to give the Assembly a list of some of the countries to which war materials have been supplied.

It is quite clear, however, that any probable increase in prosperity is unlikely so to affect the wealth of the country as to enable it to maintain unaided the defence forces on land, at sea and in the air which are required for complete security, or to provide the opportunities for military service that are asked for by the people. This being so the agreement which the Finance Member announced had been reached with His Majesty's Government as to the division between the two Governments of the liability for defence expenditure incurred by India during the war is highly satisfactory. India's liability is as clearly defined as that of any country can be. It amounts to:

- (1) The normal net annual cost of defence as represented by the 1939-40 budget estimate after subtracting from it the non-effective charges.
- (2) An addition to represent the rise in prices. This will be arrived at by the application of appropriate percentage increases to the relevant heads of the normal budget. It is, of course, a part of the maintenance cost of the normal army in India.
- (3) The cost of war measures undertaken by India in her own interest such as: the embodiment of Indian Territorial Force battalions; the employment of portions of the Auxiliary Force (India); port and local naval defence; the establishment of the Volunteer Auxiliary Air Force; additional accommodation for troops and stores and so forth.

In addition, a lump sum of rupees one crore will be contributed towards the maintenance overseas of the external defence troops referred to in the report of the Chatfield Committee. These troops are now part of the garrisons protecting Egypt and

Malaya, and contribute, together with the British, Australian and New Zealand forces, to the security of the overseas trade of India.

The defence budget for 1940-41 is Rs. 53.52 lakhs, the amounts apportioned to the above items being in lakhs of rupees: 36; 77; 2.00 and 6.59 respectively. The balance consists of non-effective charges.

India is thus in a more fortunate position than many neutrals in her ability to limit increases in defence expenditure. Most people will agree with the Finance Member that the settlement is favourable to India and conceived by His Majesty's Government in a generous spirit. In this country we have a large supply of men who are eager for military service, and much of the machinery for maintaining them. The country lacks the money to add substantially to her present commitments or to give much further help in the prosecution of a war which is as vital to her as to the rest of the Empire. There is now a prospect that our surplus resources will not be wasted for this lack of money.

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Expenditure which though classed as abnormal seems to be distressingly regular will again be incurred over operations on the western frontier.

Waziristan These comprise the clean-up of the Ahmedzai salient together with the construction of roads and posts to make the area more accessible, and measures to restore the authority of Government in the settled districts bordering on Waziristan.

The expected cold weather lull in this area failed to materialise and gang activity, sniping, damage to roads, telephone lines and water supplies have continued at the normal scale. The kidnapping of Major Dugal, I.M.S., had a disturbing effect and centred interest on the scattered Shabi Khel of South Waziristan who were responsible. Tribal allowances and lorry contracts were suspended; deposited rifles were forfeited; a somewhat abortive round-up took place in the settled districts; and air proscription was imposed. This made the tribe more recalcitrant at first; but they were unsuccessful in persuading other sections to join them and eventually Major Dugal was released with the aid of Mahsud pressure and without payment of ransom. The Shabi Khel have now made full submission and have repaired some of

the damage that they did to the roads. Their chief bad character, Fazal Din, remains unreconciled and demands heavy compensation for the punishment meted out to his tribe.

Raids into the settled districts accompanied by numerous unpleasant outrages have increased. The majority of these have been directed from the Ahmedzai salient. Air proscription, which has been imposed almost continuously since the inhabitants failed to keep their agreement last spring, has not been sufficient in this very difficult country to stop the activities of gangs of bad characters inspired by the Faqir of Ipi. On the 3rd February, in broad daylight, a military party were ambushed and a M.E.S. officer, a serjeant of the Royal Signals and a M. E. S. messenger were killed. This was only one of a number of affairs of which the local inhabitants from sympathy or fear have given no warning.

Fortunately there now seems a prospect of cleaning up the Ahmedzai salient and restoring morale and government in the settled districts. The attitude of the main tribes remains satisfactory and opposition seems to come only from the worst characters of all sections.

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The Finnish campaign has shown once again the superiority in battle of good troops well led over mere numbers even though those numbers may also be better equipped with artillery aircraft and tanks. The terrain favoured the Finns; but only because they were skilful enough to take advantage of it. Unfortunately overwhelming numbers prevailed in the end and the Finns were not able to hold out indefinitely without more assistance than had so far reached them. Credits cannot immediately be turned into material and foreign material of varied types requires training in its use. Finland's chief need was for soldiers to relieve tired troops and to form a strategic reserve. Such foreign volunteers as arrived had to be trained and could not be flung straight into battle. There was no route for more regular assistance.

The main objectives for an army invading Finland lie on the fairly open coastal plain on which is the capital and the most populated and industrial areas. The approach from the Russian military base of Leningrad is narrowed at the Karelian isthmus

by Lake Ladoga. The Mannerheim Line was constructed from east to west across this isthmus, the east and centre protected by streams and forests, the western sector more open. Beyond Lake Ladoga and in rear of the Mannerheim Line a railway runs north and slightly east; it supplied lateral communication for the Mannerheim Line and a route to the defenders north of Lake Ladoga. Further to the north-west there is another chain of lakes running north and south and a north-south railway beyond them again. A few lines cross this area from east to west: but the loss of Viipuri threatened the safety of the first lateral railway and would have entailed diversion of supplies to forces on the eastern fronts by long detours. The single Russian railway to Murmansk runs parallel to and some distance from Finland's eastern frontier. Sparse roads lead westwards into Finland through forests. The lack of communications limited the number of Russian troops that could be employed first north of Lake Ladoga as a somewhat distant threat to the flank of the Mannerheim Line, secondly further north against the "wasp waist" formed by the head of the gulf of Bothnia, and thirdly in the extreme north where an open sea and a good road connect the ports of Murmansk and Petsamo.

It was on this eastern frontier that the Finns were able to secure their biggest successes. During December the Russians advanced well across the frontier. Towards the end of the month the Finns counter-attacked, using their superior mobility over difficult snow-bound country to raid the Murmansk railway, cut communications, and surround the bewildered Russians who seem to have advanced blindly without safeguarding their vulnerable lines of supply. During January the Finns continued to drive the Russians back. Opposite the wasp waist one division was apparently surrounded and destroyed. The process was repeated in the area north of Lake Ladoga where a second division was rounded up and a third defeated.

In the extreme north the Russians were able to advance a certain distance and secure the nickel mines at Salmijarvi. The severe conditions of winter have prevented any very active operations in this sector.

In the Karelian isthmus the Finns withdrew slowly according to plan until they reached the Mannerheim Line with which

the Russian forces made contact in the middle of December. From then on the Russians attacked repeatedly with no regard for expenditure of material or loss of life, evidently determined to restore their military reputation before the snows and thaws of spring should hamper operations. The front is only fifty miles from Leningrad and served by two railways. The Russians were able to bring up fresh supplies of men and material in the numbers necessary to make good their very heavy losses. During the latter half of December and the whole of January attacks met with no success. Towards the end of January the ice of the Gulf of Riga began to be strong enough to bear troops and this was a vital factor in the campaign. During February very heavy attacks with formations superior to those that had been used at first and supported by tanks and large quantities of not conspicuously efficient artillery were at length able to gain a footing in the western or easiest sector of the Mannerheim Line. After four weeks of fierce fighting the Russians had advanced twenty miles. Using the ice, they captured Koivisto Island which had enfiladed their attack. This helped them to secure the important railway junction of Viipuri jeopardising the remainder of the Mannerheim Line and the front north of Lake Ladoga.

The Russian air force has been used in the expected manner. Raids all over the country caused considerable dislocation and no doubt interfered with production for the army. Loss of morale and of civil lives, which was doubtless the real object, was negligible. Heavy loss was incurred by the invading aircraft.

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The annual meeting of the Balkan Entente which took place early in February appears to have ended satisfactorily with prospects of increased cohesion between its members but not to the exclusion of other nations of south-eastern Europe. **The Balkans** The seven points of the final *communiqué* stressed the desire for peace and co-operation and emphasised economic rather than political agreement. There is to be an economic conference in May. The Balkan Entente, Greece, Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, is superimposed on the geographical group of south-eastern Europe, leaving Hungary and Bulgaria outside. The Entente is based on the maintenance of the status quo against the revisionist claims of the other two

states. Hungary's claims to her ancient frontiers are chiefly at the expense of Rumania. They have been declared in abeyance for the present. Bulgaria's demands are for the southern Dobrudja at the expense of Rumania and an outlet to the Aegean Sea at the expense of Greece. Further complications are introduced by the fact that the "peace front" states of Greece, Rumania and Turkey, enjoying Anglo-French guarantees, are further superimposed on the Balkan Entente leaving out Yugoslavia, a state so placed as to be particularly susceptible to suggestions or threats from the totalitarian powers and therefore anxious to avoid any of the complications of alliances or guarantees. This latter situation led, before the outbreak of war, to tentative movement towards a southern Slav *rapprochement* between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria which caused some misgivings among the other members of the Balkan Entente. Since then the attitude of Yugoslavia in encouraging a reconciliation between Hungary and Rumania has allayed suspicion.

The fact that Italy has a footing as well as an interest in south-eastern Europe has been a source of anxiety to Greece. Italy has shown herself concerned to reduce possible causes of dispute in that area, evidently with a view to stiffening any resistance that it may be necessary to offer to Russia. It is expected that she would strongly oppose the formation of a *bloc*. Fears were felt that an extension of the Balkan Entente by pacts of mutual assistance or otherwise might lead to an immediate descent on Salonika. Considerable speculation attended the conversations between Count Ciano and Count Csaky early in January. *Communiqués* announced the customary unanimity of views, and Italy later stated that she would go to Hungary's aid in the event of a Soviet attack. Italian influence seems in some ways to have reinforced the effect on Hungary of the presence of Russia on her northern frontier and to have led to the reassurance to Rumania on the subject of revisionist claims. At any rate previous suggestions that Bessarabia might more readily be yielded than Transylvania were sharply dispelled by King Carol. This was probably due as much to the lack of Russian success in Finland as to Hungarian reconciliation. Russian lack of success has raised the morale of south-eastern Europe generally. It has also dampened pan-Slav enthusiasm in Bulgaria. If the effect is confined to this and not extended to generate unwarranted optimism, it will be good.

Rumania's problems are the most pressing. Territorial claims from three directions have added to them the potential threat to Rumanian integrity resulting from the possession of surplus resources of oil. At the end of January the Rumanian Government assumed control of the oil industry. Prominence was at the same time given to German dissatisfaction with the quantities of Rumanian oil being delivered, at the shortage of rolling stock and at the failure to implement the agreement of March, 1939 which would have given German capital an increased control of the industry. Rumours of troop movements in the neighbourhood of Lwow (which have been heard again since) increased the general state of nerves.

Rumania has explained that the assumption of control over the oil industry has no ulterior significance. It has merely been done in an effort to find the million and a half tons of oil that she has agreed to supply to Germany without encroaching on the output of companies operating with Allied capital. No un-neutral policy is intended. Rumania is faced with the possibility that, if Germany cannot get delivery of the oil she requires, which may not be easy in the face of Allied competition, she may come and take it undeterred by any difficulty in transporting it to the west where it is required. It is hardly surprising therefore that Rumania views the removal of winter obstacles to movement with apprehension and is mobilising her forces. In these circumstances continued harmony in the Balkans is very desirable. It would be well if the *status quo* states did not rely too greatly on the correct manner in which, for example, Bulgaria has so far pressed her claims. Voluntary concessions might be advisable.

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The visits of Mr. Sumner Welles to European capitals are unlikely to have achieved much more than similar journeys made by United States representatives during the last great war. With another presidential election approaching, the suspicion arises that most moves of this nature are made with a view to their effect on voters. Americans may feel that a good way to avoid being drawn into the war is to stop it, and that it is always worth trying.

There are those who say that in this war, as in the last, the United States of America have abandoned their neutrality by

trading freely with the Allies: by doing so their people make plain their hostility to Germany and their sympathy with Germany's enemies. The impression is increased by the general attitude of the Administration. There are certain points to be borne in mind, however. In America the federal government has a less compact public behind it than in most nations, and one considerably less likely to take its tone from the central executive with which it is often strongly at variance. Official indications of opinion may not be endorsed by even a majority of the people. Sympathy with the Allies is probably due more to dislike of Germany than to active liking for the Allies. Resentment over the conduct of the blockade is less probable now that American ships are forbidden to enter belligerent waters; but American ships are still liable to be stopped in areas where they are allowed to move, and censorship of mails and other small but no doubt irritating matters such as the failure to release news have led to complaints. Too much should not be assumed from the fact that the United States are supplying aircraft and other warlike articles to the Allies. They would supply them to Germany as well if they could get them there and obtain payment, and in fact they are probably carrying on a restricted trade with Germany at the moment if one can judge by the marked increase in exports to Italy and the Scandinavian countries since the outbreak of war. The powerful incentive to continue a profitable trade already referred to above is unlikely to be checked in the United States either by the government or by public opinion. American merchants are not alone in their determination to trade irrespective of artificial restrictions; but they are probably more successful in ignoring them. Colonial merchants, it must be remembered, continued to conduct a profitable trade with the French during the Seven Years' War. During the Revolutionary War influential patriots continued to import from England, and the British in Philadelphia found it easy to buy supplies with their gold while Washington's army was almost starving at Valley Forge. During the War of 1812 a regular trade was carried on with England under a system of bogus privateering, and the army in Canada relied on American contractors for a considerable proportion of its supplies. Finally, the national conscience, the sinking of the *Panay*, the bombing of civilians and humiliation of American citizens has not interrupted the supply of aircraft and other essential war supplies to the Japanese.

In view of this the neutrality legislation passed since the declaration of war, which both opens American markets to the Allies and reduces the risks of bad feeling over the interruption of trade to Germany, is most satisfactory. There is no doubt also that the majority of the American people desire to see Nazism defeated and view the assistance rendered to the Allies with moral approval as well as material satisfaction at the profits made. There does not appear to be the slightest likelihood of the United States entering the war, and the overwhelming wish of the people to keep out of all such entanglements is stronger even than it was twenty-five years ago. There are some, however, who doubt whether America can or even should keep out of the war while the very ferocity of the opposition to any such suggestion indicates that entry is regarded as a possibility. The United States can hardly be said to have entered the last war voluntarily: they were practically forced into it by Germany, in fact by what amounted to an ultimatum.

Only similar circumstances, it is believed, could bring them in again.

HOW TO PLAN AND HOW TO ORDER

By "AUSPEX"

These notes in no way complete the subject: they only form a sort of structure on which one may readily produce a plan. They are written in an attempt to simplify a difficulty for the newly joined officer.

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Designing the Technique on Which to Plan

This is a stage in planning that we do not recognise and a most essential stage. If the reader will consider the different techniques employed recently by the German army against Poland and now against the Allies on the Western front, he will realise that, apart from actual planning, the general technique that a commander decides to employ against his enemy must form a sure foundation on which to build his plans of battle. Without such a technique before him he is at a loss to plan and his commanders are at a loss as to how to implement his plans. We have hitherto neglected this important stage.

In the first place, we know that it is the nature of the ground, or country, the nature of our weapons and the nature of our enemy which determine the type of tactics (there are other factors which influence the actual method or plan to be used from time to time) that we will employ. A true soldier can assess the particular technique, or perhaps one should say, can invent the particular technique, of fighting which will get the very best use from the first two factors, and take full advantage of the particular weakness of the third—the enemy—and so destroy him.

Here is a simple example from the N. E. Frontier of India on a hypothetical occasion.

Enemy.—Savage; armed with old tower muskets: too superstitious to be about at night: habit of occupying stockades to oppose our advance on main paths.

Our weapons.—Rifles.

Ground.—Hilly, with thick forest and many minor tracks.

Deductions

- (i) The enemy's habits invited us to move away from the main tracks, and to move by night, if he were likely to spot daylight movement.

- (ii) Our weapons were not such as to be able to root the enemy out from behind his stockades.
- (iii) The ground gave concealment, so ambushes were indicated.

Technique decided upon.—To move, preferably by night, on minor tracks or through the jungle, discover his stockades and sit in ambush over them till the enemy occupied them in order to oppose the force that he expected on the main track.

That is an example of a soldier's mind picking out the useful considerations to decide for him his "technique." From that technique he reasons out the actual methods, or plan, that he will employ in a particular situation.

Thus from all this, we see that before we can plan we must get our minds perfectly clear as to the technique which we intend to adopt in order to get the best from the ground, the best from our weapons and to give the enemy the worst—"the muddy end." By a proper technique, nearly every disadvantage can be turned to an advantage, our planning becomes more simple, and those working for us have a guide as to the way in which to implement our plans.

Let us look at one example of a really bad technique, which led to bad planning or even to complete lack of planning. In Mesopotamia, during the efforts to relieve Kut in early 1916, we had the following factors before us:

Ground.—Flat, with liquorice bushes about knee-high.

Our weapons.—Rifles and a few medium machine-guns. Very little artillery.

Enemy.—Discipline not too good: armed as we were: no wire obstacles in front of positions: staunch in defence.

The technique we usually employed was to advance by day over the flat country, in successive lines of infantry, under our so-called artillery support, to deliver a frontal attack. Whatever plans were made were, with few exceptions, based on this technique. The attack on Dujailah in March, 1916, started out on a good technique, that of a night movement across the desert, right out to the enemy's flanks. Had this technique continued to rule the plan and a night attack been made on the Turkish position, then we would have broken through it and either overrun or turned the strong redoubts of Dujailah and Sinn Abtar, while our cavalry passed through to hold off the Turkish reserves till we could later attack and smash them. But we went back to our old, bad way and waited for daylight and our pathetically few

guns before we attacked and were heavily thrown back by fresh reserves which had come into the redoubts.

In order that technique may be good it must be susceptible to change as conditions change. In fact, to vary one's technique within the limits set by the factors we have mentioned—country, weapons, enemy—is one way of beating one's enemy and of producing variety in planning.

The planning and fighting of a battle is an art. An artist is always ready to vary his technique in accordance with new inventions in colours, brushes, canvas, in order to produce a better picture. The soldier must be ready in the same way to change his technique. It is vital in these days of scientific development and swift movement. It is economical to change one's technique in good time so as to have a surprise in method ready for the enemy.

A Method of Approach to a Tactical Problem

There is one almost infallible approach to a tactical problem and that is to ask oneself:

"How can I give this fellow the biggest surprise of his life?"

We have discussed technique, which is the structure on which our plan rests and which maintains it throughout its course in action.

We will confine ourselves here to the assessing of the problem, for it is first of all important that we should get into the habit of isolating our problem. Once we have found it and isolated it, we can deal with it. We start by asking ourselves the question above: that embarks us on an objective search for our problem and narrows down that search.

If you wish to invest your money you will set out to get all possible information which may have a bearing on the matter and which will finally guide you to a proper selection of the best investment *for your present purpose*. In those last four words is your problem and, before you start your investigation at all, you will isolate that problem and state it quite clearly in your own mind. Is your purpose, your problem, to find a reasonable speculation or is it to find a good investment, or only a gilt-edged investment? Before you waste your time in investigating the pages of financial papers, and talking to stock-brokers, you will have made this first search in your own affairs to determine the problem that you are to pose to yourself and your broker. We must also get into the habit of isolating our military problem.

The military problem is more difficult to isolate than other problems for we do not spend most of our private lives in facing these problems as we face the problems that concern our money or our housing or our feeding. Military problems are foreign to us. However, we approach a financial problem with the one question in our mind, "How can I make more money?", a feeding problem, "How can I get enough of the right sort of food to eat?" These are approaches that are habitual to us and they help us in stating our problem.

Thus, "How can I give this fellow the biggest surprise of his life?" will help you in stating your problem and will place before you the object you are to attain. A modest section commander in the defence, though limited by the battalion, company and platoon plan, will very soon narrow his problem down to, "Am I to site my trench here or there?" If he has first asked himself the original vital question. Having decided on the exact siting of his trench, he will consider how best his section can act so as to deceive and surprise a reconnoitring or attacking enemy.

Making a Plan

The first essential in planning is the attitude of mind brought to the task by a commander. Pugnacity, guile, a balanced estimate of his enemy's mind, courage to gamble, knowledge of his assets, will to do damage. First and foremost is offensiveness, in the fullest sense, and secondly, courage and guile.

Napoleon, whom we seem to quote very often, once said, "In war the simplest operations are the best, and the secret of success lies in simple manœuvres and in taking measures to secure against surprise."

We have spoken of "technique;" we have shown that the adoption of a good technique gives us the basis on which to plan, for it keeps our minds on the few important things that matter.

There are many reasons for the vital necessity of making a simple plan which permits of simple manœuvres to implement it. Here are some of them:

We have already said that all our plans must be designed to surprising the enemy. The simple operation will have a simple plan behind it but it will be a cunning plan.

It is very seldom that all information will be at our disposal, for the enemy will try to hide his doings and intentions from us as much as we hide ours from him. If our plan is simple and fresh information comes to hand, it will not be so difficult to

modify or alter the plan as it would be were it complex. An army is a very complicated machine in any case and even a simple plan leads to much detailed arrangement; a complex plan is exceedingly difficult for a staff to implement and, if any untoward circumstance occurs, then the whole detailed work may easily be thrown out of gear and there be no way of getting it going again.

A good plan, on the other hand, should leave a considerable margin for the unexpected, that which we cannot have foreseen. Obviously, it is usually far easier to make a simple plan if we have the initiative, for we intend then, from the start, to make the enemy conform to our will. His own intentions are not of such importance to us. If we have not the initiative, if we are on the defensive and are "dancing to his tune," then we have to divine his every intention, if we possibly can, so that we can forestall it. It is then that a weak or ignorant commander may produce complicated plans in order to counter every possible hostile move. A good commander will see the one or two dangerous possibilities and provide for them.

Actually, for a commander, it is more difficult to make a simple plan than to make a complex one, just as it is far easier for the draughtsman to draw the details of a new sort of machine than it is for the designer to decide and work out what sort of a new machine is needed for a particular purpose, and to order the draughtsman to draw it. The designer has had to pick out the one great need in the problem from among a thousand conflicting smaller needs and bits of information. Having selected the one great need, he sets it before him as his object and makes his outline plan to obtain it.

Those of us who do not waste our time do this every day of our lives.

But to make a really effective plan, we must be free to act; we must not be jammed tight up against an enemy's defences with our mobile reserves so close that they too are half involved in the battle before they start to move. "The art of war," said Xenophon, "is the art of keeping one's own freedom of action." That is, of holding the initiative against our enemy. To-day "freedom of action" is needed as far back as hostile aircraft or other forces may penetrate to interfere with our plan.

Having made a clear and simple plan we keep our object—the end we must attain—before us and, as our plan works through during the operation, we take every difficulty that arises and overcome it or turn it towards the attainment of our object. An

example of this is the crushing attack by the Crown Prince's Army in France in 1918 resulting in the Germans driving a salient into our front which might well have soon spread out to north and south and so led to the rout of the Allies. The situation of our armies was desperate, but Foch turned the German advantage to his own account, by attacking the flanks of the salient, forcing the German withdrawal from it and then, by blow after blow, keeping the battle fluid and at last developing the whole of the northern sector of the Western front into a series of manœuvre battles, with his own forces on the offensive. Foch was clear as to his ultimate object and so had his plans clear before him.

This does not mean that a completely altered situation will not cause us to alter our object. Nor must we blindly and obstinately stick to our plan if we find we can better achieve our object by changing that plan. On the other hand we must not be like the lost soul in the Tibetan story, wandering over the world with no fixed purpose. He saw a lake in the East and, being thirsty, hurried there. When near the shore he smelt smoke and bethought himself that hot tea and a shelter for the night would be better, so he turned North towards the smoke. On his way, before he reached the smoke, menacing phantoms leapt up before him. In terror he ran for his life towards the South; tired, he stopped to rest. Other wanderers passed and told him of a land of milk and honey for which they were bound, so he joined the party and went Westwards, only to be tempted again and again from his object.

Orders

In the war of 1914—18, and for years after it, we passed through a phase in which all orders had to be in a set form and in greatest detail. This led to a most sterile period in real military thought, for the correctness of the form of the order and its completeness were considered by our trainers to be of far more moment than the astuteness of the plan that gave birth to the orders. In other words, planning had become the slave of staff duties. We must keep these two things in their right place. Planning is the master of staff duties and we must never again allow staff duties to rule our planning.

There will always be the danger in a great war of assuming that no one is sufficiently trained to carry out his duties unless he has the most meticulous orders in his pocket. We must at

all costs avoid this: it is paralysing. We must aim for simplicity and for teaching the personnel of our expanding armies to think in a military way. It is vital to us to do this, for although we may be engaged in an intensive struggle where weapons and men are moved and operated in masses, yet that struggle may at any moment deteriorate into a battle of manœuvre, into extensive fighting. Moreover, there will always be, right at the very front even of the most powerful positions, an area in which lower commanders are exercising all their wits and activity to pierce the enemy's screen and to gain better points for observation or defence, or to capture prisoners for identification. Patrolling and raiding will be constant.

In extensive fighting—and it is this form of warfare which we study more than any other—junior leaders are far from their superiors: their superiors are often out of touch with the latest developments where their subordinates are operating. It is then that simple, wide directions, putting the subordinate into his commander's mind, essentially into his policy rather than into his actual plan, into his hopes and fears,—these directions will enable a thinking subordinate to act.

The subordinate must have what Foch calls "Intellectual Discipline." He says:

"To obey is difficult in war. For one has to obey in presence of the enemy and in spite of the enemy; amidst danger; amidst various and unforeseen circumstances; in face of a threatening unknown; under a physical strain, moreover, due to many causes."

We must be careful not to paralyse the initiative and to ruin the ability to think, of our leaders by tying them down too strictly and too completely with detailed orders which can never envisage all possible circumstances; which will not smash up the enemy's last anti-tank nest that may ruin our attack unless the junior leader on the spot can think and act against that nest.

So we must read and follow in the proper spirit the explicit instructions for the compiling of orders; that is, knowing that these orders are only the medium by which the good plan is conveyed to the troops and that they are more likely to get there in time, to be read, to be understood and to succeed, if they are short and if they leave enough initiative to those below in case of the unexpected suddenly occurring. They are a part of the mechanics of fighting.

In very intensive fighting such as we may yet get against a civilised, highly-equipped enemy, we may have once more to go, for a time, to careful, full, detailed orders for certain of our operations, especially if our armies suffer great losses and our replacements are ill-trained as they were in the Great War, and not only ours but those of France and Germany also. We must regard them as a grim but temporary necessity and still train ourselves to write the very difficult short "directive" which will guide a leader through a phase when distant from his superiors where events cannot be fully foreseen.

SURPRISE

BY "HYDERABADI"

In the course of one of his enchanting and so very sensible essays the late Mr. G. K. Chesterton discoursed on the subject of colours, in particular of white. So many people, he claimed, looked upon white as an *absence of colour* and not in itself a colour at all. Mr. Chesterton went on to write as follows:

"The chief assertion of religious morality is that white *is* a colour. Virtue is not the absence of vices or the avoidance of moral danger; virtue is a vivid and separate thing, like pain or a particular smell. Mercy does not mean not being cruel . . . Chastity does not mean abstention from sexual wrong; it means something flaming like Joan of Arc. In a word, God paints in many colours; but He never paints so gorgeously as when He paints in white."

Adapting Mr. Chesterton's way of putting it to another subject let it be said that the principle of surprise does not mean merely an avoidance of giving away secrets.

Surprise is a *positive* thing, a weapon to be wielded as thoughtfully and energetically as a body of troops or formation of tanks. It is indeed the greatest weapon of them all. If an enemy were surprised completely enough, a few street Arabs armed with carving knives could defeat a battalion of well-trained, well-armed troops by slitting their throats as in false confidence they lay asleep.

Surprise is closely connected with information, the acquisition of which is one of the greatest problems facing a commander in war. Information has two separate aspects: first, the information of the enemy's plans, movements, numbers, disposition, etc., that a commander needs to gain in order to be able to devise his own plans. Secondly, the information about a commander's intentions, etc., that his enemy will try to obtain and which must either be withheld or allowed to reach the enemy in a form that will deceive him.

To observe effective secrecy about one's own plans merely brings about negative surprise; to make an enemy accept false information as true brings about positive surprise, a far greater thing.

Consequently, the first essential in a commander's plan of action must be a bold and cunning provision for conveying false impressions to his enemy. He must, in short, make a definite "surprise plan," apart from the plan he makes to execute his real intentions. The more completely he hoodwinks his enemy the more simple may his real plan be. Indeed, if he hoodwinked his enemy sufficiently his real plan might even be silly and yet succeed.

It is a comparatively simple matter to ensure secrecy about one's own intentions. At the worst it can be done by merely not mentioning those intentions until the last possible moment, and thus surprising everybody. But to work out a *false* plan and to get it known in time to the enemy—not by means of such obvious ruses that he is led to doubt its genuineness—demands very careful preparation and staging. It even demands a certain degree of histrionic ability on the part of all members of the force concerned.

It follows, therefore, that one staff should not be saddled with both tasks; with preparing a real plan, with all its many tactical and administrative complications, and at the same time with preparing a convincing false plan. The latter task should be allotted to a separate staff, led by a man of ingenuity, with something of the practical joker in his mentality.

This staff of "jokers" should be allowed considerable licence and must be given loyal and active support—not merely toleration—by all ranks. Its main task will be the dissemination of false information among the enemy, to do which it will have to rely considerably on all members of a force playing their parts. Prisoners taken by the enemy, for example, must be primed to let slip important details of "preparations" behind their own lines. Misleading messages and orders must be allowed somehow to fall into the hands of the enemy. And so on. Yet all must be done cleverly or the enemy will wonder rightly whether "it isn't all too good to be true."

It must be remembered that practically all tactics in war are devised very largely for the purpose of making a force in itself, or an operation in progress, proof against the unexpected and the unknown. For instance, an army holds a long line of front at great expense in men and material; yet it is never expected that the enemy may attack simultaneously at every part of that front. The point is it can never be known for certain that the enemy will *not* attack any particular sector, consequently one must be on

guard everywhere—forward, in rear, and to the flanks. Similarly, an attack is supported by reserves, largely in case anything goes wrong.

If a commander could ever have *certain* knowledge that a particular sector of his front was not going to be molested by the enemy it would be unnecessary for him to hold that sector. But, of course, in actual practice no commander can ever have certain knowledge of this description.

It is because of the "semi-foolproof" nature of tactics in modern warfare that operations of war, particularly in the case of offensive operations, become so costly, so slow, and so limited in their results. It is highly important, therefore, that every possible endeavour be made to induce the enemy to abandon, or at least to relax in, his "foolproof" methods, and to commit himself to a course of action with a single object in view. This can only be hoped for if the enemy is supplied with false information so convincing that he really believes he has the day in his hands and becomes of a mind to take risks. It is clear, therefore, that a "surprise plan" must be framed to induce the enemy to *act*, and to act in accordance with one's own wishes. It is not enough merely to forewarn him against something that is not actually going to happen to him. He must be made to deduce out of the false information he receives a golden opportunity for himself.

The writer does not imagine that he is describing in this article any new interpretation of the principle of surprise. History teems with examples of deliberately planned positive surprise being inflicted on an enemy, and doubtless in this present war surprise measures are being constantly planned and put into execution. There is a considerable difference, however, between the famous commanders of History and of to-day and the ordinary plodding junior commander. One of the characteristics of the latter is his inheritance, through training and custom, of what is called the military mind. The "military mind" is, above all, orderly, methodical and standardised. These characteristics are in themselves admirable for a soldier, and a very great deal depends both in war and peace on their being present. But any quality can be pushed too far, and unless counteracted in some way the above-mentioned qualities of the military mind overwhelm the quality of *ingenuity* that should also be present.

The proper counteraction is obviously training; that is to say, specific training in the art of surprise. If surprise were recognised as a weapon, training in its use would be a regular

item of a soldier's education, but it is not at present generally so regarded, at any rate as a weapon for junior commanders (battalion commanders and below). If looked upon as a form of weapon at all by these junior commanders it is thought of as one above their reach, like tanks and aeroplanes, only to be employed by "higher authority."

The "military mind" is not noticeably susceptible to ideas whose tendency would be to disturb it, but on the other hand it is not *impossible* for it to adapt itself to new ideas. For instance, the new drill and the new idea in field formations generally seem at first somewhat untidy, but they are now enthusiastically supported. And quite recently the writer overheard a senior officer of the old school exclaim, while watching a frontier warfare demonstration at Razmak, "what a glorious, well-ordered, confusion!" as he saw *ex piquets* and mountain artillery sub-units elbowing their way at the double through the main body in order to catch up with their units. And that officer's description was most apt. It was a confusion; it was well-ordered, in that everyone knew exactly what he had to do; and it was therefore glorious. But it was, all the same, untidy. This officer had evidently overcome at least a little of his horror of untidiness.

During the course of his career the writer has made countless military plans, on operations, on field exercises, on T.E. W.Ts. and at promotion examinations, but never once has he been required or expected to devise any deliberate surprise measures. He has on the contrary constantly been advised to keep his plan simple, which means avoiding surprise unless, as is advocated in the article, two separate plans are made, one genuine, one false.

It must never be imagined that the making of a surprise plan simultaneously with a genuine plan is the prerogative of higher formations only. It should be an integral feature of all plans. Material preparations will be necessary, and it must not be thought that the "putting across" of a "surprise plan" will always be a safe business. Losses in men and material in "spoof" operations may, however, be well worth while, and may contribute materially towards success in the genuine task to be performed.

To express the matter succinctly in journalese, it is incumbent upon all ranks to become "surprise-conscious." There are, however, pitfalls for the unwary into which they may fall despite a high degree of this "surprise-consciousness." They must never imagine that an opponent is a bloody fool, and must never fail to keep uppermost in mind the *positive* aspect of surprise. So

many surprise measures are planned with a view merely of keeping the enemy *in ignorance*. This is purely negative. Negative surprise has undoubtedly its value, but it is a low form of the art.

Two striking examples of this may be quoted. Firstly, there is the recent forbidding of the practice of cleaning the brass-work of the soldier's equipment, the motive for which order was presumably to render forces in the field less visible to the eye of the enemy. But need, one wonders, the brasses of *all* soldiers be made so inconspicuous? If an enemy cannot see troops that he has reason to suspect may be near him, he will equip himself with stronger field glasses—or take other suitable measures—until he can. On the other hand, if half a battalion wore dulled brasses and the brasses of the remainder twinkled gaily in the sun, there would be at least a hope that the enemy would estimate the strength of the battalion as half what it really was.

Again, there is the practice of despatching patrols of troops by lorry on frontier roads in order to deal with marauders. Mobile patrols of this kind are ordered out presumably in order to deter marauders from making forays on or near roads so guarded, since they (the marauders) are expected never to know where or when they will meet armed opposition. Thus these patrols are usually intended to be a form of surprise. Such surprise is, of course, purely negative even if successful, but what actually happens as a rule is that the marauder stays his hand at marauding and "lies up" for the patrol. When he does, the surprise is usually one-sided and the reverse of what was planned.

Such patrols are indeed, in the view of the writer, only admissible if the patrol wishes to "trail its coat" and is resigned to suffering casualties. This was often the case with the Black-and-Tans in Ireland in the troubled times between 1919 and 1922, but it certainly is not true of troops operating on roads within British administered territory in the North-West Frontier Province to-day.

What it amounts to is that no man in his senses allows himself to remain in ignorance when matters of life and death are concerned. He takes active steps to obtain information—and gain information of some sort he surely will. If he is an enemy and is to be deceived, let it be *false* information that he gains, let his mind be stuffed with lies, let him pat himself on the back with ill-founded glee, and let him as gleefully work out and execute a plan of action that can only (did he but know it) make him as "stubble to our swords."

That is surprise. It is the greatest, most paralysing, most disaster-inflicting weapon the world knows and has ever known. There is even tragedy in its terrible completeness.

It alone can win against immeasurable odds.

MOBILE FORCES

BY ZARIF

The main outlines of Darwin's Theory of the Origin of Species are well-known to everybody. It is equally well-known that there are still people who deny that they are an improved design of original monkey. Perhaps they are right: perhaps in their case there has been no improvement. Yet the history of all evolution is a story of adaptation to circumstances, an overcoming of obstacles, the survival of the fittest. It is hoped to show in this article that the armoured fighting vehicle, the aeroplane, and the other component parts of the modern mobile force are not a new invention which has been created like a monster to devour civilisation, but that they are the natural result of the evolution of the horseman of some thousands of years ago.

It is hoped, too, to analyse the modern mobile force, so that we can with a critical eye gauge the value of our own and of foreign organisations.

The story of this evolution runs in a series of cycles. The mobile force gained the upper hand by its mobility, and was met by missiles; the answer to missiles was armour, but armour reduced mobility until the mobile force was no longer relatively mobile. Then obstacles again stopped mobility; until a means was found of overcoming an obstacle, the mobile force was again unable to be mobile.

How did it all start? And where will it end?

The Medes were the first people to have the idea which was epitomised by General Forrest in his definition of strategy; "Getting there fust with the most men." In 1100 B.C. they put their soldiers on horseback to gain greater mobility than their opponents who walked on their flat feet. And that was three thousand years ago. The idea was most successful at first, but in about 645 B.C. the Medes were defeated by the Assyrians, and it was thought high time to reorganise the army.

Cyaxares got the credit for this, just as Messrs Cardwell, Brodrick and Hore-Belisha were credited later for their Army Reforms. Cyaxares armed his cavalry with a bow and used them

to gallop round the Assyrian infantry, loosing off ceaseless streams of arrows, to which the Assyrians, unskilled in aiming off for movement, could make no reply. All went well for about a hundred years, and then the Median cavalry met its first obstacle. Cyrus, King of Persia, employed camels to frighten the horses. Dig in their heels as they would, those Medes could not get their horses to pass those camels. So they had to dismount, or were dismounted involuntarily, and fought on foot; and they were handsomely defeated.

As far back as that, then, we see that pure mobility has the advantage over troops which are less mobile; but in order to retain this advantage, mobile troops must retain their mobility.

In B.C. 326 Alexander the Great's victorious army, whose morale can only be compared to that of Napoleon's Old Guard, reached the river Jhelum, where an Indian gentleman, called Porus, opposed his crossing. Not only was the Jhelum in flood at the time, but Porus had two hundred elephants in his order of battle. Alexander thus had a double obstacle in front of him. By a series of deceptions very similar to those used by Napoleon to force a crossing of the river Mincio at Borghetto in 1796, Alexander moved his force seventeen miles upstream and managed to get five thousand cavalry and six thousand infantry across the Jhelum. He advanced towards Porus' army, and found that twenty thousand infantry had been drawn up with two hundred elephants in front of them at one hundred-yard intervals. On the flanks were about three thousand cavalry and three hundred chariots. It was an imposing array, and it must be admitted that a lesser man than Alexander might well have considered it wiser to turn back and fish for mahseer at Tangrot.

However, Alexander appreciated the situation and made a plan. He sent off half his cavalry round the left flank well away out of sight. He himself charged the enemy's cavalry on his right flank, which induced the enemy cavalry on the other flank to come to their assistance. The other half of Alexander's cavalry, which he had sent round the left flank, then came in, charged the unprotected enemy infantry and went on to attack the enemy cavalry, which now had to face two ways at once—always an unenviable position for any soldier, though some politicians seem to like it.

The bulk of Alexander's force now attacked the enemy and routed them.

This is an example of mobile forces being used to destroy the mobile forces of the enemy, and of breaking the crust of the defence for the less mobile infantry to push through.

The Parthians, in about 53 B.C., had an interesting innovation. They introduced both heavy and light cavalry. The light cavalry was very mobile; it was unarmoured and capable of shooting arrows when moving at full speed. This had a most devastating effect upon the enemy who were not only getting (like King Harold) eyefulls of arrows, but were also subjected to the nerve-wracking test of standing up to a cavalry charge.

Our present-day tanks do the same; but the Germans, either from obtuseness or inefficiency, believe in standing stock-still to fire a round, as our anti-tank gunners will find to their great delight when the time comes.

The heavy cavalry of the Parthians was armoured, and used for shock action. Parthian tactics were to reconnoitre and discover the enemy's flanks with the light cavalry, whose subsequent task was to lure the enemy cavalry after them. The heavy cavalry would then engage the unsupported enemy cavalry, and go on to destroy the unprotected enemy infantry.

Passing quickly through the centuries, we come to the beginning of the XIVth century, when the system of forming infantry into squares was evolved.

Infantry in squares! The cavalry were most indignant. The infantry would not run, as they had always run before, and the cavalry could not break the squares. What was to be done?

Someone had the idea of bringing up archers behind the cavalry, and the archers poured such a deadly fire into the squares that the squares gave way in places and, the obstacle being broken, the cavalry charged in, and the infantry ran again.

There were occasions, too, when the cavalry raced for a tactical position and, on account of their mobility, arrived before the enemy. Cavalry being unable to hold ground while still sitting on their horses, they used to dismount and form an obstacle of lances. Provided that they took some archers with them, they were normally able to hold that position until their main body came up from behind to relieve them.

This is a most important point. Here we find mobile troops holding ground by dismounting behind obstacles; and we also see the need for "artillery" with mounted troops. Without their archers, the mobile troops could neither break through an obstacle nor defend an obstacle against determined attack.

Owing to the improvement in archery and projectiles in general, armour became heavier and heavier; the cavalry, through sheer *avoids*, became proportionately less mobile. By the beginning of the XVth century, the improvement in archer "artillery" had reached a stage when even armoured cavalry could no longer hold the field against it. Even the heaviest armour that could be carried on a horse was not proof against those tremendous arrows.

Then came the pike. The infantry, with the pike in front of them and the heavy archers shooting arrows from behind them, enjoyed an immunity which had never before been known, and the role of cavalry was practically confined to pursuit.

Finally the invention of firearms gave the cavalry of this period the last push down the hill. To protect themselves sufficiently against bullets, the cavalry had to make armour so heavy that even the stoutest horse could not drag one foot after another. Mobility was lost. Another cycle had ended.

During the period 1476 to 1796, the infantry became the main arm of the battle.

The cavalry, however, threw away their armour and became mobile once more. They were used for reconnaissance, raids, flanking movements, counter-attack and pursuit. They had found a position on the battlefield as the arm of opportunity. Their whole success depended upon their being what Lord Allenby called "sudden, rapid, and opportune." They relied on speed. They operated from a secure base of solid infantry and guns. Where they could work to advantage, they worked swiftly, and they were usually successful.

But they had recaptured their right to a place on the battlefield by *regaining their mobility*. They had ceased to be the *main army*, but had become the *mobile portion of the main army*—that is to say, mobile *relative* to the slow-moving infantry.

The next general period in the history of the evolution of mobile forces is from 1796 to 1871. In general, the period shows a decline of European cavalry.

Forty years before the period begins, the cavalry of Frederick the Great had dominated the battlefield. Frederick understood the principles of mobile troops, and he applied them by adopting an organisation which enabled his cavalry to fulfil their roles in the conditions which prevailed at the time. About this time, the increasing power of infantry firearms began to cause a fundamental change in the character of war. The changes affected the cavalry in particular; but cavalry leaders did not appreciate the implications of the changing conditions, so cavalry began to fall into disrepute, and was considered antiquated.

"Considered antiquated." And yet, how "modern" and "up-to-date" people have thought themselves to be when they said that the cavalry of 1930 was antiquated! People were thinking that before 1796! The moderns who dubbed cavalry antiquated in 1930, and who boasted of the new invention of mechanised infantry, did not know their history. They did not know that the mechanical transportation of troops, which they claimed would revolutionise war, was practised by John Ziska, the blind Hussite, in 1420 A.D., when he carried his infantry into battle in farm carts. And the cavalymen of 1930 who took such umbrage at cavalry being called antiquated could not see that it was they, the cavalry leaders, who were antiquated! They lived by tradition and not by principles.

Napoleon was an exception to this rule, and he made a better use of his cavalry; but even he used them wrongly at Waterloo, and cavalry once again sank to the depths of disrepute. By the middle of the XIXth century, the climax of incompetency was reached in the employment of cavalry, and the charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War evoked the very true remark that it was "magnificent, but it was not war." It was not until the teaching of Moltke in Germany, and also the lessons of the American Civil War, began to be appreciated, that cavalry thought in Europe once again assumed a more practical aspect.

The meagre record of cavalry during this period was due to the failure of cavalry to keep abreast of the changing conditions of war. Fire had become the predominant factor in battle. The introduction of the breach-loading rifle abolished the power of cavalry to demoralise an unshaken, well-armed enemy. It was failure to realise this, and the belief that shock-tactics by large bodies of cavalry were still possible, that led to so many disasters.

As the power of firearms increased, so shock tactics could only succeed against a previously demoralised, inferior, or surprised enemy.

Throughout the period cavalry were regarded primarily as an arm of assault, and close co-operation in the main battle by means of shock tactics was considered to be their most important role. As a result of training for shock tactics in mass, the individual efficiency of the cavalryman was neglected. At the same time, mobility was sacrificed in order to obtain greater striking power on the battlefield. Consequently, cavalry were seldom employed in, or even capable of performing, the roles of reconnaissance and protection.

When cavalry were suitably trained and equipped, as in the American Civil War, however, they proved themselves to be of the greatest value in reconnaissance and protection. But for these roles, greater mobility and individual efficiency were required.

There were few examples of successful pursuits by cavalry in this period, but what there were showed the value of cavalry for maintaining the impetus of the pursuit, and the annihilating effect when it is sustained. In addition, the examples show that in every instance the pursuit was made in co-operation with other arms; but it is obvious from history that this fact was not recognised at the time, and co-operation with other arms did not become a recognised principle for the employment of cavalry in pursuit.

The American Civil War showed the value of cavalry for carrying out independent missions. It showed the value of bold leading, the necessity for a clearly defined objective, and the value of a threat to the enemy's lines of communications by mobile troops.

Stuart's famous rides did not achieve any really important results, and possibly this is because he had no clearly defined objectives, but went out into the blue to see what damage he could inflict on the enemy if good fortune attended him. Nevertheless, the threat to the lines of communications had a considerable moral effect on the Federal army; and there is no doubt that it was the magnificent leadership of Stuart which enabled these raids to be carried out without serious losses.

In 1865 General Wilson, with fourteen thousand cavalry, marched across Alabama and Georgia. He was opposed by ten thousand cavalry, and many of the important towns were strongly

held by infantry. He marched six hundred miles in thirty days, took three cities, fought five battles, captured six thousand prisoners and one hundred and fifty-six guns, and destroyed many railroads, iron-foundries, and factories. His success was principally due to his bold leading, and to the fact that his troops could fight equally well mounted or dismounted. That was the result of his individual training. He trained his men to be individual cavalymen, not merely indistinguishable parts of a shock-tactical mass.

But after all, perhaps Wilson's march owes its greatest claim to fame because the tune which was composed to commemorate it—"Marching through Georgia"—is one of the very few tunes which can be played simultaneously by the brass and bugle bands of infantry battalions and school O.T.Cs.

With regard to equipment, a good use of cavalry for reconnaissance was only made when commanders realised that mobility was more important than attacking power in this role. Only lightly equipped cavalry was really mobile. The sword and lance remained the principal weapons for European cavalry, but the modern fire-arm prevented the close contact necessary for the successful use of these weapons. This difficulty was overcome by the American cavalry who used a combination of dismounted action by men armed with rifles and mounted action by men armed with the "arme blanche." Whether this was the best method remained a source of the bitterest controversy in the clubs of Pall Mall for many years.

Many people have a secret ambition to "make history"; but I hope that no officer living to-day will consider himself insulted when I say that the last "historical" period to be examined is from 1871 to 1918. One of the most important events in the history of the world during this period was the Mechanical Revolution. In the military sphere this revolution caused far-reaching changes. There was the great improvement in the range and efficiency of fire-arms and cannon. There was the invention of the internal combustion engine, which introduced cars and lorries to armies; and later the aeroplane and the armoured fighting vehicle were born of the same conception. Thirdly, rapid communication became possible by the means of telegraphy, telephony, and wireless.

The improvement in arms and artillery generally restricted and finally, in intensive warfare conditions, practically paralysed the activities of the existing cavalry organisations.

The internal combustion engine and means of rapid communication paved the way for an entirely new form of mobile force. Mobility had always meant horses. Horses came to mean cavalry. Finally horses came to mean mobility. It was pure logic, for, as Kipling said about the South African War:

"We've spent four hundred million pounds
To learn the fact once more
That horses are faster than men on foot
Since two and two makes four.
For horses have four legs and men have two legs,
and two into four goes twice,
With nothing over—except our lesson—
and very cheap at the price."

That is very true, but the limiting factor there is that "horses are faster than *men on foot*." Horses are not necessarily faster than *men in lorries*. We must remember the principle that the mobile force of an army must be mobile *relative to the main army*. It is mobile, not merely by the pace which it gets over the ground, but *relatively*—that is to say, in comparison with the pace at which the other parts of the army cover the ground. If a force can move a hundred miles a day in lorries, it cannot be said that horsed cavalry, moving at sixty miles a day, is as mobile as that lorried force. The range of horsed cavalry is limited, and that limit can be exceeded by a mechanised force; therefore, in comparison with a mobile mechanised force, horsed cavalry is no longer relatively mobile.

Lord Roberts, writing on the lessons learnt from the South African War, said "Knee to knee, close order charging, is practically a thing of the past."

Reconnaissance during the South African War became more difficult, more exhausting, and more important. Improved fire-arms gradually improved the power of the defence, and the power to ward off pursuit. In extensive warfare, such as was met in South Africa, the need for mobile forces became more and more urgent, while their task became more and more difficult. The root of the trouble was that while the demand for mobile forces was becoming increasingly urgent owing to modern conditions, the mobile forces available were becoming less capable, owing to those self-same conditions, of doing what was required of them. "It is the pace that kills."

Then came the Great War. On the Western Front, cavalry on the whole were largely mis-used by both sides, and eventually the opportunity vanished owing to the intensive nature of the war, the "encadré fronts," the miles and miles of wire, and that Queen of the battlefield—the machine gun. In extensive areas, such as Palestine and Mesopotamia, cavalry had more chance; but they were continually hampered by machine guns, and the lack of mobility to gain surprise owing to modern communications and aircraft. The increase in the efficiency of firearms made direct pursuit practically impossible: rearguards had such a sting in their tail that the cavalry could not effectively pursue. Indirect pursuit, such as happened at Megiddo, was the only apparent means of carrying out this role. In fact the action at Megiddo can even be called distant co-operation in the main battle and not a pursuit at all.

The horsed cavalry were being hard put to it: in order to gain a success they had to go "all out." Everything that it was possible for men and horses to do, had to be done; and they even had to do a number of things which had previously been thought impossible. They had nothing in hand, and any advance in the mobility or fire-power of the main armies was going to put the mobile roles of horsed cavalry just out of their reach.

Early in the Great War, inventive minds turned to the development of a vehicle which could be protected by armour plate, move across country, and fire whilst on the move.

This led to the Tank.

The tank was originally built in order to work in close co-operation with the infantry to destroy the enemy machine guns which were making the advance of the infantry impossible. But as tank design improved, tanks began to do the same work that cavalry used to do before the breech-loading rifle was invented: tanks began to be used for shock action. Tank design, and tank ambition, began to look forward to taking a place in mobile formations; and though the limitations of the original or even of the improved tank were many, its characteristics were beginning to single it out as the vehicle of the future. Tanks could laugh at machine guns. Tanks could waltz through barbed wire. Tanks could go where infantry and cavalry could not. Their mobility was relative; but it *was* mobility, because they could still move, while the infantry and the cavalry could not.

When the War opened up, and movement became more general in extensive warfare where distances were great and both infantry and cavalry are once again mobile, the tank fell back into the old tortoise-like role of grinding along, and was only useful in overcoming obstacles which neither the infantry nor the cavalry could surmount.

However, lighter tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles were yet to be invented.

From very early in the Great War, the aeroplane took over one of the roles of cavalry: Strategical reconnaissance.

There were no obstacles for aeroplanes; but they had their limitations, and land forces were still necessary for detailed reconnaissance. As aeroplane design improved so aeroplanes became more and more useful in mobile roles, and were even used for pursuit. Low flying attack against withdrawing troops was very effectively employed in the pursuit after Megiddo, after Vittorio Veneto, and in the final stages on the Western Front. Low flying attack was also used to check enemy pursuit when the British forces had to withdraw in 1918. Aircraft were the most mobile portion of our fighting forces, and were obviously going to take their full share in mobile duties.

After the Great War there was a great swing in favour of more and more mechanisation, and the results of mechanisation have been seen to a certain extent in Abyssinia, Spain, and China, and again in Poland. But in none of these campaigns has there really been equality in either efficiency or material on the opposing sides, so it is difficult to reach any definite conclusion, or to draw any lesson which can be well learnt as to what would happen when both sides are equally matched.

A recent issue of *THE FIGHTING FORCES*, with perhaps more truth than tact, says "The Poles have always shown a pathetic (sic) belief in their cavalry, which formed a large part of their army; and the ineffective showing of their cavalry, *vis-à-vis* the German mechanised detachments, was certainly a contributory cause of their defeat." I think perhaps a more balanced, and certainly more tactful, statement comes from the *CAVALRY JOURNAL*: "Poland's famous cavalry, on which such reliance was placed by her Higher Command, proved unable to keep the

field against the opposing mechanised forces, which were operating dismounted, both in attack and defence, and which can hold a century had so fine and dry an autumn been known in Poland.

That, I think, is the case. In country which is eminently suitable for machine guns, it is folly to expect horsed cavalry to operate without suffering severe casualties; and I do not think it is possible for horsed cavalry to keep the field against enemy armoured fighting vehicles which are *mobile*.

I stress the word *mobile* because when an armoured fighting vehicle is not mobile it is a stationary fort, and horsed cavalry can ride round it, giving it a wide berth. And there is a very simple, very humble, substance which can render almost any armoured fighting vehicle completely immobile if it is produced in large enough quantities—and that is MUD. In certain countries at certain times of the year there will always be mud. So there will be times, (and there will be many occasions too when there is no mud) when horsed cavalry will be extremely useful, even as they were useful to the Germans for reconnaissance to find routes for their armoured fighting vehicles in Poland.

It all depends upon relative mobility, and the primary consideration that mobile forces must be relatively more mobile than the force to which they belong.

What are the roles of mobile formations? A study of history has shown us that there were six roles allotted to them in the past.

- (a) Close co-operation in the main battle.
- (b) Distant co-operation in the main battle.
- (c) Pursuit.
- (d) Protection.
- (e) Reconnaissance.
- (f) Independent missions.

We have seen that conditions have changed fundamentally since even the Great War. Are these six roles still the essential roles of mobile formations in the future?

The roles of pursuit and independent missions remain unchanged, I think. Whether the pursuit is direct or indirect does not greatly matter: the role is still a role of the mobile formation. It must be. If the enemy is running away faster than the main army can catch it up, and pursuit is necessary, obviously a mobile force is required,

The independent mission, entirely divorced from the main army, must be carried out by a mobile force if that force is to return to the parent force when the mission is completed. That, too, is a role of the mobile force to-day.

What about reconnaissance? We have seen that the aeroplane has practically taken over the functions of long-distance reconnaissance, merely on account of time and space; it has taken over the duties of strategical reconnaissance for similar reasons. Whether or not we can include the Royal Air Force in our mobile formations we may discuss later; but at present let us consider land forces.

Mobile formations, composed of land forces, must still carry out reconnaissance; but that reconnaissance is a much more detailed reconnaissance, a much closer reconnaissance, than that which the Royal Air Force perform. In fact, I think that we should not be far from the truth if we say that all the reconnaissance which land forces now carry out through their mobile forces is really tactical reconnaissance.

The role of protection remains. Human nature demands that when you walk through a strange room in the dark you should spread your hands out in front of you to give you warning of an obstacle. Mobile forces, which can move faster than the main army, are still needed to carry out the role of protection or at any rate protective reconnaissance.

As regards the two remaining roles—close and distant co-operation in the main battle—I suggest that distance is now only a relative term. Owing to speed and range, actual distance does not mean as much as it used to do; so it is suggested that instead of having two roles, close and distant co-operation, we can telescope those two, and make them one—co-operation in the main battle. I do not think that any useful purpose is served any longer by splitting them.

That, then, has reduced the old six roles to five.

Are there any roles which were not formerly recognised as roles of mobile forces, but which should be roles of the mobile forces of the future?

There is one, I think. It was not catalogued as a role in recent years, because it was not apparently regarded as being of sufficient importance. We saw an example of it in Alexander's battle at the crossing of the Jhelum river against Porus in 326 B.C.:

the defeat of the enemy's mobile forces. That object has become of such importance to-day that I am sure it should be considered as one of the definite roles of modern mobile formations.

A force may be advancing with a definite objective and, since it must maintain that objective, it must not be side-tracked by chasing after an enemy mobile force which is trying to harry the lines of communications. The potential danger of that enemy mobile force may be so great, however, that the commander of the advancing force may find it imperative to destroy or neutralise that enemy mobile force. This is obviously a task which can best be taken on by another mobile force; and its role would then be to defeat the enemy's mobile forces.

We have, then, six main roles for mobile formations to-day:

- (a) Defeat of the enemy's mobile troops.
- (b) Co-operation in the main battle.
- (c) Tactical reconnaissance.
- (d) Protection.
- (e) Pursuit.
- (f) Independent missions.

What are the principles which affect the employment of mobile formations in these roles?

Let us examine the first role, *the defeat of the enemy's mobile forces*. The term defeat can be divided into two parts:

- (a) Destruction, by which we defeat his material.
- (b) Neutralisation, by which we defeat his object.

In order to attain destruction, we must have superiority in strength, by which I mean superiority in armament and mobility, but not necessarily in numbers. To attain neutralisation, superiority in strength is not essential provided that good use can be made of ground to restrict enemy movement. The neutralising force, therefore, must be capable of holding ground, and of preventing the enemy from surmounting obstacles.

May I stress the point that the force must be capable of *holding ground and of preventing the enemy from surmounting obstacles*?

In the earlier part of this article we saw that whenever cavalry were dismounted in the past they were invariably defeated unless they were specially trained in dismounted work or were amply supported by artillery; moreover, we found that they could not hold ground while they were mounted. We must beware lest

we fall into the same errors that misled our predecessors; therefore we must make special dispensation for this individual training in dismounted work, and must provide ample artillery support.

In this role of defeating the enemy's mobile forces, perhaps surprise is the most important factor, and, conversely, the need for obtaining information. I suggest—in fact I merely repeat what will very soon be a platitude—it is practically impossible in these days to conceal one's own movements unless one has at least local air superiority. We have talked and written for some years of the importance of gaining air superiority; but I do not think that anyone ever realised how absolutely helpless an army can be that is robbed of its air forces, or the astonishing weight of advantage that accrues automatically to an army which has gained complete air superiority, until the lessons of the Polish campaign of September 1939 were given to the world. Stephen King-Hall, in a recent News-Letter said that it was impossible for the Poles to move by day, and the German aircraft continually broke up counter-attacks before they could be properly developed. In short, he says, if troops are engaged in moving warfare, they are in a pretty hopeless position if the enemy has command of the air over their heads.

I said that to attain neutralisation, superiority in strength is not essential provided that good use can be made of ground to restrict enemy movement. Where two mobile forces oppose one another, the principles which appear to apply are those which govern the actions of two opposing fleets on the sea, but with one very important difference—the ground factor. I think we must watch this point rather carefully.

We, in a mobile formation, are not necessarily confined to our vehicle: we can get out and walk about on the ground. And since we can, if we wish, get out of our vehicle and dig a hole in the ground; and since we can get hull down behind a small hill or in a small nala, we must turn our ability to good effect, and must not allow ourselves to be bound by the necessary limitations of the Royal Navy.

The second role is *Co-operation in the main battle*.

For this role to be carried out satisfactorily, the ground must be suitable for the movement and manœuvre of mobile forces. Again surprise must be aimed at, and success will depend very largely upon whether we achieve surprise or not. The moment

for deployment must be carefully chosen, so as to allow the greatest chance of success to the mobile formation, and to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy. To achieve any decisive effect, the principle of concentration must be observed; too great a dispersion or the employment of too small numbers is unlikely to obtain any result commensurate with the risk to the mobile force employed. The object aimed at must be worth the risk to the scanty and often irreplaceable mobile force—which is all that may be expected to exist in prevailing conditions. The object chosen must be suitable for the characteristics of the mobile force. We must remember that the mobile force is not a battalion of "I" tanks, which are designed to accompany the slow-moving infantry and to batter down their obstacles. We did learn that lesson some years ago; but the Germans apparently forgot it in Poland, and frequently used their light mobile tanks in "I" tank roles. They found it ineffective and expensive. There is all too often a tendency to dig up potatoes with a silver spoon, which is an extravagant and not very efficient use of one's resources.

Finally, the situation must be clear enough to allow the commander of the mobile force a free hand once his troops are engaged: once a mobile force is committed to the battle, attempts at close control by the superior commander are likely to limit the results that may be achieved.

The third role is *Tactical Reconnaissance*.

Owing to the facts that in the present and in possible future wars, theatres of operations are likely to be big, armies to be large and movement rapid—at any rate in the opening stages especially in extensive warfare—the responsibilities of the mobile troops on land for strategical reconnaissance will probably be subordinate to those of the Royal Air Force, with whom there must be the closest liaison. When the main armies are not in contact, tactical reconnaissance will be chiefly carried out by mobile troops though here again the responsibilities of the Army and the Royal Air Force must be carefully co-ordinated. In order to carry out this role of tactical reconnaissance, a mobile force must be able to disperse and to search ground to obtain information; it must have the power with which to fight if any opposition is met. It must have considerable speed and radius of action which can be developed across country; and it must have an efficient means by which to transmit rapidly the information which it has obtained.

The fourth role is *Protection*.

Protection may include covering the concentration of a force, protecting an advance, protecting a flank, and covering a withdrawal. The employment of a complete mobile force for the protection of a flank will be unusual. For covering a concentration, and the advance from a concentration area, a mobile force will normally be essential. For covering a withdrawal, a mobile force, though desirable, is no longer necessary owing to the extreme power of modern defence and the mechanisation of infantry.

All the conditions of reconnaissance apply equally to protection. In addition, more holding power is necessary when protecting, and also the power to deliver a strong counter-attack. For early warning of enemy movement, the co-operation of aircraft is essential.

The fifth role is *Pursuit*.

I think that perhaps it has almost become an axiom that *indirect* pursuit will generally achieve greater results than *direct* pursuit. By direct pursuit I mean chasing straight after the enemy, just as a householder might chase straight after a burglar whom he has surprised robbing the silver-chest: he will be very hard to catch unless he trips over the stuffed tiger's head in the hall. But an example of indirect pursuit is when the householder's wife nips down the fire-escape and lays the burglar low with the poker as he comes out of the front door. The example of the cavalry at Megiddo is indirect pursuit, though as I said before it is hard to distinguish it from distant co-operation in the main battle—and some people to-day insist that it was a case of co-operation and not of pursuit. Whichever way you have it, the cavalry pursued past the Turks, and got behind them; and then the Turks were caught like rats in a trap between the main army and the cavalry. If pursuit is direct, it must be carried out on a broad front owing to the power of modern defensive weapons. Pursuit must be carried out quickly, closely, boldly, and persistently, in adequate strength; and it must be capable of being sustained. To chase a short way is seldom of any use: the enemy must be chased until he is exhausted; then you've got him.

For this very reason, fresh troops should be employed for the pursuit. It is obvious that tired troops have little advantage over

the enemy as regards mobility. Moreover, it is practically essential that aircraft should be made available to take their part in the chase.

Finally we have the sixth role, *Independent missions*.

The chief principle which affects the employment of mobile forces on independent missions is that the objective must be of sufficient importance to justify the increased risk which is incurred by the force despatched, owing to the vulnerability of a mobile force when it is acting independently of other formations. The importance of the objective must also justify the detaching of mobile troops which will be temporarily lost to the main force while the independent operation is in progress. Another principle is that the force must be sufficiently strong to achieve its object without any outside assistance. To do this, the force must be able to maintain itself and to provide an all round protection for itself at the halt and on the move at all times. If the force is inadequate to do this, a reverse may entail its complete loss. And then you have lost your mobile force.

The commander of the mobile force must be allowed latitude in deciding the *method* of carrying out his task. Owing to the difficulty of predicting distant enemy actions and dispositions, a fixed plan may jeopardise the success of the operation. In addition, the mobile formation so engaged must not be allotted any other role when it is engaged on an independent mission: it must be absolutely divorced from the main army.

I hope that I may have made clear that the principles which affect the employment of mobile forces, however modern, are exactly the same as they were when mobile forces consisted entirely of cavalry. In other words, when reading Cavalry Training, you can practically rub out the word "horse" and substitute the term "armoured fighting vehicle" and find that the precepts contained in that book make even better sense than they did before.

I cannot stress too strongly the importance of realising that armoured divisions and brigades are not part of the Grand Fleet, are not "I" tanks; are not slow-moving mechanical elephants used to push down obstacles for the infantry in the way that the Royal Tank Corps pushed down obstacles on the Western Front in the Great War. We have got our battalions of "I" tanks to do that work for the infantry to-day. Our armoured divisions, our armoured brigades, are the mobile forces of to-day; and, as you have

seen, they have to perform exactly the same functions as were performed by the mobile forces of yesterday.

As long as mechanical vehicles can remain mobile, we have the armoured fighting vehicle instead of the horse. But the principles are exactly the same as before. The cavalry spirit of old is every bit as essential to the successful and brilliant employment of mobile forces to-day as it was throughout the ages.

I am going to round off this article, not by saying what we have *got*—for I imagine that would agitate the censor unduly—but by suggesting what the component parts of a modern mobile force might very well be. If these ideas are sound, then they will be a guide to examining organisations with a critical eye; if they are unsound, then experience will have been gained in discovering their unsoundness.

What are we up against? Enemy armoured fighting vehicles, wire, gas, artillery, machine guns, anti-tank guns and rifles, air forces, speed, distances, and so on.

What have we got to do? We have got to carry out some or all of six roles:

- (a) Defeat of the enemy's mobile forces.
- (b) Co-operation in the main battle.
- (c) Tactical reconnaissance.
- (d) Protection.
- (e) Pursuit.
- (f) Independent missions.

What do we need in order to enable our mobile forces to perform these roles?

I would suggest that the mobile formations need six different elements, elements which have been deduced from a logical study of the history of mobile forces.

The first is a *reconnaissance* element.

This might consist of lightly-armoured inconspicuous vehicles of considerable cross-country performance, capable of overcoming minor opposition. It would be a protective and reconnoitring element.

The second is the *striking* element.

This might consist of armoured vehicles with great hitting power and a good average cross country performance. This will be the main element for the defeat of the enemy's mobile forces, for co-operation in the main battle, and for pursuit.

The third is the *motorised* element.

This might consist of troops who are capable of operating dismounted both in attack and defence, and which can hold ground by digging holes and getting into them if need be. This element, strong in machine guns and anti-tank rifles, will frequently be used as the pivot round which the light and striking elements will operate.

The fourth is the *artillery* element.

Although every tank would have its own guns, we have seen that mobile forces always needed artillery to support them when they were checked by an obstacle, or when they were defending an obstacle. A highly mobile gun, such as the 25 pr., might be used for this purpose, as well as the anti-tank gun.

The fifth is the *engineer* element.

Engineers are needed for the rapid construction of obstacles or hasty demolitions, and to do any necessary bridging—just sufficient light bridging to keep the mobile force mobile when it cannot go round.

The sixth element is the air element.

This is most necessary for relatively distant reconnaissance and for close co-operation. Moreover, the air can provide a most useful and powerful supplement to the artillery by low flying attack and dive bombing, in the same way that the Germans used their air forces for this purpose in Poland. Whether this air element should be included within the mobile force, or whether it should be attached as and when required, is a question of so controversial a nature that space will not admit of my attempting to answer it in this particular article.

I suggest that each one of those six elements must find a place in any mobile force to-day, otherwise, from the teachings of history, that mobile force will not be organised on sound lines. In what proportion they should be present depends entirely upon circumstances, upon finance, upon a wealth of diverse conditions, and I do not propose to examine the question any more closely here. But the subject provides a positive banquet for the thoughtful soldier.

In conclusion, I would like to suggest that, although some of my ideas may prove to be a powerful emetic to several people, they will have served their purpose if they induce those people to

publish their sounder views for all the world to read: though I apologise for the discomfort caused.

Finally, I would again stress the fact that the principles of mobile forces have not changed in any way whatever since mobile forces were first used, because those principles are sound and are based on *relative mobility*. Whether the mobile force consists of a practically naked man sitting on a small Median pony, or of a highly-skilled technician driving the latest form of tank, the personnel of mobile forces are cavalymen, trained to cavalry ideas, imbued with the cavalry spirit.

It isn't the armoured fighting vehicle, the light tank, or the cruiser, which is going to make our mobile forces things to be reckoned with: it is the cavalymen actuating their means of *relative mobility*. May they remain true to their principles!

MILITARY READING

BY "SIEGFRIED P."

The Secretary's notes in the April 1938 and July 1939 issues of this Journal gave a list of books recommended for study for promotion and Staff College examinations. These lists were made out for the syllabi then in vogue, but they are equally applicable to-day for all-round military study.

This somewhat formidable array of books may appear unduly large to a student who has been urged to read a little and think a lot. He remembers that he must also constantly study his text books and manuals, and that he should read the foremost military quarterlies and the military articles in the leading newspapers if he is to keep abreast of current military thought. He may also wish to study a foreign language or languages. Nevertheless, there is plenty of time for him to read all these books and many more between the ages of nineteen and thirty and they should be read not only by Staff College candidates but by all officers.

It is not the intention of this writer to dwell on the books in these lists which are admirable, but first to draw attention to the fact that only the first and second chapters of Colonel Henderson's "Science of War" (1905) are recommended in the July 1939 list, and secondly to suggest what other books should be read.

In a lesser degree Henderson's writings did for the army what Captain Mahon's works did for the navy. They opened the eyes of many what military criticism can and should be. His collection of essays entitled "The Science of War," although written between 1891 and 1903, will remain a British military classic. It should be the first of the above-mentioned lists of books to be read, and not only the first two chapters but the whole book and especially Chapter VII, "Lessons from the past for the future."

Is it necessary to read any military literature previous to Henderson's book? In it he recommended to the students of his day "A Precis of Modern Military Tactics," written by Colonel R. Home in 1873, revised and rewritten by Lieut.-Colonel S. C. Pratt in 1892, and Captain C. Clery's "Minor Tactics" (first edition in 1877). Unless the modern student is pressed for time, he will do well to read them too.

Von der Goltz's "Nation in Arms" (1883 First Edition) should be studied by all. It gives a wonderful insight into German military thought. The "Journal of the United States Artillery" reviewed it as a work "full of interest from beginning to end, and must always be one of the world's military classics. It repays earnest study alike of statesmen and soldiers."

Colonel Maude's "Cavalry: Its past and present" (1903) is another book which should be read by all, being full of controversial matter.

Those who think pre-XXth Century military history too antiquated for consideration should remember the immutability of principles, and note that even Liddell Hart has devoted a whole book to Scipio Africanus. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*, and fresh ideas even regarding surprise can be obtained from the ancients. Besides, every professional should know the history of his profession.

And after Henderson, apart from our lists, what other books should be chosen out of the wealth of military literature at our disposal in the splendid military station and institution libraries of to-day?

The latest edition of Foch's "Principles of War" should be read not only as a book of reference, as suggested in the April 1938 issue of the Journal, but because it gives an insight into the French mathematical treatment of military thought expressed by the supreme modern military master of our great ally.

"A History of Tactics" by Captain Johnstone (1906) is an interesting work bringing Home and Clery up to that date and is more easily obtainable now than either of those two.

Callwell's "Small Wars" (1906) is another book that has not yet been fully superseded.

The second edition (1913) of Colonel G. T. Denison's "A History of Cavalry" (brought up to date from the first edition of 1877 which had won the Emperor of Russia's prize for the best history of cavalry) is full of interesting research and of great interest to other arms besides horsed cavalry.

Cole and Priestley's "British Military History, 1660—1936," is an enjoyable time-saving account of British military activities, and gives a good ground for further study.

"The Green Curve" by Old Lukoie is a pre-last-war classic of its kind, and everyone will enjoy it and benefit from its reading.

"The Aftermath," by Winston Churchill, gives a magnificent description of "after the Great War."

"Forty-one years in India," by Lord Roberts, is a classic as fresh to-day as when it was written, and should be read by all professional officers who will probably have to serve in India for part of their service.

There are many other valuable books, but as "of learning there is no end," so there must be limit to what the student can assimilate. The writer suggests that enough, and what is best, has now been given to digest before the age of thirty, except that a short history of the world should be added to get perspective. Van Loon's "The Story of Mankind" and Wells' "Outlines of History" are good short and long examples of such a history (even though Wells does omit the name of the First Duke of Marlborough!), and Fisher's "History of Europe" is magnificent.

There should be no need for a student to delve further into military antiquity before he is thirty unless he has an archæological or historical bent; but as new military books become published, he would do well to read those specially recommended in the book reviews. Our military quarterlies review all military books worth considering, *e.g.*, "The Defence of Britain" by Liddell Hart, reviewed in this Journal in October 1939.

Our text-books are the outcome of military classics and war experience of the past. The wisdom of Napoleon, Jomini, Clausewitz, Hamley, and other earlier and later masters of military writing tempered by modern experience have been condensed into these text-books (see the bibliography in Home's book among others). Henderson and others quoted above have explained beyond doubt why the text-books themselves are not sufficient for an officer. It would be unseemly for the writer to repeat their arguments: but, besides the practical value of such reading which they stress, there is surely an aesthetic value. An officer should desire to be a cultivated critic of his profession and not only a champion gladiator or super-N.C.O. (and many N.C.O.s nowadays are highly educated individuals!). For this an educated background is essential.

Again a professional officer may be a fine leader of men with sound tactical knowledge, but he should also have ambition. Only by supreme mistake will even a Major-Generalcy come to the uncultured; and if it comes how difficult for him to show his best, to

prove his point in debate perhaps before glib-tongued civilians whose general education in their early twenties gave historical and literary knowledge, critical and forensic power, often enhanced by a hobby of military study, which can only be equalled by the officer who has studied seriously (see Winston Churchill's "My Early Life"). In fact the army's correct point of view may go by default through the personal equation in the council chamber, where wisdom from knowledge acquired by study is required to fortify a ready tongue which the leader of military men may lack.

By the age of thirty an officer should be able to hold his own in argument with his civilian counterpart on all matters pertaining to the army. Hence the stressing of military reading and the now frequent use of the tongue in discussions and debates.

List of Military Books Recommended for Study excluding Manuals, Official Memoranda, Periodicals and administrative Books; in List of U.S.I.I. Journal April, 1938:

The Defence of Duffers Drift.

Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II (Kirby and Kennedy). 1931.

Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School. Vol. (Pakenham Walsh), 1926.

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

Elements of Imperial Defence (Boycott), 1936.

*British Strategy (Maurice), 1929.

Outline of the Development of the British Army up to 1914 (Hastings Anderson), 1931.

Passing It On (Skeen).

*The Science of War (Henderson), 1905.

The Transformation of War (Colin), 1912.

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman), 1924.

The Principles of War (Foch), 1918.

The Direction of War (Bird), 1925.

*Soldiers and Statesmen (Robertson), 1926.

Historical Illustrations to F.S.R. II (Eady), 1926.

The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart), 1932.

Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton), 1912.

Waterloo Campaign (Robinson).

Outline History of Russo-Japanese War (Pakenham Walsh), 1935.

*The World Crisis (Churchill), 1931 (abridged and revised edition).

*A History of the Great War (Cruttwell), 1936.

*The Palestine Campaign (Wavell), 1931.

A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Evans), 1926.

*Official Histories of the War—France, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli.

Waziristan, 1919-20 (Watteville).

The Third Afghan War (Official), 1926.

The Government of the British Empire (Jenks).

A Short History of British Expansion (Williamson), 1930.

In *List of U.S.I.I. Journal of July, 1939 (War Office List)*:

Wellington (Fortescue).

Wellington's Army (Oman).

Decisive Wars of History (Liddell Hart).

History of the Civil War in the United States (Wood and Edmond).

Stonewall Jackson (Henderson).

Sherman (Liddell Hart).

Lee (Maurice).

Forest (Lyttle).

British Strategy in the Great War (Cruttwell).

*History of the Great War 1914—19 (Cruttwell).

*World Crisis (abridged edition) (Winston Churchill).

*Soldiers and Statesmen (Robertson).

The War Outline (Liddell Hart).

Liaison (Spears).

The Campaign of the Marne (Sewell Tyng).

Advance from Mons (Bloem).

*The Official Histories of the War—France, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli.

*Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

London Men in Palestine (Caldecott).

Tannenburg (Ironside).

The Truth About Tannenburg (Von Hoffman).

Encyclopædia Britannica's Articles on "Strategy" and on the above campaigns.

*British Strategy (Maurice).

*The Science of War (Henderson).

The Army and Sea Power (Pargiter and Eady).

Wellington (Cruttwell).

* Books mentioned in both lists.

LEARNING TURKISH

BY KARSHISH

When I first went to Turkey in 1919, I took a decision which was regarded with grave misgiving by most of my brother officers. I decided to learn Turkish. In spite of frequent and well-meant attempts to deter me, I did learn Turkish and though it did not contribute much, if at all, to my advancement in the Service, it enabled me to spend four happy and interesting years in Turkey. Many years of friendly relations between Great Britain and Turkey have now been crowned by the Treaty of October, 1939, and it is not unreasonable to expect that intercourse between the two countries will become increasingly close. This being so, it seems likely that, when the popular misconception about all educated Turks speaking French has been finally exploded, a knowledge of Turkish may be considered more important for officers (even Staff College graduates!) of the Army than it is at present. It is partly with a view to stimulating a desire for such knowledge that I have written this article and I have accompanied it with a few suggestions about books which may be useful to students of one of the most ingenious and beautiful languages in the world.

I began my Turkish studies while travelling from Karachi to the Dardanelles. I knew nothing whatever about it and my only book was "Turkish Self-taught" in Marlborough's Self-taught Series. By the time I had reached the Indian Base Depot at Chanakkalé on the Dardanelles, my studies had not progressed much beyond the numerals and the knowledge that the Turkish verb was so elastic that it could, in a single word, express the somewhat involved idea of "not to be able to be obliged to cause others to love each other mutually."

Since the Armistice, Turkey had been in the possession of an Allied Army of Occupation. The Turks were at first cowed and disposed to be friendly but this state of affairs was soon to be altered by the Tripartite agreement which, among other things, resulted in the landing of a Greek force at Smyrna in May, 1919. The situation thenceforward gradually deteriorated from the Allied point of view. Stung to the quick by the sup-

port given to their traditional enemies, the Turks rallied and, greatly helped by political events, ultimately succeeded in ridding themselves of the Greek Army and obtaining a substantial revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. When I arrived at Chanakkalé, the so-called Army of the Black Sea was occupying Constantinople, actually if not technically, and had units and Intelligence officers all over Anatolia. My own battalion was in the Caucasus but I was fated not to join it nor indeed did I ever see it again. To my intense annoyance I was detained at Chanakkalé as adjutant of the Indian Base Depot. It was only after the first difficulty of organising the depot was over, when those long workless afternoons and evenings which are such a dear feature of Army life, began to follow each other with undisturbed regularity, that I realised that I was very fortunate and could now begin my language studies in earnest.

It is not easy to learn Turkish anywhere and in Chanakkalé, though in Turkey, it was very difficult indeed. The Indian Base Depot was about three-and-a-half miles from the town and there was no conveyance to be had. There was no teacher to be found in the depot except an interpreter, Socratis Mikailides, who offered his services with the reassuring statement that he could at least teach me how to write "some words." But Socratis, though a good fellow and a good teacher of Greek, was hopeless at Turkish. Next I tried O Kyrios Philanthides, "Professor of Languages" in Chanakkalé. Three times a week I walked three-and-a-half miles and back in the sun to hear this "son of a lover of flowers" mispronounce and mutilate one of the most melodious tongues in the world. At length I had had enough and took as teacher a Turkish officer who was in a prison camp near the depot as a "political offender." I did not then know what this meant and am not altogether sure now, but Hikmet Bey was a nice man and pleased to come to my comparatively fly-proof tent and speak in liquid tones his incomparable language. We had no common tongue for Hikmet knew only a few words of French, but from him I acquired something of the "ahenk kaideleri," the rules of harmony of Turkish. I now had a better book than Thimm's "Turkish Self-taught," a little book of Grammar and phrases by some Armenian. It was pretty accurate so far as it went but did not thoroughly explain the peculiarities of the language.

It was only when, during a visit to Constantinople, I acquired Moise Bey's "*Méthode Turque*" (still one of the best books) that

I began to understand the structure of the language. The principle difficulty lies in the entire absence of any sort of relative pronoun. The difficulty is aggravated by the fact that there is always a temptation to use the particle "ki" which is incorrectly used as a relative by Greeks and others of non-Turkish origin. "I know that the man who gave you permission has gone away" presents itself to the Turkish mind as "To you permission of the having given man his going away I know." Intransitive verbs, when used in a relative clause, seem to lose their properties. "The book which I took" becomes "the having been taken by me book." This is clear enough, but when "the chair in which I sat" becomes "the having been sat (not sat in) by me chair" one is somewhat perplexed. In so far as these difficulties are capable of elucidation, Moise Bey explains them but for some time I continued to find the constant use of participles and gerunds most confusing.

After a few weeks, Hikmet Bey was released to resume his life of political offensiveness and I started to work with Anyg Guljian, clerk to the Brigade Education Officer. Anyg was an Armenian girl and a very good one. She originated from Eskishehir where she had been well-educated in an American school. She had left Eskishehir during the War to escape the attentions of a Turkish officer, and, knowing English and French well, she had soon found employment. She spoke Turkish quite perfectly except for the slight but characteristic Armenian accent. This I acquired myself and it is noticed by every Turk with whom I speak. I do not care, for it is a pleasant souvenir of a good and painstaking teacher.

In the autumn of 1919 the depot moved to Bostanjik, near Constantinople. Anyg also moved with her Education Office to Moda on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus and eight miles from Bostanjik. I could now speak both Turkish and Greek with some fluency and, tired of the depot, I visited General Headquarters in Constantinople to offer myself for Intelligence duties. Somewhat to my mortification I was received with thinly veiled contempt and was told that I must not think a mere knowledge of languages was of any use in Intelligence work. It was experience that counted, and anyway they did not want Indian Army officers.

Rather crestfallen I withdrew and decided to use other means of getting away from the depot. A chance soon presented

itself. Anyg's Education Officer whose father had been a prominent member of the Anti-vaccination League, had refused to be vaccinated and was to be demobilised in consequence. He recommended that I should relieve him and, strange to relate, although an Indian Army officer could not be employed in Intelligence, there seemed to be no objection to a partially educated Indian Army officer of twenty-two being employed to supervise the education of British soldiers and to control some half dozen unit Education Officers most of whom were professional schoolmasters. My object in taking on this work was simply to get an opportunity of blowing my own trumpet at Divisional Headquarters. My conscience sometimes smote me but I do not think that I did much harm and really did my best to supply these excellent men with books and stationery.

While in Bostanjik, I had worked for a while with an Armenian telegraph clerk from the railway station. This no doubt increased my Armenian accent and it may be asked why I did not employ Turkish teachers. The reason is that it was then exceedingly difficult to find Turks who had any knowledge of teaching or even a knowledge of the structure of their own language. Women, who are always the best language teachers, were in those days to a large extent secluded and the best available alternative was to use Armenian.

I had now acquired more grammars and dictionaries. The only comparatively modern English-Turkish Grammar was Hago-pian's which is by no means satisfactory though it deals well with the Arabic element in Turkish. I had Redhouse's and Sami Bey's dictionaries. The former I found of little use and it is only recently that I have learned to respect Redhouse and his like for the great pioneer work they have done in languages. . . They had practically nothing on which to base their work and the task of making the Turks give up the secrets and jewels of their language in which they themselves took little interest must have been a gigantic one. There are many redundancies and many omissions in Redhouse but I fancy that what appear to be omissions are mostly modernisms while the redundancies merely illustrate the tendency of that age towards prolixity. Sami Bey's Turkish-French dictionary was, and still is in spite of the old orthography, an admirable dictionary of Turkish. He generously includes a number of words not used in Ottoman Turkish but current in North Persia and Turkestan.

I took up residence in Moda and led a very pleasant existence. My sister had come out to spend a few months with me and took an intelligent interest in my language studies which gave me great gratification for I got but little encouragement from my brother officers. Anyg went back to Chanakkalé in May so I only had two months more of her instruction. She taught me much of the idiomatic side of Turkish and even some tongue-twisters. One of these I still remember: "Yamalamalamy, yamalamamaly?"—"Should it be patched or not?" She gave me a fairly accurate account of the Armenian massacres and painted a lurid and generally speaking inaccurate picture of the Turkish character. The desperate hatred then existing between Turks and Armenians was not, as many people suppose, of ancient origin. For centuries they lived amicably side by side and the start of the feud can, perhaps, be traced to American uplift carried out by missionaries in the Eastern Vilayets. This gave a bogus sense of nationality to a people whose national entity geography had made impossible. It had tragic results when the Committee of Union and Progress got busy with their Pan-Turk policy. Be that as it may, Anyg hated the Turks and did not see much more of them, for shortly afterwards she went to the United States and is probably still there.

It had certainly been a sound move to obtain an entrée to Divisional Headquarters by becoming Education Officer. My knowledge of Greek and Turkish soon became known and I was several times employed as an interpreter. Early in June my real chance came. Near the village of Beikos on the Bosphorus, an Indian battalion was stationed. Further down the coast was a Greek battalion. Very early one morning, a band of brigands came into Beikos, sacked the police-station and took away a quantity of flour. One or two members of this band, apparently posted as look-outs on the road near the ferry landing-stage, fired at and killed an Indian Officer who was coming down to catch the 5-30 A.M. ferry to Constantinople. So far as could be ascertained afterwards, the whole band then beat a hasty retreat. The Indian battalion was now aroused and, not thoroughly understanding what had happened, carried out a house-to-house search for arms and arrested about eighty people. Meanwhile, the Greek battalion was moving towards Beikos and a scuffle between British and Greek troops was narrowly avoided. This situation was, of course, reported to Headquarters, and on my return from a day in the country, I was ordered to go immediately to Beikos by motor-launch and clear up the situation.

I arrived at about 10-30 P.M. greatly to the surprise of the Indian Battalion who thought I had come to educate them, and next morning I proceeded to examine the prisoners. I at once began to feel that my knowledge of Turkish was gravely deficient. I could manage all right with educated people but some of the peasants I found very difficult to follow at first. With the dawn came crowds of women to plead for their men-folk and I spent the whole day interviewing these and the prisoners. Most of the women were villagers, but as I sat at my table beneath a tree, there came one heavily veiled young woman who, by her carriage and the rich silk of the *charshaf* I could see belonged to a different class. She sat down on the chair I offered and at once lifted her veil from one of the most lovely faces I have ever seen. I then had my first experience of hearing the most melodious of languages spoken by a beautiful and cultivated Turkish woman, Zahiré, as I afterwards found her name was, explained that her father, a retired Army officer, was among the prisoners and since he was quite innocent and the sole protector of herself and her sister, would I please release him at once? She then smiled, thinking, and not without reason, that her father was already as good as released. I did in fact release the old man the next day, partly because he was obviously innocent and partly because of Zahiré's irresistible petition.

My investigations proceeded and gradually the prisoners were released and order re-established. G.H.Q. had become somewhat alarmed and a mixed brigade was rapidly formed at Beikos and a staff provided, my work being that of Intelligence Officer. We lived in Sultan Aziz's palace overlooking the Bosphorus down to which stretched a terraced garden with broad white marble steps on the water's edge. For work I toured the country and patrolled the Bosphorus in a motor-launch, satisfied myself that the brigands were brigands and not Nationalists, interpreted for the Brigade Commander and wrote reports to G.H.Q. For recreation, I bathed and walked and enjoyed local society. The latter included, of course, Ali Bey, Zahiré's father and, shortly after his release, I was duly invited to dinner. It was quite delightful. Zahiré proved to be of a roguish and charming disposition, while her sister was a handsome girl whose husband's "morals had broken up," as I was informed. The food was excellent and Ali Bey a good host. Later, when I knew them better, I was allowed into what was still called the "haremlik" and used to sit talking to the girls while Ali Bey nodded over his newspaper.

The ban on the employment of Indian Army officers in Intelligence had now evidently been lifted for when things had quietened down at Beikos, another officer was sent to relieve me and I was ordered to report to the General Staff. I was employed in a section of G. S. "I" and I cannot say that I found the work in the least degree interesting. It seemed to consist entirely in reading through reports and initialing them. During this time I lived in the London Hotel and spent most of my evenings studying Turkish. I now had a real Turk for a teacher but I did not make much progress with him. I began, however, to read the newspapers and also the anecdotes of Nasreddin Hoja. Modern Turkish literature is very poor and at that time consisted largely of translations from the less reputable Continental authors. I remember some years later, an Afghan Consul-General in Iran showing me what he described as the latest example of Turkish literary genius: it was a Turkish translation of "La Garconne!" I had not aspired yet to such writers as Hussein Rahmi and Hussein Cahit who were then considered to be Turkey's best novelists.

I had applied to sit for the Turkish Interpretership examination in London and, immediately on my arrival in England I began work at the School of Oriental Studies. The Turkish professor was then, as now, Ali Riza Bey, without exception the most enlightened teacher of any language I have ever met. He had once been employed in the Ministry of Agriculture in Smyrna but when I met him he had been in England many years. Arriving in England by mistake (he wished to go to America) just before the War, he took up teaching Turkish in order to escape internment. His method is difficult to describe as he taught largely by means of diagrams at the drawing of which he was amazingly adept. Every lesson resulted in my taking away sheaves of foolscap covered with circles, arrows and shading, all done quite impromptu and illustrating in the most graphic way possible the intricacies of Turkish grammar and syntax. Not a great scholar and by no means perfect in English, Ali Riza had, nevertheless, an extraordinary "sense" of his own language.

In addition to teaching me Turkish, Ali Riza also taught me a great deal about the Turks which I had not realised before. In Smyrna I had got to know and like the Greeks and had, as it were, taken sides with them against the Turks. Ali Riza showed me that I really knew nothing of the Turks and strongly advised me

to get to know them better before I made up my mind about them.

In June I qualified as a First Class Interpreter in Turkish and a little later gained two diplomas at the School of Oriental Studies. Until I returned to Turkey at the end of 1921 I laboured under the erroneous impression that I knew Turkish thoroughly.

On my return to Constantinople I was appointed secretary to one of the inter-allied commissions working at the Ottoman War Office. My office was in the Ministry and I was in close touch with all the branches of the Staff both personally and by telephone. The first thing I found out was that my Turkish was nothing like good enough. The telephone defeated me as it will defeat many a so-called First Class Interpreter. I did not even know the preliminaries: "Neresi orasy, effendim—?"—"Where is that?" (*i.e.*, whose house or office) and then "Kimile musherref oliyorum, effendim?"—"By whom am I being honoured?" (*i.e.*, Who is speaking?).

I was living at this time in Bayazid, the heart of the Turkish quarter and at once set about improving my knowledge under two teachers, one the Professor of Psychology at the Istanbul University and the other, Remzi Bey, Chief of one of the Sections of the General Staff and sometime A.D.C. to General Liman von Sanders. To the latter I went in the evenings and from him and his cheerful wife I imbibed much knowledge. He spoke at a great rate which was just what I wanted and he was obliging and fertile in his ideas for dispelling my ignorance of the Turkish language. Together we read the greater part of "Turoman," one of Hussein Rahmi's novels and a remarkable picture of lower middle-class Turkish life. Madame Remzi would rally me for blushing and hesitating over some of the freer allusions and I dare say she thought me an insufferable prig.

Life was not altogether easy in the Commission. My chief was C—, a fine soldier and gentleman with whom I had little in common. I fear he disliked me very much and I was foolish enough not even to pretend to understand his attitude that all officers should be with their regiments and that those who unavoidably were extra-regimentally employed, should deplore the fact and try and get back to their regiments as soon as possible. "You have missed your vocation," he said to me one evening after an argument on this subject, "You should have gone into politics and politics of the lowest and most heckling description." C—was no linguist but fancied his French and insisted on speaking that

long-suffering language. I can only remember a few of his best expressions. "Je vous donne mon mot"—"I give you my word" was one, and another—"fulfiller les conditions" which meant just what it seems to mean. The worst came, however, when he decided to learn Turkish. It was not until, when intending to order a car to be sent for another member of the Commission, he inadvertently explained to the Turkish orderly that the other member had a very disagreeable deformity, that I felt it my duty to hint to him that his Turkish studies might have unpleasant results. He took this well and gave up the unequal struggle. In spite of our differences I liked him and when I left the Commission to go to G.H.Q., I was gratified to hear him say, "When I first met you I thought you were the most frightful—but I must say I find now you are not *quite* such a—as I thought." This was high praise.

I had one or two interesting experiences in the War Office. One day I was seated at work when there was a scuffle outside, the door was flung open and an elderly Turkish Colonel entered at the double hotly pursued by two other officers. With some irritation I asked what the matter was. Breathing heavily the Colonel said that he placed himself under the protection of the British Flag. I told him that he could hardly do that in the Turkish Ministry of War and requested him to withdraw to the adjoining room. When he had done this the other officers told me that this was Colonel F—whom they had been escorting to the Court-Martial at which he was being tried, when he had suddenly dodged them and run into my office. C—was not in the Office at the time so I went to see Zia Pasha, the War Minister to ask for further details for I hardly liked to turn away someone who asked for protection even though it was not our policy to interfere in cases of this kind. Zia Pasha told me that Colonel F—was being tried by Court-Martial for a serious breach of discipline the nature of which he did not specify. He also told me that during the War Colonel F—had commanded a certain Prisoners of War Camp. After the Armistice, the British authorities had thought fit to present him with a document of appreciation of the way in which he had treated the prisoners under his care. The War Minister believed that it was by virtue of the possession of this document that Colonel F—had sought the protection of the British. He requested that, as the present matter had no connection with Prisoners of War, we would not think it necessary to hinder the ordinary march of Turkish military justice. I then telephoned to G.H.Q. for instructions

and was told to hand over the Colonel to his guards. It was not pleasant to see the old man frogmarched out of the room expostulating loudly. I learnt afterwards, however, that his lenient treatment of prisoners had been actuated more by motives of insurance than anything else. Apparently he used openly to state that he thought Great Britain was going to win the war and would show substantial appreciation of his lenience.

Another unexpected visitor in the War Office was Zahiré, the Beikos beauty. She must have bribed the door-keeper, for the entry of a young woman into the War Office was in those days considered to be highly irregular. I had not seen Zahiré for over a year and was delighted to meet her again. While in Beikos I had found out that she was married and I was able to get her husband out of serious trouble. An officer in a cavalry regiment which had joined up with Mustafa Kemal, he had apparently deserted from his regiment in Anatolia and come to Constantinople. When I was in Beikos he was in hiding for he feared arrest though whether on account of having served the Kemalists or of having deserted from them I could not make out, nor I believe could he. In any case I had secured a pardon for him. Now he was under arrest again and Zahiré tearfully asked for my help. It was awkward, but I really could not resist Zahiré and agreed to meet her husband in a small café off Bavazid Square while he was out on parole. We duly met, but I gathered that Zahiré had come to me without her husband's permission and he was not pleased about it. He told me that the situation was now quite changed and that my intervention would only make matters worse. He was very likely right here and I was glad not to have to take any action. He was eventually court-martialled but acquitted and went back to the arms of his lovely Zahiré.

Living in the Turkish quarter afforded me excellent practice in speaking Turkish and especially during the month of Ramazan. Although even in those days few Turks kept the fast at all strictly, the evening gun was the signal to begin jollification and feasting which usually lasted until the morning. The streets were gaily lighted up all night, and theatres, circuses and fun-fairs did a brisk trade. It was impossible to sleep for the noise so we used to go to the theatre and walk about the streets until the small hours of the morning. In this way I got an enormous amount of practice in colloquial Turkish and had now got to the stage of being able to understand quite a fair

proportion of "Ay Dede," a comic paper edited by the clever journalist, Refik Halid Bey. I could now read the newspapers without much difficulty and could write a letter without fear of a breach of etiquette. I was still, however, very far from being a first-class interpreter, as my knowledge of scientific terms and legal phraseology was gravely deficient. I was to make considerable progress in this side of the language during the following year.

While working in the War Ministry, I used to interpret a great deal for C—and especially during a curious campaign started by Allied Headquarters for collecting funds for the Turkish Red Crescent Society. It was announced as a non-political move which made it quite certain that everyone regarded it as made from political motives. The general impression caused was, indeed, that whereas the British had been comparatively neutral, so far, in the matter of the Graeco-Turkish war, they had now decided that the Turks were going to win and that some benevolent gesture should be made. C—and I, accompanied by a Turkish officer, visited all the big shops and business houses in Stamboul and asked for subscriptions to the fund. Nearly all gave for though none, including the Turks, believed in organised charity, it was still considered to be a good thing to humour the British. We only met one honest man so far as I remember. He was an Armenian cloth-merchant and he explained quite coolly that he was an *Armenian* who subscribed heavily to *Armenian* relief organisations. He did not see his way to subscribing for Turks who, he believed, were entirely responsible for the plight of his fellow-countrymen. "Tell him he's a damned swine," roared C—, with true British logic. I told him C—was sorry he would not subscribe and we left.

Altogether I only stayed six months in the Turkish War Office. The Commission was a solemn farce. The Turks were not disarming. On the contrary, the principal work carried on by the War Office was that of organising the supply of munitions to Mustafa Kemal's army. It was an open secret, or so it seemed to me but others seemed to think that the Minister for War at least was "loyal," that is, that he was a traitor to his country and, for some obscure reason, loyal to us. I fear he was no traitor but playing a difficult hand for the Turkish Nationalists with no ordinary skill.

The last few months in Constantinople before the evacuation were of great interest and moment. When I first went to

Allied Headquarters, I went to live on the other side of the Bosphorus at Moda and used to come over every day in the steam-ferry. Greenhill of the National Bank of Turkey, Chaytor, the most generous Gunner and the best Intelligence Officer I ever met, and myself lived in a private house in great luxury and comfort. We had to spend the whole day in Constantinople but usually got back in time for a bath and profited greatly by the hospitality of the British residents in the evenings. In Constantinople, meanwhile, the situation was becoming extremely disagreeable. The Greeks had collapsed politically and might collapse militarily at any moment. The Turks were truculent and offensive and the Authorities not quite so "loyal" as they had been. The French and Italians were now pursuing a pro-Turk policy for which they had, no doubt, good reason. Our own attitude was from a moral point of view, a sincere one and I believe we were as neutral as it was possible to be.

During the time that I was at Allied Headquarters, I got very little practice in speaking Turkish though I was steadily improving my knowledge of the written language. Every now and then I was sent for to interpret either for General Harington or for other officers. Interpreting for General Harington was easy for his ideas were clear and he had evidently studied the art of speaking through an interpreter. With others it was by no means so easy. Even though very senior they had not always a proper notion of arranging their ideas and would fire off strings of technical expressions quite impossible to render into Turkish. On one occasion I had to interpret for an officer who was interviewing the Prefect about the repair of certain roads. The first thing that I had to ask the Prefect was what official was responsible for the adjudication of tenders for contract. I had no conception of what this meant and said so. "Don't bother about what it means," said the officer who was very senior indeed, "All I want you to do is to translate what I say."

The political and military tension was somewhat relieved by the Conference of Mudania but was later revived during the Lausanne negotiations so brilliantly concluded by Lord Curzon. Looking back, I see that I was too close to the situation properly to appreciate its potentialities. My work was of a specialist character and the impressions I received were not unlike those of a man trying to read a book through a telescope. What I saw was vastly magnified and seemed clear, but it was difficult to correlate these spasmodic glimpses with other aspects of the

situation. By rubbing shoulders with many different races, however, I think I sloughed off that partiality for one or another people which I had felt during the early part of my stay in Turkey. As I learnt Turkish better and associated more with the Turks, I began to understand to some extent the Turkish irritation against the Greeks and Armenians. Indeed, after living in the Turkish quarter I became almost "turklemish" and it needed some further study and experience to perceive that where the Greeks appeared to be to blame, the real villains of the piece were the so-called Allies who were being propelled by I know not what ill-advised or ill-intentioned politicians. What added fuel to the fire was the fact that the Spirit of Nationalism had everywhere raised its head. The Greeks, encouraged by the Powers in their "megali idhea" had brought about the rebirth of Turkish patriotism. The Turks in their oppression of Armenians and Kurds had invented the Minorities problem.

My last months in Turkey were spent at Arnaoutkeui on the Bosphorus where I lived in a large Turkish house right on the edge of the water. My companions were Heywood and O'Leary, two interesting and clever Gunners. Of Heywood I saw but little as he was Chief of General Harington's Staff and extremely busy, but O'Leary and I were kindred spirits over the matters of languages (he is one of the best linguists in the Army), Jane Austen's novels and Constantinople night-life. I have long ago forgiven him for playing Scriabine's Preludes before breakfast. At night we would often go out together, sometimes to Bebek where there was a delightful open-air restaurant and cabaret run by Russians or else to one of the many resorts in Constantinople. There was always good music and good dancing and an abundance of good food and drink. I saw some curious things in those days and the remembrance of them made me wonder a little at the righteous indignation displayed in High Places when someone ventured the remark that the behaviour of the British Army of Occupation had not, on the whole, been exemplary. The behaviour of the rank and file was, so far as I could see, good. Every now and then there was a scuffle in Galata but the cause was usually high spirits combined with a certain amount of drunkenness and was easily excused by all. The Italians themselves could see the funny side of the defence of the British sailor who, having knocked down an Italian officer, pleaded that he had understood his victim was trying to sell him a certain kind of postcard.

My few months' stay at Arnaoutkeui was a fitting end to my sojourn in Turkey. The peculiar beauty of the Bosphorus must be seen to be understood. There are those who say that the romance of Turkey has passed with the fez and the *charshaf* but, in my opinion, nothing but extensive building could rob the Bosphorus of its at times almost eerie charm. The black masses of towering cypresses, the medieval castles, the swiftly flowing current and the long-drawn-out cries of boatmen still remain and I believe they have more to do with the genius of the place than the dignified fez and the shrouded figures of women haunting these ragged cemeteries on Fridays.

Something more about the Turkish language must be added. The philological and etymological side of the language have been ably dealt with by those competent to do so. I propose merely to add a few general remarks which may not be within the scope of the experts.

Turkish in some shape or form is spoken from the Great Wall of China to Albania. I have used it to advantage in Belgrade and North-East Iran. It has two main forms: (a) Ottoman Turkish, spoken with slight variations all over Turkey and until recently the official language of Iraq, Syria and Palestine where Arabic is now taking its place. (b) The Tartar dialects of the Caucasus and Turkestan. The language is everywhere substantially the same but there are great differences in pronunciation and in words of common use. The oldest form of Turkish spoken to-day is, I believe, Jagatai Tartar used by a dwindling race, the Tekké Turkomans. Jagatai has many resemblances to Ottoman Turkish but it is exceedingly difficult to pronounce ("gelengyonk"—"thou comest not," I could never quite manage). A Constantinople Turk, be he ever so intelligent, could not get further with the Tekkés than asking for the bare necessities of life. Nor could he manage much better with Uzbegs, Sarts, Kirghiz or Kalmucks, all of whom speak Turkish of a sort. For any one who wishes to learn Turkish as a lingua franca for use over Turkestan and Northern Iran and Afghanistan, the best form to study is what is called Azerbaijani Tartar which has its cultural home in Tabriz or perhaps in Baku. This dialect is the half way house between Ottoman Turkish and the pure Tartar dialects of Central Asia. It is written in both the Arabic and Latin characters and has a considerable literature. Army Headquarters, India, until quite recently used to send officers to Constantinople to learn Ottoman Turkish which, it is to

be feared, would be almost if not quite useless in any country in which the Indian Army might reasonably be expected to operate in war. It is as if one were to learn Spanish in view of the possibility of one's going to Italy.

There is an important movement on foot in Turkey to re-introduce purely Tartar words in place of the many Arabic, Persian and European words which have passed into the language. To many this seems as likely to succeed as the reintroduction of Irish but some headway has been made in Turkey, largely by the use of compulsion. However much Ottoman Turkish is "tatarised" it will, in my opinion, remain distinct from Azerbaijani Tartar and, of course, still more so from Eastern Turki which embraces the dialects of Turkestan. The pronunciation of Ottoman Turkish remains the same, smooth, harmonious and balanced as opposed to the strident gutturals and open vowel sounds of the Tartar dialects, which, in addition, often violate the rules of harmony which are such a feature of Ottoman Turkish.

To read some modern Turkish books and periodicals one would imagine that the language had undergone a radical change. It is true that the adoption of the Latin character and of punctuation has greatly simplified Turkish, both for the Turks and for foreigners. A number of new words have been introduced, especially into the military language, but one has only to listen to Turkish broadcasts from Ankara to realise that the language is still substantially the same. If it was ever the intention of the authorities to banish the Arabic element they have so far had little success. The Arabic element in Turkish is still as great, if not greater, than in modern Persian.

A few more words must be said about books. I have not yet seen a satisfactory and up-to-date English-Turkish Grammar. Moise Bey's "*Méthode Turque*" contains the best treatment of Turkish in a European language (French) which I have ever seen. If there is a modern edition of this book in the new orthography then it is the one to get. For those who know Italian, "*Metodo Teorico-Pratico di Lingua Turca Moderna*" by Padré Francesca da Scandiano (Hoepli, 1932) will prove a safe little book for elementary study. Another excellent book for beginners is "*Inductive Turkish Lessons*" by Frank Field Goodsell (American Board, Istanbul, 1931). Those who know Russian will find the Turkish-Russian Dictionary by D. A. Magazannik (Soviet Encyclopædic Press, Moscow, 1931) by far the best dictionary. There are several small Turkish-French and Turkish-English dictionaries on

the market. A most useful book to get hold of is "Iyi Zevceler," an admirable translation of Louisa Alcott's "Good Wives." The private study of Tartar dialects presents some difficulty for English students, though a hunt in Luzac or Foyle's shops will produce more than one old phrase-book, or grammar. Plenty of Russian or Persian books for the study of Azerbaijani Tartar can be obtained in Tabriz.

[*Note.*—As far as possible, the new Turkish Orthography has been used in the writing of Turkish words. Owing to typographical difficulties, however, I have had to use English phonetic substitutes for such letters as 's' cedilla and undotted 'i.']

THE HISTORY OF GURKHA RECRUITING

BY CAPTAIN W. J. M. SPAIGHT

RAISING OF GURKHA REGIMENTS

The first three Gurkha units of the Indian Army were raised on the authority of a General Order dated 24th April, 1815.

At that time the Nepal war was still in progress. On account of continual Gurkha raids into British India and the occupation of certain lands in the Gorakhpur District by Gurkha troops, hostilities broke out in May, 1814. For reasons not unconnected with the climate the actual declaration of war was, however, delayed until the 1st November, 1814.

During the winter, 1814-15, five separate columns attacked the Nepalese forces. The preliminary operations were not successful. On the 16th April, 1815, however, General Ochterlony's column defeated the Gurkha General Amar Sing Thapa at Deothal, near Malaun in the Simla hills. On the 25th April, General Jasper Nicholls captured Almora. Amar Sing Thapa capitulated at Malaun on the 15th May, 1815, and peace negotiations were opened with the Nepal government. The negotiations broke down in December, 1815 and the war continued until the Peace of Segowli, signed on the 4th March, 1816.

It will thus be seen that the Gurkha units were formed at a time when war was being waged against Nepal. The exact reason for the formation of these corps is difficult to ascertain. It is, however, probable that when they were authorised, the intention was to enlist hillmen resident in the war zone who were hostile to Nepal, and that after the surrender of the Gurkha armies west of the Sardar River, disbanded Gurkhas were accepted. Disbanded soldiery, if neglected, frequently turn their hands to armed robbery and it is possible that disbanded Gurkhas were enlisted in these units in order to prevent dacoity.

The Gurkhas had conquered Kumaon in 1790 and finally subdued Garhwal in 1803. The Nepal rule in these areas was therefore sufficiently recent to suggest that there must have been large numbers of subjects of the deposed hill Rajas hostile to the Gurkha *raj*.

The Gurkhas had also raised local levies from amongst the population of the conquered districts:

"In 1814 quite two-thirds of the Nepalese forces in the west were composed of men from the upper parganas of Kumaon and Garhwal. These levies were not, however, incorporated with the regular troops, but were considered in the light of local militia, and were as a rule under the orders of Gurkha officers, though Kumaonis occasionally were entrusted with small commands."*

The Indian Army List states that the regiments were raised from Gurkha soldiers who took service with the British after the fall of Malaun, or the first phase of the Nepal war. Yet the order authorising their formation was published some weeks before the fall of Malaun. Therefore the original intention, in all probability, was not to enlist Gurkhas at all. The composition of these corps must have been very mixed.

"During the close of the first phase of the Nepal War, 1814-15, numbers of disbanded Nepalese soldiers came over to the British side; and these together with prisoners and wounded recovered in our hospitals, and certain irregular troops were formed into four Nepalese irregular corps."†

The original composition of the Kumaon Battalion, (1/3 G. R.) is given as:

- "(a) Enemy subjects, *i.e.*, disbanded Gurkhas, etc., who joined the British after Ochterlony's victory at Deothal.
- (b) 300 Oudh and Palpa men from Gorakhpur who had been employed by the British against the Nepalese.
- (c) Some Gurkhas and others who entered our service after the fighting round Almora."‡

The four corps were based in the areas in which they had been raised. The two Nasiri Battalions (1/1st G. R.) in the Simla hills, the Simoor Battalion (1/2nd G. R.) in the Dehra Dun area and the Kumaon Battalion (1/3rd G. R.) in Kumaon.

In a general order dated 6th May, 1823, the four units are graded as Local Battalions. The duties of a Local Battalion, as laid down in this order, were: "the service and defence of the Provinces or Districts in which they were formed" but they were, on emergency, liable to active service in the field.§

* "Handbook on Garhwalis," p. 36.

† Hist., 2nd G. R., Pt. 1, p. 1.

‡ Hist., 3rd G. R., p. 9.

§ Hist., 1st G. R., p. 10.

Both the Nasiri Battalion (1/1st G. R.) and the Simoor Battalion (1/2nd G. R.) took part in the successful siege and assault on Bhurtpore in 1826. Otherwise the three units (the 2nd Nasiri Battalion was disbanded on 1829) carried out duties of a police nature until the Sikh War.

REGIMENTAL RECRUITING IN BRITISH INDIA, 1815—60

By the Treaty of Segowli in 1816 Nepal surrendered all her recent conquests. This decision had been forced upon her by defeat in war. The Kathmandu Government was therefore by no means on friendly terms with the British and a recurrence of war was a distinct possibility until Maharaja Jang Bahadur came to power in 1846.

It was, therefore, not possible to send recruiting parties into Nepal. All recruiting had to be done inside British India. This practically, confined recruiting to the districts of Kumaon and Garhwal or the sons of serving and pensioned soldiers.

Kumaon.—"In the early days recruiting parties were not allowed into Nepal and wandered about the border attending fairs. Recruiting seems to have been done by parties wandering up and down the Sardar (Mahakali) Valley and in Kumaon—which still had a number of Gurkha families residing in pre-mutiny days. Many Garhwalis and Kumaonis of good stamp were enlisted."*

The Kumaon Battalion (1/3rd G. R.) remained in Kumaon from 1815 until 1850, when both the Simoor Battalion (1/2nd G. R.) and the 66th or Gurkha Regiment (1/1st G. R.) did a tour of duty there. At the outbreak of the mutiny the 66th were stationed at Almora. In 1857 the Extra Gurkha Regiment (1/4th G. R.) was raised at Pithoragarh in Kumaon. The 25th Punjab Infantry or Hazara Gurkha Regiment (1/5th R. G. R.) was raised at Abbottabad in 1858 but obtained its recruits mainly from Kumaon.

"In October, 1858, the first recruiting party was sent out, not to Nepal, be it noted, but to Kumaon. The recruits enlisted were Gurkhas, Garhwalis and Kumaonis, each class in approximately equal numbers. Many years were to elapse before the regiment confined its efforts to the recruiting of Magars and Gurungs of Central Nepal."†

* Hist., 2nd G. R., Pt. I, p. 73.

† Hist., 5th R. G. R., p. 8.

During this period there must have been a large number of Kumaonis and Garhwalis in the ranks of all Gurkha regiments. The actual Gurkhas enlisted were probably either from the Gurkha colonies in Kumaon or from the Western Districts of Nepal—Doti, Bajhang, Bajura Raj, Talahara and Jumla. Men from these districts are never enlisted nowadays; though large numbers of men from Doti migrate into India to obtain work as coolies. There are still (1939) said to be 1,500 Gurkha families living in the Pithoragarh sub-division of Kumaon.

Line Boys.—"The progeny of Gurkha soldiers who are born and brought up in a regiment are called line boys. Properly speaking the use of the term should be so confined, but it is nowadays loosely used to denote any Gurkha who has been born and brought up in British India."*

In these early days it was the policy of Government to encourage the formation of Gurkha colonies in India. Colonies were formed in Kumaon and at Dehra Dun.

"In 1859 an attempt was made to start a Gurkha colony (in Abbottabad). A small area of land immediately north of cantonments was bought by Government in the hope that a portion of the men of the regiment, with their families, instead of returning to Nepal on completion of their service, would take up a part of the colony land and make their home there."† The colony was not, however, a success; partly owing to the poor quality of the land.

The line boy acquitted himself well in the Gurkha regiments. "Reid (the commandant of the regiment during the mutiny) eulogises the fine feelings of *esprit de corps* and pluck evinced by the 'line boys' of whom he could cite many examples ... out of 25 men who obtained the Order of Merit for Delhi (1857) 12 were line boys, while of 7 who received the Order for Aliwal (1846) five were line boys."‡

It would appear that when Prithwi Narayan of Gurkha brought the hill tribes of what is now Central Nepal under one ruler—Circa 1770—many fighting men, who had previously been engaged in internecine quarrels, were released for other employment. From 1770 till 1816 the energies of these warriors were

* "Handbook on Gurkhas" (1933), p. 124.

† Hist., 5th R. G. R., p. 8.

‡ Hist., 2nd G. R., Pt. I, p. 58.

employed in aggressive wars against near-by states. The whole of the hills on the south side of the Himalayas, from Bhutan in the east to the Sutlej in the west, were conquered by Gurkha armies. When, by the Treaty of Segowli, Nepal was confined to the area between the Mechni and the Sardar rivers another outlet was necessary for this surplus man-power.

In similar circumstances the clansmen of Scotland had migrated to America after the disarming of the Highlanders had been carried out by General Wade in 1725. The only outlet for the unemployed soldiery of Nepal was in India. Many Gurkhas descended to the plains to offer their services as mercenaries. Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, raised several Gurkha units, some of whom at one time formed his personal bodyguard. Gurkhas also enlisted in the irregular corps formed in the Punjab after the Sikh War, 1845—46.

The 25th Punjab Infantry or Hazara Gurkha Regiment (1/5th R. G. R.) was raised, in 1858, on a nucleus of Gurkhas transferred from the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Sikh Infantry, The Guides, Punjab Infantry and Punjab Police Battalions. The majority of the men came from the Guides and the 2nd Sikhs.*

Gurkhas also overflowed over the Eastern border of Nepal into Assam. The 1st Assam Light Infantry (1/6th G. R.) absorbed two companies of Gurkhas from the Sylhet Battalion in 1828.†

The Assam Sebundy Corps (2/8th G. R.), which was raised in 1835 at Gauhati, Assam, included a considerable number of Nepalese from Eastern Nepal who had taken service in the former Assam Sebundy Company.‡

The numbers of Gurkhas living in British India have increased in recent years. The result of the 1931 census shows that, at that time, there were 384,138 Gurkhas living in British India, over 180,000 of whom were in Bengal. These figures are said to be almost certainly an underestimate. The majority of these belong to the fighting classes.§

It is not easy to discover to what extent Gurkhas domiciled in India were enlisted during the War of 1814—18. The 1/10th Gurkhas carried out some recruiting in the Gurkha *basties* of the Shan States and obtained some useful recruits. The depot of the regiment was at that time in Burma.||

* Hist., 5th R. G. R., p. 8.

† Hist., 6th G. R., p. 12.

‡ Short Hist., 2/8th G. R., p. 3.

§ "Handbook on Gurkhas" (1933), p. 159.

|| Hist., 1/10th G. R., p. 106.

In recent years line boys have been very sparingly enlisted. This is due to the change of opinion on their usefulness. It is certain that the Indian-born Gurkha deteriorates but it may well be that this change of opinion is partly due to the fact that the material now enlisted in Gurkha regiments is superior to the pre-mutiny recruits and that the line boy suffers by comparison.

During this period, when enlistment was carried out within the limits of British India, Gurkha units were present at Bhurt-pore, 1826, Aliwal and Sobraon, 1846, and Delhi, 1857.

REGIMENTAL RECRUITING IN NEPAL, 1860—86

In 1857, after the capture of Delhi, the Government accepted the offer made by the Nepal Government to assist in suppressing the Sepoy Mutiny. Maharaja Jang Bahadur in person led a large Nepalese contingent which took a prominent part in the final capture of Lucknow. The Nepalese contingent also operated independently against the Mutineers, recapturing, amongst other towns, Gorakhpur. For this invaluable service a considerable portion of the Nepal Terai, which had been taken after the War of 1814—16, was returned to Nepal. Relations between the two countries improved and recruiting parties entered Nepal proper. From 1858 to 1886 there were five battalions of Gurkhas. Recruiting was carried out under unit arrangements. It would appear that commanding officers had a certain amount of liberty to choose recruiting area and the class enlisted.

The Army in India had taken over more stations in Northern India and there were not many cantonments near the Nepal border from which recruiting parties could operate. Gorakhpur was the most convenient station near the border and it became the main recruiting centre for Gurkhas. Purneah, in Bengal, which was also well placed, was abandoned as a military station in 1859.

"Since the 'sixties Gorakhpur had been continually used as a central recruiting station, it being near the Nepal border and a cantonment with Medical officers, etc. In October 1867 a recruiting party under Lt. Battye was sent to Gorakhpur. It enlisted 100 excellent recruits."*

The 5th Gurkha Regiment also sent a strong recruiting party to Gorakhpur in 1878, as one of the preparations for the 2nd Afghan War.†

* Hist., 2nd G. R., p. 73.

† Hist., 5th R. G. R., p. 34.

It is reasonable to suppose that the use of Gorakhpur for regimental recruiting parties was the cause of the large-scale enlistment of Magars and Gurungs in Gurkha regiments. Before the 'sixties Gurkha regiments were of very mixed composition and it is probable that Magars and Gurungs were sparingly enlisted. These two tribes form the majority of the population in the Gandak Basin, which lies in the Nepal hills North of Gorakhpur. Fourteen Gurkha battalions are now recruited exclusively from these two tribes.

In addition to the Gurkhas enlisted into the five Gurkha battalions, other corps also enlisted a proportion of Gurkhas. The Assam Regiments contained a large number of Gurkhas, probably Eastern Nepalis. The 43rd Assam Light Infantry (2/8th G. R.) in 1862 had an authorised proportion of three-quarters Gurkhas. Occasional recruiting parties were sent into Nepal to obtain these, though normally all recruiting was carried out locally in Assam.*

In 1865 the 42nd Assam Light Infantry (1/6th G. R.) had, four Gurkha companies.§

An official description of the troops in Assam in 1880 states that the 42nd Light Infantry had a strong Sikh element, the 43rd Assam Light Infantry was mostly composed of Assamese; but both contained a good many men from Hindustan. The 44th Sylhet Light Infantry (1/8th G. R.) was practically a Gurkha corps.†

It would appear that Government controlled the numbers of men to be enlisted from Nepal. "During this year, 1880, all recruiting was carried out through Gorakhpur and the recruitment of Gurkhas was confined by the Government of India to the Gurkha battalions only. From 1883 to 1885 the 43rd was stopped from recruiting men west of Kathmandu and therefore had to enrol a proportion of their recruits by sending parties *via* Darjeeling and Segowli. From 1885 onwards all recruiting was concentrated on the parts of Nepal west of Kathmandu."‡

The 9th Bengal Native Infantry (1/9th G. R.) in 1881 enlisted some Newars from Nepal.||

During this period Gurkha units took part in numerous Frontier expeditions and in the 2nd Afghan War. They were prominent at the storming of the Peiwar Kotal and the Battle of Ahmed Khel.

* Short Hist., 2/8th G. R., p. 4.

† Short Hist., 2/8th G. R., p. 7.

‡ Short Hist., 2/8th G. R., p. 7.

§ Hist., 6th G. R., p. 23.

|| Hist., 9th G. R., p. 19.

CENTRAL RECRUITING IN NEPAL, 1886—1940

In 1885 fear of war with Russia led to an increase in the Army in India.

"The Panjdeh crisis, when war seemed imminent and a force of 65,000 men was mobilised by the Indian Government, led to the immediate increase of the Indian Army by 10,000 European and 20,000 Indians."*

It was decided by Government to raise second battalions for the five Gurkha regiments. Definite orders for their formation were issued in February, 1886. During the same year the 42nd and 43rd Assam Light Infantry and the 44th Sylhet Light Infantry became class Gurkha regiments. The numbers of Gurkha units was thus increased from five to thirteen battalions.

"Negotiations were entered into with the Nepal government by which they opened Nepal more to our recruiting parties and permitted the enlistment of numbers of Nepalese sufficient to supply a second battalion for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Gurkhas. In exchange for these men a large number of service rifles were presented to the Nepal Darbar, together with a large monetary consideration. During the winter (1885) Colonel Beecher was sent to Darjeeling to report on the facilities for recruiting along the Eastern border of Nepal, and so relieve the congestion anticipated at Gorakhpur, which for many years had been our only depot for collecting Gurkha recruits."†

"In 1886, however, when second battalions were raised for the first five Gurkha regiments, sanction was accorded for the establishment of a Gurkha Recruiting Depot at Gorakhpur. It is interesting to note that this depot was the first of its kind to be established in India; and it was its success which eventually led to similar organisations being formed for the recruitment of other classes in the Indian Army. Before 1885 no arrangement with regard to recruiting appears to have been made with the Nepal Government

* Sketch of History of India (Dodwell), p. 94.

† Hist., 2nd G. R., Pt. I, p. 105.

and recruiters were obliged to smuggle their recruits across the border as best they could.”*

“Up till 1888 cases of recruiters being ill-treated in Nepal were of common occurrence, but thanks to the firmness of our Residents and the broad-minded policy of successive Prime Ministers such cases are now seldom heard of, and recruiters are allowed to carry on their work unmolested.”†

The Gurkha Recruiting Depot was opened during the winter months only. In 1887, however, all troops were withdrawn from Gorakhpur. In consequence the depot was allowed to demolish the Artillery bazaar buildings, in which they had been accommodated, and to build huts with the débris. The depot continued to function in Gorakhpur until 1903 when, owing to an outbreak of plague, it moved nearer the Nepal border at Pharenda. In 1906 the depot returned and a site was obtained at Kunraghat, three miles from Gorakhpur on the banks of the Ramgarh Tal. This site was occupied in 1910. Whilst the present depot was being built the recruiting establishment lived in tents near-by.

The recruiting procedure adopted was similar to the present one. Each battalion sent serving soldiers to act as recruiters—one recruiter for every two or three recruits required. These recruiters, based on the depot, made trips into Nepal bringing out prospective recruits. These were passed by a recruiting officer and a medical officer. Recruiters were provided with a distinctive recruiting duty pass—printed in both English and Nepali. Rejected recruits were given a small allowance for the journey back to their homes.

Owing to the fact that the recruiting area in Nepal is badly served by roads and bridges it was impossible for men to come down during the monsoon period when flooded rivers are often impassable. From Gorakhpur the Terai belt had to be crossed. Malaria is prevalent in the *terai*. Recruiting was therefore confined to the winter months. The Nepal Government have now constructed a motor road from the British India railhead at Nautunwa to Batauli. This enables men to cross the *terai* in one day.

It is doubtful if a European has ever visited the Gurkha recruiting area in Nepal. The handbooks on the Thums and

* “Handbook on Gurkhas” (1933), p. 128.

† “Handbook on Gurkhas” (1918), p. 148.

villages in Western and Eastern Nepal have been compiled by recruiting officers from information received from serving soldiers and pensioners.

Newars.—In 1893 it was proposed to make the 9th Bengal Native Infantry (1/9th G. R.) a class Newar Battalion. On the advice of the Recruiting officer (Captain Vansittart), however, Government decided to enlist Khas Gurkhas, (Thakurs and Chettries) instead. The 9th Bengal Native Infantry became a class Gurkha regiment in 1894.* The Newars from Nepal are not now enlisted, though during the War (1914—18) some were taken. In Nepal the Newars form the trading class.

Garhwalis.—Until 1887 Garhwalis were enlisted in Gurkha regiments. In 1886, when second battalions were being raised for the five Gurkha regiments, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, decided that one of them should be a class Garhwali battalion. The second battalion of the 3rd Gurkha Regiment was chosen. The 3rd Gurkhas were serving in Burma at this time so the 2/3rd Gurkhas were not raised until 1887. This battalion was raised on a nucleus of Garhwali soldiers transferred from every existing Gurkha unit. In 1891 this battalion became the 39th Garhwal Rifles and the present 2/3rd Gurkhas were raised.†

Eastern Nepal Recruiting Depot.—A recruiting depot was opened at Ghoom, near Darjeeling, in 1890.

In 1895 the 10th Regiment (1st Burma Rifles) Madras Infantry (1/10th G. R.) became a class Gurkha regiment, composed of Limbus and Rais from Eastern Nepal; though until 1905 other classes continued to serve.‡

In 1902 the 8th Gurkha Rifles (1/7th G. R.) was raised with a composition of Limbus and Rais. A second battalion was raised for both the 6th and 9th Gurkha Rifles in 1904. A second battalion was raised for the 7th Gurkha Rifles in 1907 and for the 10th Gurkha Rifles in 1908.

Thus at the outbreak of War in 1914 there were ten regiments of Gurkhas, each of two battalions. Of these, sixteen battalions were enlisted from the Western Nepal recruiting depôt at Kunraghat—fourteen Magar and Gurung and two Thakur and Chettries—and four battalions from the Eastern Nepal recruiting depot at Ghoom—Limbus and Rais.

* Hist., 9th G. R., pp. 19 and 23.

† Hist., 3rd G. R., p. 53.

‡ Hist., 1/10th G. R., p. 16.

The Great War, 1914—18.—During the Great War, 1914—18, third battalions were raised for eight of the Gurkha regiments—the 4th and 10th Gurkha Rifles did not raise a third battalion—and a new regiment, the 11th Gurkha Rifles, of four battalions, was raised. The numbers of Gurkha battalions thus increased to 33. The 3rd Gurkha Rifles raised a fourth battalion. Recruiting was carried on throughout the year. As well as providing men for the Gurkha regiments many Nepalis were employed in labour and other corps.

“The number of men taken out of the country (Nepal) since the outbreak of war had exceeded 200,000. When it is recollected that the bulk of these men came from the martial classes, of which the total male population, according to the census of 1911, amounted to 907,000—from which total those who were too young, too old or physically unfit must be excluded—it can be seen to what extent the country had been denuded of its manhood. Fifty-five thousand of these were enlisted in the regular Gurkha battalions of the Indian Army. Nepal suffered some 20,000 casualties on our behalf.”*

As was to be expected, this enormous increase in recruiting caused the standards of various regiments to be relaxed. Eastern Nepalis and Khas Gurkhas were accepted into the Magar and Gurung regiments.

In the 6th Gurkha Rifles:

“The custom of the regiment to enlist only Magars and Gurungs had to be dropped for the time being. By the end of the first year there was almost every class of Gurkha to be found in the ranks of the regiment—Khas, Chettri, Limbu, Rai, Sunwar, Lohar, Magar and Gurung.”†

It must be remembered that the population of the Eastern Nepal recruiting area, from which only four battalions are normally recruited, is almost as great as that of the Western area.‡ Extensive recruiting was also carried out from the Western districts of Piuthan, Sallyan and Dullu Dailekh which in peace-time furnish few recruits.

* “The Gurkhas,” by Northey and Morris, pp. 266-67.

† Hist., 6th G. R., p. 149.

‡ “Handbook on Gurkhas” (1933), p. 158.

CONCLUSION

Though the class and type of man recruited into the Gurkha regiments of the Indian Army has varied from time to time, it is an interesting fact that their reputation in war has always been high. At the storming of Bhurtpore (1826), in the battles of the Sikh War and during the Mutiny, Gurkha regiments, composed almost entirely of classes no longer enlisted, distinguished themselves notably.

During the interim period when the present classes were beginning to be enlisted Gurkha regiments gained fame at the storming of the Peiwar Kotal and the Battle of Ahmed Khel.

In the Great War Gurkhas fought on many fronts. At the end of the War, in the 1919-20 Waziristan Operations, when regiments were composed of a high percentage of young soldiers and when classes were mixed, the behaviour of the Gurkha regiments at the Ahnai Tangai was beyond praise.

ARMoured LORRIES

By MAJOR D. H. J. WILLIAMS

From time to time, in articles in the Journal, remarks have appeared on the question of armour plate protection for lorries. As a rule this has been with reference to conditions on the North-West Frontier. The question is one which one has heard discussed by officers on this frontier frequently. It is one which could not fail to receive attention in a Corps such as the South Waziristan Scouts. A good deal of consideration was given to the subject some eighteen months ago, and it might be of interest to describe what has since been done in the matter.

It was decided that armoured lorries could only be accepted if they could be used as general purpose vehicles, for men or supplies as might be required. From the administrative point of view, a lorry which is a specialised type, not available for general purposes, is undesirable.

Bullet-proof plate may be very desirable, but it is heavy. Unless the performance and carrying capacity of the vehicle is to be seriously impaired, the result of any armouring problem must be a compromise between protection, speed, and useful load.

The necessary bullet-proof plate for us was ordered from England in December, 1938. It was only received some seven months later, a month before the outbreak of war. The plate is five millimetres, which is proof, at the normal angle of impact, against the service .303 bullet. Five millimetres is appreciably less than a quarter of an inch. It will be understood that plate of only this thickness, capable of stopping a .303 bullet at short range, must be pretty tough. In order to minimise drilling operations here, it was in consequence obtained ready drilled from the works. A certain amount of additional drilling was required in fitting up the lorries here, but not very much.

The sketches and photographs with this article will give an idea of the layout of the vehicles, and the armour protection provided. Insufficient bullet-proof plate was received to complete all the armouring required, and certain items were made up from ordinary steel plates with a "sandwich" of hard wood between them. The thickness of mild steel and wood necessary was, of course, determined by test. In two cases a single mild steel plate has been used, where the thickness of a steel and wood "sand-

wich" would have been inconvenient. The fact is accepted in these cases that the plate may not be proof against the right-angled strike of a bullet at very short range.

It will be seen that most of the armour is built into the vehicles and is not visible. The only exceptions to this are the windscreen-shutter, a side-shutter above the door by the driver's seat and one exterior plate on the bonnet. It was not essential to conceal the protective armour in the structure of the vehicle, but it was convenient. In hot weather it is an advantage, as the plate is not exposed to the direct rays of the sun and an insulating layer of wood outside it keeps down its temperature. The protective plate on the bonnet was purposely fitted outside. It can be speedily removed and thus allows easy access to the engine. The folding shutters over the front door of the lorry, and the adjustable windscreen-shutter, enable it to be used as an ordinary open vehicle when tactical considerations do not dictate otherwise.

It will be noticed that, with the side-shutters and windscreen-shutter closed, the driver has quite a good degree of protection from either side or from the front.

Above the line of the main body armour, running the full length of the lorry, he has little protection directly from the rear. To be candid, however, he is well protected by the bodies of his passengers from this direction, and only a very lucky shot could render him *hors-de-combat*. If supplies form his load he is just as well protected. With an empty lorry he might be unlucky.

The roofs of these lorries have not been armoured in any way. When men form the load, their kit is carried on the roof and gives some degree of protection. If supplies form the load a portion can be carried on the roof for the same purpose.

All fittings used in the construction of these armoured lorry bodies had, of course, to be designed and made in the Corps workshops. In consequence, they had to be as simple as possible, such as any blacksmith-fitter could turn out, and, at the same time, be effective. The various fittings required a certain amount of consideration. An armoured door, for instance, measuring some three feet by two, cannot just be swung from anything, with a few screws and a bazaar hinge.

The weight of the armour with necessary fittings totals about fourteen maunds. Some sixty or seventy maunds can be carried without overloading, so this amount is not excessive. But for the fact that the lorries are required for operation in hilly country,

on roads up to 7,500 feet, the weight of armour might have increased. A normal load works out more or less as follows:

Armour	14	maunds.	
20 fully equipped men	...	40	„		
Kit (say)	...	8	„	Total 62	maunds.

Alternatively,

Armour	14	„	
Stores	50	„	Total 64 „


With these totals the vehicles can travel comfortably on the flat at 35 M.P.H., which is a very reasonable speed. I have myself driven them for hundreds of miles, and they travel quite nicely at 50 M.P.H. with a load of about forty maunds. Not that I advocate this speed as a general practice. Twenty-four men is the maximum who can be carried, but this is overcrowding though not overloading. The passenger seats are so designed that they can be lifted straight out and carried on the roof, to provide a clear space for rations or stores.

The exits from the lorry are three. Double doors at the back and a door on each side of the driver's seat. It will be seen from the drawings that passage way is provided on either side of the driver's seat to these doors, from the rear of the lorry. It will also be noticed that these doors hinge from the rear—a method which facilitates entry or exit.


Turning for a moment to the sketches, I should like to mention a few points about them.

Sketch 1.—This shows the armoured areas of the lorry from the side. Except where it is required to cover the driver and the petrol tank, the main armoured portion does not come down to the floor level of the lorry. A belt of plate runs the full length of the lorry at seat level. Seated passengers are thus given body protection, but their feet and heads are not covered. Considerations of weight alone governed this layout. The men were not long in evolving a proper technique to deal with this problem. Heads disappear with unanimous rapidity whenever sniping starts on the roads.

Sketch 2.—This shows a general plan of the lorry layout, principally seating arrangements and exits. A comparison with the first sketch will give an idea of how far the driver is protected towards the rear. I refer to head protection, and protection against a degree of “plunging” fire, which the higher level of the armour in this part of the lorry affords.



Armoured lorry with shutters open.




Armoured lorry with shutters closed.

Sketch 3.—This is an attempt to show the armoured areas of the lorry, when viewed directly from the front. It is not altogether successful, as I found the exact distribution of armour difficult to represent from this angle. It should be remembered that the bonnet of these lorries narrows a great deal in width towards the front. Plates, such as the exterior plate on the bonnet and others, follow this narrowing line of the bonnet, and so give protection when viewed directly from the front.

The radiator shutter works on the Venetian blind principle, the extent to which it is closed being controlled from the driver's seat. This shutter is not proof against the normal angle of strike of a bullet at short range, it is only mild steel at present. However, it is proof at various angles and for a right-angled strike at longer range.

One of the most important pieces of bullet-proof plate, the dashboard armour in front of the driver, does not appear well in this sketch. Its "legs" rise from floor level. The front armoured doors close against it on either side, and the windscreen-shutter, when closed, slightly overlaps the top of it. Its shape is:



The driver is provided with a slot in the windscreen-shutter at eye-level. The present slot is more than adequate when the shutter is closed, and could have been reduced in size a bit. The shutter itself can be adjusted to any angle up to fully closed, by a simple fitting within reach of the driver's hand.

Two photographs of a lorry with side and windscreen-shutters open and closed, also accompany this article. The vehicle shown is a 1937 Chevrolet chassis. Most of these armoured bodies have now been transferred to 1939 chassis, and the sketches are based on these. There is little alteration except that the driver sits an inch or so lower relative to the armour, and thus has greater protection from "plunging fire." The radiator end of the 1939 chassis is also somewhat different in design, a fact which necessitated a number of alterations in fitting them up.

So much for the sketches and photographs. Our object has been to construct a general purpose lorry which would—

- (a) Give a good degree of protection to the driver, petrol tank and engine.
- (b) Some degree of protection to the passengers. The vehicles have been on the road for about six months now, and the bodies have not shown any sign of weakness. They have been sniped on numerous occasions, but only one or two ineffective hits have so far been recorded.

Now that the job is finished, I think we could have used thinner bullet-proof plate in certain places.

Without going into the full details of the immunity thickness of proper bullet-proof plate at various ranges and various angles of impact, I may say that 4.5 mm. is immunity thickness at 100 yards for a normal angle of impact. In the case of these lorries some of the 5 mm. plate is built into the structure, and lies between layers of wood planking. I think it possible that we might have reduced that plate by half, or perhaps even one millimetre. A reduction of half or one millimetre thickness of plate may not seem worth worrying about. On this job, though, it would have represented an additional five to ten square feet of armour plate available for the same weight. This could still have been utilised with advantage.


The vulnerability of men in ordinary lorries on our most unpeaceful "roads of peace," has been shown on more than one occasion in recent years—quite recently on the Kohat—Bannu road. On this last occasion, a platoon in two lorries were reported to have lost six killed and fourteen wounded in a few minutes. One cannot think that such losses would have occurred immediately, in a type of partially armoured vehicle here described. We, at any rate, hope that it will not occur.

NOTE


Since the above was written, three of these armour-protected lorries, carrying forty men, who formed an escort, were involved in a close ambush on the Jandola—Sararogha road. A gang of some eighty mixed Mahsud, having seen the lorries pass up the road towards Sararogha, laid the ambush to catch them on their return.

No road block was made. The reason for this was, of course, that the ambush was intended specifically for the Scout lorries.


SOUTH WAZIRISTAN SCOUTS CHEVROLET LORRY
(ARMOUR PROTECTED)



1. SIDE



2. PLAN



3. FRONT

BUILT-IN ARMOUR PLATE.

ARMoured SHUTTERS, OPENED
 AND CLOSED FROM DRIVERS SEAT

EXTERIOR REMOVABLE ARMOUR

[APPROXIMATE SCALE $\frac{1}{2}$ " = 1' $\frac{1}{2}$ FT.]

Stones would have formed the only available material just there, but that would have stopped local lorry traffic and would have risked spoiling the show. The gang concealed itself carefully in depth on either side of the road and waited, while privileged spectators from the locality publicly occupied a convenient natural grandstand some five hundred yards from the spot.

The lorries passed through under very heavy fire. Three men were slightly wounded. Little was seen of the ambushers, though the fire of a few men at close range was returned. The lorries were struck by eighteen bullets, and a bomb. Subsequent examination of the armour plate showed that a good proportion of the hits had been made at ranges of less than fifty yards. Most of the close-range shooting was directed at the front half of lorries, in other words, at the engines and at the drivers. There were in fact no hits towards the rear of the vehicles, I should say in the last eight feet. One bullet only caused minor damage to an engine. This shot, fired from below road-level and slightly from the front, passed below any protective armour. It holed the casing of a timing gear pinion immediately in front of the cylinder block. This, however, had no effect on the running of the engine.

I was interested to observe, also, that the windscreen-shutter, composed of a sandwich of mild steel and wood, stood this unsolicited test with success.

"BLACK HORSE ROCK"

By RONOCO

It happened many years ago whilst I was serving with the South Waziristan Scouts, and where we captured him was in the broken hilly country just north of the entrance to the Shahur Tangi—a few hundred yards below and east of Entrance Piquet.

We were at the time advancing downstream in the direction of Chagmalai with the intention of establishing a Scouts' Post there, and with me I had some four hundred men of the Sarwekai garrison, some of whom would ultimately be used to garrison the new post.

The day was hot for it was the month of June and the mid-day hour just passed, and we had been marching since shortly after dawn. With luck we should make Chagmalai within the hour, that is if the Gods were kind to us and all went well, for we were working in the land of the unseen eye where every error made was paid for in the price of blood.

Although commanding the column, at the time I had dropped back to the rear-guard to see that all was well as the tail of the column cleared the Tangi, and that the rearmost piquets got away without becoming seriously engaged.

The permissive signal to retire had been given to a piquet high up on the hills to our right, and an acknowledgement received by flag, and we took up covering positions to support the piquet down. As it withdrew and had reached a point about twenty yards from the evacuated sangar a sudden burst of fire was opened on the piquet from close quarters.

This piquet was composed of three men and an N.C.O.—all Adam Khel Afridis bred and born to rugged and rocky ground such as that we were operating over at the time. Nothing new to them this barren land of prodigious curves and crests, nor the hidden hand of death which lurked amongst the rocks and tried to reach them as they moved over the territory he called his own. Was not a like toll exacted from them in their own distant lands bordering the Kohat Pass? Had they not been reared since childhood on the border system of blood feuds which many times had proved to them that the eye, the ear and the trigger finger were the guardians of their lives?

What had they to fear in such natural surroundings even had they been further removed from the long column of men they could see below them in the *nala*—a snake-like column moving slowly and keeping parallel to the river—a column of their own blood—the Scouts.

When the firing started I yelled to Jim, who was my second in command, to stand by to support me, and taking a platoon of men I dashed down the *nala* bank, across the stream, and started off up the hillside in the direction of the firing. Before we had crossed the *nala* which lay between us and the foot of the hill I had seen my Adam Khel piquet charging back to retake the sangar, and had breathed a silent prayer of thanks that none of them had been hit as I had seen all the four men. It didn't take us long to reach the sangar as we had rushed the hill in extended order, but once we got there all we could discover was one dead man, obviously a Mahsud, inside the sangar walls. Of my Adam Khels there wasn't a sign. Possibly they had rushed on and past the sangar in their eagerness to come to grips with the enemy. There had been no further firing except for one short burst delivered soon after the piquet had been fired on and before the Adam Khels had regained the sangar—possibly they themselves had returned the fire. Maybe by now they had all been knifed in the very broken ground the other side of the crest—better push forward and see.

After making arrangements for covering fire for our further move forward we advanced over the crest and down the slope the other side but could still see nothing of the Adam Khels. Why no signal as they had been taught to give under like circumstances? Were they all dead?

"Look, sahib, a man, a shout." Yes—further down the hill there's a man waving furiously. He's one of my men too. Detailing a section as a layback I set off down the hill with a few men in the direction of the waving man, and on approaching closer I discovered that there was with him another man of the piquet. I asked what all the noise was about and if any of the men had been hit, and in reply was informed that so far as they knew no one had been. I was told that the piquet commander and one other man had disappeared further down the hill chasing an unwounded Mahsud, but that their special quarry at the moment lay under the huge table-sized rock at our feet.

I was invited to look for myself, and glancing down to the base of the rock I saw the legs and feet of a man protruding, and

by the side of them a rifle butt, the remaining portions of both being hidden under the rock.

"That man is dead," I was informed, "but there is another man alive well in under the rock." "Tell him to come out," said I, "or else we'll put a grenade under there to help him make up his mind," although I knew only too well that we were minus grenades that day.

Apparently my smattering of Pashto had been understood by the inhabitant of the rock for very soon afterwards a voice was heard as if from inside the rock itself saying, "If I come out you'll kill me, and if I don't come out you'll still kill me, so what am I to do?"

It required no great conflict of emotions to supply the answer, and after a little while out came our hero, tall and gaunt and eagle-eyed, defiant to the last. "Now do your damndest," was all he said.

I asked him what he was doing under the rock and who his pal, now dead, might be; but all he replied was, "I know nothing of this man. I was walking this way when I heard the sound of firing and being unarmed I took cover under the rock. Scarcely had I reached the rock when that man, badly wounded, ran down the mountain side, and I called to him to shelter under my rock. He is now dead and that is his rifle." It is true there was only the one rifle between the two men, nor did a second rifle come to light though we searched the ground exhaustively. I got from him his name and tribe but no amount of cross-questioning could shake him in his denial of having taken any action that day against our troops. No, not even the threat of instant death which was handed out to him as a matter of course.

We then took out the strings of his pyjamas, and with them tied his hands together behind his back, at the same time telling him to hold on well to his pyjamas and that when we were ready we would take him along with us to Chagmalai. Not often did the Scouts bring prisoners home, although they captured many, for were not these men our enemies, and would not mutilation debar them from the Kingdom of Heaven? In any case the Political, even after the dangers of the hunt and the capture, would probably set them free.

Soon afterwards the missing N.C.O. and man joined the group and from this N.C.O. I learnt the full rate of the morning's happening. He said that shortly after he and his men

had evacuated the piquet position they were fired on by four men from the piquet position itself, and turning round they returned the fire and rushed on the position. The enemy must have been lying up close to the position from early morning, and hidden in the rocks which were massed all over the ground. By their fire they had dropped one man in the piquet position and had badly wounded another, but two unwounded men had got away and over the crest, one, followed by the wounded man, making down the right-hand slope and the other the left. He had given orders to two of his command to chase the men who had gone down the hill to the right whilst he and the other man had followed him to the left.

He had failed to put his man in the bag but undoubtedly, he said, the dead body and the stranger now in our midst were the two who had made off down the right spur.

Instead of praising him for his dash and initiative I just cursed him thoroughly for not examining the near-by ground before taking up his original position, but that was a way we had in the Scouts, and the men themselves knew there would be appreciation to follow.

Later on that morning we arrived in Chagmalai and there handed over our prisoner to the political representative, and in due course I returned to Sarwekai—to forget about the rigours of our recent dash to Chagmalai, and to cease to wonder what might have happened to our hero—now that he was in political hands.

Quite frankly I believed that long since he would have been released and that maybe I should run across him again some day walking innocently over ground from which we had been sniped. If so we would forget about the Political and take the law into our own fair hands.

Three weeks later I was to hear the tale of the Black Horse Rock when I arrived in Dera Ismail Khan in answer to a summons demanding my presence there to give evidence for the prosecution in a case against Khabul Khan. For the life of me I couldn't imagine who this Khabul Khan might be or why I had been subpoenaed to give evidence against him. Could he possibly be the big fat lout I had pulled off his donkey going up that steep incline a week or so ago and who vowed he would get even with me yet?—or maybe a relation of the poor unfortunate who ran into a Scout ambush near Sarwekai a day or so ago? Surely in either case I would have little to do with the prosecution.

I was to learn the following morning who this Khabul Khan was, when I attended the political court, and saw there in the dock our hero of the Shahur Tangi affair. He was on trial for his life, and in his defence he told in quiet and pleasing Pashto tones the following story—a tale of the Black Horse Rock:—

I am Khabul Khan, a son of the Gugi Khel who inhabit the lands to the north of Sarwekai and whose territories extend to the east as far as the Black Horse Rock and my village is that of Ahmedwan which lies at the foot of the Jalel Algad. I grew to manhood there and was respected for my prowess among the sons of the Gugi Khel. Life was hard but I was happy until I took to wife Gul Jahan, a daughter of the Shaman Khel, who are renowned among the Sons of the North for the unsurpassed beauty of their women. Nor was Gul Jahan but a sample of the daughters of the Shaman Khel—she was beautiful more than any, but resentful at being sold and made to labour for a son of the Gugi Khel. We were happy for a time, a world unto ourselves, and none more proud of his possessions than Khabul Khan, but it is written that pride goes before a fall.

It is written also that woman is the serpent and that her beauty is as the night-dew which deceiveth the flowers in the morning, and soon I too was deceived and found cause to hang my head. Better far that I had found companionship among the daughters of my own tribe, and not of the Shaman Khel.

Gul Jahan spent longer at the water than was her wont and many times she was not there to minister to my needs when I returned with my herds at the hour of the setting of the sun.

For long I suspected her fidelity and then one day at evening time I returned alone, leaving my herds grazing on the distant hill-sides, and hid close to the watering-well where the village women drew for their needs, and with my own eyes did I perceive what is about to be related here.

Soon before the setting of the sun that day did Gul Jahan, when the others of her kind were busy at the well, hide her water-pot in the near-by bushes, and take the path which leads to the east in the direction of the Black Horse Rock, and in her hand she carried something small.

She stopped every now and then and glanced behind as is the way of those who are afraid or who go forth to carry out a task of shame, but her speed was as that of the mountain-goat who runs from rock to rock and then takes stock of his ground to see that all is well. But I followed close, taking cover in the

shadows cast by the rocks, for the sun was not yet set and the shadows were long.

Arrived at the Back Horse Rock which stands alone on the edge of the plain—a landmark and a refuge for the outlaw and for those who pass that way—Gul Jahan advanced to the side of the stream which flows within a stone's throw of the Rock, and there depositing the thing she carried, sat down to wait. I then advanced to the Rock and hid myself in its folds and prepared to see what she would do.

No cause had she to suspect that she was followed and in her innocence she played with the stones which lay at her feet. Not long afterwards and whilst it was still light, I perceived a lone horseman approaching across the plain from the east, and drawing nigh he greeted the woman and led her to the outer face of the Rock, not more than two paces from where I lay with, knife in hand, ready to avenge myself of the insult which had been hurled against the honour of my house.

"Your food is brought," said the woman as he got down from his horse and seated himself on a stone besides the Rock, and she opened up the thing she was carrying and placed it before him on the ground. "Woman, go down to the river and bring me water that I may wash my hands before partaking of the food," was all he replied. Now was my time come, and when the woman had gone I leaped on the man and with but one quick slash his head rolled at my feet. Nor did I recognise the man but his clothes were of the Shaman Khel. Picking up the headless body I quickly tied it on the panting horse by means of the reins, and then I struck the horse and made him scurry off in the direction whence he came—and all this time the woman remained hidden in the folds of the ground between the banks and the river, nor did she hear anything except maybe the galloping horse, as no sound was uttered when I did this thing.

When the woman returned and saw no one there but, on the sands the head of the man she had left but some minutes before, she cried aloud with fear, and gathering up her skirts she ran like the deer along the path which led back to Ahmedwan. No need for caution now as the dusk had come, so setting the lifeless head upon a pinnacle of the Rock that all might see, I went down to the river and performed the ablutions prescribed for those who have taken life, and then I went my way back by the path taken by Gul Jahan.

Neither that night nor for long months afterwards did I give cause to make the woman suspect that it was I who shared her secret, and in the meantime she bore her burden well but she was afraid of the dark. It was the hour of the coming of darkness when her lover was slain, and maybe daily at this hour her thought of him would return, and remain with her until the coming of the day. No longer did she stray from the house as if afraid to forsake the protection of its walls, and I was given little cause to complain of my lot even though she continued to treat me with disdain.

It was many moons after that, when the short days had come round again and she and I were sitting on the steps in the courtyard of our village home. It was again the hour of dusk.

I said to the woman, "Go inside and bring me out my *hugqa* that I may smoke." And then the terror seized her such as I had never seen before, for jumping up she cried, "I'm afraid to go into that room—it is dark inside." Then did I lose my manhood and my self-respect for in anger I replied, "Ah! You weren't afraid to go forth to the Black Horse Rock on the night there was no moon." At this time only did she suspect, and picking up a spear which lay there on the ground besides the steps she rushed at me and screamed, "So, *you* were the one who did it, and may Allah give me power to square the deal!" I could have strangled the woman without much ado but her screams brought the men of the village from their resting places, and seeing a woman attacking a man, they killed the woman, and then turning to me they asked, "Why did you make us kill our own sister?"

Now that the woman was dead and my honour avenged, why should more blood be spilt in so unworthy a cause? Should I take refuge by admitting the cause of the quarrel between the woman and me and thereby admit even my own dishonour? No, *sahib*, this is not the way of the Pathan.

Taking up my cloth, I said, "Peace be on you, my brothers—I am no more," and, stepping down from my house, I passed through the gate as the stars were appearing in the sky.

"Starre mashe!" (May you never be tired!) they cried to me as I went forth, and in salute I replied "Quar mashe" (May you never be poor!), for is this not the salutation in adversity as well as in wealth?

That night I wandered south by the road which leads to Splitoi, and was in the hills of the Shahur Tangi when the firing started and I hid under the rock. Of the cause of the firing I know nothing, and I am innocent of the charge. This is the story of Khabul Khan.

May I meet you again one day, Khabul Khan, to hear you say that what you then spoke was true, and that your life was wrongly forfeited to the ends of so-called justice. Not that your life mattered much even to yourself but, all the same, your bearing and your words, to me, savoured of the truth.

PETROL CONSUMPTION

By MAJOR C. MC I. DELF

Petrol is to the mechanised force of to-day what grain and hay have been to past armies. But there is one big difference. Animals in an emergency can be worked for a short time without food, and for a rather longer period they can very often carry on with such food as the country affords. The motor vehicle without fuel is useless. It is the purpose of this paper to show how much can be done to mitigate this state of affairs by the extraction of the maximum mileage from each gallon of fuel put into the tank. Care by all concerned can improve a vehicle's fuel consumption by as much as twenty-five per cent. It follows that this will lead to a much greater radius of action per tank of fuel in war and very considerable economy in peace. The points dealt with can be grouped under the headings driving, tuning, cooling and fuel quality.

DRIVING


Civilian road transport companies in England pay the greatest attention to their fuel consumption figures. Their profits depend upon them. The human factor plays a large part in getting the best out of the motor vehicle and many firms have introduced a bonus system to encourage their drivers to handle their machines economically. The mediocre driver who finds his more skilful brother getting a higher rate of pay is stimulated to drive more carefully; to avoid violent acceleration, overspeeding, overusing the low gears, waste of petrol when filling up, unnecessary flooding of the carburettor and so on. The naturally bad driver who is so clumsy with his controls that he returns a consistently bad petrol consumption is weeded out. As he is usually accident-prone also, his elimination is doubly necessary.

It is suggested that some such system might be introduced into the service with advantage, possibly by making the driver's proficiency pay contingent on good petrol consumption figures.

Before this can be done it will be necessary for all concerned to be thoroughly familiar with the capabilities of each type of vehicle under varying conditions. In this connection the mileage figures required by the regulations are not much use. They are put deliberately low to allow for expensive conditions, such

as cross-country work in low gears. It must also be borne in mind that a modern vehicle is far less costly to run than the older service vehicles. Great improvements have been made in recent years in carburation and in design generally. Incidentally this is a cogent argument for the elimination of older vehicles even though perfectly sound mechanically.

The speed at which a vehicle is driven determines to a great extent its consumption figures. Another important factor is the quality of the road surface. A standard Norton motor-cycle as used in the service is capable of ninety miles per gallon if not driven at more than forty miles per hour. The same machine if driven at sixty miles an hour for long stretches on the same road and under the same conditions, apart from speed, will give less than sixty miles per gallon. The report of the British delegation which examined the new German roads in 1937 is illuminating on this subject. A six-cylinder car was driven on one of the old main roads at 44.3 M.P.H. at which speed it showed 17 M.P.G. It was then driven on the autobahn at the same speed and its petrol consumption was lowered to 29.7 M.P.G. The speed was then increased to 77.4 M.P.H. and the petrol consumption was increased to 16.75 M.P.G. (Appendix IV of the report). These figures clearly show the very important effect of speed and road surface on consumption. A typical speed-consumption curve for a medium-sized modern car is as follows:



The commander who wishes to get the maximum mileage from his petrol will permit high speeds only when the necessity is paramount. Such occasions are few. The type of road he has to work over is generally out of his control; but it should be borne in mind that to work vehicles in convoy is equivalent, as far as consumption is concerned, to operating over bad roads. Convoy work entails frequent stopping and starting, excessive use of low

gears, baulking on hills, the idling of engines for long periods and many other ways of wasting petrol. It follows that convoys should only be used in cases of military necessity. Where there is a choice between protecting a road and running a convoy it is far better to protect the road and allow each type of vehicle to run along it at its own most economical pace. To achieve this successfully demands a high standard of traffic control and intelligence on the part of each driver.

Care must be taken that there is no coasting down hills in neutral gear. This is the bus driver's way of saving petrol: it leads to frequent accidents.

TUNING

Another important factor in petrol consumption is the condition and the tune of the engine. Very often an engine is perfectly sound in the essentials and yet gives poor results, because it is out of tune. This is sure to be reflected in heavy fuel consumption. The complete tuning of the modern engine is the job of the specialist and as such must be left to the maintenance unit, but the officer in charge of mechanical transport can do much to keep his engines in tune by ensuring among other things that the right types of oils are used, that the plugs are in good order, that the advance and retard mechanism is working properly and that the air cleaner is clean and setting up no restriction.

Recently much research work has been done by the oil companies and this has resulted in engine oils which are more nearly akin to the ideal. The ideal oil is perfectly fluid and free from gumminess at low atmospheric temperatures while at the same time it provides complete lubrication at the highest temperature at which the engine is called upon to operate; or, in more technical parlance, it is an oil with a flat viscosity curve. It is clear that such an oil will render starting in cold weather much easier, especially when vehicles have to be parked in the open. It also improves petrol consumption, for less power is absorbed in internal friction which can be considerable when a thick oil is used. Most modern engines use a grade thinner oil than their predecessors of a year or two ago. Oil consumption may be slightly greater but this is more than compensated for by the better starting and fuel consumption.

Sparking plugs need to be carefully watched. One with a cracked porcelain should be changed at once. The gaps should be as laid down in the maker's handbook. After about ten

thousand miles a plug is past its best; it usually puts fresh life into an engine to fit a new set of plugs after that mileage.

The ignition timing devices of the modern engine are rather complicated. There is usually an automatic advance and retard mechanism working in conjunction with a vacuum control underneath the distributor. These are set in the workshops and the unit commander should confine himself to seeing that lubrication instructions are carried out and that the mechanism is working freely. There is often a third, hand-operated, control known as an octane selector. The question of octane numbers will be touched on later. If an engine knocks badly on the fuel supplied its running can be improved by setting back the selector pointer one or two divisions. This comes to the same thing as retarding the ignition on the older hand-controlled vehicles. A sign of a well-tuned engine is a slight "ping" when the engine is suddenly accelerated.

Air cleaners need careful watching, especially in India, where, with the dust that usually prevails, they soon become choked. A choked air cleaner is worse than useless as it restricts the flow of air to the carburettor. This leads to an excessively rich mixture. The surplus petrol washes the lubricant from the cylinder walls and rapid cylinder wear, which the cleaner is designed to prevent, is the result. Neglect of any of these points is bound to lead to unnecessarily heavy fuel consumption. The smaller the cleaner the more frequently it requires attention.

A careful study of, and attention to, the points laid down by the maker in the handbook which is provided with every type of vehicle is time well spent and will be at once reflected in improved petrol consumption figures. There is sometimes a temptation to attempt to improve petrol consumption by fitting smaller jets in the carburettor. This should never be permitted. Too weak a mixture will need a larger throttle opening for a given speed and this will lead to heavier petrol consumption. Also there is a danger of over-heating and burning out valves.

As is well-known, to obtain the maximum life from pneumatic tyres the pressures must be kept to those laid down by the maker. It is not so well-known that petrol consumption can also be affected by incorrect pressures. During a recent motor-cycle test it is reported that the running of the tyres a few pounds below the correct figure increased the petrol consumption by fifteen per cent.

COOLING

Another way of wasting petrol is to run with an over-cooled engine. It is now accepted that to get the best from a water-cooled internal combustion engine the cooling water should be maintained between 170° F and 180° F. This does not apply to the engines of tanks in which, to cope with extreme conditions, the cooling system is under slight pressure which has the effect of raising the boiling point of the cooling water and thus makes higher temperatures permissible.

The Indian hot weather demands a cooling system which is more than adequate in the cold weather prevailing for half the year in Northern India with the result that, cooling water temperatures may rarely go above 150° F during that season without some antidote. Cooling systems designed for the Indian hot weather are not necessarily suited to the cold weather in Northern India. As a result the temperature of the cooling water may remain below 150° F in the cold weather unless radiators are blanked off. Thermostats, radiator shutters or blanking-off plates are usually provided with service vehicles to meet this situation. The tendency is for the appliances within the driver's control, blanking-off plates and shutters, to be insufficiently used. A vehicle used in the Punjab cold weather on short runs with frequent stops and starts should normally have one if not two radiator blanking-off plates permanently in position.

PETROL QUALITY

The final major factor affecting petrol consumption is the quality of the petrol. This naturally is out of the control of the unit commander. He can, however, protest where he has reason to suspect that a consignment is below standard.

When petrol is supplied in tins there is always the chance of a little water in the tin and this water may cause a stoppage at an awkward moment with a loss of fuel. Tins which show signs of internal rust should be rejected. Petrol which causes severe detonation or "pinking" in an engine hitherto free from it is almost sure to be of poor quality; it may even be contaminated with kerosine. Compression ratios have increased very considerably in recent years. This has set up a demand for fuels of a higher octane number or better anti-knock value. In America much use is made of lead derivatives as it is found that their addition to petrol raises its octane number considerably.

That frequent cause of stoppage on hill-runs in the hot weather, "vapour lock," is very often due to petrol of poor quality. Such petrol in order that it shall be capable of starting the engine readily is "doped" with exceptionally volatile fuels. These fuels separate out as gas in an over-heated fuel pump and interrupt the flow of petrol to the carburettor. This explains the bus driver's remedy which is to pour cold water over a cloth wrapped round the pump. All petrols are mixtures of several hydrocarbons and the lighter fractions are liable to evaporate if petrol is left lying in the tanks for some time. This loss by evaporation can be considerable, especially in hot weather. It is minimised by keeping tanks full, thus limiting the surface area in contact with the air. If the escape of the lighter fractions is considerable the petrol left may be incapable of starting the engine. In England it is customary to supply two grades of petrol, for winter and summer running. The former contains a higher proportion of the lighter fractions to ensure easy starting. In Northern India where temperature variations are exceptionally wide there is a definite need for two grades of petrol.

To sum up: the four major ways in which a Unit Commander can extract the maximum fuel mileage from his vehicles are by demanding the highest possible standard from his driving personnel; by ensuring that his engines are always in good tune and run at the optimum temperature; and by watching the quality of the petrol supplied to him. It is suggested that the achievement of the first can be helped by making pay and promotion depend upon it, the second and third call for close co-operation with the maintenance unit as well as study of instruction books, while the fourth is a matter for liaison with the supply authorities.

Attention to the question of petrol consumption will lead to a high standard of efficiency and motor-mastership as well as to economy and will well repay the detailed work which it involves.

O'REGAN PREPARES FOR WAR

By F. M. M.

[Being letters from 2nd Lieutenant Michael O'Regan, the newest-joined subaltern of 1st Bolton Irish (Territorials), to his brother Pat.]

MY DEAR PAT,

One of the most important things in the Army is discipline.

For instance, you remember Billy Mooney, the dirty lying little squirt that lived near Mountjoy. Well, he's a Major in this battalion, if you please, and if he's fit to be a Major, then I'm fit to be a General. But every morning, when he comes riding on to parade, I have to salute him and say "Goodmorning, Sir." But the minute his back is turned, I say to myself "May you fall off that flaming horse and break your silly neck." Now that's real discipline, Pat.

And then there are any number of other kinds of discipline.

For instance, the Commanding Officer, when he was lecturing us on Discipline, a few days ago, explained that he expected us to display the strictest discipline when we were on parade or wearing uniform, but that he wanted us all to be good friends at all other times.

Well, the next day, when I was passing the Bull and Eel, I heard singing and shouting, so of course I looked in, just to see what was happening. There was Private Murphy, drunk as a Lord and singing "The Mountains of Mourne."

Unfortunately he saw me and shouted "Come along in, Mr. Mike, and join the party." Being in uniform I couldn't accept and I almost felt I should have taken some action in the matter. But, there you are, Tom is one of the Lisnaleake Murphys and they've always been decent quiet folk, except when they have drink taken. So, on the way home, I decided to get into mufti and then we could all be good friends together.

So I changed and went back to the pub and a very good evening we had.

At midnight I hailed a taxi and, with considerable difficulty, got Tom into it. I let him sing the whole way home, until we got near the barracks and then I gave him a good hard upper-cut under the chin, just to keep him quiet when we were passing the Quarter Guard.

All would have been well, if I'd only hit him a little harder. But, just as I was explaining to the Guard Commander that I had baggage in the taxi and wished to take it to my quarters, Tom poked his head out of the window and said, "Sergeant of the Guard, I've brought a drunken officer safely home for you. Kindly make him comfortable for the night."

Now the real point about discipline came out the next day.

When Tom was brought before the Commanding Officer he pleaded "Guilty" and merely said "I'm sorry, Sir, I fell in with low company last night;" and the Sergeant of the Guard swore that Tom had crawled on all fours up to the gate and had been arrested.

Neither of them said a word about me and, even if Tom did wink, as he was being taken away to the cells, it just shows you what discipline will do.

Finally there's Mess Discipline. The Adjutant explained to me that one must not mention a woman's name or talk about politics or religion in Mess. So that's finished me. For what else, in the name of heaven, is there to talk about?

Last night was my first Guest Night and we gave the Snipeshires, a Regular Regiment, a slap-up dinner.

Well, you'll hardly believe it, but Dick Leonard is in the Regiment and we could have had a grand old chat, if only I could have talked about Molly. In fact, once I forgot and mentioned her name, and Major Corbett turned round and said, "Mr. O'Regan, I distinctly heard you mention a lady's name." Dick roared with laughter and said, "No fear, Sir, Molly's an old mare of mine."

Well, it saved the situation, Pat, but I wouldn't refer to my sister as "an old mare," not for a thousand Major Corbetts.

After dinner, the junior officers sat round and laughed whenever a senior officer made a joke. By heaven, Pat, I knew most of their stories before I left school. But the first time, when I didn't laugh, the Adjutant whispered in my ear, "Laugh, damn you."

"Well, the big noises cleared off about 10-30 P.M. and then the fun began.

One of the Snipeshires said that the Irish Rugger team was no good this year. "Come on," says we, "and we'll show you."

Off came our jackets and back went the furniture and, with a cushion as a ball, we had one of the best games I've ever played in.

We weren't doing too well and the Snipeshires had just kicked a goal, over the back of a sofa, when who should appear but the Colonel. "Boys," says he, "don't let me intrude, I'll referee."

I saw the glint in his eye and well I remembered his rushes when he was leading the Irish pack.

He stuck it for about five minutes and then, when the Snipeshires scored again, in he came. Man dear, it was grand to see him. In no time the Snipeshires were scattered to glory and the scores were level. With a smile on his face he said "Gentlemen, I bid you goodnight, as my overalls are bust."

Is it any wonder that we'd do anything for old "Tiger" White? He may give us hell all day, but he knows when to be human and that, Pat, is the secret of good discipline.

Au revoir to you, Pat. I hope the wheat is still standing, after all the rain there's been.

Your loving brother,
MIKE.

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE NOTES

ARMY

The Indian Army Contingent in France

During December the first contingent of the Indian Army consisting of animal transport units of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps together with the necessary supply, medical and and veterinary personnel for their care and maintenance, were sent to France where they arrived without mishap.

Special arrangements were made before their departure to provide the contingent with suitable clothing for a French winter. Men and animals have remained fit and have, from all accounts, settled down to their duties establishing amicable relations with the British Expeditionary Force and the French inhabitants of the areas where they are accommodated.

It is thus shown once again that a war can hardly be fought without mules. In the present stable conditions, the long carry which requires a mechanically propelled vehicle is not always necessary. Further, mechanical vehicles cannot approach too close to the forward posts without drawing fire, and as a result the infantry may be faced with long carries of supplies and engineer stores. The mule is quiet, hardy and can move off the roads. The Indian drivers and their mules will therefore relieve the fighting soldiers in France of many arduous and uncongenial tasks.

Other Overseas Forces

The troops in Malaya are now for the most part accommodated in hutted camps. There, as in Egypt, they have been training in the use of up-to-date weapons and equipment including mechanical transport and have passed on to collective training in the types of warfare peculiar to their respective areas.

When Mr. Eden visited Egypt to welcome the Australian and New Zealand contingents, he reviewed the Indian troops and gave them the following message which His Majesty the King-Emperor had entrusted to him to deliver:

"I appreciate the contribution the Indian Army is making to the war effort of the British Empire, and I know that, as in the Great War, they will prove themselves equal to any demands that may be made upon them."

Indian Territorial Force

The formation of five new provincial battalions of the Indian Territorial Force was referred to in the last number of the journal. These units are not being embodied at present, but will carry out training in the same way as the other battalions did in peace. The number of these units has been increased by a further three which will be recruited in the United Provinces.

Artillery

The Mountain Artillery has now ceased to form a part of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. It remains a separate artillery corps, distinct from the Indian Field Artillery.

Family Allowances

British service and Indian Army officers under thirty are now entitled to a family allowance with effect from the 11th September, 1939. These allowances range from Rs. 60/- per month for an officer with a wife but no children to Rs. 110/- per month for an officer with two children. The measure is not a permanent one but is designed primarily for emergency commissioned and other officers called up for service for the duration of the war only.

AHMEDZAI OPERATIONS

Towards the beginning of February the Government announced its intention of clearing the hostile gangs out of the Ahmedzai salient. Roads are to be constructed so as to facilitate movement of troops in the area. No endeavour was made to conceal the concentration of troops or their intentions. The gang leaders encouraged by Ipi determined to resist.

Four columns were formed. One took up a position on the northern flank of the salient, two on the southern flank north-east and north-west of Bannu, and one on the road Mir Ali—Spinwam along the base.

On the 21st February the two columns on the southern flank advanced. The right hand one moved some distance westwards encountering some resistance and later returned to camp. The left hand column made a night advance from Kurran Garhi and at daybreak, with artillery support assaulted the Gumatti Tangi, where the only road penetrates a very short way into the salient. A Battalion of the Baluch Regiment on the right and a Battalion of the 16th Punjab Regiment on the left soon secured the first hills on either side of the defile: but resistance stiffened

particularly on the right. Enemy ensconced in caves required mountain artillery and two companies of Gurkhas to dislodge them. All objectives were then secured. The main body returned to camp leaving outposts to hold the captured ground. Movement into the salient had been observed before this action: on the following day it was reversed. The two southerly columns now aligned themselves on the road which was pushed forward with slight opposition.

It appeared that the enemy had acquired a healthy respect for these columns and his activities were thereafter directed chiefly against road protection troops on the roads Mir Ali—Spinwam and Mir Ali—Saidgi. The northern column met with no opposition. On the night of the 24th February a frontier constabulary patrol was ambushed in practically the same place at which they had intercepted hostile ration parties on the two previous nights. Heavily outnumbered and running out of ammunition, they suffered considerable loss though some managed to get away.

Since the beginning of March operations have continued according to plan and the road is being steadily pushed forward into the salient. All columns have carried out reconnaissances meeting with little resistance.

The attitude of the tribes on the borders of the salient remains satisfactory and there are signs that the attitude of the inhabitants of the settled districts has begun to improve.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

THE "NEW" DRILL IN THREES

SIR,

It may not be generally realised that the so-called "new" drill in threes is not really new at all. Drill in three ranks was originally introduced in the year 1826 by Sir Henry Torrens and was retained for many years until ousted by drill in fours so the latest orders are, therefore, so far as we are concerned, merely the revival of an old idea.

Until 1826 drill had been a very simple affair and officers apparently did not take very kindly to the new fangled evolutions, so much so that a periodical of the time, Mr. Buckingham's paper "The Journal," was constrained to publish a skit on the subaltern's troubles in coping with them. The poem is said to have amused everybody at the time and as it has once again become topical and may yet touch a sympathetic chord, it is reproduced below as it appeared in 1826. It was entitled "A Day in Cantonments:"

"Light in the East, top-dugga (1) on the ear,
And hark, the bugle's summons shrill and clear,
Enter Ram-Churrun (2), messenger for woe,
'Top-dugga, sahib'—answer 'Nikal jow' (3);
'Bugle bujata' (4)—'Hum ne soona, nay' (5).
'Hum soona, sahib (6)'—'Nikkul jow, I say.'
Alas! Ram-Churrun, patient, mild Hindoo,
Reckless of angry threats and glances blue.
Still persevering, at a prudent distance,
Urges the fruitlessness of all resistance—
Urges, and would have failed at last,
But that a second loud, unwelcome blast
Floats on the breeze and proves beyond a doubt,
That, nolens volens, master must turn out.
Slowly he rises, with Ram-Churrun's aid,
Habilitates, and canters to parade;
Gropes in the thick dull mist, and having found
His regiment, falls in and marches round.
All hail, Sir Harry! but for thy improvements,
Still should we study antiquated movements,
Still plodding on the old dull trackless way,

Hack at Dundas but every other day,
And revel in a nap, unhallowed leaven
Of sleep, four mornings out of seven.
Now, barring Sundays, every burra bhore (7),
Views us unlearning what we learnt before.
Threes to the right—"Toom kuhan jate ho?" (8),
Threes to the left—"You paugul, ither ao" (9).

- (1) Gun fire. (2) The unfortunate sub's unfortunate valet,
(3) Get out. (4) The bugle sounds. (5) I didn't hear it.
(6) I heard it, sir. (7) Early dawn. (8) Where are you going
to?
(9) Come this way, fool."

Yours faithfully,
R. M. HALL.

REVIEWS

THE GERMAN ARMY

By HERBERT ROSINSKI

(*The Hogarth Press*: 12s. 6d.)

In this interesting book the writer gives a brief history of the German army from the time of Frederick the Great to the early part of 1939. He starts with Frederick the Great because he thinks it is from that period that the structure and spirit of the present German army is determined and that the struggles and the miseries of the Thirty Years War had left only this important imprint on the German nation, namely, that they had hammered into it the conviction that war is an inevitable element of human existence.

The main points of interest in the book are: the various methods used to recruit the German army; the status of the officer and his relations to the rank and file; and the strategy which the Germans studied and employed.

In making the army that his son was destined to use, it was one of Frederick William's aims to eject the mercenary element common to all European armies of that period and to make full use of the man-power of his own kingdom. By a system of cantonisation, that is, by making areas responsible for furnishing units with their reserves, he provided a standing army and behind it a reserve of man-power. As time went on, Frederick the Great found he was unable to adhere to his father's principles, partly because he was forced by circumstances to collect trained soldiers in haste, partly because he was afraid of dangerously reducing the man-power of his country. Eventually, his armies contained many foreign mercenaries of doubtful quality who were only held together by the iron discipline enforced by the officer class. Disintegration in nation and army followed the death of Frederick the Great and lasted until the reformers—Stein, Gneisenau and Scharnhorst—pulled the nation and army together in remarkable fashion between the Treaty of Tilsit and the year 1813. The basis on which their reorganisation rested

was the creation among the German people of a love of service and in the individual the will to take upon himself voluntarily the cause of the defence of his country. The result was that by 1813 Prussia was able to put in the field an army equal to six per cent. of the population. It would seem that the growth of the German army marked time until Bismark introduced conscription and lengthened the period of colour service from two to three years, but from then on the German army gradually increased in size up to the outbreak of the Great War. The author gives the credit for the modern resurrection of the German army to Von Seeckt though, as he points out, this reconstruction cannot compare with that carried out by Scharnhorst and his colleagues. The work of the latter was not an isolated act but was part of the national spirit while Von Seeckt produced a *corps d'élite* in which every man was meant to be a leader for the future army. Writing, however, as he did in 1939, the author points out that the German army was then very short of officers and N.C.O.s and that in his opinion it would take several years before this shortage could be made good.

Under Frederick the Great, the Prussian officer became the first citizen in the land and a claim to noble birth rather than merit was the hall-mark of the officer class. The rank and file were looked upon as scum and it was only iron discipline which kept the army together. As a result there arose an unsurmountable barrier between officer and man. This fault was remedied for a time by Scharnhorst, who made merit rather than the accident of birth the access to gaining a commission and to promotion. Once again, however, with the rise to power of the General Staff in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the old fault began to reappear, and by 1914 there was a strict dividing line between officer and rank and file, the full effects of which, it is pointed out, were felt after the failure of the German attacks in 1914. The author thinks that a mistake of the Great War was the granting of commissions to young, inexperienced men and the disregard of the claims to promotion of good N.C.O.s, of whom remarkably few received commissions. In the post-war period Von Seeckt succeeded in attracting the best type of officer and did his utmost to bring them into touch with the rank and file. In the present German army, Mr. Rosinski's view is that the tenets of National Socialism, under which all Germans, willingly or otherwise, are

educated, may have the effect of cementing cordiality and good understanding between officer and man.

The book says nothing about German strategy until the description of the latter part of the nineteenth century is reached. From that time up to the Great War, the principle of mobile Napoleonic warfare, depicted by Clausewitz and as put into practice by the elder Moltke and Schleiffen, dominated German military thought and was the basis on which their plans were made. In the author's opinion the turning point of the war was the 15th September, 1914, the day on which Falkenhayn decided to stand on the defensive on the western front and by so doing discarded the principles on which German teaching for the last fifty years had rested. There was no one in Germany, he says, capable of realising that Schleiffen had never intended his plan to be an infallible recipe for victory but rather that the idea which underlay it was that it was a particular solution applied to a situation which was in constant need of revision. As the war went on, excessive centralisation grew, which resulted in the reluctance to assume responsibility without orders from above and the curbing of individual initiative in commanders. In the post-war years every effort has been made to eradicate this fault and, amongst other ways, this object has been sought for by including in units and formations a high proportion of supporting arms so that they can fight their own battle and by inculcating the teaching that most of the culpable offence in any situation in war is to do nothing. At present there would seem to be two strategical schools of thought in Germany. The first, and the one favoured by the General Staff, is the conception of a war of long-drawn-out battles with one side eating into the other frontally until it collapses. The second, and this cannot be altogether excluded even when a first-class enemy is opposed, is the lightning war. The latter type, it is pointed out, possibly represents the views of the Nazi leaders rather than that of the army.

In concluding his book, Mr. Rosinski brings out an interesting point. Under Frederick the Great, under Moltke, in the Great War, even under Von Seeckt, the army had always been carefully kept free of political control. But under the Third Reich, war is no longer a military act but a mixture of propaganda, economic and military pressure. The direction of the whole will lie in the hands of the political leader and it may well happen that considerations of a purely military character may not be allowed to play a role corresponding to their real importance. The same difficulty will, of course, face every belligerent but, as the German nation is constituted at present, this mistake may be particularly difficult to avoid.

H. R. J.

HAIG

BY DUFF COOPER

(Faber and Faber: 12s. 6d.)

This is a re-issue complete in one volume of Mr. Duff Cooper's biography of Haig, first published in 1935. It has arrived at an opportune time, when many will want to read—or re-read—how the last B. E. F. under Haig's resolute leadership won through to final victory.

The life of Lord Haig was "an epic drama of four years and one hundred days. There is also a preparatory prologue of fifty three years, and an epilogue of ten." The prologue is briefly dealt with and rightly so—not that it is unimportant, but because our interest is naturally focussed on the drama itself. This is largely outlined in Haig's own words from his diaries. These records confirm the accuracy of the official histories and add little regarding the operations. They do, however, reveal to us his personal opinions on many of the great problems and his relations with some of the leading men of the day. His views on strategy are given and we see that he was constantly striving in difficult circumstances, for surprise effect and that he welcomed the assistance that science could give as regards new weapons.

The account of Passchendaele is of great interest. Much has been written in many books about this operation. It is now clear from his diary that it was fought for reasons largely out of Haig's control—the alarming state of affairs portrayed by Admiral Jellicoe as the result of the submarine campaign and the vital necessity of giving urgent and substantial help to our allies. The great measure of its success is often slurred over. Enemy testimony on this point is above suspicion and Ludendorff in his war memories dwells at length upon the "tremendous anxiety" of this period. "The impressions I continually received were very terrible . . . I had not known what joy meant for many a long day."

The account of his relations with the political leaders is of absorbing interest at the present time. The dust and noise of controversy and clashing personalities of that period has now settled—for ever, we hope—but the principles involved should be a compulsory study for all political leaders and all service officers. The services are often impatient with politicians, but their point of view must be appreciated. As the author points out, it is not usually the British way to criticise its army—generals or privates—in war, but the Government is at all times

under a stream of criticism and their difficulties must be sympathetically considered. Haig was shy and tongue-tied in public speech, and there is still much prejudice against eloquent officers, nevertheless the advantages of clear convincing exposition of views and plans to political leaders cannot be over-estimated.

After making all allowances, one is left with the impression that the politicians had the most to learn. The lack of confidence in the military leader and lack of appreciation of the army's efforts, the preference for foreign generals—akin to the British appreciation of musicians with foreign names, and with even less justification—and the instability of view of some of the political leaders were a source of weakness and danger to the cause. The Government constantly sought recipes for winning victories without fighting, or at least with few casualties. Against a great military power, this search was bound to be a vain one. But if the politicians and civilians have most to learn about the relationship which should exist in war between the services and the Government, surely the onus is on the services to do all they can to educate the political leaders, and the more such instruction is undertaken in peace the more efficient will be the direction of our forces in war. It is hopeful to note the developments since the last war in liaison and mutual knowledge between the civilian government and the services. One wishes that they could have been on an even larger scale but there is no doubt that this increase in mutual understanding will prove of inestimable value in the present struggle.

Haig is not revealed as a genius, but most readers will agree with the author's summing-up that "as the mists created by prejudice, propaganda and false witness begin to scatter, the figure of Haig looms ever larger as that of the man who foresaw more accurately than most, who endured longer than most, and who inspired most confidence amongst his fellows."

A. J. M. W.

WARFARE

THE RELATION OF WAR TO SOCIETY

BY LUDWIG RENN

Translated from the German by Edward Fitzgerald

(Faber and Faber: 8s. 6d.)

In time of war our literature like our luxuries must be rationed, and many volumes have perforce to be relegated with

uncut pages to the top shelf to be taken down, dusted and read after the signing of the peace treaty. At first glance "Warfare" should receive this treatment, but as we get into the book we find much that is of real value at the present moment to all three services. Suffice to say that for war time reading this volume may be likened to the curate's egg.

The author was a regular German officer who fought through the last war as a front line infantry man and later in Spain on the side of the Republicans, where at one time he commanded an officers' school. He is strongly anti-Nazi with deep personal antipathies to individuals on the staff and in high command. It is hard to judge his politics, but to name him a flamingo-hued communist would not be far from the mark. He writes with great tolerance except when dealing with Kaiser Wilhelm II, General Ludendorff, the Nazi leaders and the Spanish Republican General, Largo Caballero, when personal feelings obviously tinge his judgment.

The book is divided into three parts, of which the first traces the causes of war from the days of Rome to the present, and shows the various factors that have governed the size and form of armies through the ages. Although written in 1939, the author cannot visualize any agreement between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Pointing out that the only way in which economic exhaustion can be avoided in modern war by a nation lacking raw materials is to link itself with another, rich in these essentials, by conquest or amicable agreement on the basis of equality, he asks "With what country could Germany unite herself for instance?" To this question the answer is given:

"The Soviet Union perhaps? However the unification of Germany and Soviet Union would be possible only if one of the two countries abandoned its present State form, and that can happen only as a result of war—or revolution."

Perhaps the results of this war can be foretold from the above, and the 'understanding' (it cannot be called an agreement—gentlemen's or otherwise) with Soviet Russia may lead to the downfall of Nazidom, though it may not hasten the triumph of the Allies.

The beginning of Part II is reminiscent of the pre-1914 era when Staff College instructors were termed professors. It compares the various definitions of strategy and coldly condemns

Clausewitz, Delbruck and Moltke for their heresies and schisms. Its academic value cannot be denied, and the historical examples, ranging as they do from the Great Wall of China to the Great War, are interesting. Nevertheless it reeks of the senior wrangler rather than the soldier.

After this we find an analysis of tactics through the ages, and it is here that the curate gets several spoonfuls of excellent egg—many of them flavoured with ripe historical knowledge and seasoned with the author's own considerable experience. We read how the German front line officer retired disgruntled after the war, and only the "Base Swine" remained to reorganize the Reichswehr. In France on the other hand the young front liners fought and vanquished the old regime, and from 1930 dates the rejuvenation of the French Army heralded by the pensioning off of whole groups of hidebound officers. It would be interesting to hear the author's views on the British Army in this respect. Did we decay, and if so has our rejuvenation already taken place, or is it still to come?

The author's opinions on the effectiveness of air attack on ground troops are encouraging to an infantry man, and are backed by his experiences in Spain where attacks by German and Italian aircraft on unprotected troops did surprisingly little damage, if elementary precautions in regard to concealment and cover were taken.

The tactics of each arm in modern warfare are discussed, and tanks and motorization are more fully dealt with than most books of this type. Every soldier, irrespective of his arm, will find much of interest in this section.

Part II ends with a section on the strategy and tactics of naval warfare, and here the author is very obviously all at sea. It is all too plainly the writing of a soldier, and a Continental soldier at that. The translator has made no attempt to gloss over the author's lack of knowledge of naval terms, and with tongue in cheek has perpetuated the howlers with which the original German must bristle. However, the apology tendered in the last paragraph redeems all, and like a front line veteran, the author retreats in good order with an effective parting shot at the Senior Service.

In the final part the diverse subjects of propaganda, dissemination of information, training and discipline are discussed, and it is here that we find the clue to the author's character and political creed, and for this alone it is worth reading. In regard to

propaganda we are given examples of methods employed to influence the army and the home front as opposed to the enemy. The majority of these are of the 'how not to do it' type. The author deprecates the tendency to 'catch them young' and considers that the older recruit assimilates military knowledge more quickly and more permanently than the youngster. The impression is left that political training is given more weight than the equivalent subject, which in the Indian Army is termed citizenship. Much sound common sense and experience is evinced when discipline is examined, particularly on the subject of the qualifications of a leader.

Though this book has been likened to the Curate's egg, no ill effects will result from its mastication, but the reader would be well advised to jettison considerable portions of it in the manner of a foot-baller dealing with the half time slice of lemon.

W. D. A. L.

OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS

One of the main difficulties which the ordinary reader experiences in attempting to discover the main trends of contemporary events is that of selecting suitable reading matter on the subject. Literature on current international questions is prolific, but not all of it is good, and a great deal of it is biased. Particularly is this true of the type which can be classified as condensed accounts and short critiques—and it is to these that the ordinary reader is apt to turn in order to make the best use of his inevitably limited time for reading. A notable exception to this general rule however is the series of "Oxford Pamphlets on World's Affairs." This now comprises some twenty-four numbers, and new ones appear at frequent intervals. The subjects dealt with range over the major political and economic questions which are now of topical interest. Thus, "Turkey, Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean" (G. F. Hudson) gives a useful background against which to judge present possibilities in the Balkans, while J. Walter Jones's "Nazi Conception of Law" helps towards an understanding of certain of Germany's more recent actions.

Contributors to the series are generally acknowledged authorities on their particular subjects—the names of Professor J. L. Brierley, Sir Arthur Salter, Geoffrey Crowther and Professor

Gathorne-Hardy may be mentioned. The measure of agreement between the various contributors is also remarkable when one recollects how often the opinions of experts conflict on the treatment of international problems. This is perhaps as strong a point of internal evidence as one could wish for when attempting to assess the authenticity of these pamphlets and the impartiality of the treatment accorded.

The economic aspect of the war claims three of the most recent numbers in the series. In "Blockade and the Civilian Population" Sir William Beveridge examines the effect of the Anglo-French blockade on the people of Germany from the legal, humanitarian and economic aspects. He comes to the conclusion that the hunger of the German people depends finally on the decision of their own Government, because there is nothing that we can do by way of blockade that is likely to make it impossible for the German population to be fed, provided their Government devotes to this purpose enough of Germany's total resources of man-power, materials and money. One may or may not accept this somewhat naive conclusion—prompted no doubt by a desire to refute the alleged inhumanity of blockade as a weapon—but this does not detract from the value of the article as a succinct essay on the power of economic warfare to-day.

Two different aspects of economic warfare are dealt with by Mr. Thompson in "Can Germany stand the Strain?" and Mr. Geoffrey Crowther (Editor of the *Economist*) in "The Sinews of War." Mr. Thompson's article loses nothing from critical comparison with the views expressed by Sir William Beveridge, and it is noteworthy that both these experts consider that the problem of the supply of animal and vegetable fats is the one factor which is likely to result in hardship to the German people. Mr. Thompson's arguments, however, deal more with the possibility of Germany obtaining essential supplies of material from "accessible neutrals" and the assistance Russia may be able to give her. In his opinion—"It is, in fact, inescapable that neither by ordinary commercial methods nor by coercion can Germany hope to evade the slow but sure pressure of naval blockade. In the corner of the world which remains open to Germany there simply do not exist some of the materials essential to the conduct of war and indeed to the maintenance of civil life." It is an opinion which does not take into consideration the effect of future German occupation of some of her neutral neighbours or penetration into the Middle East—possible developments outside the scope of the article. It is perhaps the more interesting for this

reason; for, if it is correct, the future can only offer two alternatives to the Nazi Government.

"The Sinews of War" is more "statistical" than most of these pamphlets. It is a model of clarity, and it would be difficult indeed to refute the five points which Mr. Crowther concludes are the vital conditions for victory. He is one of the many who believe that time is our ally—but he is cautious enough to add a proviso so obvious that it is too often forgotten: "Time is on our side—if we use it."

"Who Hitler Is" (R. C. K. Ensor) is a good short biography of the man who at twenty-one was "a slender, sickly, æsthetic youth" and in 1939 "decided for war, and signed the death-warrants for, perhaps, millions of lives." It is the only pamphlet in the series so far which deals with a personality rather than with the more general aspects of world affairs. Similar short studies of Stalin and Mussolini would be welcome when Russian, Balkan and Mediterranean affairs form the subjects of future pamphlets, as one may hope they will.

Although mention has been confined chiefly to the later pamphlets dealing with matters immediately connected with the war, it should not be overlooked that many of the earlier numbers in the series discuss subjects of equal importance and interest, though they may for the time being have become overshadowed by recent events. A complete list of titles to date is given on the back of each pamphlet and this forms a convenient guide to the scope of the series as a whole. These pamphlets can be obtained from the India branches of the Oxford University Press in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, and presumably from most of the larger provincial booksellers and stationers. The price is As. 3 each.

J. G. N.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- The Fighting Soldier, by Major W. A. S. Dunlop, late Australian Staff Corps (Angus and Robertson).
Jenghiz Khan, by Squadron Leader C. C. Walker, Royal Canadian Air Force (Luzac and Co: 17s. 6d.)

MAGAZINES

- Battle Training in Word and Picture (George Newnes, Ltd.)
(Primarily intended for the private soldier and the junior leader, but strongly recommended to those more senior).

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
JULY, 1940

No. 300

The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official, and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

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A BLENHEIM BOMBER.
(By Courtesy of "The Aeroplane.")

EDITORIAL

Since the last Editorial was written Norway, Denmark,
 Holland, Belgium and a large part of France
 have been invaded. Paris has fallen and the
 Italian jackal has joined the German lion.

The hopes of the Allies are centred on stopping the German advance, so that behind a stable front the armaments of Great Britain and America may accumulate until the scale is turned. We are thinking of early September, 1914, when the situation was very similar. There is another period in the history of France which was even more similar to the present time. In 1796, France was in a state of considerable chaos internally; she was ringed with enemies and rays of hope were hard to see. At that time no sudden access of armaments or men saved her. She was saved by one man—a junior gunner-major, aged twenty-six years.

Napoleon found France everywhere on the defensive, and apparently incapable of any form of attack. In one speech he charged his men with an offensive spirit, in a few weeks he led them in an attack which has become, and will remain, a classic.

The present Allied leaders are men with brilliant military careers. They have been tested and never found wanting in war. They are still performing wonders of defense and there is no question whatever but that our armies are well served. Still it is no disloyalty to hope for a re-incarnation of Napoleon, even if he be re-born into some other arm of the service. If age is the potent factor, he will not be a major.

* * * *

The lot of a war prophet is usually unhappy unless his prophecies are so prolific that he has covered almost every possibility. He can then await events with confidence in his heart and "I told you so" on his lips. There are very few such people at the present time. Perhaps the most confounding fact has been the success of offensive action. Even now many of us are rescuing our beliefs with the

Prophecy and Fact

thought that attack has always been possible for those who would face the bill. Captain Liddell Hart and others have always stressed the prohibitive cost of offensive action in the last war. They were not entirely right.

Writing with reference to the British losses in the German attack of March 21, 1918, General Charteris stated in his journal, at G. H. Q.: "Our casualties are enormous. There is not yet a complete return of them, but they exceed by far what we have suffered during any of our great attacks in 1916 or last year. That also was what we have always urged—that attack, even when not fully successful, was less costly in lives than imperfect defence. The Cabinet would not believe it; but it is unfair to blame the whole Cabinet, for the Prime Minister is virtually Dictator." The British, defending from March 21 to June 30, 1918, had 418,374 casualties, while in the offensive battle from July to November the casualties amounted to 411,636.

Much of the truth of General Charteris' remark lies in the words "imperfect defence," but those words apply to the Allied operations in Belgium and Northern France. It may, therefore, be wrong for us to presume that the casualties suffered by Germany in the early attacks greatly exceed those of France and ourselves.

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The German invasions of Southern Norway, Holland and Belgium must excite admiration in any soldier's mind. They were not humane, they were not in accordance with the rules of war and they may prove to be political blunders, but they were successful to a degree which few soldiers foresaw. Two civilised nations were overrun in little more than a week apiece. Surprise was achieved by parachutists, by the extent to which air forces were used and by the weight and mobility of the land attack. All these three methods resulted in heavy casualties among the individuals concerned—and in success. General newspaper comment expressed horror at the illegal and inhuman side of such methods. That is right. Newspapers are written by law-abiding civilians, for civilians. Soldiers, who are paid to protect these civilians cannot be content to regard the facts with horror; they, like doctors dissecting a poisoned child, must view the facts with purely

analytical eyes. Such questions will arise as, "How can such methods be prevented from succeeding in the future?" "Can we, albeit with less inhumanity and more legality, do the same?" The first of these questions has undoubtedly been asked, and in some part answered, in Europe. The second may well repay thought in India. Before the Germans overran their victim countries they trained their troops for those specific operations. They thought out the best technique and then practised it with every soldier who was to take part. It was a different technique for each country. So in India if the Germans were faced with the invasion of, say, the Ahmedzai Salient, they would decide on the most suitable methods and train the whole force concerned in these methods until that force was perfect. The operations would then be executed.

The days are gone when the general-purpose soldiers that we keep in peace-time can be regarded as fully trained for war. They still need the finishing process of "rehearsal," or whatever the final training will come to be called. The fact that such training may forewarn or incense the chosen victim is potent, but did not prevent the German Army from allowing a British officer to attend the manoeuvres on which they rehearsed their method of attack on the Czechoslovakian defences in 1938.

* * * *

There is another feature of modern warfare that gives thought to soldiers in India. It is the paramountcy of superior equipment on the battlefield. In the last War trenches and small-arms fire were sufficient to check an advance and, in most cases, to prevent a break-through. Trenches and small-arms fire are both the result of man-power, in which India is rich; they have now been overridden by tanks and aircraft to an extent that has never happened before. Tanks and aircraft do not represent man-power, but wealth and industrial development. In both these India is far from rich. For the moment we may feel safety between the Himalayas and British sea-power, but it is, nevertheless, unpleasant to think that if final decisions are to be made by war, then non-industrial nations, however large, will have no say in such decisions.

* * * *

The Ahmedzai operations which began on 20th February were completed on 24th May. Our casualties
The Ahmedzai Operations totalled one British officer, three V. C. O.s and 15 Indian Other Ranks killed; the enemy killed have been

estimated at twenty-nine, but were probably more. A few only of the known leaders of anti-government elements were among the enemy casualties, and none was captured.

The operations may be regarded as successful.

We achieved our limited object, which was to open up the Salient and deny its use to hostile gangs as a safe base from which to raid the Settled Districts. The salient is now penetrated by roads, and posts have been established. Only one "regrettable incident" was suffered, and against this we can balance a most successful battle at the beginning of the operation. This battle derived its success from the surprise use of an unusual weight of artillery fire and air support.

The science of invasion has been advanced so much during the last few months that it will be satisfactory to start a new chapter of Frontier Warfare, leaving a successful little operation at the end of the last chapter.

* * * *

The Japanese invasion of China has not been much in the news, largely because it is overshadowed by events in Europe, but also because little of importance is happening in China. The Japanese hold the main lines of communication in the east and south of China; and they are now consolidating their hold on these areas. The Chinese are carrying on guerilla warfare, directed chiefly against the Japanese communications. These operations have had some successes in the last few months and the Japanese have suffered casualties.

There are three main areas of operations. The south is the most important because it lies on the borders of Burma and French Indo-China, and contains the main lines of supply of armaments to the Chinese. Great Britain, the United States and France are all interested in this area; and it is probably their influence that is deterring the Japanese from any form of total war. The Chinese have had some considerable successes in this area, chiefly round Nanking, which is 400 miles west of Hong-kong.

The central area centres on Nanchang (400 miles south-west of Shanghai) where the activity is entirely guerilla. The Chinese have had few successes, but their nuisance-value has been considerable. This is the least important area.

The Northern area runs westwards from Peiping (Pekin) towards Inner Mongolia. The Japanese have made long advances

in this area, and, in some cases, subsequent withdrawals. It is probable that these moves have had the dual object of suppressing Chinese guerilla bands and of interrupting communications with Soviet territory. The Chinese have had no considerable successes in this area.

There are so few countries left from whom the Chinese can import armaments, that we cannot expect any great change in the tide of events in the near future. A reasonable outlook would seem to include the gradual consolidation of the Japanese in the east and south, continuing until the war in Europe is finished. At the end of the European war it might well prove prejudicial to Japan's ultimate interests for her to be too strongly entrenched in China.

* * * *

The announcement by H.E. the Commander-in-Chief of a considerable expansion to the military, naval and air forces of India carries with it inevitable financial consequences. So far, the impact of the war upon India has been financially beneficial. Without any very great additional strain upon her resources, the rise of prices of her products and a great extension of demands upon her, have increased the national income. The change in the war situation in Europe and the entry of Italy into the war, and the consequent necessity for additional armaments, have abruptly shattered the golden dreams of the first months of the war. Additional and almost certainly heavy, expenditure will be needed. It is not yet known whether the Government of India proposes to introduce a supplementary budget in the current financial year, but administrative considerations of this kind are of purely secondary importance. The time has come when pecuniary sacrifices are called for, and all pretence of maintaining pre-war standards must be dropped. The essence of a war economy is abstention from consumption: the resources thus set free must be placed at the disposal of the military machine, which, in modern war, devours materials even more voraciously than it devours men.

India has still to adjust itself to this situation. The most obvious form in which a contribution can be made is by way of additional taxation. But, as already indicated, this may not be imposed at once. In the absence of extra taxation alternative solutions are possible.

In 1931 all pay suffered a 10 per cent. cut because money was needed. Money is more urgently needed now. Both civil and military salary scales in this country have been pitched higher than in the United Kingdom for reasons which can be defended in peace-time. Yet in war-time the higher scale of payment should be a direct challenge to the patriotic feelings of Government servants in India. It is not difficult to work out a scale of pay cuts, which might be as low as $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. at the lower end, and should certainly not be less than 10 per cent. on salaries of over, let us say, 2,500 rupees per mensem. A level cut, as imposed in 1931, is manifestly unjust; but a graduated cut should be welcomed.

* * * *

German girls have thrown themselves from aeroplanes with German parachute troops. On landing they carry hand grenades and other material for the troops.

Belgian girls have been machine-gunned as they fled from their homes.

Polish girls have been moved into Germany for unknown destinations and unspecified work.

Girls in England are working, and breaking down through overwork, in hospital kitchens, munition factories and offices. Many are risking and giving their lives on land, and at sea in hospital ships.

It is therefore, possible to expect with confidence that the young socialites of India's hill stations will face with fortitude any curtailment of entertainments that may be forced on them. The hardiest of them might even consider learning to type or to nurse in case the fact that they are already wanted becomes known to them.

In a speech on 10th June the Chancellor of the Exchequer said: "In this war there are no non-combatants." Any woman or girl who is neither working nor training to work is a non-combatant; and quarrelling with this statement will not raise her to combatant status.

* * * *

The Articles in this Number

"MILITARY RESEARCH" is a provocative article which recommends the establishment of a kind of mental lighthouse in the higher headquarters. Lighthouses guide mariners at sea but only in hours of darkness,

"EAST PRUSSIAN INTERLUDE" tells of the manner in which General Samsonov met his end after Tannenburg. It is a strange tale.

"HOW TO LIVE IN INDIA ON YOUR PAY" is a witty and practical account of an Indian Army Officer's financial life. The answer provided will be summarised by many as "Living poor in order to die idle," and they may well prefer to live a bit richer and continue work after retirement.

"LEARNING RUSSIAN" follows "LEARNING TURKISH" in the April number, and is better.

"COLONEL SCOTT'S BUNGALOW" is an account of a strange incident in Southern India. It gives some insight into military life in the past when news travelled slowly.

"THE BALTIC STATES AND FINLAND" is a short article covering a wide field. It gives a useful background to a part of Europe which will reappear in the newspaper headlines.

"THE PATH OF DELIVERANCE" is of no direct military application. It is a translation from a Hindi author and points one true road to peace, perhaps the only one.

"CAUCASIAN EXCURSION" is an interesting account of an area that may well become of military importance before many months are past.

"THE STEYR-SOLOTHUM MACHINE PISTOL" is a short article describing one type of "Tommy gun."

"O'REGAN PREPARES FOR WAR" is a continuation in a series of light articles.

MILITARY RESEARCH

BY "AUSPEX"

In nearly all other professions, in which progress is necessary, there is a considerable amount of research. The object of research is to look into the past for guidance and for any points at which the roads of progress forked, so as to find a parallel for to-day, or to follow up a fork in the road of progress which has not hitherto been explored. Research into past history and into present writings gives the matter from which it is possible to produce new material, new technique, in fact, new invention in thought and in material, which form a starting point from which again to look into the future.

In commerce, success lies in being ahead of one's competitors. In the profession of war, success lies also in being ahead of all one's potential enemies in thought, in material, in technique and, finally, in the training devised for these. Many commercial firms have a special staff detailed for this work. The Army has no such special staff. All the Army has is a few individuals who take a deep interest in their profession and who so absorb themselves in it that every now and then they are able to throw a shaft of light on future technique and progress and on present deficiencies. These officers are naturally struggling against the mass of the opinion of the Army. Their efforts are unco-ordinated and their strength is only that of the individual. Thus they effect very little and the Army naturally either stagnates, or tends to fall behind. Worst of all, the attitude of mind of the Army as a whole becomes resistant instead of being receptive and creative.

We have left it to the Germans to produce a new technique in this war, just as we so frequently left it to them in the Great War. Numbers, and industrial and financial strength have the greatest effect in war, but all these can be successfully opposed and defeated by an army whose military thought, whose technique and whose training and skill are well ahead of those of their opponent.

At times, the terms "military mind," "military thought" are regarded as things to be held up to derision. If only the amateurs, both civil and military, would realise how vitally essential it is for soldiers to have military minds and to think in the military way, then there would be far more real thought given to the profession of war in our army than there is to-day.

It is because the individual effort and the individual military mind is failing to advance military thought that we must possess a definite organisation which has the power to influence it in creative and progressive directions.

Military History moves in cycles. The wheel of development turns full circle. We should not be caught guessing at the next phase for we should see it coming.

It seems almost that no form of land war which we see to-day or may see in the future, until such time as a revolutionary weapon appears, has not had its parallel in the past, however much it may be disguised in its new dress. Ingredients of fire-power, protection, and mobility are continually being mixed by the processes of material progress in ever-varying quantities to form the military whole. Are we to remain blind to the effects of the differing mixture as time goes by? Can we not see how civilisation will mix these ingredients five years hence for the purpose of the military machine? Can we not see what must be the effect on our technique and on the whole face of war of the next mixture?

To-day in France we see a reversion in history to the wars of the early 18th Century, affected, of course, in a new way by the advent of aircraft. Yet, it does not seem to be realised that the days of Marlborough are back with us on land. We think in terms of linear defences in depth instead of realising that defence is area defence in which the great strategic towns form the defended islands between which the war of manœuvre will rage and where are held the vital depots of supply. The only linear defences are those which form geographical barriers to armoured movement. The defended islands are there to provision, to recuperate and to obstruct the movements of the enemy's field forces. A linear defence in depth pre-supposes the existence throughout of suitable and sufficient weapons, or that those weapons can be brought up at call to throw back the attack of heavy armoured

formations. What happens, in fact, is that these defences are beaten in detail from front to rear for their strong points are seldom strong enough to withstand armoured attack for long.

Practically never in military history has there been a defensive position which has not been broken or turned. The Maginot Line is unlikely to be an exception.

With the ability of mechanised forces to live to a great extent on the country, or, at any rate, to be fed from the air, it is vital that main points of supply, such as are these towns of which I speak, shall be defended against their onslaught far to the rear. Air fields must be grouped within the defended islands or in an area enclosed by their defences or else they are lost, at least temporarily.

The study of the history of the early 18th Century shows us how closely the cavalry arm of that day resembled the tank arm of to-day, most particularly in its correlation with infantry in attack. I have made this point about 18th Century warfare in order to show the immense value that can be got from historical research when one is puzzled as to the future.

In 1914 we were caught unprepared. The Russo-Japanese War, the Boer War and the Wars in the Balkans had shown us only too clearly the effect of the small-bore weapon in defence. We had seen the slaughter done by the automatic weapon and the strength of modern earthworks in defence. Yet we entered that war with few enough automatics and no heavy artillery. Fire-power was the main ingredient but we did not possess it nor had we made a study of how to overcome it. We paid the penalty in many a battle up to 1918. Of recent years the study of modern war, in so far as it has looked to the future, seems to have been conducted, or at any rate made public, for our Army by ex-officers or civilians and little enough by the Army itself. To-day we find ourselves taken aback by what are obvious tactics employing incidentally an arm, the tank, that we had ourselves invented and which we intended to use in hordes in 1919 and a form of close air attack that we can be said to have introduced. We seem to have been dreaming. Even now it is not too late to wake up and to get ahead in military thought on total war.

It is within the General Staff of a nation's army that the research organisation must be formed, for the General Staff must be

the nation's guide and mentor. This organisation can easily be worked out in detail, and experience will soon show finally how it should be constituted. It must have access to every officer and every organisation in the army and be in a position to extract whatever information it needs from the civil government. In war, if not in peace, its organisation must stretch from Army Headquarters in India, down through the army headquarters in the field, through corps headquarters, down to divisional headquarters. At Divisional Headquarters must be a representative whose business it is to be in constant personal touch with the foremost elements in the battle, so that he can study the enemy's technique and see how our methods can be improved, modified or completely altered in order to put us ahead of the enemy in technique and training, and to give us the immediate initiative from the smallest sub-unit on the battlefield, upwards. From this representative will frequently come the demand for some new weapon which will perform some new and desirable task.

In peacetime the research section will be needed to put us ahead of our enemy from the very inception of a war, at least in our methods, in our weapons, and in our whole conception of what is modern in thought and material. It is probable that the research section at Army Headquarters would soon find itself thrown into research about field administration, as well as into the complex problems for which it should be primarily designed. The Staff Duties Directorate co-ordinates the factual side of the army, while the research section must co-ordinate its thinking and creative side. Even now, there is vital need for such a section in India, for it can, in no very great period, at least throw our military thought ahead of that of a potential enemy and so create the demand for the right sort of weapon and the right sort of organisation.

EAST PRUSSIAN INTERLUDE

BY CAPTAIN J. KNAPP, R.A.

The German Lufthansa passenger plane, in which I was travelling, was flying low over the thickly wooded plain of East Prussia. It was the summer of 1938. As we approached Konigsberg, only occasional glimpses of the town were to be seen between great gusts of rain. We had been flying through squalls and heavy weather ever since we left Tallinn. For a short while we had flown into better conditions while crossing a short bit of sea in the gulf of Riga. Now as we planed down on the great new aerodrome at Konigsberg, cold driving rain was sweeping across it. I soon discovered that it takes more than the weather to affect the spirits of Nazi officials.

The plane had hardly taxied to a standstill before the door of the cabin was flung open and we found ourselves the centre of bustle and efficiency. Uniforms, of course, were everywhere. In the shelter of large umbrellas and accompanied by our luggage we were conducted to the customs office. Speed was the keynote of the whole procedure. Orders were given and obeyed with alacrity.

When the customs were over I went into the restaurant next door. From the opposite direction the only waiter arrived at a pace which compromised between a walk and a trot. He took my order, disappeared and was back in a moment or two with some not wholly appetising chunks of meat swimming in gravy. However, what was lacking in the quality of the food was made up in the excellence of the service. Anyhow I was hungry and did full justice to that meat. Little did I realise that this meal was to cost me a long wait later on. Perhaps I ought to explain here that my knowledge of the German language was limited to the small dictionary, which I kept in my pocket. At any rate this proved to be little disadvantage, for though the English speaking people in Konigsberg are comparatively few, yet great courtesy was shown by all and I quickly found myself carried off in a taxi to the station by a total stranger, who had been commandeered for the job.

It was now, as I looked at the face of the big clock outside the station, that the truth dawned on me for the first time. I had gained an hour in the aeroplane in my journey from Estonia, but I had lost it again in having my lunch at the aerodrome. My

train was due to leave for Allenstein at 2-15 P.M.; it was now 2-20. After a certain amount of hard labour with the dictionary I discovered that the next train did not leave till 6-30 P.M. I could at least occupy my time looking at the town. Königsberg calls for little description really. In ten days' time it was due to celebrate its tenth anniversary of Nazism. Everywhere there were Nazi banners, the footpaths were crowded with brownshirts, uniformed police patrolled the streets and through the midst of them all strode with easy confidence the children of the movement—the Nazi youth. The Nazi party relies on blind obedience from its members, and in its youth element it has found just such suitable material. To-day the most unbalanced and vicious forces in Germany are represented by these youth corps. Power and authority are put into the hands of boys for the most part town-bred and without any experience of responsibility. On this particular day in the summer of 1938 Königsberg had all the appearance of an armed camp.

The branch line of the East Prussian Railway, which runs to Allenstein, conducts one through a very fertile countryside and it looked as though 1938 was to produce a fine harvest for Germany. The trains, not unlike those which run on our branch lines at home, are not conspicuous for their speed. It was already after 9-00 P.M. when I reached Allenstein. Here I had to change into another train for the last fifteen miles to Hohenstein, the centre from which most people tour the Tannenberg Battlefield.

Eventually I arrived there about 10-30 to be met by a boy from the hotel, who took over my bags. The hotel was full of German officers. They had on the previous day concluded large-scale manœuvres in the area; and it was for this reason that I had put off my arrival for two days, as the German War Office had stipulated that I should not put in an appearance in those parts before the end of manœuvres. They had also mentioned that a guide would be waiting at Hohenstein to take me round the battlefields. But who this would be, whether military or civilian, I had no idea.

In the morning I was down to breakfast by 8-00 A.M. The day was wet and stormy and the prospect of seeing long distances over the battlefield did not appear good. While eating my breakfast I presently became aware of a very smartly dressed German Cavalry officer, who was restlessly wandering in and out of the restaurant. It never occurred to me that he could be my guide. But he presently came up and asked me if I was the British officer

who had come over to see the Battlefield of Tannenberg. I told him that I was; and he then told me that he had been detailed by the German War Office to look after me. He further told me that his car was outside and that we could start as soon as I was ready. This was far beyond my modest expectations. I had hoped for nothing better than to walk round the nearer portions of the battlefield and to take a taxi for the most distant actions. And now here I was being escorted by a specially selected interpreter at the German Government's expense. No wonder that I felt that I had something to live up to.

My escort was a very young looking captain, tall, with a fine figure, a typical cavalryman to look at. He had a quiet reserved manner. He talked English quite well, but was obviously a bit out of practice. He was stationed in a Cavalry Regiment in Allenstein, but was himself from the Rhineland. He had been just old enough to take part in the last year of the Great War, but after the War, he had been demobilised and had only been recalled when Hitler increased the armed forces of the Reich. He was to prove a most friendly and interesting companion during the next three days.

On leaving Hohenstein we went first to the Tannenberg War Memorial. This is a typically German building—harsh and unlovely, characterising much that is German and nothing that is beautiful. Constructed out of reddish brown brick, hexagonal in shape, with a square tower at each corner, it stands up gaunt and rugged, surmounted as everything is in Germany to-day by the inevitable cluster of Nazi flags. In the days when they still built defensive lines above ground it might well have formed some bastion of some long forgotten Siegfried line. The site is a fine one, standing up on a dominating slope marking as it does almost the furthest advance of the Russians, before this advance was turned into disastrous rout.

Opened only a short while ago, its surroundings were still not completed, and yet, at the same time, preparations on a large scale were going ahead for the present war.

Near the War Memorial there was a hall, in which descriptions of the whole battle during the five days that it lasted are given. The lectures are characterised by typical German thoroughness. In the hall there hangs a huge map of East Prussia. As soon as the lecture is about to start, the lights are turned down and the map is illuminated to show the dispositions

of both forces at the outbreak of the battle, divisions being represented by small bulbs. Gradually as the lecturer unfolds the tale of the battle so these divisions move and hour by hour take up the positions that they occupied. Thus very graphically you see on a small scale this great drama enacted before you. Particularly clear is the great encircling movement carried out by the troops detached from Von Francois' command.

From the War Memorial we motored South, stopping to study two actions on the way, which were described to me by my companion from minutely accurate accounts compiled by the Germans.

By the time that we reached the little town of Neudenberg, where General Samsonov had had his headquarters during the greater part of the battle, we were beginning to want our lunch. So we drew up in front of the little inn in the corner of the town square and went into lunch.

From my seat at the table I could see out of the window across the small town square; it was surrounded as it must have been in 1914 by the same insignificant, grey houses; its cobbled surface was probably a bit more worn than in those hot summer days, when the whole power of Imperial Russia had marched into the borders of East Prussia in its attempt to save its allies in the West. Some of the houses, which had suffered from bombardment, had had to be built up, but apart from this there was little difference. I had never expected, as I read the accounts of the Battle of Tannenberg, to be sitting so soon after in the historic little inn in Neudenberg, where General Samsonov had had his headquarters during this fateful battle. And now I was lunching with a German Cavalry officer in this very same inn after a morning spent in visiting various parts of the battlefield.

He was as pleased as I was to have an opportunity of seeing for himself all the actions of which there are such detailed German accounts, and calling the innkeeper to him he asked him if he could tell us anything of the part which the inn had played in those momentous days. The innkeeper as it turned out, was the same fellow who had been there in 1914. He told us that it had indeed been the Headquarters of the II Russian Army during the greater part of the battle. He could remember the different officers of Samsonov's staff quite well, and, as a matter of fact, he still had some photographs that had been taken there at the time.

He went off and presently returned with several large photographs. These were remarkably clear and it was easy to recognise

the various personalities in the staff from the descriptions one had heard of them. One was of General (?) Samsonov, a huge soldierly figure in his long Russian greatcoat standing outside his Headquarters. One could see at a glance that, if not a strategist, he had all the air of a commander. Another photograph showed his chief of intelligence interrogating two German prisoners in a room of the inn; in the picture one of his assistants is clearly seen extracting a message out of the lining of one of the German helmets. The third photograph was of a sister of mercy going round in a German prisoner-of-war camp among a crowd of Russian soldiers; the sister of mercy had a strikingly strong and dignified face and the innkeeper related to us a strange story as he explained her presence there.

The 29th of August, 1914, was, like its predecessors, hot and stuffy and the sun tried vainly to force its way through the damp, foggy atmosphere. For four days already the battle had rolled over the East Prussian plain. And now its fate had been decided and 80,000 Russians were pouring back by the same tracks over which they had advanced so confidently a few days before. Their commander, fighting with them up to the last possible moment, had only now considered his own necessity for escape. He, the commander of five corps, in all upward of 200,000 men, had now to find a way out before the German pincers closed, completely ringing in the retreating Russian masses. And so it was that early on this particular morning with his chief of staff, General Postovsky, his Quartermaster General, Filimonov, Lebedev, his head of the operations section, Colonel Vyalov, the liaison officer sent from G. H. Q., and with a small escort of Cossacks, he set out from Orlau to find a way out of the net, a place to reform his battered troops where he could await reinforcements before advancing again. Arriving only a fortnight before the battle from sick leave in the Caucasus, with a staff entirely new to him, he had been called upon to make an immediate advance into the heart of East Prussia and, by so doing, to cause consternation at German Headquarters and so relieve the pressure on France on the Western Front. Questions of time and space, the necessity for detailed organisation, the hopeless state of the commissariat, defects of equipment, all had been set aside before the desire to help the French. And now the result was this, that Samsonov had been fighting a pitched battle for four days against a better equipped and more highly trained enemy, who knew all his movements long before he made them. It was now just a question of saving what he could from the wreckage of his army.

It was in such a frame of mind that Samsonov set out on this disastrous day. Mounted on a troop horse with an ordinary G. S saddle, for his own groom and horse had been lost in the hurried moves, he rode on ahead, sitting heavily slumped forward in his saddle, his head sunk on his breast. His iron self-control had at last deserted him. The party rode in silence and it was clear now to the staff that Samsonov had come to the end of his resources. The utter hopelessness of his position only added to his physical exhaustion. The road by which they were moving was heavily encumbered with transport; some of it moving slowly in the direction of the Russian border; some of it standing dejectedly by the side of the road, the drivers and horses incapable of going any further. Nowhere was there evidence of an organised withdrawal and the appearance of men and animals showed what they had gone through in the last few days owing to lack of food. Samsonov's staff, seeing his exhaustion, tried to persuade him to commandeered a cart. At first he refused and then, when no effort of will would sustain him further, he gave in. Vyalov, who had taken charge of the party, called on one of the carts to pull up and ordered the soldiers sprawling inside it to get out. They obeyed sulkily and Samsonov was assisted into it. The escort formed round it and the ride continued in the direction of Janovo. Ten kilometres passed rapidly, and it seemed as though the commander would yet make his escape. But, suddenly, the way in front appeared blocked by halted groups of infantry, standing listlessly on the road.

Not far ahead firing could be heard. The information on the spot was conflicting, and so Vyalov rode on to find out the real situation. He came back with the news that they would have to try and find another way out. The troops in front had met strong opposition from a force of Germans entrenched across the line of their retreat. And so, close as they were to the frontier, they turned back, and their problem became all the harder. They now headed along the route taken by Martos Corps in the direction of Villenberg. The road, which had been little better than a track, now got steadily worse. The cart made desperately slow progress and, with great creakings, ploughed its way through the deep ruts which alternated with long stretches of deep sand which are to be found all over the great forests of Grunfliess and Kaltenborn. Woods and clearings follow each other in a ceaseless procession and the little party used the escort to guard against surprise. An hour passed and there were shouts and fir

ing ahead. A wounded Cossack galloped back to report that they had been heavily fired at and once again they had to turn back.

So they wandered along, demoralised by the endlessness of these great woods, always hoping that chance had left a gap, by which they might profit. At last they reached a point where, from some rising ground, they could discern the main road from Neudenberg to Villenberg; once across this and they would be safe. Making their way as far as possible under cover they left the protection of the trees and almost immediately came under heavy fire. A hurried consultation followed and it was decided to stake all on a desperate chance. Colonel Vyalov, at the head of the Cossack escort, led three headlong charges, only to be beaten back each time with heavy losses. A council-of-war was now held and the weary men exerted their tired wills to form a new plan. Samsonov eventually gave orders for them to abandon the Headquarters papers. He ordered his Cossack escort to disperse and proposed that he, with his personal staff, should try to escape on foot, as it was evident that on horseback they attracted too much attention. This they did, even stripping off their badges of rank, so that the Germans should not realise whom they were pursuing. And so the flight continued, but now more slowly than before, as the little band struggled across the broken country.

Night overtook them as they walked, and they groped their way along heavy, sandy tracks which never seemed to end. Fatigue and demoralisation were taking their toll; only Vyalov now seemed capable of leading. He had the only remaining map and, with the aid of this and a torch, he somehow contrived to find a way. Soon even the torch gave out. A roll-call was organised in order to ensure that the party kept together. Word was passed from front to rear as on column of march. Thus, slowly and heavily, they went forward. Samsonov and Lebedev were the first to show signs of cracking under the terrific strain; both were big, heavily built men, unused to great physical exertion and, in addition, none of the staff had touched food for forty-eight hours, so that their condition was hardly to be wondered at. Towards dawn a halt was called. Each man fell where he stood and was instantly overpowered with sleep, even Vyalov, who was most concerned with the safety of the party, was unable to keep watch for long. But their rest was short and disturbed. The tramp of approaching feet brought them to their senses and, while they lay hidden, hundreds of German soldiers marched by on the road that ran not far away. It was clearly time to be on the move again, before

it should be full light. Again they set out, this time in more extended file than before, and once again they had to resort to the roll-call. Things became serious when Lebedev fell unconscious of sheer exhaustion. Every effort was made to restore him to consciousness, but the precious minutes slipped by and still he showed no signs of reviving. Eventually it was Vyalov who gave the order to continue the march. And so Lebedev was left to his fate; but fate was kind to him and when, after a few hours he regained consciousness, he had not gone far before he came upon a forester's hut where he was taken in and looked after, eventually recrossing the frontier two days later. The little party, now grown even smaller, marched on and on, and always the same monotonous cry could be heard passing back and forward along the file. Now they had passed the main road and Vyalov could see ahead the railway cutting over which they had to pass to safety. Suddenly the voice of Postovsky was heard calling urgently from some way behind; the rear of the party had straggled; he had lost touch with general Samsonov and now there was no sign of him. No one had seen him in front and their calls met with no response. They strained their ears and waited. Only a few minutes before the General had answered his name and now he had vanished. And while they listened, distinct and clear a shot rang out from somewhere at a little distance. They looked at each other and on each man's face were portrayed his worst fears. For an hour or more they searched, but all to no avail; General Samsonov's batman, distraught with grief, left the others and was not seen again till ten days later, when he was picked up by a Russian patrol. Samsonov was never seen again alive, and the little band of exhausted men, the remnants of the staff of an army of 250,000 men, could give no news of the whereabouts of their commander to the Russian Cavalry patrol, which found them that morning as they dragged their way across the frontier.

It was in search of news of her husband that Mme. Samsonov visited the Russian prisoners-of-war camps and it had been her photo that I had seen in the inn. For two years she combined her work of mercy with her search. How impossible it was can be judged from the fact that over 50,000 Russians and about 10,000 Germans had been laid side by side in huge common graves after the battle. The casualties in the battle had been terrible and men had been employed for months clearing the wreckage. None-the-less Mme. Samsonov never wavered in her faith that ultimately she would find the body of her husband. And by

chance one day she stopped at a woodcutter's hut on her errand of mercy and, being given something to eat, she learnt that the woodcutter had been amongst those who had helped to bury the dead. He recounted how he had found the body of a big handsome officer lying all by itself in the wood. How he had met his death it was impossible to say for certain, for there were no evidences of a struggle. The officer from his appearance had clearly been of high rank, but was not wearing any distinguishing badges. However, the woodcutter had noticed a locket which the officer was wearing round his neck and had kept it for a keepsake. He went in search of it and presently returned and showed to Mme. Samsonov.

Inside it were two miniatures; one of a very handsome young woman in evening dress; the other of a general of the Russian army. This was the very locket which General Samsonov always carried about with him wherever he went. To Mme. Samsonov it meant the end of her long search, for the woodcutter, certain that this was not an ordinary Russian officer, had buried him in a separate grave at some little distance from the main cemeteries and he was able to lead Mme. Samsonov to the spot. Only a year before the downfall of the Russian Empire the body of the General was carried back to Russia for burial in the family estate of the Samsonovs.

Shortly afterwards, I stood myself by the stone memorial commemorating the death of Samsonov. It is erected in the wood close to the Polish frontier, near where the body is supposed to have been found. The story was fresh in my mind and the photo too, which the innkeeper had shown me, that of a man who had commanded an army of five corps and had lost everything.

"HOW TO LIVE IN INDIA ON YOUR PAY"

BY RS. AS. PS.

Some years ago an officer calling himself "Mauser" wrote a book on "How to Live in England on a Pension;" the gist of the book was that you can't.

This really useful, though somewhat depressing book did, however, suggest various plans which, if adopted, made living on a pension possible; the principle ingredient being that you should live on your pay while serving and save sufficient to purchase a house and furniture on retirement. I have not read the book for some years but fancy the sum was about £2,500. It is on this subject that I propose to give the results of something under 30 years' service in India during which accurate records have been kept.

I take throughout the case of an officer of the Indian Army who marries round about 30, has two children fairly soon and retires as a Lieut.-Colonel—the lot, after all, of the majority.

Many officers on joining the Army have little or no money and some on retirement have a small overdraft of say £100; the result, therefore, of the trading of their body with the Army for some 28 years is a net loss of £100; not good business! Admittedly they have assets in the shape of a wife and two children; no doubt a delightful wife and delightful children but these assets require such dull things as food, clothes, schools, a house to live in and a bed to sleep on. Mauser assures us that a pension will not provide all these and my experience in having a family in England for the last year confirms this quite positively.

Is this financial problem capable, therefore, of solution? It is.

Now the Indian Army officer has a great advantage over his civilian confrères in that he gets a fixed salary and knows exactly at what age it will rise and to what amount and, above all, he knows what his pension will be. He therefore does not have to save all that is needed to support him in the days to come: when he will talk of "Peshawar way back in '39." And so his financial plans (if any) run something like this: "I'm now a subaltern drawing Rs. 535 P.M.; I get most of it too, as my rent, taxes and subscriptions are very small, but I cannot, of course, save; however, I play polo, shoot and I do live on my pay, and

when I'm a captain I'll draw the by-no-means insufficient sum of about Rs. 700."

Sure enough in a few years he is a captain drawing Rs. 700; he's a little injured that increased income-tax and rent, etc., take up a good deal, but he finds he can do all he wants, buy a good car and contemplate matrimony.

Now meet our friend two years later, just married, a captain drawing Rs. 760 P.M. He has wisely married an economical wife, but even an economical wife must eat, be clothed and live in a bungalow. She costs him roughly Rs. 300 P.M., so he finds himself with Rs. 760 *minus* Rs. 300 equals Rs. 460, while increased rent, tax, etc., bring this down to less than he had as a subaltern six years ago. However, she has lovely clothes, they had a wonderful leave touring most of Europe in that nice new car, and by dropping polo he can live on his pay. Anyway, in a month or two his pay rises to Rs. 925, and he will be able to manage till he gets a major's fabulous pay of Rs. 1,300 a month, so it won't matter.

Now meet our friend as a major with his nicely (though not so nicely) dressed wife, and hear of the two delightful children at the preparatory school (fortunately grannie takes them for the holidays, which saves a lot). He's given up shooting for fishing which he enjoys as much and costs much less, as he finds that from this pay of Rs. 1,300 he must—

	Rs.
Put by (or even pay) for two schools ...	400 P.M.
His wife still costs him ...	300 P.M.
Tax, rent and I.M.W. & O. Fund cost ...	240 P.M.

leaving him with Rs. 365 P.M. or considerably less than he had 16 years ago. Then, as he has not enough to meet the insurance premia and the bills over from the last leave home, he starts a small overdraft with the bank. This he explains is no harm as the overdraft is covered by his insurance policy, and it won't be long till he gets a rise of Rs. 130 P.M. and not so very long till he's a Lieut.-Colonel with, at last, a decent salary of Rs. 1,950.

Finally meet our friends now a Colonel and a Colonel's wife; you'll be glad to hear he got command; but she will tell you quite frankly that such clothes as she can buy come from the "Guinea" shops with shoes from Bata's. He still fishes, has his car, his games, his club and . . . his overdraft which has increased. Unfortunately his wife now lives at Home to provide a holiday home for the children (grannie's home having gone

the way of all good homes); or if not, is frequently travelling to and fro to see the children or to choose a new holiday home to replace that last unsuccessful one! Her Lee Commission passages are all gone, so every time she tearfully bids "Good-bye," her husband hands at least £100 to Mr. Cook. He is worried, too, about what will happen to his family should he die, and as his wife suggests that it would be much cheaper to buy a house he writes out the following little sum:

Gross pay, Rs. 1,950 P.M.—

	Rs.
Income tax	... 200
Half rent	... 75 (wife at Home).
I. M. W. & O. Fd.	... 55
Two public schools	... 500 P.M.
Two children's clothes	... 50 "
Wife's clothes	... 25 " !!
Clothes for self	... 0 " !!
Insurance	... 100
To try to pay back the overdraft	... 100
Wife's living at Home:	
8 months at £32	
(very low)	
4 months at £50	
(holidays)	
Average	... 460
TOTAL	... 1,580 P.M.

leaving that distraught man with Rs. 370 P.M. for himself to live on or less than he had 24 years ago, and with higher mess, etc., subscriptions, etc., to pay.

"Damn it all," he says, "I can't live on that."

That sad tale is not fantasy; it is true; but don't rush off and wire the girl cancelling your marriage; it *can* be done.

The whole trouble comes from the expression "I can't save so much and live on my pay." In England people can't say "I can't live on my pay;" they've *got* to. They can't praise England, sign a chit at the local cinema, and instead of scribbling their name for a bottle of whiskey must rattle six or seven hard half-crowns on the counter, and so, instead of doing what they want and adding up the bills at the end of the month showing a debit, they buy only what they can afford. Well, we in India must do the same.

Our aims must be:

- (a) To live a nice life, including sport.
- (b) To pay for our leaves Home.
- (c) To save some money to set up a house.
- (d) To provide for the family in case of death.

I have put these aims in this order deliberately as this is the order in which we usually put them in India—quite wrongly of course. The correct order is:

- (a) To provide for one's family in case of death;
- (b) To provide for a house and furniture on retirement;
- (c) To provide for leaves, necessary for health;

and what is left over is *all we have to live on*, which has nothing whatever to do with *how* we'd like to live.

The moral of the sad tale of our friend is, of course, that the less pay he had, the "richer" he was, and so in a better position to save, especially when a subaltern or unmarried captain and also when he was a senior married captain without children, or even with children young enough not to have to go Home to school.

Do you, young Mr. Flounder of to-day, realise that a Lieut.-Colonel's rent, income-tax and I. M. W. & O. Fund alone amount to approximately Rs. 405 P.M.—the whole of a 2nd Lieut.'s pay, *plus* higher mess subscriptions and higher drink bills, (largely your own)? If you don't save in these precious years, your burden will be almost impossible later, and if you don't care to believe this, wait till you have 28 years' service and you'll find out then.

And now we have reached the stage when we can work out the sums we must set aside for our three aims. Finally, I will show the best way to go about living on what is left over; the figures are only approximate.

PROVIDING FOR THE FAMILY

This, of course, is done by taking out a policy and as there are innumerable expert agents who can advise on this, I will say little about it except to stress that it should be started as early as possible. (I started this for my children with a tiny premium at the age of 9.)

An endowment policy can be purchased for as little as about Rs. 20 p.m., which will give you at the age of 46 a sum (including profits) of about £600, or would be paid at once to your widow on your death. You may criticise this in that it is not enough, but read the rest of my plan; it is a start anyway. The widow could, if you prefer, get a much larger sum from the same premium by a whole-life policy but it would only be payable on death and would not be returned to the fold when you reach the age of 46.

A marriage settlement is an inestimable boon and enforces the retention of any capital a young officer or his bride may have. If he has no capital, then at least he can put in an endowment assurance policy.

Later, when children are born, he will also have to provide for their education but I will return to this later.

NOW FOR THE HOUSE AND FURNITURE

Our aim must be to save £2,000 for the house and £500 for furniture, clothes, etc. If this sum is not saved, the only way a pensioner and his family can avoid sleeping in a field with no clothes on is by the Building Society-Hire Purchase System. Now, while these are great boons, it is a well-known fact that you pay far more (through interest charges) for an article by the hire-purchase plan than by cash purchase. Moreover, if you are going to buy your house and furniture by instalments out of your pension, you will find from Mr. Mauser's book that you won't have enough to eat. You may say, "But I can't save £2,500 in 28 years, namely, Rs. 33,000 or about Rs. 1,200 P.A." Well, I must admit it doesn't look possible but, thanks to the principle of compound interest, it can be done by joining the Defence Services Officers' Provident Fund as a 2nd Lieut. Done thus, considerably less than Rs. 1,200 need be deposited, the interest alone in some years amounting to Rs. 1,000 odd.

It is a regular gold mine, especially as you get older, for all deposits are income-tax-free, and the interest is $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *compound*, a rolling stone which does gather moss at an almost unbelievable rate. Take a Lieut.-Colonel for instance, paying in Rs. 90 p.m. He is exempt Rs. 9-9-0 tax rebate, namely, 11 per cent.; so with every deposit he makes an actual increase of 11 per cent. of his capital straight away plus $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. compound interest thereafter on Rs. 90 although in fact he only paid in Rs. 80-7-0. This is too good to be missed. Junior officers won't of course make so much as they pay less tax, but they will all make

an appreciable sum straight away *plus* the very good rate of interest.

It is of course, voluntary and the subscriptions are:

	<i>Minimum</i> P.M.	<i>*Maximum</i> P.M.
	Rs.	Rs.
2nd Lieutenants	... 10	30
Lieutenants	... 12	36
Captains	... 20	60
Majors	... 25	75
Lieut.-Colonels	... 30	90

The total savings *plus* compound interest are repaid when you go on leave pending retirement, or to the widow at death.

I am not an actuary but, according to my working, if you have saved the maximum rate from your first year of service, you will have saved the following almost incredible figures:

	£
By the time you are promoted captain	... 300
By the time you are promoted Major	... 1,000
By the time you are promoted Lieut.-Colonel	1,800
By the time you retire at, say, 28 years	... 2,500

and don't forget that in addition you will have saved a very large sum in tax rebate with each deposit.

This is why I feel justified in suggesting a policy of £600 only for family provision.

There are, by the way, two useful options open to D.S.O.P. Fd. subscribers; first in case of need you can take an advance from your savings and repay it in 12 or 24 months, or you can use your savings to pay insurance premia, and, secondly, if you find you can not continue your subscription, you can reduce the amount on the 1st April.

Now having provided for family and house let us:

PROVIDE FOR LONG LEAVE HOME

Apart from the writer's first long leave Home, when he spent as a young and foolish officer a huge sum above his pay, he has spent as a married man on every leave home £200 above his pay. So for a bachelor, let us call it £100. £200 is roughly Rs. 2,700 and assuming that leave is taken after $3\frac{1}{2}$ years (42 months) in the country, a sum of Rs. 65 for a married man or Rs. 35 for a bachelor p.m. must be put into a P.O.S.B. account or equivalent, by bankers' order. It is essential that it be paid in by bankers' order otherwise it will be "forgotten."

*The maximum has been increased recently.

As a summary I suggest that the following must be set aside:

All figures are Rupees per mensem.

	2nd Lt.	Lt.	Lieut.	Capt.	Major.	Lt.-Col.
Insurance Premium	0	20	20	20	20	20
D.S.O.P. Fd. for house	30	36	60	75	90	90
P.O.S.B. a/c for leave	0	35	35/65	0/65	65	65

The accompanying table shows that if this is done there will be left over Rs. 350 p.m. for a bachelor or Rs. 700 for a married couple to live on, rent, tax and the above already paid.

Exception 1.—The subalterns and captains will have a sum of from Rs. 45 to 150 over and above the Rs. 350. This surplus must be paid into a P.O.S.B. a/c to meet the deficit later. Alternatively or preferably, this surplus can be used to buy a series of endowment insurance policies which will mature from the estimated year children might go home to school to the estimated year of promotion to Lt.-Colonel.

Exception 2.—The senior major and 11-year captain will not be able to go on leave unless they have saved as shown above, and as marked by a * in the Table.

The interesting point to note is that the poorest rank is that of major or of captain if married before the rise to Rs. 1,105, but this latter is only for a year or so.

Finally, I promised to give guidance as to how to live on what's left over, *i.e.*, Rs. 350 for a bachelor or Rs. 700 for a married couple; I repeat, it's no good saying "I can't live on that;" it's all you will have and remember that it is free of all other liabilities except mess bill. In any case, during the last few years when my bank balance forced me to live on it, I found that I could do it reasonably comfortably and include games, fishing, dancing, bridge (usually losing!), a fair share of "parties," fair clothes for my wife and a car, but we had to be careful, *e.g.*, very few cinemas. It wasn't easy. As a "bachelor," I lived on from Rs. 305 to Rs. 380, exclusive, of course, of rent, I.M.W. & O.Fd., etc.

Now for a system to achieve this: it's quite simple; a budget must be made varying with each individual's taste, separating essentials from non-essentials, thus:

<i>Available</i>	<i>Bachelors</i>	<i>Married</i>
	Rs.	Rs.
	350	700
Rent, income-tax, I.M.W. & O.Fd., Insurance, D.S.O.P. Fd., Savings for leave.	} Allowed for separately.	

ESSENTIALS

Servants	a	a
Mess bill	b	b
Grocer's bill (not drinks)	c	c
Chemist's bill	d	d
Cook's account	e	e
Petty bills	f	f
Dairy bills	g	g
Furniture bills	h	h
Wife's clothes	i	i
Children's clothes	j	j
Self	k	k
Petty Cash	l	l
Local taxes	m	m
Etc.?	n	n
			—	—
TOTAL	o	o
			—	—
BALANCE AVAILABLE	...	p	p	p
<i>For</i>	<i>Bachelor</i>	<i>Married</i>		
Club,				
Drinks,				
Fishing,				
Shooting,				
Horses,				
Purchase of a car,				
Upkeep of a car,				
Parties,				
Cinema,				
Etc.				
The balance at Rs. p must be apportioned against each of these items as the individual thinks best value.				
TOTAL	...	Rs. 330	Rs. 680	
Reserve for the				
Unforeseen	...	Rs. 20	Rs. 20	
GRAND TOTAL	...	Rs. 350	Rs. 700	

A few minor tips: fishing is cheaper than shooting and is excellent sport, in which moreover a wife can join; the cinema in India usually costs $3/4d.$ for a bachelor or $6/8d.$ for a couple or £1 for three trips; two bicycles cost less than a car; a car depreciates; a car *must* be paid for in advance; so must a radio. It is to be hoped that every officer will have an English nurse, a car and a radio *if he can afford them.*

One tip for those who are already in the mire of the overdraft: you can secure a policy for, say, £500, payable to your widow for as little as about £5 p.a.; this would ensure that *she* gets your endowment insurance policy money and that it does not go to meet *your* overdraft. Of course, if you don't die you lose your £5 and so it is "bad" finance, but cheap and comforting and you can drop it the moment (if ever!!) you pay off your overdraft.

My figures are mostly based on pre-this-war facts. Whatever comes of this war, you may be sure of one thing—it won't improve my figures.

In conclusion, you may not agree with these figures. I admit that many are open to severe criticism but you will, I hope, admit that they at least provide food for thought, and a reasonable basis on which (especially subalterns and captains) can budget to "save to defend the right to be free" of debt as a Major or Lieut.-Colonel on retirement.

"How to live in India on your Pay"

M=Married. B=Bachelor. Rank.	Gross Pay.	Rent.	Income-Tax.	I.M.W. & O. Fund.	Insurance.	To D.S.O.P. Fund.	To P.O.S.B. a/c for leave.	School Bills.	Total Cols. 3 to 9.	Additional saving to P.O.S.B. a/c for leave as Junior Captain or senior Major.	Balance left for self and wife in case of marrieds.	Remarks.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
2nd Lieut. (B)	405	20	10	5	0	30	0	..	65	..	340	*See note (a)
Lieut. (B) 3 years	535	25	20	5	20	36	35	..	140	45*	350	*See note (a)
Lieut. (B) 6 years	605	25	25	5	20	36	35	..	145	110*	350	*See note (a)
Captain (B) 8 years	690	35	30	10	20	60	35	..	190	150*	350	(a) Can only afford to go on leave if he has saved at *above.
Captain (M) 11 years..	925	70	50	30	20	60	Nil available for leave (a)	0	230	..	695	(b) One child at preparatory School.
Captain (M) 14 years..	1,105	90	70	30	20	75	65	0	350	..	755	(a) Can only afford to go on leave if he has saved at *above.
Major (M) 17 years	1,305	100	95	40	20	75	65	200 (b)	605	..	700	(c) Two children at school
Major (M) 22 years	1,435	110	115	40	20	75	Nil available for leave (a)	400 (c)	760	..	675	(d) From this he can set aside Rs. 135 to increase insurance or put it in a building society to help buy the house.
Lt.-Col. (M)	1,950	150	190q	55	20	90	65	500	1,085	..	885 (d)	

q—All figures in this column are lower than might be expected as rebate of income-tax in columns 5, 6 and 7 has been allowed.

LEARNING RUSSIAN

BY KARSHISH

Learning languages in the Army, or at any rate in the Indian Army, often leads to disappointment. The attitude of the General Staff towards the linguist sometimes gives an impression of suspicion not unmingled with contempt. As a rule, however, the study of Russian has the General Staff's unstinted approval and it not infrequently happens that officers who know Russian are allowed to use their knowledge. It is, therefore, with some assurance that I embark on a light sketch intended to encourage officers to learn a language which, apart from its professional value, is a sheer delight to any man of education and taste, and which is not nearly so difficult as it is made out to be.

My own Russian studies have mostly been spasmodic and light-hearted and I do not suppose I shall ever know the language thoroughly. It is 19 years ago that I first began to learn Russian and I am still learning it now. Looking back, I realise that I might never have started Russian at all had not Bingham of the Queen's invited me, one spring morning in Constantinople, to go with him to a *jigitovka*. Intrigued by the roguish sound of a word I had never heard before, I accepted at once and that afternoon went off to a *jigitovka* or Russian rough-riding display. Never much of a hippophile, I found the conversation of Nina Alekseevna, who was one of the party, far more interesting than the *jigitovka*. Like many other Russian girls, Nina was the prettiest girl I had ever seen. Within a week she had made me learn to dance and the following week she started giving me Russian lessons.

I have said elsewhere and I repeat it here that women are far better language teachers than men, but let me give one word of warning to my young and ardent readers: It is not much use trying to learn a language from a young and attractive girl unless she knows no language but her own. If, like Nina, she knows English and French well, you will make little progress. So I made small progress with Nina, but though I learned little Russian beyond the basis of a fair pronunciation, she did introduce me to Russian society. Through Nina and through my new accomplishment of dancing (I never danced a step until I was twenty-five) I met many Russians, mostly women, and incidentally

got to know a great deal of the Russian character. I moved in two circles. One had its centre in the Y.W.C.A. Here there lived some fifteen women, mostly young and of good family, who were earning their living as secretaries, clerks and shop assistants. The other circle was that of the cabarets and night-clubs where worked many Russians, mostly of what one must call the middle class although no such thing ever really existed in Russia. Many of them were the wives or relations of army officers of "the Line" and were supposed by foreigners to be members of the Russian aristocracy.

Much criticism, most of it unfair, has been levelled against Russian refugees. The majority of Western European critics have derived their impressions from the less reputable type of Russian who haunted and still haunts places of amusements or who attempted to live on charity which they claimed as a right due to real or bogus artistocratic descent. These either deluded themselves or tried to delude others that, on the imminent re-establishment of the Royalist régime in Russia, they would step once more "into their own." The best Russians preferred to get down to work out their own salvation without stopping to consider whether the Soviet régime was transitory or not. The Englishman who so readily condemns Russian inconsequence, lack of thrift and laziness may often be found to be basing his ideas on people who would be wasters in any country and in any circumstances. Thousands of Russian refugees of good family, who had never before known want or discomfort, have settled in Europe and have never attempted to ingratiate themselves with better class people in the country of their forced adoption. In Baghdad I came to know by chance an officer of the Household Cavalry Division (his father had commanded it) who came of one of the best and oldest families in Russia. He was a first-class horseman and tennis-player who might have led a pleasant social existence among British officers for, in addition to other things, he spoke English quite perfectly. Yet he preferred to remain what circumstances had driven him to—a small clerk in a commercial firm. He told me that he thought the Russian reputation for cadging was quite sufficiently established already.

Of my acquaintance in the cabaret-night-club circle I shall say little as it was only trivial. I think the men were mostly scallywags who would have been scallywags anywhere. The women were some of them merely "gay" and improvident, while

others were supporting idle or incompetent husbands by any means varying from drudgery to prostitution.

In 1922 there were anything up to 200,000 Russians in and around Constantinople. The greater part of these have moved elsewhere and there must be but very few left in Turkey now. At the time of which I am writing the Allied Army of Occupation found employment for many but I do not think we were ever properly sympathetic with them. There was a feeling that, had the Russians not been such an inferior people, the Revolution could not have taken place. The apparent futility and improvidence of many senior Russian officers in exile came in for sharp criticism from British officers who did not stop to think what kind of figure some of themselves might cut if reduced to the plight of the Russian refugees. Many Englishmen who knew nothing of Russians beyond the girls they had met and found so accommodating in restaurants and night-clubs had formed the hasty and totally erroneous conclusion that the average Russian woman's morals were of the flimsiest description.

Towards the end of 1922, I began to get down to Russian more seriously and found a capable teacher in Mr. Seeman, an Englishman who had spent most of his life in Russia. He was bilingual or nearly so, for actually he knew Russian better than English. Seeman told me what I now know to be perfectly true, that it is really useless to attempt Russian seriously until one has a complete command of the accidence. It was this conviction that prompted Nevill Forbes to write his *First Russian Book* which deals exclusively with the case-endings of nouns, pronouns and adjectives. As he says in the preface, a great deal can be said in Russian without the use of verbs for the present tense of the verb "to be" can hardly be said to exist.

I took lessons every day with Seeman but somehow I made very little progress. I seemed to be acquiring a kind of general grasp of the language but I could not speak it with any fluency. I now know that one reason was the lack of the proper atmosphere. There were any number of Russians in Constantinople and I was constantly hearing the language spoken, but there was something in the appearance and air of the city that was utterly un-Russian and I feel sure that this acted as a kind of subtle brake on my progress. My friend Maria Alekseevna, though all her English was so perfect, frequently used Russian expressions which she said were untranslatable. They were almost always lost on me

and she used to say that there was not much use in my being keen on languages if I could not manage to learn Russian.

In 1923 I left Constantinople and dropped Russian for a period of nearly three years. Though I had nominally been learning Russian for almost eighteen months, I had learnt surprisingly little. I had, however, formed a lasting affection for the language and for the people and, by mixing so much with Russians, had acquired not a little insight into the genius and spirit which is behind every language.

After brief sojourns in Malta and Palestine I returned to India and spent four months with my regiment. During this time, I got to know and like my brother officers, learned to admire and marvel at the tolerance and friendliness with which they could treat a bird of passage and an interloper, and aroused the disgust and manifest hostility of the Brigade Commander. Flushed with these notable achievements, I left to take up a temporary appointment on the Staff of a Command and in May, 1926, went to Meshed as Military Attaché.

In 1926 the history of Russian relations with Iran had reached a turning point. The lapsing of the Anglo-Russian Agreement consequent on the Revolution had at first seemed to place Great Britain in an exceedingly strong position vis-à-vis Iran. Russia and Great Britain had been the only serious competitors for influence in Iran. The Revolution caused Russia's temporary retirement from the field and more adroit handling and a closer knowledge of the Iranian character might indeed have placed Great Britain in a lasting position of benevolent yet firm control. But, as in Turkey so in Iran, we failed to perceive the rising tide of nationalism. Lord Curzon for all his vast store of knowledge and experience did not understand that the projected Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919 was precisely what was not required.

At first it seemed as if, by making this error, we had played into the hands of the Russians. Indeed, the earlier activities of Soviet Russia in the Middle East were crowned with a certain amount of success. Closer in touch with realities by reason of their proximity to and familiarity with oriental peoples, the Russians did not fail as we had done to mark the growth of Nationalism. By repudiating the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 and renouncing the Capitulations in Iran, by financially assisting the Turkish Nationalists and many other similar gestures, the U.S.S.R. proclaimed itself the champion of small oriental nations against "western exploitation." Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan

were perfectly ready to accept such aid, but their rulers had apparently no intention of offering the U.S.S.R. any *quid pro quo*. Neither they nor their people had any wish to associate themselves politically with Turkestan or to rely for their existence on the patronage of Soviet Russia. These countries, and especially Iran had had a respect for the despotic magnificence of the Tsar; they did not see anything worthy of respect in the "democratic" emissaries of the Soviet who, more often than not, were Armenians or Jews—objects of their almost traditional contempt. The goal of Middle Eastern Nationalism was first of all independence but, that attained, the newly formed states wished to become members of the Western Comity of Nations rather than maintain an exclusively oriental character. The idea of becoming mere members of some federation of Eastern republics they regarded with strong repugnance.

It was some time before Moscow could fully grasp this new state of affairs. In the disorganisation of the post-war period their propaganda methods had a certain superficial effect in Iran. They established clubs in all the big cities, Soviet officials and the flashy ladies who usually accompanied them associated with Iranians on terms of easy familiarity and Soviet commercial employees, mostly Caucasians, were to be found everywhere, giving the impression of important trade connections between the U.S.S.R. and Iran. The support of some of the influential though less reputable Moslem religious dignitaries was obtained and for a time it certainly looked as if Soviet influence in Iran were paramount. With the growing power of the Shah, however, the Russians seemed to realise that their methods were out of date, that Iranian society was not to be undermined by toadying or by insidious means and that the proper line to take, at any rate for the moment, was that of supporting the Shah and of trying to cut as dignified a figure in the diplomatic world as the hated capitalists.

Accordingly, in 1926, a number of Soviet Consuls and other representatives were replaced by men of respectable appearance and undoubted gifts of diplomacy. My arrival in Meshed almost coincided with the appointment as Soviet Consul-General of Comrade Krzhinski, a Polish Jew of considerable culture and personal charm. His predecessor had been an Armenian whose "ideology" was no doubt beyond reproach but whose appearance and general bearing were not calculated favourably to impress a people like the Iranians.

I realised at once that the atmosphere in Meshed was eminently Russian and that there was nothing to prevent my long-delayed progress in the language. I secured a good teacher in Vera Sergeevna, the wife of a White Russian working in a Soviet-German concern. She was a good and painstaking teacher and fortunately, though an ardent Royalist in sentiment, she strongly advised me to work in new orthography which is easier than the old and, of course, of far greater practical value.

Officially we saw a good deal of the staff of the Soviet Consulate-General. Comrade Krzhminski was really a charming man. Whatever his instructions may have been he was evidently determined to raise Bolshevik prestige in Meshed. He himself was a brilliant and interesting conversationalist who skilfully avoided political subjects, at any rate when speaking with us. He was doubtless a sound Communist but he did not allow this to obscure either his common-sense or his sense of humour.

I was by this time sufficiently fluent in Russian to act as interpreter and when Colonel Biscoe, the new Consul-General, arrived, I accompanied him on his official visit to the Soviet Consulate-General. We both went in full dress and were suitably received by Comrade Krzhminski and his staff attired in frock-coats. The most genial compliments were exchanged and in a few moments His Majesty's representatives, gorgeously dressed in black, gold and scarlet, were sitting down at a table drinking tea and eating huge slices of a most excellent but very messy cream cake. The Bolsheviks sat round and made light conversation. The scene struck us both as distinctly humorous and we could hardly refrain from roaring with laughter as we drove off in the car surrounded by our cavalry escort. Interviews with the Bolsheviks were always pleasant and sometimes quaint. I remember another occasion when I was acting Consul-General for a short-time. Comrade Krassin had died and according to custom we received a card to the effect that visits of condolence would be received at a specified time. I duly presented myself assuming a *figure de circonstance* which I felt to be appropriate to the occasion. To my surprise I found Krzhminski and his colleagues in a gay and hearty mood. I was again regaled with cream cake and carried on a light conversation for several minutes. On leaving I made some remark about Comrade Krassin's untimely demise but it was received with delighted smiles by the Bolsheviks.

Krzhminski's assistants were not quite up to his own standard. The Vice-Consul was Comrade Levinsohn, a very small Jew with

whom I ultimately became very friendly. Another assistant of a more sinister type was Comrade Braun who spoke fluent English. He had been a jeweller in London and was a member of a well-known London club. He was really quite horrible to look at and his gallantries eventually became displeasing to Krzhminski who had him withdrawn.

Before Krzhminski's arrival the Soviet Club had been a distinctly rowdy institution. Occasionally concerts were given to which we were invited. There was plenty of talent but little organisation and the appearance and behaviour of some of the wives of Soviet officials left much to be desired. Krzhminski changed all this and, at the first concert given after his arrival, achieved a really remarkable degree of respectability. The women were all dressed in black and their behaviour was positively demure. The concert was excellently arranged and the refreshments delicious. Krzhminski was in evening dress and proved a perfect and polished host.

I have already said that the year 1926 marked a turning point in Iranian-Soviet relations. The Bolsheviks became outwardly more normal and their subterranean activities, though still considerable, were directed towards different ends. Up to 1925, they had unquestionably been concerned in making trouble in various parts of Iran. They had without doubt attempted to sow the seeds of Communism among Iranian youth and to poison the minds of Iranian officials against the British. From 1926 onwards, however, they were principally concerned with pushing their commercial interests, with secretly observing what they genuinely believed to be British machinations and with attempting to sabotage British endeavours to get information out of Soviet Russia in general and Turkestan in particular.

In the winter of 1926, there arrived in Meshed one Agabekov whose interesting memoirs may now be obtained under the title of "OGPU, The Russian Secret Terror." I knew him to be in charge of all espionage work at the Soviet Consulate-General but I did not know the full extent of his activities until after he had left Soviet Service and his reminiscences began to appear in a Russian paper published in Paris during 1930. Actually, his principal work in Meshed, where he did not stay long, was that of intercepting British official correspondence arriving from India by the Iranian post. His activities in Tehran and other parts of Iran were more extensive and of much greater interest. He was undoubtedly a most competent and quite unscrupulous secret

agent and his organisation for intercepting diplomatic correspondence going to and from the various foreign legations in Tehran was excellent. All this makes good reading in his book and its novelty and thrill have served to obscure for some the real interest of his revelations.

It is quite obvious from Agabekov's book that from 1925 onwards the work of the OGPU in Iran was largely of a defensive character. He himself, in common, I think, with the Soviet Government, genuinely believed that Great Britain had the most far-reaching designs on Iran and maintained an elaborate and heavily financed organisation for the purpose of sabotaging Soviet interests. The Soviet official contention, so repeatedly expressed to the Russian people, that the Capitalists were preparing for war with Soviet Russia, was not merely propaganda; they really believed it. Agabekov, before he seceded from Soviet service, had held a number of appointments under the OGPU in Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey and had also been employed in the Eastern Section of the OGPU in Moscow. It is unlikely that he could have been given bogus instructions in view of the free hand which, quite apart from his own statements, he was obviously allowed. Our failure to grasp the genuine nature of the U.S.S.R.'s fear of "intervention" and our reluctance to admit that Soviet commercial operations were in any sense serious caused us to impute subversive motives to their activities which they did not in reality possess. Up to 1931 stories were still current of the "dissemination of propaganda" by Soviet vessels in the Persian Gulf. The fact that no sample of this propaganda, which was supposed to be in leaflet form, ever came to hand did not, curiously enough, serve to discount the reports. Soviet activities were supposed to be furtive and subterranean and the axiom was not generally accepted that propaganda, to be effective, must be propagated.

In actual fact, I do not believe that Agabekov's or the OGPU's activities in Iran did us very much harm. The correspondence which he intercepted was not of any great importance. At that time, the minds of many Soviet officials were so loaded with prejudice and so poor in education and experience that they sometimes put the most grotesque interpretation on despatches which they intercepted. In the case of the Afghan rebellion of 1928, it appears to have been a total misunderstanding of intercepted British despatches that impelled the U.S.S.R. to make its ill-fated armed intervention in Afghan Turkestan. It is significant that Agabekov considered British Consuls' situation reports from Tabriz, Isfahan,

Shiraz and elsewhere as the most important of the intercepted correspondence for they provided a more reliable and more detailed account of happenings in those parts than the garbled and hyperbolic effusions of Soviet representatives.

In Meshed I occasionally found myself almost at handgrips with the OGPU. Among my employees was an old Turkoman who had escaped to Iran in the early days of the Revolution. He was a remarkable and very reliable old man and became a close personal friend of mine, but being totally illiterate he could clearly play no very important part in my work. The OGPU, however, were convinced that he was the repository of my greatest secrets and made more than one attempt to suborn him. One of these attempts is worth recounting for a different version of it appears in Agabekov's book. The old man had a son who had remained in Soviet territory and had some slight official dealings with Soviet Government officials. One day the old man told me that he had received a telegram from his son asking him to go urgently to Bolan, a small town on the Iranian-Soviet frontier. He suspected some trick so I told him to ignore the telegram altogether. A few days afterwards the son himself arrived in Meshed and told the following story: Karutski, chief of the OGPU in Askhabad, had sent for him and told him that he must get his father into Soviet territory. The telegram had been sent and, when it achieved no result, the son was ordered to go to Meshed and there endeavour to discover from his father by what means the British were obtaining their information. The young man was somewhat perturbed. He had no wish to harm either his father or the British but feared for his life and his family if he were to go back empty-handed. After some consideration, I told him to go back to Askhabad and tell Karutski that he had only been able to find out one thing from his father, namely, that the British obtained most of their information from an important official in the Soviet Consulate-General in Meshed. This story, which was quite untrue, seemed to me to serve the double purpose of saving the young Turkoman's bacon and frustrating Karutski's knavish tricks. I do not know for certain whether my instructions were carried out to the letter but very shortly afterwards a comb-out of the staff of the Consulate-General took place and several officials were removed.

Intelligence is not always such fun as might appear from the foregoing incident. I remember once, many years later, visiting in the purlieus of . . . , a Russian whom I hoped to employ as an agent on account of his extensive acquaintance among a particular group of people. He was a highly educated man who had

fallen on evil days and he listened with some interest to my proposals. He seemed to hesitate and I gathered that he thought such work would be dangerous. I hastened to explain that I did not think he would incur any danger; the people of the country had hospitably received the Russian refugees and, in accordance with tradition, scarcely suspected them of any irregular activities. His face cleared: "I cannot do such work," he said, "You yourself have underlined the fact of this people's hospitality. I have consistently received kindness and consideration at their hands. How do you expect me to abuse their hospitality? It is different for you. It is your duty to do such work for your country. I have no country now but I cannot forget that once, at any rate, I was a gentleman." There was only one thing to do: I apologised for having made the suggestion and expressed my admiration for his attitude. It was not the first nor the last time that intelligence work has made me feel thoroughly uncomfortable.

By the spring of 1927, I had become quite friendly with some of the Bolsheviks. Comrade Levinsohn had accepted an invitation to dinner. He felt it his duty to maintain a strictly democratic attitude throughout and on leaving formally shook hands with every member of the Iranian guard outside my gate. After this, however, he used to drop in and see me in the evenings and we had long and interesting conversations. He would seldom take anything to drink but on one occasion he accepted a glass of vermouth. He raised his glass and said with some emphasis, "Pyu za nashu druzhbu." (I drink to our friendship.) I liked Comrade Levinsohn and was very sorry to hear of his death which took place a short while later.

My friendly relations with the Bolsheviks were soon to be cut short by the breaking off of diplomatic relations following on the Arcos raid. As usual, the Bolsheviks got the news before we did. At the Iranian army races, Comrade Krzhinski drew me aside and asked if I had heard that Great Britain had broken off relations with the U.S.S.R. He added that he sincerely hoped the report was not true as it would spoil our friendship. True, however, it was and, with the exception of a few words at an Iranian reception to which we were both invited, I did not speak to Comrade Krzhinski or any other Bolsheviks again.

By this time the more soldierly of my readers are, I feel, beginning to "curve a contumelious lip." "This fellow," they are thinking (perhaps using an even stronger expression out of their simple vocabulary), "is clearly not the right type of officer.

What is all this stuff about Russian girls and Bolshevik spies? We expected some serious advice about learning Russian—something about the importance of the language in the Army." Such criticism would be far from unjust. Though it was not my fault that my duties led me off the beaten track of military life, I did most culpably neglect the serious study of Russian. Since I left Meshed in 1928 I have had to make good the omission by much hard reading and calculated study. You cannot trifle with a language like Russian. I had had exceptional opportunities for acquiring a good colloquial knowledge of the language and had rubbed shoulders with Russians of almost every sort. If, however, I had early acquired a sound knowledge of the grammar and structure of the language I should have done my work far better. Realising all this, I shall now try and disarm my critics by concluding with some more serious observations about the study of Russian and its relation to military efficiency.

Why is a knowledge of Russian important for army officers in general and in particular for those of the Indian Army? Because it is the language spoken throughout the length and breadth of the Soviet Union, because the Red Army and Air Force are among the largest in the world and because the southern frontiers of the U.S.S.R. closely approach those of India. Few will disagree with this answer but the matter does not end there. For over twenty years the U.S.S.R. has remained aloof from the rest of the world, large areas have remained practically inaccessible to foreigners and the number of Soviet subjects who have visited other countries has been strictly limited. During this period vast changes have taken place in the administrative, economic, military and scientific life of the Union. Descriptions of these changes can, indeed, be found in the not inconsiderable number of books published in English or other Western European languages. Most of these books are, however, tendentious or heavily biased and by far the most accurate description of Soviet industrial and other developments is to be obtained from purely Russian sources. Only a close and objective study of those sources will make up, to some extent, for the lack of ordinary intercourse with the U.S.S.R. since the Revolution. From the military point of view, with which we are here principally concerned, it must be emphasised that *a proper understanding of the tactical and technical development of the Soviet armed forces requires a close, constant and imaginative scrutiny of Soviet technical and military publications in the original Russian.*

Russian is the most important of the Slavonic languages and the most highly developed. It is what is known as an inflectional language, that is to say, grammatical relations are expressed by the inflection or modification of the endings of words, and in this respect it closely resembles Greek. It is a language rich in vocabulary and power of idiomatic expression. It is popularly believed that it has greatly changed its nature under the Soviet regime but this is not true. The orthography has, however, been much simplified.

It is obvious that Russian, like any other language, can best be learnt in the country and with the assistance of a competent native teacher. A great deal, however, can be achieved by private study provided that use is made of the right books and of gramophone records. What follows does not claim to be a complete list of all the available aids for the learning of Russian but only of those that I have come across during a fairly long experience and which seem to me to be good.

When beginning the study of Russian or any other language, the first necessity is to obtain a grasp of the essentials of the grammar and of the basic vocabulary. One of the best books for this purpose is "Russian Grammar and Self-Educator" by Louis Segal (5th Edition published by the British Russian Gazette and Trade Outlook Ltd.). While working carefully through this, the student may profitably use "The Basis and Essentials of Russian" by Duff and Krongliakoff (Nelson). Hugo's "Russian Simplified" may be used in place of Segal's book but it is less up-to-date. Parallel with his grammatical studies the student should work through the Linguaphone Course of gramophone records which will introduce him to the pronunciation of Russian and place him in possession of a considerable vocabulary. Another complete Russian Course is "Spoken Russian" by Boyanus and Jopson, with 12 companion records (Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd., price £2-2-0). I have not yet seen this course but it appears to be comprehensive and has been well reviewed. Once a general grasp of the grammar is obtained, the student should secure Nevill Forbes' First, Second and Third Russian Books. No books exist which show a better appreciation of the difficulties of Russian for English students. Until recently they were, unfortunately, only available in the old orthography, but it is understood that new editions are in the course of preparation. Forbes' "Russian Grammar" is also an excellent book but until it is reprinted in the new orthography, the student is advised to use Anna Semeonoff's Russian

Grammar (Dent). A more advanced book by Semeonoff is "Brush Up Your Russian" (Dent) with companion gramophone records. Good elementary reading-books are Segal's "First Russian Reader" and "The Album and Other Tales," both in the new orthography. Once he is perfectly familiar with the new orthography, the student will find no difficulty whatever in reading the old, and this is important as most of the Russian classics are still more easily available in the old spelling. By far the best Russian dictionary is that by Muller and Boyanus (Soviet Encyclopædic Press).

One word about reading. I have been astonished to find how little of Russian literature is read by students of Russian. I have met many Army officers claiming to be interested in things Russian whose reading has been almost entirely confined to reading-books and newspapers. Some of them cherish the totally erroneous idea that the language and the Russian character have changed so much that it is waste of time to bother with classical Russian literature. Many of these, of course, have in their hearts a profound contempt for good literature in general and their ignorance of Russian literature is probably no greater than of the literature of their own country. I have already said that much can be done without either a good teacher or residence among Russians, but I must qualify this by saying that the student deprived of these advantages *must read and read constantly*. If he cannot bring himself to read, if the exceptional qualities of Russian literature cannot charm him then he had better give up Russian altogether for, without reading or intercourse with the people, it is impossible to learn Russian properly.

Readers of this article will have detected signs of a liking for, almost a prejudice in favour of the Russians on the part of the writer. Though I do not disclaim this I realise that it is largely a matter of taste and experience. The idea, once widespread, that the Russians were "a hopeless people" is steadily losing ground and whatever opinion they may hold of the present policy and methods of the U.S.S.R., most people agree that the Russians, as a people, count and count tremendously. It may not be unfitting to close with the words of Count Keyserling:

"I am certain of a great future for Russia, nay, one of the very greatest in every respect. Within this marvellously gifted people, rich in soul and vital power, one of the most important cultures of mankind will blossom forth. But that great radiant future which I foresee can only dawn after centuries. Until then chaos is inevitable."

Note.—It should be realised that the events described in this article took place during the infancy of the Soviet regime whose policy and methods in the Middle East have undergone considerable changes during the past fourteen years.

COLONEL SCOTT'S BUNGALOW

*There stands by the Isle of Seringapatam
By the Cauvery eddying fast,
A bungalow lonely
And tenanted only
By memories of the past.
It has stood as though under curse or spell
Untouched since the year that Tippoo fell.*
—Lays of Ind.

In the plains of Southern India, just where the high-road between Mysore and Bangalore crosses the Cauvery river, lies the remarkable island of Seringapatam, that has witnessed more deaths by violence than the Tower of London. Indeed, so many strange things have happened there that the place is said to be haunted.

I once spent several days on the island, writing an account of it. I think I must have visited every hole and corner, every nook and cranny, in the place. Perhaps I peered too deeply into things. Unwittingly, I may have disturbed one of the jinns in the giant *pipal* trees, or an *ifrit* hiding at the bottom of some well. If so, I paid dearly for my boldness; for an attack of smallpox, contracted during my wanderings, nearly cost me my life, and all my notes were mysteriously lost in the post.

Seringapatam is a name bringing to the memory a breach in lofty walls, and a spirited dash across a rocky river-bed; an eastern palace of fabulous riches where once upon a time gold and precious stones lay about in great heaps; and a dictator's stronghold in which many a prisoner has been done to death.

For centuries the island was a holy place of the Hindus, but when George III was king, it was seized by Hyder Ali and converted from a Hindu sanctuary into a Muhammadan fortress. Shortly afterwards, that great soldier-adventurer died and was succeeded by his son Tippoo.

Then came the famous siege of 1799, when Seringapatam was stormed by the British and handed back to the lawful Hindu dynasty. Tippoo was killed, and the long, stricken years of fighting came to an end. Once again the monotonous tom-tom throbbed in the bazaars, and the summoning conch blared from

the ravished temples. Fields were cultivated that had lain untilled through the seasons, and everywhere the handmills hummed as the women ground the corn.

But the time was not yet when the traveller might pass without let or hindrance, and the shriek of terror no longer startled the night. For gangs of those wandering marauders, who were known as thugs and made strangling their profession, infested the countryside. From time to time, cholera and smallpox took fearful toll of the people; and where the river forked, the ground was thickly studded with little white pillars, each marking the spot where some hapless Hindu widow had been burnt alive on the funeral pyre of her departed husband. The shadow of death still brooded over the island.

At the time of my visit, nearly a hundred years had elapsed since the famous siege; yet much remained to thrill the student of history. There, for example, was the very breach in the walls through which the British soldiers had rushed to victory; the sally-port where Tippoo had been killed, sword in hand; the tomb, side by side, where he and his father lay amid the ruins of their former capital; and the fetid dungeons where Englishmen had been put to death by having iron nails hammered into their skulls. The visitor ponders over each scene in turn, experiencing a sense of pride at one and a condition of horror at another.

Yet, strange to relate, it is none of these things that leaves the deepest impression on his mind; but a lonely bungalow, that long ago was *suddenly deserted and never occupied again*. This is the original "Deserted Bungalow" of the *Lays of Ind.* It was never the home of a famous man, and it is not even haunted; yet no one, European or Indian, ever sets foot in Seringapatam without paying a visit to this house of mystery.

The bungalow stands alone by the river brink, with a broad flight of stone steps leading down to the water's edge. At one time it possessed a beautiful garden, bounded on one side by a grove of trees where all day long the green parrots flocked and screamed, the hoopoes chattered and the doves cooed, and the long-tailed monkeys "swung in and out of the leaves."

The first time I saw the bungalow was in the hot weather of 1897. In appearance it is quite ordinary and unimposing, and though well built does not boast any architectural pretensions. The house itself was still in excellent repair, but its contents had long ago fallen into ruin. Except for a few articles of furniture

—some of doubtful authenticity and others manifestly spurious—the rooms were empty. I happened to be the only visitor that morning and the caretaker, as he showed me round the place, regaled me with the following version of its history.

The bungalow, he declared, originally belonged to a Colonel Scott, who lived there happily with his family. One day, however, the Colonel rode back to find his wife and two daughters dead of cholera. Dazed by this sudden blow, and mad with grief, the wretched man fled from the house and was never seen again. No one knew what had become of him. Some said he rode his charger into the raging torrent of the Cauvery as it swirled past his house, and that both horse and rider were drowned. His servants, greatly distressed and completely mystified, waited for their master in vain. Day after day, they prepared his bath as usual and even cooked his meals; but he never came back again. When the news reached the ears of the Maharaja of Mysore, he sent one of his own retinue to take charge of the bungalow in the hope that some day his friend would return. He gave strict orders that nothing was to be removed on pain of death, and that all the rooms were to be left exactly as they were. But the Colonel was never heard of again, and the bungalow has remained empty ever since.

Such a story could hardly fail to arouse the curiosity of the least imaginative of men. It certainly aroused mine; and no sooner had I left the place than I wanted to visit it again. There is always something sad, something uncanny, about a house that has been empty for a long time; and with this one it was doubly so. I had seen it by day, but now I wanted to catch it in a different mood; so that night I went out and studied it by moonlight. I was amply rewarded.

As I set out on my expedition, a deathly silence hung moodily over everything. Suddenly, however, it was broken by some jackals in the fields of sugarcane across the river, giving vent to a series of howls that sounded like the fiendish laughter of madmen. At one spot, the pathway leading to the bungalow ran past some old *pipal* trees, whose black shadows seemed to be asleep. Such indeed was the force of this suggestion that I actually found myself walking through them on tip-toe! Then an owl hooted at me ominously from his leafy solitude. Presently, at the far end of the island, half-veiled in milk-white mist, I could just discern the tall cypresses that stood like sentinels round the tombs of the two bloody assassins. On gaining the river-bank,

I continued along it until I came in sight of the deserted bungalow. Then I stopped, and for a long time stood gazing at it across the lapse of years. There it was, telling its own sad story to the stars, and with the spirit of tragedy hanging over it still.

The legend of the deserted bungalow did not reach England until it was told many years afterwards in the *Lays of Ind.** No testimony of mine, however, is needed to show the widespread interest it soon aroused in India. News travelled slowly in those days; but within a few months of the Colonel's disappearance, sight-seers from all parts of the country began to wend their way towards the scene of the tragedy.

From the very day it was forsaken, the bungalow was carefully tended; but as the seasons revolved and the years slipped by like the waters at its feet, the furniture suffered from the ravages of time until at last there was very little of it left. In the process of inexorable decay, the carpets slowly rotted on the floors, the mirrors cracked, the spinet fell to pieces, the punkahs dropped from their hangings, and the pictures from the walls. The books lay mouldering on their shelves till all were consumed, and the wooden bedstead where the corpses had lain crumbled away into dust.

The native caretaker, who prospered exceedingly on the *bakhshish* he amassed from visitors, viewed the disintegration around him with considerable alarm. If the rooms were allowed to go bare—he mused—the bungalow would soon lose its attraction, which in turn would lead to a serious decline in business. Unfortunately, no steps were taken to save from exploitation the deserted bungalow that had now become so famous. Articles of furniture, some of them from Tippoo's palace, were smuggled in to replace those that had fallen into decay; and on the last occasion I was there, I remember seeing amongst the pictures on the wall, a coloured print from a modern illustrated paper!

The caretaker's legend of Colonel Scott's bungalow has been told with little variation to every visitor for the past hundred years, and must have been listened to by many thousands of people. It has been published in guide books and sung in verse; but it is stark nonsense. The theory of the Colonel drowning himself in the Cauvery is particularly unfortunate, because the

* By Captain W. Yeldham, 18th Hussars; 1861—75. His pen-name was "Aliph Cheem."

tragedy occurred at a time of year when the river is so low that it is little more than a succession of shallow pools.

The bungalow was suddenly deserted because of a tragedy; but for some unknown reason, the tragedy has been made to put on fancy dress, and decked out in the tinsel of myth and legend, instead of being allowed to appear in the ordinary garb of mourning. The true story, however, is so full of human feeling and so simple, that trashy embellishments of this kind merely spoil it. Here it is, for the first time.

According to the official records in the India Office, Colonel James George Scott was an artillery officer in the service of the Honourable East India Company. Some years after the siege of 1799, he was sent to Seringapatam, and whilst commandant of the troops there, he was overtaken by a great tragedy, the circumstances of which are recorded in a simple inscription on a tombstone, which is still standing in the garrison cemetery on the island. It runs as follows:

"CAROLINE ISABELLA SCOTT (AND INFANT CHILD), WIFE OF
COLONEL J. G. SCOTT, COMMANDANT OF SERINGAPATAM; WHO
DIED IN CHILD-BED, 19TH APRIL, 1817."

Very shortly after the death of his wife, Colonel Scott "fled from the house of woe," and without telling any one where he was going, set out for Madras. Three months later, he was granted furlough to England for reasons of health, and sailed for home in the Indiaman named the *Lord Melville*. None of his friends or servants knew that he had even left the country.

When he made his hurried departure from the island, he left his house and belongings in the charge of his servants. This was, of course, the usual practice when proceeding on short leave; but the extraordinary part of the story is that, although he never intended to return, he should have gone away and left all his furniture, books, wines, clothes and other household effects, behind him, without making any arrangements for their disposal or giving them a single thought again. It is beyond doubt or question that for many years after it had been deserted, the bungalow remained in almost exactly the same state as on the morning of the tragedy, and that it has never been occupied since then. Fortunately, the hand of time has fallen less heavily on the house itself than on its contents; and there it stands to this very day, for all who wish to see.

Colonel Scott was promoted major-general in 1821, and on New Year's Day of 1833 he died in London, little dreaming that all through those five-and-twenty years of retirement his old home by the far-off Cauvery had been kept in constant readiness for his return.

THE BALTIC STATES AND FINLAND

BY CAPTAIN G. H. NASH

I.—HISTORICAL

Taken collectively, Finland and the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania cover an area roughly one-and-a-half times that of the British Isles and possess a total population of nine-and-a-quarter millions. Two-thirds of this area belongs to Finland which has a population of 3,800,000.

The wisdom of forming four independent states from a population of nine-and-a-quarter million people seems at first sight to be questionable; because of their close connection with Russia in the past one is inclined to lump them together under the heading of "Slavs." Except, however, in the case of the Lithuanians, who are remotely akin to them, neither racially nor etymologically are these peoples Slavs. By way of comparison, "Kuidas Kasi Kaib?" is the Estonian and "Kak ve pahjevahyehteh?" the Russian for "How are you?"

The Finns and Estonians are related and claim as their distant cousins, the Turks. An Estonian told the writer that there are still several words common to all three languages. The Latvians and Lithuanians are kindered races coming from a stock entirely different from that of the people to the North of them.

The history of these states is a history of hundreds of years of foreign domination. Taking them from the North their history may be summarised as follows:

Finland.—Under Swedish rule until 1808, when it was taken by Russia. It became independent after the last Great War.

Estonia.—Originally under the Danes. In 1346 conquered and reduced to serfdom by the Teutonic Knights. Taken over by Sweden in 1561 and remained so for a century and a half when the Russians conquered it. Oppression led to a revolt in 1905. The revolt was put down severely and a legacy of hatred against the Russians remains.

Latvia.—Was originally linked with Lithuania; and later became part of Russia. Thereafter its history runs with that of Estonia.

Lithuania.—Was originally a powerful independent state but became part of Poland and then, with Poland, part of Russia. In

the years preceding the last Great War Russia attempted vigorous Russification and religious persecution was prevalent against the Catholics.

II.—THE INFLUENCE OF THE PAST ON THE PRESENT

In 1918, when faced with the confiscation of their lands, the Baltic States appealed to the Kaiser for a Union with East Prussia. The Kaiser agreed and this last year of the Great War was marked by considerable German military activity in the Baltic. Twelve thousand German troops helped to rid Finland of Bolsheviks, whilst a German force entered and remained in occupation of Estonia until the Armistice. They executed the Estonian Prime Minister and put various other Estonians, including the present President, into a concentration camp. In the summer of 1919 a volunteer German force under General Von de Goltz began its advance Northwards through Latvia. This force, joined by Baltic German volunteers, liberated Riga from a Red terror; but the Estonians had had a few previous months, after the German evacuation of November, 1918, to organise their forces and, having no desire to be "liberated" by the Germans a second time, they fought Von de Goltz's force at Roopa and Venden-Ronneburg, after which actions the Germans retired. The anniversary of this battle is always celebrated by the Estonian army and a picture of the battlefield, depicting grizzly Estonians in nondescript uniform engrossed in collecting German rifles and field guns and burying German corpses, adorns both mess and barrack-room walls. It is obviously a matter of considerable pride to this brave little army. The writer was led straight to this picture when he first entered an Estonian Mess.

Hate breeds hate, and years of neglect and petty persecutions had fanned to white heat that spirit of nationalism which successive Russian governments, eagerly assisted by the Baltic Barons, had set out to destroy. In the hour of triumph there was no restraining hand, no one to cry halt at the moment of victory. It was only a matter of time before the now powerless over-lords of yesterday would be sacrificed upon the altar of ultra-nationalism. The new states had only to gather strength, win the confidence of the League Powers and deal with the urgent questions of the moment; then there would be time to put Barons and Russians in their places. The new era was heralded with a guarantee of the most generous treatment for minorities—guarantees which were not kept by Latvia and Lithuania. By about 1929 the

treatment of minorities in these two countries was rapidly becoming worse, and in no way was this more marked than in the Lithuanian treatment of Memel-landers, who were tried for treason, sentenced to death, or imprisonment, made to close their schools and deprived of all share in the administration. The treatment meted out to Polish and Jewish minorities was equally harsh and, as early as in 1926, nearly fifty Polish schools were shut in Lithuania.

There could be no better ground in which to sow the Nazi seed. In every Baltic State there grew a Fascist organisation and people who had never been to Germany and whose ancestors had for generations regarded St. Petersburg as the centre of their world, began, soon after Hitler's rise to power, to count themselves amongst the lost Germans.

In Lithuania, where the persecution of minorities had been more marked, the 150,000 Memel-landers were rapidly welded together into a National-Socialist community owing allegiance to Hitler; from thence it was but a step to incorporation in the German Reich.

The German minority in Latvia also had its Nazi organisation, called the "Fascist Iron Cross." However, as the President of the state is himself a dictator, there was little room for a Nazi movement, and the only effect it had was to curtail still more the liberties which the German and other minorities had hitherto enjoyed, but which, from 1929 onwards, were gradually whittled away by a government whose intensely national spirit far outweighed its sense of justice.

The Estonian Government has always allowed a reasonable measure of freedom to its minorities—but not enough apparently for its 17,000 Baltic Germans. Soon after Hitler came into power in Germany the Estonians discovered that a movement had been organised within their country, every member of which was pledged to fight for the German Fatherland. It was called "The League of Liberty Fighters" and its leaders attempted a putsch in March, 1934. The President and the Commander-in-Chief struck hard and with great rapidity and the organisation was dissolved. "But we still have our cultural society," said a Baltic German in 1937, "and every member is entitled to a German passport immediately the country is occupied." The military part of the organisation had gone but the spirit was still there.

When the German Cruiser "Leipzig" visited the capital in 1937, a bevy of senior school girls from a Baltic German school,

dressed in uniforms very similar to those worn by the German Maidens, were rushed down to the docks to take the sailors out—that is, to show them round the ancient monuments!

In Finland ten per cent. of the population is still Swedish. The Swedes are an influential minority who, besides controlling big business, have competed successfully against the Finns for the civil service. A few years ago the Finns placed various restrictions both on commercial concerns and on entry into the civil service. A firm was not permitted to have a board of directors consisting entirely of Finnish Swedes, nor could the capital be owned entirely by them. No one was permitted to compete for the civil service unless he had a Finnish name. These and various other restrictions ensured that a Swede had, to all intents and purposes, lost or hidden every trace of origin before he was accepted for a Government appointment. One Swedish father summarised the situation very well by telling the writer that his son was now entirely "Finnished!"

Estonia has a white Russian minority which forms eight per cent. of the total population. The Russians have their own schools and cultural institutions and are, on the whole, treated very well. A Russian family, with whom the writer once stayed, were very indignant that they had to hang an Estonian flag from their balcony on public holidays,—but it appears that the Estonians had learned this custom from the Russians.

So much for the treatment of minorities. It may well be said that they reaped what their forefathers had sown for them: where the past was characterised by an absence of bitterness, the present has been characterised by tolerance and understanding; particularly is this so in Finland. In Estonia, the minorities benefited by living under what had been for the most part the benevolent rule of people who, by the time they became independent, had achieved an intellectual standard considerably higher than that of the Latvians and Lithuanians. Under the two southern states the lot of the minorities had not been a happy one. A Russian living in Latvia once told the writer that if he spoke his mother-tongue at the post office he would not be served unless he could produce a certificate to the effect that he knew no Latvian. Hard to believe, perhaps, but this was later corroborated by another Russian who said that this applied equally to asking the policeman the way. A stony silence was invariably observed until the certificate was produced. Only a few decades before the Latvian language was not recognised.

III.—THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BALTS

The Balts have struggled for hundreds of years to regain their independence and, however hopeless the situation has seemed, they have never given up. This centuries-long struggle has cultivated in successive generations a pronounced spirit of determination. They possess a will to win which has enabled them to snatch victory from the very jaws of defeat. Whilst hardly more than armed bands, indifferently armed and for the most part without uniform or equipment, the Latvians and Estonians fought both Bolsheviks and German volunteers. A regiment to which the writer was attached got its first machine-guns from a captured enemy position. These soldiers of the Baltic states, although no longer a factor in Baltics affairs now that their countries are dominated by the U.S.S.R., impress one with their practical efficiency. To a casual observer, they are not impressive. Their rifles are slung on the march and are at the "order" when they are halted; their equipment is a combination of leather and canvas, their buttons are never polished and the men are often unshaven. On the other hand the Estonians, for example, can march 50 kilometers in a day. In winter they hold manoeuvres on skis, and the troops bivouac out in the snow. It is all taken as a matter of course. During the winter training the acid in the batteries of the portable wireless sets often freezes.

They are remarkably good shots both with the rifle and light machine-gun, and both officers and men classify annually with these weapons. The Estonian army won the international rifle competition held in Switzerland before the war.

Nor is their practicality confined to training. The social centre of a regiment (three battalions) is its Mess. The Mess at Narva, on the Soviet frontier of Estonia, contains a ballroom, a restaurant, a bar, a card-room, a billiard-room and two or three rooms for private parties. There is also a mess dining room of the kind we know, but this is kept more or less as a museum piece. There are no government quarters for officers and there is no compulsion about feeding in the Mess. The Mess was immensely popular—even the officers' children used the restaurant at lunch time—and it was cheaper than anything outside. The staff, however, cost nothing, as waiters and cooks serving their year as conscripts worked in the Mess.

National feeling is carried almost to the point of fanaticism. "That church," once said an Estonian pointing out a Russian cathedral built upon a hill, "should be destroyed; it is not in

harmony with the Estonian landscape." And the Estonians are tolerant. National feeling manifests itself in a number of ways. Not the least of these is a passion for changing people's names: Mullerstein, for example, although he may be a devout nationalist, is invited to take the name of Vesikiwi—a translation of his original name—in order that no one should think him to be a German. It matters not that neither in manner, speech nor looks is he a Teuton.

Intense national pride, combined with a marked egoistic strain, produces in its turn a large bump of self-satisfaction and conceit. The President's portrait adorns his own study. The officer has his decoration for bravery embossed on his visiting cards, and many are the young people who carry about snapshots of themselves to show to or present to likely admirers. "This is me at the university." "This is me when I visited France last year." "This is me riding in my uncle's car—my uncle is a minister and owns a house on the Riviera."

To sum up. They may be conceited, but they have won a centuries-long battle against heavy odds. They may have an over-developed sense of nationalism—but it is a nationalism which, after hundreds of years of persecution, is at last free to express itself, and a flood of literature and art in all its forms has already shown a great deal worthy of expression. Much of the literature has already been translated into English.

If they do not forget oppression they also do not forget the countries which helped them in their fight for independence. The Estonians still recall with warm gratitude the part played by the British Navy when Admiral Sinclair's ships prevented the Bolsheviks from attacking the port of Tallinn. The British not only attacked the naval base at Kronstadt but also captured two Bolshevik destroyers which became the nucleus of the little Estonian Navy. That was twenty years ago, but the British are still the most honoured guests and the most welcome visitors.

Until Germany's aggressiveness grew, the same strain of gratitude for foreign help was evident in Finland. German troops had rid the country of Bolsheviks and then, through force of circumstances and not by intent, they returned to the Fatherland, to be regarded, at least for a time, as the unselfish saviours of Finland.

IV.—SOVIET DOMINATION IN THE BALTIC

The Soviet Union has two major interests in the Baltic. First she is anxious that the small states around the Gulf of Finland should not be held or dominated by another major power. A

strong Naval and Military force astride the Gulf of Finland could control the port of Leningrad, bottle up the Soviet Baltic Fleet at Kronstadt, converge on the Leningrad industrial district by advancing eastwards through Finland and Estonia, and turn the right flank of the Soviet frontier defences.

This fear is not altogether an unfounded one, for in 1918-19 German troops had operated on both sides of the Gulf of Finland and had inflicted more than one defeat on such forces as the Bolsheviks could muster at that time. In their memoirs both von Hindenburg and von der Goltz leave no doubt as to the object of these operations; von Hindenburg quite frankly explains: "We hoped that by assisting Finland we should get her on our side. . . . Further, we were thus gaining a foothold at a point which immediately menaced Petersburg (now Leningrad), and this would have great importance if Bolshevik Russia attempted to attack our Eastern Front again." Referring to German gains South of the Gulf of Finland he writes: ". . . I welcomed the liberation of the Baltic Provinces because it was to be assumed that from henceforth the German elements there would be able to develop in greater freedom, and the process of German colonisation in that region would be extended." Von der Goltz stresses the naval advantage of the operations in Finland and says that they were to form "the corner-stone of German command of the sea in the Baltic."

In 1934 the Soviet Government was still anxious about its Baltic frontiers and suggested to the German Government that the two countries should sign a joint protocol in which they would undertake to preserve the independence and integrity of the Baltic States. In reply the German Government said that it saw no reason whatever for any special treaty for the protection of these states. In the same year (1934) a Nazi organisation attempted a putsch in Estonia. From now onwards subversive movements owing allegiance to Germany fomented trouble in all three Baltic states. Finland alone—already possessing strong Nazi tendencies which were especially noticeable in 1936-37—was left untouched by these disturbances.

From 1934 onwards the Nazi Government repeatedly spoke of the necessity of expanding Eastwards and "Der Ritt nach Osten" became a national slogan. With such a political and military background to German-Soviet relations in the Baltic some very positive Soviet demands were to be expected in any agreement made between these two states.

The German-Soviet agreement gave to Germany a new Frontier about 350 miles East of the original one; it also destroyed the buffer state of Poland. Indeed, the moment the thieves fell out the whole stage was set for a combined frontal and flank attack by Germany on the Soviet Union. The fifth column—the traitors living in the Baltic States—and a friendly Finland would have made the flanking operations comparatively easy.

And so, to balance the advantages given to Germany by the Agreement of September, 1939, it was vitally important that the U.S.S.R. should occupy an advanced position on the shores of the Baltic.

Hiiumaa and Saaremaa, the two islands on the west coast of Estonia, were both occupied by the Germans as an initial stage in their operations in Estonia at the end of the Great War. These islands are now occupied by the Russians. They have also occupied all naval ports on both sides of the Gulf of Finland and, by seizing the Karel'ian Isthmus, the shores of Lake Ladoga and a considerable area north of the lake, they have secured the land approaches to the Leningrad area from the north-west. At the same time, garrisons at strategic points in Estonia secure the approaches to Leningrad from the south-west. The projected railway from Kandalaksha on the White Sea to Kemijärvi near the northern end of the Gulf of Bothnia would help deal with any threat through Norway and Sweden. Conversely this railway will in itself be a threat to these two countries.

There is no moral justification for the Soviet occupation of so many points in these Baltic lands, but German activities in the past, coupled with the Nazis' opportunist attitude towards all agreements to which they are partner, made it vitally important that the Russians should secure themselves against their friends, for it may take some time for Stalin to discover whether he has bluffed the Nazis or been bluffed himself. And then it might be too late to do anything about it.

The second Soviet interest in the Baltic lands is as transit countries. The ports of Tallinn and Riga, if not entirely free from ice, are open all the year round, and the rôle of the Baltic states as transit countries has invariably formed a vital part of any agreement made between them and the U.S.S.R.

To sum up, the Soviet Government now completely dominates the Baltic states and Finland, and this was strategically inevitable as a counter measure to any ambitions Germany may have in the future to expand eastwards at the expense of the U.S.S.R.

V.—NOTES ON PRODUCE AND EXPORTS

All the Baltic countries are engaged in agriculture and dairy farming. South of the Gulf of Finland this is the principle occupation, whilst in Finland it is second in importance only to the timber trade and its by-products. Finland, Estonia and Latvia are all rich in timber. Estonia possesses oil shale deposits which are estimated at over 5,000 million tons. There were, in 1939, six companies working this industry and the output has increased by leaps and bounds. Between 1930 and 1936 the annual output increased from ten thousand tons to sixty thousand tons of oil. This is exported both as crude oil and as petrol and Germany is the principal buyer.

The exports of Finland and the three Baltic states amount to some sixty-three million pounds a year, two-thirds of this coming from Finland (in normal times). This is roughly equal to New Zealand's exports. New Zealand's external trade is also approximately equal to the external trade of these four states. Before the war between a half and a third of their exports went to Great Britain.

THE PATH OF DELIVERANCE

BY PREM CHAND

Translated from the Hindi by G. E. W.

I

That same pride which a policeman takes in his red *pagri*, a beautiful woman in her ornaments and a doctor in his patients is also experienced by the peasant as he surveys his rippling fields. As Jhingur looked at his sugarcane fields, a kind of intoxication swept over him. Three *bighas* of cane there were. With ease they would yield six hundred rupees and, if God raised prices, why, there was no knowing what they might not be worth! His two bullocks were old; he would have to get another pair from the fair at Batesar and if two more *bighas* of land were forthcoming he would lease them too. No need of anxiety about money. The banias were already beginning to flatter him. There was no one in the village with whom he had not quarrelled and no one whom he admitted as his superior.

One evening he was sitting, shelling peas, with his son in his lap, when he espied a flock of sheep coming towards him. "There used not to be any right of way here to drive sheep through," he thought to himself, "why can't the flock go along the edge of the field? Why must sheep be brought this way? They'll trample the crops down and eat them too, and who's going to pay for the damage? Ah, it is Buddhu, the sheep-farmer, I see. He's grown bold all of a sudden. Here he comes with his sheep right through the middle of the fields. What impertinence! He sees me standing here but he makes no attempt to turn the sheep back. What indulgence has he ever shown me that I should deal leniently with him? If I should ask him for a ram he'll say five rupees and no less. Blankets are sold for four rupees the whole world over but he won't come below five."

Meanwhile the sheep had reached the field. Jhingur called out: "Hi, where are you taking those sheep to? Are you blind or what?"

Buddhu answered politely, "They'll go along the cattle-path, master. If I turn round and go back, I'll have to make a round of a whole *kos*."

"And why should I have my field trampled down just to save you making a round?" said Jhingur, "if you must take them

across, why not take them across some other field? Do you take me for a sweeper or something? Or has prosperity turned your head? Take them back."

"Let them go through to-day, master. If I ever come again, punish me as you like."

"I told you to take them back," said Jhingur, "if so much as one sheep comes over the edge, it will be the worse for you."

"Master," said Buddhu, "if one single stalk gets under my sheep's feet, you can abuse me to your heart's content."

Buddhu was speaking very politely. Still, he thought it beneath his dignity to turn back. "If I start turning the sheep back on petty threats like this," he thought, "I might as well have done with grazing sheep altogether. If I go back to-day, then to-morrow there will be no way through anywhere. They'll all start trying to frighten me."

Buddhu also was a man of means. He had twelve score of sheep and he got eight annas a score a night for putting them down in fields for manuring purposes. In addition to this, he sold milk and made woollen blankets. He thought: "He's got himself worked up, but what can he do to me? I'm not his underling." The sheep had seen the nice green leaves and became restless. They burst into the field. Buddhu drove them away from the edge of the field with blows from his stick but here and there they made their way through. Boiling with anger, Jhingur said: "Try and bluff me, would you? Well, I'll just call your bluff!"

"They got frightened when they saw you," said Buddhu, "you get out and I'll get them all away."

Jhingur put the child down from his lap and, grasping his stick, attacked the sheep. A *dhobi* could not have beaten his donkey more mercilessly. Some of the sheep's legs were broken and some of their backs. They all set up a loud bleating. Buddhu stood by, silently watching the destruction of his army. He neither cried out to his sheep nor said a word to Jhingur. He just watched and, in two minutes, Jhingur had put to flight the whole flock with inhuman violence.

This cattle-slaughter achieved, he spoke in the flush of victory:

"Now get off and just try coming this way again."

"Jhingur," said Buddhu, looking towards his mangled sheep, "this is a bad thing you have done. You will repent it."

II

To avenge oneself on a peasant is easier than slicing bananas. All his wealth lies in his fields or in his threshing-floor. Suppose after a series of heaven-sent or man-made disasters some grain should reach his house. Let but a quarrel be added to disaster and the wretched peasant is finished. When Jhingur got home and recounted the tale of the battle, people took him to task.

"Jhingur," they said, "you have made a mess of this. You know it and act as if you didn't. Don't you know what a quarrelsome individual Buddhu is? Well, it's not too late yet. Go and make it up with him. Otherwise, the whole village will suffer as well as you." Jhingur began to see the point and to regret that he had stopped Buddhu from going where he wanted. Even if the sheep had grazed a little on his field, he would hardly have been ruined. "Actually the happiness of us peasants lies in our keeping our tempers," he thought, "and, besides, God won't be pleased at my arrogance."

He felt disinclined to go to Buddhu's house but the others insisted, so he had to go. He had hardly got outside the village when suddenly he was startled to see the glow of fire coming from the direction of his sugur-cane field. His heart quaked. His field was on fire. He ran headlong, still trying to persuade himself that it was not his field, but as he approached nearer, this forlorn hope was dissipated. That very calamity had come upon him which he had left his house to avert. The rascal had set fire to his fields and the whole village would be involved in his ruin. It seemed to him that the field had come nearer, as if the intervening waste land no longer existed. When at last he arrived on the field, the fire was already in raging possession. Jhingur set up a great shouting and the villagers came running. They tore up pulse sticks and began to beat the fire.

Then ensued that frightful scene when men and fire battle for supremacy, and the tumult lasted until the first watch. First one side prevailed and then the other. Even as they were beaten the Firegod's warriors rallied and, growing fiercer, began to struggle with redoubled violence. The most brilliant fighter on the human side was Buddhu. Clad only in a loin-cloth, he took his life in his hands. Leaping into the blazing mass, he despatched his enemies one after the other and got away only by the skin of his teeth. At last the human army won. But it was a victory at which defeat might scoff. The village's whole stock of cane was reduced to ashes and with the cane went all their hopes.

III

It was an open secret who had started the fire but no one had the courage to say so. There was no proof and what sense is there in talking without that? It began to be difficult for Jhingur to leave his house, for wherever he went he had to listen to reproaches. People said openly:

"You caused the fire. You, and you only have ruined us. You were too proud to come down to earth. You put your own foot in it and have ruined us in the bargain. If you hadn't irritated Buddhu, we should never have seen this day."

It was not so much his loss as these taunts that Jhingur resented. He sat at home all day. December came when the sugar presses should have been working all night, when the fine odour of *gur* should have been continually in the air, the ovens burning and people sitting in front of them smoking their *huqqas*. But this year silence reigned. On account of the cold, folk shut their doors at eventide and cursed Jhingur.

January was worse still. The sugarcane does not only mean wealth to the peasants, it means life. It helps them to pass the winter. They drink the warm syrup, the leaves serve as fuel and they feed their animals on the husks.

The village dogs that used to lie in the oven ashes of nights all died of cold. Many animals, too, died from the lack of fodder. There was a cold snap and the whole village was prostrated with fever and cough. All this misery was the fault of Jhingur—of that wretched waster Jhingur!

After much thought Jhingur decided to reduce Buddhu to the same plight as himself. Buddhu had been the cause of his ruin and was enjoying peace and quiet. Well, he would ruin Buddhu.

Since the seed of this bitter quarrel had been sown, Buddhu had given up coming to those parts. Jhingur now began to become more intimate with him. He wanted to show that he did not harbour the slightest suspicion against him, so one day buying a blanket and another getting milk gave him an excuse for going to see him. Buddhu received him very respectfully. A man will give a pipe even to his enemy, and he would not let Jhingur go without milk and sherbet. At this time Jhingur used to work in a flax-winding factory and often received several days' wages in arrears. It was owing to Buddhu's good offices that he was able to manage about his daily expenses, and consequently he became much more intimate with Buddhu. One day the latter

said: "What would you do if you found out who had burnt your sugarcane, what would you do? Do tell me."

"I should say to him," said Jhingur impressively, "brother, what you did was good. You broke my pride and have made a man of me."

"In your place," said Buddhu, "I should not be content until I had burnt his house down."

"In this short life," said Jhingur, "what is the use of letting grievances rankle? If I'm ruined, what point is there in ruining him?"

"Of course, that's what a man should do," said Buddhu, "but, my friend, as a rule, anger gets the better of common-sense."

IV

It was March and the peasants were preparing their fields for sowing sugarcane. Buddhu's business was flourishing. Sheep were in great demand and two or three people were always round currying favour with him. Buddhu gave no one a straight answer. He had doubled his charges for letting out his sheep for manure. If any one demurred at his prices, he said frankly: "My friend, I don't want to force my sheep on you. If you don't want them, don't have them, but I can't quote you a *kauri* less, than what I have said." The result was that, in spite of this indifference, he was besieged by customers who laid wait for him just as guides do for pilgrims.

The goddess Lakshmi is no giantess and such size as she does possess varies according to circumstances. So much so, that sometimes she contracts and lies hidden in a few letters or a piece of paper. Her body may be hidden but still she needs considerable space for her accommodation. When she comes, a house must begin to expand for she won't live in a small house. So it was that Buddhu's house began to grow larger. A porch was fixed above the door and the two rooms became six rooms. It looked as if the house was being built all over again. From one peasant he got wood, from another dung-cakes to bake tiles, from a third bamboos and from a fourth reeds. The walls had to be made higher. For all this he did not pay in cash but in lambs. The whole of the work was done for nothing for this is the prerogative of Lakshmi. A comfortable house was built for nothing and now the preparations for the house-warming began.

Meanwhile, if Jhingur laboured the whole day, he only got half enough to eat while in Buddhu's house money flowed. If

Jhingur was jealous, who could blame him? No one could have endured such injustice.

One day, while out for a stroll, he went in the direction of the tanners' quarter and summoned Harihar. Harihar came up, saluted him and filled up his pipe. Harihar was the biggest scoundrel among the tanners and all the peasants went in fear and trembling of him.

"Isn't *Holi* on now?" said Jhingur as he smoked, "there's no sound of it, though."

"How can you keep *Holi* when it takes you all your time to get enough to eat?" said Harihar, "tell me how are things going with you."

"How are things going?" said Jhingur, "life's not worth living. If I work all day long at the mill, I can just keep a fire alight. Buddhu has all the luck these days. He does not know what to do with his money. He's built a new house and bought more sheep. All the talk is of his house-warming. He's invited guests from seven villages."

"As a rule, when Mother Lakshmi comes," said Harihar, "a man takes on a look of benevolence. But look at that fellow! He's got his head in the clouds. He can't speak without swaggering."

"And well he may," said Jhingur, "who is his equal in the village? But still, my friend, this sort of thing is unheard of. If God is kind to a man he should be modest and not imagine that he is above everyone else. It makes my blood boil to listen to his boasting. Yesterday's tramp is to-day's toff. He looks down on us now. Only yesterday he was frightening off crows in the fields dressed in a loin-cloth and now he's known to everyone."

"Well, would you like me to do something about it?" asked Harihar.

"What could you do? It is for fear of you that he won't keep cows."

"He's got sheep, hasn't he?"

"Pooh! Not worth the trouble."

"Very well, you think of something."

"You must think out a plan," said Jhingur, "which will stop him from ever prospering again."

After this the conversation was carried on in whispers. It is a remarkable fact that though the good usually quarrel, the bad usually love each other. Scholars, saints and poets have only to look at each other to become jealous. They do not want to see

each other. But when gamblers, drunkards and thieves meet there is at once a fellow-feeling and they are ready to help each other. If a pundit falls and hurts himself, any other pundit, instead of helping him up, will give him another couple of kicks to make sure he cannot get up again. But if one thief sees another in distress, he protects him. Everyone hates evil and so the wicked love each other. All the world praises goodness, so the good hate each other. If one thief strikes another, what does he get? Censure. If one scholar puts another to shame, what does he get? Fame.

Jhingur and Harihar took counsel together and between them they hatched a plot. The time and place were then decided upon. Jhingur went off swaggering. He'd got his enemy now. How could he escape?

V

The next day Jhingur called at Buddhu's house on his way to work.

"Hullo!" said Buddhu, "Haven't you gone to work to-day?"

"I'm going now," said Jhingur, "I came to ask you if there is any reason why my calf shouldn't graze with your sheep. The poor thing is nearly dead from being tied so long to a post. There is no grass or fodder for it to feed on.

"I don't keep cows, you know, my friend," said Buddhu, "you know what scoundrels these tanners are. That fellow Harihar killed two cows of mine. I don't know what he gives them to eat. Once bitten twice shy. I don't keep cows any longer. But your one calf, no one will do anything to her. Bring her along when you like."

This said, Buddhu began to show him what he had got ready for the house-warming. Ghee, sugar, flour and vegetables—everything had been ordered. Only the recital of "Satyanarayan" remained to be done. Jhingur's eyes opened wide. He himself had never made such preparations, nor had he seen anyone else make them. When his work was finished, he returned home and the first thing he did was to take his calf round to Buddhu's.

That night the Satyanarayan recital took place at Buddhu's house. There was a feast for the Brahmans and the whole night the holy men arrived and were welcome: There was no time to go and look at the flocks. He had just finished eating in the morning (for he did not get his evening meal till then) when a man came in.

"You're sitting here, Buddhu," he informed him, "and meanwhile a calf has died among your sheep. Its tether hadn't been loosened."

Buddhu listened and it was as if he had received a blow. Jhingur was sitting there too after the feast. "Oh, it's my calf," he said, "come on, let's see what's happening. I never tethered her. I brought her along to your sheep and then went off home. When did you put on the tether?"

"God knows that I never e'en saw its tether," said Buddhu; "since then I haven't been out to the sheep."

"If you didn't go," said Jhingur, "who could have tethered her? You must have gone and have forgotten about it."

"Died among the sheep, did it?" said one of the Brahmans. "Then everyone will say its death was caused by Buddhu's carelessness. Someone must have tethered it."

Harihar spoke:

"Yesterday evening I saw Buddhu tying a calf up with the sheep."

"You saw me?" exclaimed Buddhu.

"Well, wasn't that you with a staff on your shoulder who was tying up a calf?"

"A truthful fellow you are! You saw me tying up a calf?"

"Why are you getting so angry with me, friend. If you didn't tie the calf up, well you didn't, and that's that."

"This matter will have to be decided," said the Brahman, "killing a cow means expiation. It's no laughing matter."

"Oh, well, sir," said Jhingur, "he didn't tether it on purpose, you know."

"What has that to do with it?" said the Brahman. "That's how cows get killed. No one kills them intentionally."

"That's true," said Jhingur, "it's a risky business tethering and loosing cows."

"The law counts this a great sin," said the Brahman, "It's as bad as killing a Brahman."

"Yes, and it's a cow's calf in this case," said Jhingur, "and should be respected accordingly. The Cow is our Mother. But, sir, it was done by mistake. Try and see that he gets off lightly."

Buddhu stood listening to the case with which the charge of killing a cow descended upon him. He quite understood Jhingur's evil intentions, but he knew that however many times he said he had not tied up the calf, no one would believe him. People would simply say he was trying to avoid doing penance.

The pious Brahman, too, was to gain some profit from this penance. Brahmans never miss such chances. The result was that Buddhu was found guilty of murder. The Brahmans were jealous of him like everyone else and they now found an opportunity of getting their own back. The sentence was three months' mendicancy, then visits to seven places of pilgrimage and, in addition, he had to feed five hundred Brahmans and make an offering of five cows. Buddhu listened and realised that he was lost. He wept and the period of mendicancy was cut down to two months; no other concession could be made. There was no appeal and no use in complaining. The unfortunate man had to accept his punishment.

VI

Buddhu left his sheep in God's care. His sons were small and his wife could do nothing by herself. He went begging from door to door and, hiding his face, would say, "Behold me, an outcaste for the sake of a calf." Alms were given to him but, besides alms, he had to take many harsh and shameful words.

What he was given during the day he took and cooked under a tree and at night there he would remain. He did not mind the discomfort. He had been used to moving about all day with his sheep and to sleeping under trees, and the food he got was even rather better than usual. It was the shame of begging that hit him so hard. Especially, when some shrew would say scornfully that he had found a fine way of making a living, shame pierced him to the heart. But what could he do? After two months, he returned home. His hair had grown long and he was as weak as an old man of sixty. He now had to arrange for money to carry out his pilgrimages. It was not likely that any money-lender would advance money to a sheep-farmer for sheep could not be relied on as a security. There might be an outbreak of some disease and whole quantities of them might die in a night. On top of this, it was June when no profit could be expected on the sheep themselves. An oilman agreed to lend him money at an interest of two annas in the rupee. In eight months the interest would equal the principal. Buddhu had not the courage to borrow money on such terms.

In the meantime, during his two months' absence, a number of sheep had been stolen. The boys took them out to graze and the other villagers used cunningly to hide one or two sheep in a field or a house and afterwards kill and eat them. The poor boys

did not get hold of a single one of these thieves for if they saw them they were quite unable to stand up to them. The whole village combined against them. Another month and more than half the sheep would be gone. Buddhu was forced to send for a butcher and sell the whole lot for five hundred rupees. Of this he took two hundred rupees and left on his pilgrimage; the remainder he left for the feeding of the Brahmans and his other penances.

After his departure, two attempts were made to burgle Buddhu's house but, fortunately, the occupants woke up and his money was saved.

VII

It was July and the countryside was covered in green. Jhingur had no bullocks and his fields were out on batai. Buddhu had completed his penance and, as a result, was now untrammelled by any luxuries! Neither Jhingur nor Buddhu had anything left and there was no longer any reason for them to be jealous of each other.

The flax factory had closed down and Jhingur was now working as a labourer. A large rest-house was being built in the city and thousands of labourers were employed and Jhingur among them. Every seven days he took his wages and went home, spent the night there and then went back to work.

In his search for work Buddhu arrived at the same place. The foreman saw he was a weak sort of man and unable to do any hard work so he put him on to supplying the labourers with mortar. Going along with his mortar-trough on his head Buddhu saw Jhingur. Salutations were exchanged. Jhingur filled up the trough, Buddhu took it off and the whole day they both carried out their work in silence.

In the evening Jhingur asked Buddhu if he was going to cook a meal.

"How shall I get anything to eat otherwise?" said Buddhu.

"I just make up a snack of gram," said Jhingur, "I manage all right with that. It's too much trouble to cook."

"There are a lot of sticks lying about," said Buddhu, "you collect them. 'I've brought some flour from home and I had it ground there. Here it's very expensive. 'I'll knead it on this rock. You won't eat what I cook so you can bake the bread and I'll prepare it."

"But we haven't got an iron-plate."

"There are plenty of iron-plates. I'll just clean this mortar."

The fire was lit and the flour kneaded. Jhingur made some half-baked bread. Buddhu brought some water and both ate the bread with salt and red pepper. Then pipes were filled and both men sat on the rocks, smoking.

Then Buddhu said:

"I set fire to your sugarcane field."

"I know," said Jhingur jokingly. Then, after a pause, he said, "I tied up the calf and Harihar gave it something to eat."

"I know," said Buddhu in the same tone.

Then they both went to sleep.

CAUCASIAN EXCURSION

BY CAPTAIN L. H. G. GIRLING

In October, 1918, the 27th Division was about two days' march from Sophia when the order came to turn about and go back to Salonica for, what was to most of us an unknown destination, Batum. Quite a number of us had never heard of this place before, and on being told that it was on the Black Sea and was a part of the Caucasus, we were little wiser; we had no maps of that part of the world and no idea of what it was like. The prospect of moving to a new country after three years of Macedonia made some amends for the tediousness of returning by exactly the same road as we had followed from the Vardar front, and, as we moved by slow stages towards Salonica, small items of information, usually completely inaccurate, filtered through from higher command and began to whet our appetite for new scenes and adventures.

The voyage *via* Constantinople, where we were not allowed to land was smooth and uneventful, even the dreaded Black Sea euphemistically named by the Greeks "the Hospital," belied its evil reputation, and on December 24th the troopship containing Divisional Headquarters and two very weak infantry battalions cast anchor outside Batum.

A destroyer had arrived a few days before, presumably to protect us in case of attack from the Turkish Army, which had been in occupation of the Caucasus for the last year or so. Our object, we were told, was to see that these Turks evacuated the country, and we had also to prevent the Bolsheviks from taking their place. We attained our first object, but not the second.

There were supposed to be five to seven thousand Turkish soldiers in the town of Batum, while Tiflis, which lies midway between the Black Sea and the Caspian, had been "taken under the protection" of the Germans.

Baku on the Caspian was nobody's child, and an attempt to occupy it by the British from North Persia had been a failure, owing to lack of supplies and reinforcements. We had not anchored for more than an hour or two before our divisional commander summoned the Turkish General and his Chief of Staff onto the ship and a long conference was held, the outcome of which was that the Turks, who had great difficulty in realising

that the war was over, and that their country had been defeated, agreed to march some of their men to their homes in Anatolia while arrangements were made for others to be transported to Constantinople by sea. All of course were to hand over their arms to the British. "But surely," said the Turkish General, "the British, who are generous victors, will not submit our soldiers to the dangers of bandits, who infest the regions by which we must travel. If we have no means of protection, we shall all be slaughtered on the way." Of course an appeal of this nature could have only one answer, and permission was given for a proportion of men in every company that was to go by land, to retain their arms and ammunition. I am not sure how many were actually authorised to keep their rifles, but certainly nearly 99 per cent. went off, armed to the teeth, into the mountainous regions of Anatolia where they formed a very useful nucleus for an army which Mustapha Kemal was raising, and which was soon to be actually employed in driving the Greeks out of Asia Minor. The Turkish command at Batum also arranged to hand over certain barracks for the use of the British troops. For various reasons it was found impossible to occupy these buildings and in consequence we were billeted in public halls, schools and various empty houses.

Batum is a very picturesque town, situated at the foot of low tree-covered hills. It contains some imposing buildings, and several Russian orthodox churches. The streets are cobbled and the town has been laid out on a systematic plan. Batum was a Russian colony in the midst of a non-Russian land, for Georgia only became part of the Russian Empire in 1805.

Our first difficulty was caused by the rate of exchange. Tsarist paper money was in use, and at first all we got was 72 roubles to the pound, which made life very expensive. However, after a little while the rouble dropped to 150, and by the time we had left the Caucasus it was somewhere in the region of 500.

Batum in winter enjoys a very mild but wet climate; it rained for ten days on end while we were there. Oranges were growing on the trees in the public gardens and roses blooming under the care and enthusiasm of the old Russian gardener, who had served his apprenticeship in Kew gardens and had brought back and introduced many different types of English roses. He was always delighted to show anyone round the gardens and to discuss London in the good old Edwardian days.

The British army, finding that confusion reigned supreme in Batum, took over complete control of the town. One officer was

appointed postmaster, another food controller, the A.P.M. became chief of police, while others were put in charge of the tea gardens at Chakva and the tobacco plantations. The system worked very well and the Russian police, who during the rule of the Turks had almost ceased to function, took up their work again with renewed vigour and patrolled the streets—one Russian and one British soldier side by side. Although there were only two or three officers on Divisional headquarters who could speak Russian, we never lacked interpreters, and could pick and choose among the many local inhabitants who came forward gladly to give their services. Most of these spoke English extraordinarily well, and their pronunciation was excellent. They were also equally at home in French and German and could converse in Georgian and Armenian. When asked how it was that they excelled so in the knowledge of other languages, their invariable answer was "Our own language is so difficult that when we have learnt to speak it we find others easy"—to me not a very convincing argument. A great many of the better class families had had English governesses and tutors and had insisted on their children learning the language systematically.

As the Turks gradually eliminated themselves, a new group of uniformed men were to be seen wandering about the streets and surreptitiously begging; they were Russian former prisoners of war, who, after enduring incredible hardships in Germany and on the way back came "home" to find their own country in upheaval and no work for themselves to do. A certain number found employment in the British army as grooms, telegraphists and orderlies, others hung about the streets in their shabby prisoners clothes, gaunt and despairing.

The first incident which caused any stir, apart from the cheerful custom of all policemen loosing off their rifles but of sheer *joie de vivre* on Russian New Year's Day, was the shooting by an Indian sentry of an aged and deaf Russian general, who, wandering near the wireless station, failed to answer the challenge and paid the penalty with his life. The British authorities gave him a sumptuous funeral, a battery of artillery and two infantry battalions escorted him from the Russian church to the cemetery, and, what probably struck his relations as a far more practical expression of regret, was the substantial pecuniary compensation which they received. Malicious rumours said that other aged generals were being sent on errands by their families in the direction of the wireless station.

After about three weeks in Batum, Divisional headquarters was moved to Tiflis, the chief town in the Caucasus. The name Tiflis is a Russianised form of Tvilisi which in Georgian means "hot springs" and the climate of this most interesting place is not unlike that of Bath, stuffy in Summer but not unendurably hot, and moderate in Winter. There was only one fall of snow while we were there and this only lasted a day and gave the hooligan element an opportunity of snowballing any women or girls who had the misfortune to come their way.

The R. T. O. at Batum had secured for the officers of the Divisional Signal Coy. a first class compartment, which from the outside seemed very luxurious, but when we got inside we found that all the leather from the seats had been ripped off, exposing the stuffing and springs to view. At least half the compartment had been subjected to this treatment, the Turks and the war of course were to blame, but the station master being aroused from his slumbers by an unknown and greasy individual who apparently was his second in command, bestirred himself to get another coach added to the train, where we settled in fairly comfortably. We chose a compartment with leather-covered seats, avoiding those upholstered in cloth, as they harbour importunate strangers.

After a night in the train and a good many halts at wayside stations to allow the regular services to pass us, we arrived at Tiflis next morning and detrained in the Goods station. I should explain here that by some mysterious reason we were not "occupying" Tiflis as we had "occupied" Batum, but were merely going to live in Georgia as paying guests, and so instead of commandeering buildings, we had to ask politely for their use. We also had to learn to endure the interminable delays which accompany any business in Russia.

Tiflis is a large well-built town with broad wide streets, it lies in a hollow and is surrounded by hills and is built on both sides of the river Kura. Scholars are divided in their opinions as to whether Georgia or the country round Batum was the ancient land of Colchis, whose princess Medea helped Jason steal the golden fleece. Be that as it may, Georgia does not lack modern Medeas, many of whom left their native land with foreign husbands. The 27th Division took up its headquarters in the Hotel Majestic, a large building which, being completed just before the war, had never been used for its original purpose, and from its windows we used to see the parades of the Georgian Army, who were dressed in a kind of dull grey uniform with small pill-box caps. There

were frequent parades which resulted in the stoppage of all traffic for the time being. Occasionally there would be processions of symbolical groups representing the union of the Caucasus people, trade and prosperity under the new Georgian Republic, liberty and fraternity, etc.; these processions often did not run very smoothly, in fact I remember on one occasion the car bearing the Tableau of beautiful Maidens representing Georgia, was delayed owing to engine trouble for at least twenty minutes in front of the Majestic Hotel, to the great delight of the sentries and others whose windows faced the *Erwanski Prospect*.

Another great occasion was the weekly payment of the Georgian garrison. A car would proceed to the bank and would return, surrounded by at least fifty soldiers, all with fixed bayonets carrying their rifles at the "low port." Again all traffic was stopped, while this cortège passed along the streets. In spite of this precaution, an attempt at a smash and grab raid was once made, but the thieves were unable to get any cash and managed to escape in the confusion, and the only casualties were one Georgian soldier shot by one of his comrades in the excitement of the moment and three or four innocent passers-by.

The variety of costumes worn in the street made a very picturesque effect. A good many of the older women wore the Georgian dress, a flat round cap and long dark gown with a necklace consisting of gold coins, while most of the men of the upper classes wore the fur cap and "cherkess" or longish tight-waisted coat and high soft leather boots, which is the dress of the cossacks. Those who had been government employees, and under this heading came schoolmasters, local government officials, civil servants, railway officials, judges and so on, all wore their old uniform, a dark-green coat like a patrol jacket and a peaked cap from which they had removed the imperial eagle of Tsarist Russia. Tiflis possessed some fine shops, which were nearly all empty of stock, only the music shops had any goods for sale and these consisted of gramophone records and music. Most of the population had not tasted sugar for two years, and we were constantly being asked by our Georgian friends to buy them sugar or coffee at the army canteen. This was strictly against orders, but I fancy that in spite of regulations quite a considerable amount of sugar and chocolate reached the civil populace.

The upper classes seemed to live by selling their jewellery and engaging in shady forms of business, such as gambling on the exchange, while the middle class practically starved. The number of suicides was appalling, mostly among the Russian officer class,

who having come back after serving their country for over three years found themselves destitute with no money and no provision made for their support, for the Georgians having suffered under the tyranny of Russia, would not extend any charity to the thousands of Russians who had lived very peaceably side by side with them for many generations.

As demobilisation was going on and every week men were being sent back to England, clerks, orderlies, transport drivers and fatigue men were recruited from the local inhabitants and it was a pathetic sight to see the eagerness with which ex-officers of the Russian Army lined up daily in the queues, anxious to get any kind of work that would keep them from starvation. Two Generals were glad to get jobs in the Majestic Hotel, sweeping down the stairs every day and washing passages.

Besides the epidemic of suicides among the civil populace, typhus took a great toll, and nearly every day from the Majestic Hotel we would see long funeral processions headed by priests and mourners, the coffin always open, carried on the shoulders of friends, while the hearse followed after.

In Summer Tiflis gets rather hot and stuffy and most of the rich inhabitants move to country houses among the hills. These are mostly built of wood and are usually very attractive bungalows, set in the midst of orchards and flower gardens.

Sometimes we were invited out to visit friends at one of these "Dachas", and it was very pleasant to stop half way for lunch at a village inn and eat bread and caviare and drink the rough native wine. Caviare was extremely cheap and seemed to be eaten as commonly as butter; in addition to the preserved caviare we used to get the fresh kind, which has an infinitely more delicate flavour. The sturgeon, which provide this luxury, are caught in the Caspian Sea. It was at Baku that the British force, when first coming up from North Persia, were extremely short of army rations and a certain number of provisions had to be bought locally. It was impossible to obtain jam, so the Supply Officer hit upon the bright idea of issuing caviare to the troops to spread on their bread at tea. "Any complaints?" said the orderly officer making his round. "Yes Sir," replied a corporal, "the men don't like this 'ere dripping, it tastes of fish."

The Russian language is reputed to be one of the most difficult of European tongues and the troops soon got a sufficient knowledge to be able to make themselves understood and many charming young ladies were only too glad to exchange Russian for English lessons. Quite a number of officers started to learn in

this pleasant way but whether they progressed in their study of the language, is like the song that the sirens sang to Odysseus, a matter for conjecture. Most of us were never very long in the same place and our studies were thus enforcedly interrupted, for British Military Missions were established in Kars, Nahichevan Erivan (the capital of Armenia) and many other places.

When we arrived at Tiflis, the Georgians were at war with the Armenians, but an officer, Major Douglas of the Rifle Brigade, was sent down to "stop the war" which he accordingly did, by appearing on the battlefield with an orderly carrying a Union Jack, and ordering both sides to retire five miles from each other until terms of peace had been agreed upon. The policy of "appeasement" worked well on this occasion. A curious incident occurred on a train, which was making the journey to Kars with a platoon of infantry and the officer who was to be "British Military representative." For many months no train had run along the track beyond a few miles from the main line. Grass had grown up between the rails and as we went on, the train slowed up and came to a standstill. We got out to see what was the matter and saw the wheels of the stationary engine revolving furiously, they could get no grip on the rails as the grass all became churned up and formed a pulpy mass. We had to send a man on ahead with a scythe, before we could move forward—the train was rather behind scheduled time, on arrival at Kars.

On another occasion a train stopped at a lonely station to take in Mazout or crude petrol, which is used for fuel. After a long wait we went to the engine to see what was wrong and were told that the engine driver had run away. Being an Armenian he was not going to risk his life in Kurdish territory. A short search however brought him to light and at the point of the bayonet, he was marched to his place on the footplate, while a soldier with loaded revolver stood behind him to see that he did not abscond a second time. One could sympathise with the poor fellow's fears, for only a short while before, two Armenian business men, who had obtained special permission to go down to Kars on the military train, were murdered on the night of their arrival, but no British soldier or officer was harmed, during the whole of our stay there. In Tiflis, however, an unfortunate tragedy took place at Easter time, when a captain in the R.A.M.C. was murdered in the street just outside the Cadet barracks. He was walking with a Russian lady, when he was suddenly set upon by some of the Cadets, who had been celebrating too freely,

and was shot dead. The girl managed to get away somehow or other and ran to the British Military police barracks. The Georgian authorities were immediately informed and despatched their head detective, a most formidable individual who "packed" two revolvers and wore bound round him several belts of ammunition. He walked straight up to the guard at the Cadet School and ordered them all to parade. Then, scowling fearfully, he pointed out first one, then another, till six men had been handcuffed by his two assistants. Not one attempted to protest. They were tried and confessed their guilt and were all condemned to death.

As far as I can remember, that was the only case of violence committed against the British, during the six months we were in the Caucasus, but we were frequently hearing of robberies with murder, in private houses in the town.

In 1918 and 1919 the old Russian system of titles was still in vogue in these parts and we were amazed to learn how many people bore the title of "prince." Now there is a Russian saying "wherever you spit in Georgia, you hit a prince," and anyone conversant with Russian habits will realise that this means that princes are cheaper than three a penny. Nearly everyone is a prince and his wife and daughters princesses; the Russian title "Kniaz" which is wrongly translated in English, is really the equivalent of "Esquire." As a sop to the Georgians, when they lost their independence, the Tzar allowed all, owners of so much land, to adopt this title, which they hand down to their children and so on *ad infinitum*. Now of course all are "Comrades" under the U.S.S.R.

In Tiflis the Indo-European Telegraph Company had a large station, under the direction of an Englishman and two Armenian assistants. One of the chief lines of communication between England and India passed through Georgia and Armenia and it was our constant pious hope that one day we should be able to send messages direct to England; but what with civil war in Russia, and the activities of the "Green Guards" we were never to achieve this end. The Green Guards, it should be said, were an army of free-booters, who used to join first one side and then desert to the other, when it suited them better, and they operated round about Sukhaum in the N. W. Caucasus.

The Khurds also to the South, were constantly cutting the wire and stealing it, and using it for mending their carts and fencing in their cattle. An experiment was tried which promised success—the headmen of various villages were put in charge of a

certain sector and told to ensure its protection, but the wire was constantly being cut and the headmen would duly report that the thief had been executed. Investigations would prove that a man had certainly paid the penalty, but it was more often than not some wretched beggar or wanderer who had been made the scape-goat.

On one great occasion, however, the Armenian assistant at the "Indo," Mr. Ter-Boizegian, rang us up at divisional headquarters to say that he was through to Karachi. This happy state of affairs lasted for twelve hours, during which time we were able to send several messages to England via India and received answers, but after that period the line failed again and communication was never re-established that way.

Meanwhile rumours were spread that the Italians were coming to take our place in the Caucasus and I believe that some arrangement of this kind had been anticipated, but Italy at that time was occupied with her own internal dissensions and it was decided that the whole of Georgia and Azerbaijan (the country round Baku) was to be evacuated by the British and only a small garrison left in Batum.

Just before the troops left Baku, I had the good fortune to be sent there to take the place of an officer who had gone to hospital. Travelling from Tiflis to Baku, you gradually come out of a countryside that is not unlike England and pass into a sandy desert-like region with small tartar villages dotted here and there. In the distance to the North you can see the long range of the Caucasus mountains keeping almost parallel to the railway line and 30—40 miles away.

During the war most of the railway stations had been burnt down and remained silent witnesses to the struggle. I was told that the famous General Andranik, who lead his band of desperadoes with great success against the Turkish rearguards, was responsible for most of this damage. He had also cut the oil pipe line, which follows the railway across the Caucasus from Baku to Batum. This, together with the numerous pumping stations, was in process of repair.

The oil fields of Baku present a most curious spectacle; on a flat horizon one sees hundreds of pyramid-shaped erections which give the impression of enormous stacks of matches, piled horizontally one on top of the other. Apparently, when a well is exhausted, the superstructure is not removed, as after a time

the oil may reappear, and so while new erections are constantly being built, the old ones still remain.

Baku contains some fine buildings, the club being one of the most imposing. Here I heard a splendid concert of classical music given by a full-sized string orchestra, who, when they had finished, left the stage and were followed by two Tartars. These accompanied themselves on a kind of Zither and began to sing some interminably eastern songs; a singular contrast to their predecessors' Beethoven symphony.

I only spent a week in Baku, during which time I was kept very busy making arrangements for the dismantling of our telephones and wires, and selling all surplus apparatus to the Swedish Telephone Company, which ran all the telephones in the town. At the same time the A.T. carts and mules of an Indian transport company were sold to the Azerbaijan Government. We felt very sorry for the sleek well-fed mules, which, judging by the appearance of the local beasts of burden, would probably never see a good feed again.

A number of horses were also sold, but officers who wished to buy their own chargers were allowed to do so on condition that they also paid for their transport cost to England. At last the day came to leave Baku and, as the train steamed out of the station there were many tearful farewells waved by the Russian girls to the departing soldiers. A great many Russians felt that, with the exodus of the British troops, all their chance of security had disappeared, for it was evident that the U.S.S.R. were only waiting for us to leave the country, before they took it over themselves.

Our train took three days to cross the Caucasus from Baku to Batum, and we had a very comfortable journey. Three of us shared a goods truck, in which we set up our camp beds and during the day we put deck chairs on an unused "flat" and had an uninterrupted view of the surrounding country.

Once when the train had gone on after a short stop, it was reported that one of our men was missing. As he must have got off in a most lonely and desolate spot, where the natives were reported to be in the habit of killing a man for the sake of his boots, we wondered very much whether we should ever see him again, but on arriving at a large station we found him waiting on the platform. He had hailed an express which had stopped to pick him up, and had passed us during the night.

At Batum our train took us down to the docks, and we found that we had to do all the stevedore work ourselves, no labourers being available. A certain amount of confusion was inevitable and I found it best to get into the hold and direct operations there. I believe a piano was loaded on top of a Brigade Headquarters china and that a very senior officer's gramophone was required from the very bottom of the hold, just as we had completed loading; needless to say, it could not be found. Apart from such minor incidents, all went well and we all turned into our bunks after fourteen hours hard work and slept so soundly that we never heard the sirens and whistles that accompany the departure of a ship, and awoke to find ourselves in the Black Sea with the Caucasus already far behind us, and whatever regrets we may have felt at leaving a very hospitable country, they were soon supplanted by the pleasant anticipation of demobilisation for some of us and home leave, after some two or three years' absence, for the rest.

THE STEYR-SOLOTHURN MACHINE PISTOL

By MAJOR D. H. J. WILLIAMS, O.B.E.,

Commandant, South Waziristan Scouts

While on short leave the year before last, I enquired into types of light-weight automatic weapons known generally as "Automatic Carbines" or "Machine Pistols." Most of us know a number of slang expressions for weapons of this sort, which have come to us from the U.S.A. On the continent of Europe the type seems to have been developed for more strictly military purposes.

The Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield very kindly showed me a variety of such weapons, about a dozen different types in all, which they had tested.

Three types Automatic were placed equal first in order of merit in the Factory's list. One of these, the Steyr-Solothurn, a few of which we have acquired for our own private purposes, forms the subject of this article.

First let us be clear as to the main characteristics of any weapon of this type, so far as the user is concerned. Compared with the Light Automatics in use in our Army to-day, they lack range and penetrative power. The Solothurn is sighted to 550 yards and, at that range, will penetrate four inches of pinewood. On the other hand, they have certain desirable characteristics:

- (a) Extremely light weight, not only of the weapon itself but also its ammunition.
- (b) Absence of overheating in firing.
- (c) Firing stresses of all kinds are much reduced.

The first enables a single man to carry a large quantity of ammunition. The second does away with the necessity for changing barrels. The third, which, like the second point, arises from lower muzzle velocity, enables a comparatively stout job to be made of the weapon, and reduces spares to the minimum.

The Solothurn is manufactured in Austria and Switzerland certainly, possibly elsewhere. Our few models cost £16 apiece f. o. r. Hamburg.

The detail of weights, ammunition, etc., is as follows:

Weight less magazine	Weight of magazine	Capacity of magazine	Ammunition and weight
9 lbs. 6½ ozs.	7½ ozs.	30	9 mm. mauser, about 2¾ lbs. per 100 rounds.

The weapon is, of course, fitted for the bayonet, as all weapons of this sort are considered, for one thing, as close fighting infantry weapons in the country of their manufacture in Europe. The rate of fire is 700 rounds per minute. The Solothurn is made for several different kinds of ammunition, but 9 mm. gives the best results as regards flatness of trajectory and penetration.

A table of heights of trajectories may be of interest. Taken from the Makers' handbook, it is as follows:

TABLE OF HEIGHTS OF TRAJECTORIES

Range (metres)	Distance from the firer (metres).									
	50	100	150	200	250	300	350	400	450	500
50	0									
100	·07	0								
150	·18	·20	0							
200	·27	·40	·30	0						
250	·39	·64	·66	·48	0					
300	·52	·90	1·05	1·00	·64	0				
350	·66	1·18	1·47	1·56	1·34	·83	0			
400	·80	1·45	1·88	2·10	2·02	1·65	·95	0		
450	·96	1·77	2·37	2·74	2·82	2·61	2·07	1·27	0	
500	1·13	2·11	2·87	3·42	3·66	3·62	3·24	2·62	1·51	0

The main parts of the carbine are shown in the photographs. The weapon is actuated by gas-pressure *plus* a return spring (39) which is located in the butt. There is nothing very unusual about this type, so I do not propose to describe it in great detail. The cocking handle (32) has to be drawn back before firing. A catch on the side of the stock [photo 3 (a)] provides for single-shot or continuous fire. No round reaches

the chamber until the trigger is pressed, when the breech-piece (25) in travelling forward under pressure of the return spring (39), carries the first round from the magazine with it. When the trigger is released after a burst of fire, the breech-piece and cocking handle are held in the rear position. The chamber is again empty, extraction having taken place as the breech-piece came back. Exceptions to this are a missfire, which leaves the breech-piece and handle right forward, or some other stoppage which leaves these in an intermediate position.

In single-shot firing, the "single-shot lever" (52) prevents the breech-piece from going forward after the shot, until the trigger is released and again pressed.

The weapon is quite pleasant to fire and has no recoil. It can be fired from the hip at close range. The foresight is very broad, which is disconcerting at first, and does not give accuracy of aim in single-shot firing at the longer ranges. The back-sight is a normal V. The effective accurate range of the Solothurn appears to be about 400—450 yards. Personally, I prefer 300—350 yards. At this range I feel one could "sprinkle" an opponent very comfortably.

The stoppages we have experienced are few and simple. A firer sometimes gets a finger-tip in front of the ejection opening, preventing proper ejection. Until one gets used to it, the trigger pressure required is heavy, and if relaxed or uneven during a burst, may be sufficient to check the mechanism and cause a stoppage. Improper ejection, occasionally extraction, whether due to bad handling, bad ammunition or lack of oil on the moving parts, is the only cause of stoppage we have really met so far. The result does not vary much. Another round is carried forward by the breech-piece and jams on the partly ejected case. The remedy is simple; pull back the cocking handle and shake, or pull out the jammed round and case. The functioning of the Solothurn is described as "good" by the Royal Small Arms Factory.

The makers have evident faith in the strength of the various components of the carbine. They recommend and supply one striker, one ejector, one extractor and one return spring to be carried as spares. They provide one combination tool (a spanner-screwdriver), an oilcan and a punch which, with the spares

mentioned above, are carried in a small pocket on the leather magazine case. The Solothurn can be stripped down completely with the combination tool and punch, including the barrel which is screwed into the breech casing (2).

The magazine case holds six magazines. Its shape and size can be seen from Photo 4. The rounds in these six magazines do not represent anything like the total ammunition a single man can carry. The magazines are, however, reloaded very rapidly from ten round clips of Mauser ammunition. To reload, the magazine is inserted into its slide on the weapon from below, instead of horizontally as in firing. Three clips of ammunition are then pressed quickly into it. (Photo 3.)

The special advantages claimed for the Solothurn in the maker's handbook and its language read:

- "1. A few but robust parts, simple design.
2. Easy operation.
3. Arrangement both single shot firing and continuous fire.
4. Little sensibility to dirtying.
5. Easy and quick stripping without the aid of tools.
6. Light weight of weapon.
7. As there is a loading attachment fitted to the weapon, magazine filling apparatuses to be carried apart are not required.
8. Very light recoil, hence no tiring of the firer when delivering many consecutive bursts.
9. Great moral and physical effect.
10. Low price for weapon and ammunition.
11. Facility for fixing the bayonet.
12. Very short period of instruction for the troop, owing to simplicity of the weapon."

Most of these points are self-evident and do not require comment. Strangely enough they do not claim light weight of ammunition as a special advantage, though it is actually an important one in this type of arm. No. 4 one might want to know more about, but we have not indulged in any particular tests in this line.


The maker's pamphlet also gives a note on the ideas underlying machine pistols in general. It is too long to quote, but

here is one extract: "The opinion that the rifle-equipped infantryman has to come into action early and at long ranges has been given up, the fact being realised that, generally speaking, it is not possible to achieve a real success at long ranges by the utilisation of the infantry rifle, in other words, that spending the ammunition for this purpose more or less means wasting it, and that it is much better for the infantryman—apart from the machine-gun servants—to spare his forces for the end-fighting, avoiding thus also to reveal to the enemy his position and strength earlier than necessary." And so on.


In Europe the weapon apparently has its attractions. If, as I am told, some type of machine pistol does form part of the new equipment of German Divisions, it will be of interest to learn its uses. The Hun is no fool, and must have good reasons if he has introduced such a weapon into his organisation.

To the South Waziristan Scout such a weapon must also possess attractions. Long range automatics are prohibitive, by reason of their weight and the weight of their ammunition, in his normal work. Nor indeed should he require automatic fire at long range. Yet on occasions, at short range, it may be very valuable.

STEYR-SOLOTHURN MARK S1-100
(Machine Pistol)




(1)



(2)

- 1—Barrel.
- 2—Breech casing.
- 3—Barrel cooler.
- 6/8—Magazine retaining catch.
- 10—Ejector.
- 11—Foresight.
- 12—Protector foresight.
- 13—Body cover.
- 14—17 and 24—Body cover locking device.
- 18—Body cover retaining screw.
- 19/23—Backsight.
- 21—Safety catch old model, now on top of body cover.
- 25—Breech-piece.
- 26—Extractor.
- 27/31—Striker.
- 32—Cocking handle.
- 33/36 and 43—Return spring lever with breech and spring fittings.
- 39—Return spring.
- 40/42—Return spring retaining pin in butt.
- 48—Seer.
- 52—Single-shot lever.
- 56—Trigger.
- 66—68—Trigger-guard and screws.
- 69/73—Fire regulator.
- 74—Butt.
- 75/76 and 86/87—Sling swivels.
- 95a—Bayonet catch.
- 113—Magazine-loading attachment.
- 114/118—Magazine catch when loading.

STEYR-SOLOTHURN MARK S1-100
(Machine Pistol)



(3)


RELOADING MAGAZINES.

"A"—Catch for single-shot or continuous fire.



(4)

A South Waziristan Scout with the Solothurn, showing
leather magazine case.



O'REGAN PREPARES FOR WAR

By F. M. M.

[Being letters from 2nd Lieutenant Michael O'Regan, the newest-joined subaltern of 1st Bolton Irish (Territorials), to his brother Pat.]

MY DEAR PAT,

The attack exercise is over and whether I did well or badly depends which side you were on, because the Regulars just don't seem to understand art.

Before the exercise, "Tiger" White sent for me and said, "Mr. O'Regan, I have selected your platoon to carry out a special mission in the attack to-day, because I know you possess initiative and original ideas." He went on to tell me that he knew the position he had to attack and therefore the enemy would be found somewhere near there.

"I want you," says he, "to take your platoon round by a flank and annihilate the enemy's headquarters." "Old Smasher Hallet, their commanding officer, is a fine soldier, and if we could get rid of him, I believe their whole defence might crumble."

"Do your best, my boy," says he, "and, if you put up a good show, your other mistakes will be forgotten."

Well, we made a wide detour and sure enough I found a position from which I could see the whole enemy's dispositions. After a careful look, I spotted the Snipeshires "Headquarters" flag and that was all I wanted to know.

We wormed our way round to the enemy's rear and, when we got to the village of Foogle, I saw the Brigade Commander and his Staff riding off from the Hounds and Horses Inn, where they were living.

That gave me the big idea, Pat, and it certainly was original. They told me afterwards that it was ridiculous and could not have been accomplished in war. But, as far as I know, nobody has ever tried telephoning to the enemy, so how do they know it would be impossible?

I had noticed that the Snipeshires "Headquarters" was near the corner of a sunken lane and my plan was to kidnap Smasher and his Adjutant myself and then to draw the rest of the "Head-

quarters" down the lane, where the platoon, under Sergeant O'Rafferty, would kill the lot of them.

One difficulty presented itself. I remembered that blanks could not be fired at close range, as I had learnt to my cost in the first exercise, and I could not think of how to carry out the annihilation, until Private Murphy said, "Mr. Mike, Sir, don't you remember the way they turned the fire-engine on the Dublin strikers and I was wet through?"

That put the finishing touch to my plan and I promoted Murphy to Lance-Corporal for the day and put him in charge of the fire-engine.

First of all, I tested the men to find one with an English accent and finally selected Muldoon, who is a teacher in the local school and indeed he might be a product of Oxford he speaks so beautifully.

Then I sent O'Rafferty off, with the platoon, to take up his position, whilst Murphy, with his usual flow of "Blarney", weeded the fire-engine out of the local authorities and got it to the corner of the lane.

I took Muldoon with me to the "Hounds and Horses" and sure enough "fortune favours the brave," for there was the Brigade Staff car sitting outside, unattended.

I wrote down what Muldoon had to say and it read like this:

From 2 Bde

To 1 Snipeshires

Colonel Hallett and his Adjutant will report to Hounds and Horses Inn forthwith. The Staff car will collect them. Snipeshires, less two coys, will withdraw to position three miles west of Footle. Lines of withdrawal . . . (and I took good care to order Battalion Headquarters down the lane!)

I made Muldoon telephone the message to the Half Moon Inn, which was only a couple of hundred yards from the Snipeshires "Headquarters" and ask the proprietor to be kind enough to deliver the message to Smasher.

The proprietor fully thought it was the Brigadier speaking and conveyed the message "with pleasure."

Muldoon then drove the car round and in walked me two beauties.

They were met by Micky, the proprietor of the "Hounds and Horses" and conducted to the Brigadier's room, just like good children.

The minute I had them inside, I turned the key and that was the end of them, even though they nearly destroyed the door trying to break it down.

Then Muldoon and I ran like hares for the lane and arrived just in time to see the disaster.

Private Murphy is so impetuous and I've taken away his stripe again. He was lying well hidden beside the fire-engine, just at the back of the corner, when he heard the sound of galloping horses.

"Cavalry, be Heaven!" says he (and there was no cavalry in the scheme at all). "Now, boys, are you ready. . . . FIRE!"

The first squirt removed the Brigade Commander clean out of his saddle and the Brigade staff was routed.

Paddy dear, I could have cried. There was the Snipeshires "Headquarters" only thirty yards behind and they hardly got a drop.

But O'Rafferty came in and tried to save the situation.

We nearly had them done, when a stentorian voice yelled: "What the blazes is this? Stop this nonsense at once and you, young man, come here and explain what the . . . you think you are doing."

It was terrible to see the poor Brigadier wet to the skin and covered with mud and I couldn't help laughing, which made him madder than ever.

While I was explaining, old Tiger White launched his attack and forty umpires couldn't stop the Bolton Irish from mopping up two companies of the Snipeshires, even though they are Regulars.

So the Brigadier ordered the "Cease Fire" to be sounded and held a conference, after he'd changed and old Smasher had been let out.

I had to explain everything I'd done and it didn't seem to go down too well. The Brigadier ordered the exercise to be done again and I was told to remain in barracks, as I seemed to mess up all the schemes.

But, on the way home, Tiger said to me, "Don't worry, me lad, not even Napoleon could have given the Brigadier a bigger or wetter surprise."

But, for all that, Pat, I've just received a bill:

	£	s.	d.
Hire of fire engine	...	2	10 0
Damage to door of "Hounds and Horses"	...	1	10 0
		<hr/>	
Total	...	4	0 0

So, you'd better sell the big ass and send me the money.

Your loving brother,

MIKE.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

DEAR SIR,

Under the heading "Editorial" on page 115 of the April number of the Journal you make the following statement:

"In this country we have a large supply of men who are eager for military service, and much of the machinery for maintaining them. *The country lacks the money to add substantially to her present commitments or to give much further help in the prosecution of a war which is as vital to her as to the rest of the Empire.* There is now a prospect that our surplus resources will not be wasted for this lack of money."

The implications of this statement are that although India has the manpower, through lack of money it has almost reached the limit of the assistance it can give, and that any help beyond this limit must be paid for by someone else—presumably H.M.G.

Besides being immoral, I question whether this statement is, in actual fact, strictly accurate. Without laying any claim to being a financier, I ask in my own mind whether the fault does not lie, not so much in the lack of money, but in the fact that a large amount of the money is not in circulation, and that little effort has yet been made to obtain for use in furthering India's war effort even a reasonable proportion of the money which is circulating. My first explanation can only be a matter of conjecture, but the impression conveyed to the ordinary observant visitor (and resident) in India, is that in certain quarters considerable sums of money are quite uselessly locked up. One knows that political considerations must bulk largely (perhaps too largely) in all questions of official finance, but would it not be possible to attract some of these frozen assets by floating a war loan? My second explanation, I suggest, is a self-evident fact; with the exception of the Excess Profits Tax and the voluntary contributions given by patriotic persons of all ranks and classes, what concrete effort has been made to provide additional money for the war effort? India is indeed lucky to be able to take part in a war on a next to "no-cost basis." Compare this with conditions in Great Britain—income-tax at 7/6 in the pound with a prospect of going higher, a campaign in the country to find more money, and the savings of all voluntarily going into the new war loan. Hitler has

openly declared his intention to destroy the British Empire, and is at this moment straining every nerve to do so. The present, then, is no time at which to put forward a plea of "financial stringency" as an excuse for not taking more part in the contest—particularly when the plea is hardly valid.

India *has* willing men and, I am sure, *can* produce more money. Will not the financial authorities and they who have the money find it, so as to enable those to fight who want to do so, and thus permit India to be worthy of itself? If your statement is true that India has reached the limit of its war effort, presumably arrangements will be made to release some of the many highly trained officers now in India to let them take their place besides those other nations of the Empire who are willing and able to participate in the present struggle.

All this sounds very bitter, but there is a very general feeling abroad among all ranks of the Indian Army that India as a whole is not doing all that it could. To judge from the letters now appearing in the Press, this view is also held in other quarters. If the reason is lack of money, then let attempts be made to produce at least a portion of the money required as other nations in the Empire are doing. I am assured by some of my Indian friends that a war loan would be oversubscribed in a very short time—is it not worth while making the experiment?

Yours faithfully,
R. P. L. RANKING.
18-5-40.

REVIEWS

"BRITAIN'S AIR POWER"

By E. C. SHEPHERD

(Oxford University Press. 3d. net.)

OXFORD PAMPHLET

To-day air power may well decide the fate of the nations taking part in the present war, yet even now a clear picture of what air power is and means is confined to comparatively few.

Even among people intimately connected with the Air Forces there have existed marked differences of opinion. These differences have been and are being speedily resolved in the struggle now taking place.

Most timely, therefore, is the appearance of this pamphlet which sets out, in clear language for universal information, facts which but a few weeks ago were conjecture and the cause of bitter controversy.

Here is a brief history of the development and use of air power in general and of our own in particular.

No one, having read "Britain's Air Power," can fail to appreciate the tasks confronting the Junior Service, the supreme standards of resolution which are set our airmen and what they and our technical personnel have accomplished.

N.A.N.B.

"THE HERO OF DELHI"

By HESKETH PEARSON

(Collins. 12/6d.)

This Life of John Nicholson is a vigorously written biography of a man who was described by Lord Roberts, when a subaltern, as the "beau ideal of a soldier and a gentleman." Mr. Pearson says, "his imperial air, giant build, grave handsome face, curt speech and sonorous voice inspired annoyance or confidence at sight." The annoyance was felt only by his seniors in age, over whose heads he was promoted Brigadier-General at the age

of 34 during the siege of Delhi. They asserted his appointment was unauthorised by the terms of the Queen's Warrant and called him an up-start. But to his men he was always "The General" and his authority to lead them unquestioned. By the Sikhs, when deputy commissioner in Rawalpindi in 1849, he was deified, a *fakir* declaring that the great hero "Nikal Seyn" was the reincarnation of Brahma.

The book is also an extremely good, concise history of British Rule in India before and during the mutiny.

Mr. Pearson is outspoken and humorously cynical in all he has to say, particularly about the Viceroys and Commanders-in-Chief who so mishandled their powers, eventually bringing about such a fall in British prestige that their feebleness and incompetence encouraged rebellion and their greed and injustice provoked mutiny. He dismisses the blunders of Elphinstone during the Afgan war with the remark: "It was not the General's fault; he should have been in a bath-chair at some pleasant seaside resort." And he refers scornfully to the choice of Sir Charles Napier as Commander-in-Chief in India when aged nearly seventy "as the only alternative to the Duke of Wellington, aged eighty." Nicholson's force and fearlessness of character are made to seem all the more alive by contrast. "There was no need to tell Nicholson to act energetically. The difficulty was to make him stop once he had started."

"A STUDY OF UNIT ADMINISTRATION"

By MAJOR-GENERAL B. C. FREYBERG, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., LL.D.

(*Gale and Polden*, 6/6d.)

This very readable and clear study of unit administration could well carry the sub-title "Happy Housekeeping for the Soldier."

It is primarily written for units of the British Army serving at Home, but it can equally well be applied to British units in India, if allowances are made for differences in the messing system.

For officers who find themselves in the position of P.R.I. or Messing Officer and for Commanding Officers who are now in war-time deprived of many of their experienced officers, this book should prove very helpful.

To state that the soldier's well-being and contentment is dependent on sound administration within the unit may seem a platitude, but without foresight and without systematic study on the lines on which the author has approached his problem, a sound administrative system will not be achieved.

The author has based his work on records both as an infantry battalion commander and as an administrative staff officer and clearly shows that crime and discontent amongst the men of a unit decrease as the standard of "housekeeping" is raised.

J.W.

"MODERN ARMAMENTS"

BY PROFESSOR A. M. LOW

(*John Gifford, Ltd. 8s./6d.*)

In this volume Professor Low has set out to explain in language suited to the non-technical reader something of the scientific principles on which modern weapons and equipments are based, and to give a brief survey of the developments of these weapons and equipments and their probable use in future wars. It is well that the tax-payer, who, in the year before the war, was bearing his share of our £700-million defence bill, should learn something of what he is helping to buy. This book will assist him.

The book was written before the outbreak of war, but the reader with the evidence of nine months of the war before him will find that Professor Low has put in some effective shooting into the future with his "Modern Armaments." A chapter on parachutes, for example, is very apt. The range is wide. There are some chapter headings: Explosives—Artillery—Optics—Acoustics—Chemical Warfare—Camouflage—Wireless—Warships—the Air.

Professor Low defends modern science from the charge that it is responsible for war, but at the same time he holds out no hope that science, by the severity and destruction which it can bring to war, will tend to make wars impossible. Nor will any weapon be overlooked. It, therefore, behoves the scientific soldier to study the development of equipment with vision and boldness in order to formulate tactical methods derived not only from the lessons of the last war but, more important, from the possibilities

of the next. And in this respect the conservatism of the soldier does not escape the author's criticism. He considers that military leaders from the beginning of time have been prejudiced and that it takes a major war or heavy casualties to alter their ideas. It is well for us as a nation to consider the truth of this charge and to resolve for the future at this moment when the Germans have won the first round of tactical surprises and have made it abundantly clear that no method of destruction, however bestial, will be overlooked by them.

The volume, therefore, is well timed and will be read with interest by soldiers and civilians alike.

E.F.E.A.

SIMPLE MATHEMATICS FOR GUNNER OFFICERS

By J. C. S. HYMANS, M.A.

(*Gale and Polden Ltd.* 1s. 6d.)

The first half of this little 30-page book deals with those elements of trigonometry and logarithms which must be understood before simple gunnery problems can be solved. The second half applies the knowledge thus gained to the three or four everyday situations confronting the Gunner Officer at O.P. or Battery.

Written by an officer who actually saw the need of it amongst his fellow cadets at an Officers' Cadet Training Unit, this book should prove of value to the large number of Reserve Officers and Civilians now coming in to the Regiment whose school-day mathematics may have fallen into disuse. It should also prove helpful to the many young soldiers and N. C. O.s who, in these days of rapid promotion, are finding themselves called upon to fill responsible positions in all branches of the Artillery.

PRESIDENT'S REPORT FOR 1939

1. Finance

The Auditor's Report is before the members of the Council: the Statement of Accounts has been issued to all Members of the Institution. The Auditor's Report is satisfactory. Income from subscriptions, interest on investments and the sale of tactical schemes has declined. Expenditure has been generally reduced principally on the Journal which has, however, maintained a satisfactory standard. As a result, the year's working shows an excess of income over expenditure of Rs. 4,989-13-7 as against Rs. 5,278-6-7 the year before.

The financial position of the Institution remains sound. The balance on capital account stands at Rs. 1,22,801-14-4. No investments were made last year. Rs. 7,350 in Post Office Cash Certificates matured. Investments, Post Office Cash Certificates and Fixed Deposit total Rs. 72,297-1-6. Investments had, however, depreciated in value at the end of the year by a net amount of Rs. 3,879-0-0 below cost. Cash and other balances amount to Rs. 13,609-7-2.

2. Membership

The result of the war has apparently been that a number of Members have resigned prematurely while others have failed to pay their subscriptions while neglecting to resign. Prospective Members refrained from joining at first.

Eighty-four Ordinary Members were enrolled during the year against 80 Ordinary Members died or resigned. Thirty-nine Members were struck off for non-payment of subscriptions, leaving a net reduction of 35. This is a lower net reduction than the previous year, but only because special measures were taken to extend membership.

A further 32 members have had to be struck off for non-payment of subscription since the close of the year although it is possible that some of these may pay up in due course.

On 31st December, 1939, the position was:

Life Members	...	390
Honorary Member	...	1
Ordinary Members	...	1,430
Total	...	1,821

The small reduction since last year is satisfactory in the circumstances and there are signs that membership will continue at a satisfactory total.

3. Library

The library has now been fully card-indexed on a proper system and it is hoped to issue the new catalogue this year. Purchase of suitable books continues and the popularity of the library is maintained.

One hundred and twenty-three books were added during the year and 624 borrowed.

It is hoped that members will make suggestions for the purchase of volumes likely to be of interest or value.

4. Journal

As mentioned, the standard of the Journal has been maintained; but more contributions would be welcomed. Entries for the Prize Essay were disappointing in numbers and did not merit award of the medal.

5. Lectures

During the year the following lectures were delivered at Simla and were well attended. His Excellency the Governor of the Punjab honoured the Institution with his presence at the lecture on the "N. W. F. P. Policies."

1. "How a Journalist Gets His News," by Josslyn Hennessy, Esq.
2. "N. W. F. P. Policies," by Major W. E. Maxwell, C.I.E.
3. "Economic and Financial Aspects of Defence and Re-Armament," by Dr. T. E. Gregory, D.Sc.
4. "Modernisation of the Land Forces in India," by Brigadier E. E. Dorman-Smith, M.C.

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The Journal

OF THE

United Service Institution of India

Vol. LXX


OCTOBER, 1940

No. 301

The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official, and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

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REQUESTED TO KEEP THE SECRETARY INFORMED OF
CHANGES IN THEIR ADDRESSES.**

THE COVER OF THE JOURNAL

The opposite page is a facsimile of the cover which it is proposed to introduce for future numbers of the Journal. It has been suggested that the colour of the printing might be varied for each quarter's number, say—

January ... Red,
April ... Blue,
July ... Dark green,
October ... Black,

or that the colour should be, say, red for every number.

The opinion of members is invited, because there is no intention of making any change which is contrary to the wishes of the majority of members. Members are, therefore, invited to complete the attached form and return it to the Secretary. An unsealed envelop with a half-anna stamp is sufficient if no writing matter is added.

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
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Signature.....



EDITORIAL

The British Expeditionary Force has come well through its test in Flanders and France. On no occasion "The War" was its front ever broken and its tactics and equipment were proved to be suitable with few minor adjustments. Tactically the long winter of defence had slightly dulled the edge of its offensive spirit, and the German infiltrating tanks and infantry were not attacked with the vigour they deserved. This has been put right by the introduction of sub-units whose duty it is to hunt any enemy forces that penetrate the position. It was known that the infantry anti-tank weapons were not on a lavish scale, and these are being increased. Mortars have proved their value, and the armoured carrier has come through with flying colours. These carriers, as many people expected, were used as tanks when the necessity arose, and for many other tasks which were forbidden in training.

Our artillery suffered from lack of air support, and were outranged in the medium categories. Engineers' equipment is being simplified; the number of tools they carry will be reduced and the bridging equipment will be further standardized and reduced in variety. The Armoured Corps saw a lot of fighting; the armoured cars and the later models of cruiser tanks were both invaluable; the light tanks and the infantry tanks suffered from lack of armour and speed respectively.

That our hastily manufactured equipment has proved itself so well is very satisfactory though not unexpected; but what is most satisfactory is that the British soldier has proved himself man for man the equal of the German; and, since he proved it "man for three men" it is safe to assume that this is an underestimate.

The German surprised us by the quantity and quality of their tanks; and by the weight and efficiency of the air-support they gave their troops. Otherwise they did nothing to suggest uncanny value as soldiers, in fact they showed a marked dislike

of being attacked. This is probably a psychological result of Nazism, which is an aggressive creed, not designed to move in reverse.

* * * *

The full story of the collapse of France will not be known until the war is over, but it appears that her military leaders were unable to stand the strain of misfortune. They admitted defeat before their men did, yet they were men who had been proved in battle twenty-one years ago. Perhaps the following quotation is relevant:

"The Fall of France" "I am doubtful whether the fact that a man has gained the Victoria Cross for bravery as a young officer fits him to command an army twenty or thirty years later. I have noticed more than one serious misfortune which arose from such assumptions. Age, easy living, heaviness of body, many years of promotion and success in time of peace, dissipate the vital forces indispensable to intense action. During the long peace the State should always have ready a few naval and military officers of middle rank and under forty. These officers should be specially trained and tested. They should be moved from one command to another and given opportunities to take important decisions. They should be brought into the Council of Defence and cross-examined on their opinions. As they grow older, they should be replaced by other men of similar age."

This was written ten years ago by the man who is now Prime Minister of England.

* * * *

It is always of interest to speculate on the subject of "after the war." There is one facet of this subject which seems inevitable. The Germans are waging a more ruthless war than any that has yet been fought in modern history. Their ruthlessness is almost as much against their own people as against us. It is ruthless leadership as much as ruthless execution and, as such, it must be met by ruthless leadership on our part. The Germans have regimented their population without regard to individuals' wishes; they have suppressed without mercy all who might be dangerous to their cause; as an example, they have killed all dogs that are of no use to the country. We are slowly following in some of the same directions; and it is quite certain

that before we achieve victory we shall have followed further still. This means that by the end of the war we shall be governed by men who are not used to the benign and bureaucratic methods of peace; nor even to the constitutional rigours that won us the last war. They will be men who have become used to sacrificing parts for the good of the whole, and to dealing with, and rendering harmless, unhelpful and disloyal elements. Such men are unlikely to be tolerant with people who could have, but have not, helped us when we most needed help. There are quite a lot of these people within the Empire.

* * * *

The question whether the Army should or should not have its own air arm was apt to become acrimonious before the war. We now have a lot of evidence on which to judge the true values of the problem. The Germans gave extremely heavy and effective close support to their armies in Flanders, whilst we used the great majority of the Royal Air Force on other tasks. The result of the land battle proves conclusively that direct support by the heaviest air forces is an essential of success. The results of the air warfare which is still continuing are not known, but no one can doubt that they will be found to have proved that Germany has lost vitally by neglecting the practice of purely air warfare. At first sight both sides of the argument have been proved right: close support of land forces leads to victory and purely air warfare may be able to inflict defeat. If this is so, then the correct answer lies in building an air force which can attack either land forces, or air forces and the enemy's country. Ours was trained primarily for the latter, the Germans' for the former. The problem is one of dual purpose machines and general training, for neither we nor Germany can hope to have two separate forces for the two rôles. There are already machines which can be switched from one task to the other, and these will be developed. In the past our training has leant unduly towards bombing and fighting, possibly because the army's claim for their own squadrons gave close co-operation with the army the reputation of being too specialised and highly trained work for the ordinary pilot. Certain aspects of army co-operation such as artillery co-operation are highly specialised; but the German methods of close support require no very different training from that of the fighter or bomber crews.

If the army is to have sufficient support for it to be successful in a decisive battle on land, nothing less than the entire resources of the Air Force will provide it, and if only the air force will accept this principle, the idea of the army having its own support squadron will soon die a natural death. The support of land forces is one of the tasks which the Air Force may be required to carry out and they, in their turn, must regard it as a normal rôle for which all must be trained. They will have to train a few specialists in artillery co-operation and other refinements, as they do now, and whether they or the army control the unexciting lives of those who pilot troop-carrying and supply aircraft is not very important.

* * * *

It is not at present clear whether Japan is working in the East for herself alone or for others as well. "The Far East" The new Konoye Cabinet is undoubtedly under the influence of the militarists, but Prince Konoye himself is an experienced and responsible statesman who may be able to exert a steadying influence.

Japanese pressure on French Indo-China has had the result of bringing Japan into closer relationship with Thailand. It is generally recognised that Thailand wishes to recover the provinces west of the Mekong river which were ceded to France at the end of the nineteenth century as the price of her acquiescence in the Japanese invasion of Tonking.

The closing of the Burma road naturally provoked Chinese resentment against Great Britain but it has not altered Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek's determination to carry on the struggle. In point of fact Chinese forces have assumed the offensive in the north and in Shantung province. The Generalissimo has also announced his intention of actively assisting in the defence of Indo-China should the Japanese invade.

The United States Government announcement that they proposed to put an embargo on the export of oil and scrap-iron was taken by the Japanese as aimed directly at themselves. They may be right. The immediate result has been the despatch from Tokyo of a strong mission to the Netherland East Indies where ample resources of both commodities are available.

Finally, it is apparent that, Japan is seizing the opportunity to establish her policy of a new order in Asia while France is impotent and Great Britain occupied in Europe. It remains to be seen whether she can complete this policy and at the same time finish the war in China.

The Articles in this Number.

"FIFTY YEARS AGO"—These are short extracts from the U.S.I. Journal which was published exactly fifty years ago. It does not require any imagination, nor many changes of words, to apply these extracts to the present.

"THE VALUE OF MECHANISATION IN ASSISTING TO SOLVE THE DEFENCE PROBLEMS OF INDIA" is the essay which, although not awarded the Medal, was judged the best submitted for last year's Gold Medal Prize essay. Certain omissions have been made before publication in the interests of secrecy, but these do not affect the author's purport.

"MORALE OF THE INDIAN ARMY" is a strong and necessary plea for more interest being taken in the Morale of the Indian soldier. It gives a very just description of existing conditions and constructive suggestions for their improvement.

"MESSES AND CLUBS" is the financial article of this number. The belief that unit messes have outlived their day is widely held among junior officers and readers' views on this article will be welcomed.

"LEARNING PERSIAN" lacks the female interest we expect from "Karshish"; but nothing else.

"THE WAR IN EAST AFRICA—A ROLE FOR THE INDIAN ARMY" is a timely article by an officer with first-hand experience of the subject. His comments on Italian prestige in East Africa are illuminating and encouraging.

"THE FUTURE OF THE TRIBAL AREAS" gives a description of the North-West Frontier and its history which is of interest to those who are new to the subject. The author advocates a scheme which will result in the replacement of regular troops from Frontier duty. Any scheme to this end merits careful study.

"MORE THAN FIFTY YEARS AGO" requires no comment.

"POLITICAL COMMISSARS IN THE SOVIET ARMY" is a short article on a subject which has been in the news lately.

It explains the events which have led to their absorption into the army.

"PROPAGANDA PROBLEMS".—The author of this article is no fumbling amateur. He is not wholly content with what is now achieved in India; and perhaps few people are. India has not got the resources of experts that are available in England, so some degree of amateurism must be accepted, but it is thought that more thorough efforts might be made to ensure that the right type of propaganda does reach the soldier and the ex-soldier and peasant in his village.

"A STUDY IN RUSSIAN STRATEGY".—This article is not quite correctly named. From a military point of view the subject is "Administration" rather than "Strategy," but as the military aspect of the article is obscure it does not matter much.

"O'REGAN PREPARES FOR WAR".—This is the last of the series.

"FIFTY YEARS AGO"

(From the October, 1890, Number of the Journal of the U.S.I.)

"The Council have chosen as the subject for their Gold Medal Essay, 1891, the following:

Our recruiting grounds of the future for the Indian Army, in view to obtaining the best material available for soldiers; the "Pax Britannica" having reduced the warlike spirit of some races which have hitherto supplied our native armies by inducing their youth to lay aside the sword for the ploughshare."

* * * * *

Extracts from a paper read at the United Service Institution, Simla, on 10th September, 1890, by Captain C. M. Maguire on the Difficulties Attendant on Assuming the Initiative in Modern European Warfare:—

"Though continental warfare is of less immediate interest to us English, than to the other European nations, the armed peace prevailing on the continent is too burning a question not to affect a power of world-wide interests, like ours, at least indirectly. We have so long formed part of the European comity of nations, that sentiment alone will prevent us from regarding a great European war with indifference.

If the value of a discussion, a great part of which is involved in theory, be questioned, it may be argued in reply, that it was by forming tentative conclusions based on careful theoretical study that the Germans were able to prepare detailed plans of operations, and to impart a training to their troops, which enabled them after fifty years of peace to inflict during the space of five years crushing defeats on two of the greatest military empires in Europe.

.

It is, however, justifiable to anticipate that, in armies with a war establishment of some forty thousand officers, more military genius will be developed than heretofore, and that three or four great leaders will be able to exercise the same influence over a modern army as Napoleon did on the smaller armies of his day.

.

Therefore, if Germany is acting by herself, circumstances will compel her to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and perhaps (though this is less probable owing to geographical considerations) of Luxemburg also.

.

There can be no doubt but that the more highly civilised a nation is, the more acutely it feels the sacrifices entailed by war.

When war becomes imperatively necessary, there seems no reason to believe that patriotism will grudge the sacrifices required for the maintenance of national honour. Should it be so, little regret need be felt for the loss of a civilisation that renders a people too unmanly to defend its rights."

* * * *

The concluding paragraphs of an article entitled "The Resurrection of the Lance" by Captain G. J. Young-husband:—

Being a cautious nation, and ever fearful of spending a shilling, though our wealth is vast beyond the dreams of avarice, all things with us have to be done very gradually, so that the expense may be spread over a long period. Instead of manfully spending our shilling down on the nail, and all at once, as other nations do, we more frequently spread the expense over a series of years, and spend our shilling gradually at the rate of two pence per annum.

So with the lance, instead of going with the times and lumping for one weapon or another, we allow it to filter in, in a surreptitious and half-unauthorised manner. The Colonel of a regiment, on his own responsibility and expense, arms the front rank of his regiment with lances, possibly by the personal influence of the some one high in command. After several years, this regiment struggles manfully into the ranks of the lancer regiments. Why all this difficulty? I am sure I cannot think unless as I said before, the expense is what stands in the way. Curiosity has impelled me to calculate out the possible cost of turning a regiment into a lancer regiment. If I err not it would cost about £125 per regiment, and twenty regiments would therefore cost £2,500. Surely this is not much for the richest nation in the world to spend upon such an important matter. Every new experience shows us more clearly, how eminently suitable the lance is for our Indian warriors, and the over-whelming wave of European opinion cannot have failed to have driven the conviction further home amongst soldiers of learning and experience. We have at this moment fourteen regiments composed of men with an unmistakable penchant for the lance: why not therefore for once in a way spend our shilling all at once and arm them with it; raising our cavalry at once to a degree of excellence unsurpassed by that of any nation? Surely it behoves us to profit by the experience of past masters in the art of war; when men like Napoleon and Marmont exclaim, after years of gignatic warfare, that the only way to meet the lance is with the lance. Surely we might profit by the lesson taught them instead of insisting on proving again in our own persons the truth of their conclusions.

THE VALUE OF MECHANISATION IN ASSISTING TO SOLVE THE DEFENCE PROBLEMS OF INDIA*

BY MAJOR D. F. W. WARREN, 8TH PUNJAB REGIMENT

"Here, I thought, all difficulty was over.

And so it would have been had not those twin Virtues so fatal to the joie de vivre of our civilised West, the sense of responsibility and the illusion, dear to well-regulated minds, that every action must have a purpose—had not these virtues of Responsibility and Purpose met me at every step with the embarrassing enquiry: 'Why are you here?' and: 'What do you intend to do?'"—Freya Stark: "The Valleys of the Assassins," page 7.

1.—INTRODUCTORY

(a) *The Scope of this Article*

To most people, "mechanisation" means the introduction of machinery to replace more primitive equipment or methods, in any field of human endeavour. The army, however, has a facility, both brutal and licentious (vide Mr. A. P. Herbert's articles in "Punch"), for twisting the English language to its own ends; and generally uses the word to describe the more limited process of replacing older forms of conveyance, and particularly animal transport or the human foot, by mechanical transport. It is in this sense that the word "mechanisation" is used in this paper.

Other aspects of army mechanisation, such as the provision of power tools and workshop machinery, are in the main developments only made possible or necessary by the mechanisation of transport, and cannot be dealt with separately in a short essay of this nature. Nor, although the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force play a great and increasing part in the defence of India against external attack, are improvements in ships and aircraft relevant to the matter in hand; for ships were mechanised once and for all when sail gave way to steam, and modern aircraft were born fully mechanised.

Again the rearward portions of the army's lines of communication do not come under discussion; for railways are no new

* The Gold Medal was not awarded for any of the essays submitted for the 1940 Gold Medal Prize Essay. This essay was selected by the judges as the best submitted and recommended for publication with certain omissions. The omissions have been made.

development, and the value of the motor lorry for third and second-line transport tasks has been proved beyond all argument.

The direct concern of this article is with the mechanisation of unit first-line transport, as now being carried out in the Army in India; with the objects of this mechanisation; and with the results likely to accrue from it.

(b) Army Mechanisation: the Present Position in India

This process is still in various stages of provisional or experimental evolution. The greater part of the cavalry, British and Indian, is being fully mechanised; and, with the exception of the few remaining horsed cavalry regiments, the whole of its personnel, equipment and stores will be carried in mechanically propelled vehicles. The same is true of the horse artillery, the medium artillery, and a proportion of the field artillery and the engineers.

In many units of the infantry arm and in most of the remaining engineer units, it is the intention to eliminate all animal transport; and to provide mechanical vehicles for the carriage of all personnel, arms, ammunition and equipment which were previously animal-carried or drawn. In addition, mechanical conveyance is to be provided for certain reconnaissance, intercommunication, administrative and fighting personnel, who previously went on foot. It should be clearly understood that the majority of the personnel of these units will still walk, as in the past, but a small proportion will now normally be carried in mechanical transport at all times; and mechanisation on these lines will make it possible, when necessary, to embus whole units, by dumping stores, etc., and thus making mechanised first-line vehicles available for the carriage of troops. Embussing of infantry in this way must, however, be looked upon as the exception rather than the rule; for, broadly speaking, the first-line mechanical transport of infantry battalions is designed and primarily intended for the conveyance of those loads previously carried by animal transport. The secondary use of unit vehicles, to carry large numbers of personnel who are not normally so carried, involves considerable readjustment and dislocation of normal transport arrangements.

2.—INDIA'S DEFENCE PROBLEMS

The help that mechanisation can give in solving India's defence problems depends firstly upon the nature of the problems themselves, and secondly upon the nature of the proposed mechanisation.

The main tasks of the Army in India are defined as follows in Army Headquarters Training Memoranda Nos. 16 and 17:

"The main tasks of the Army in India are the defence of the frontiers and coasts from external attack, and the preservation of internal security." (Army Headquarters Training Memorandum No. 16, Paragraph 1.) "It must be recognised that, in its broader aspect, this defence may on occasions entail active operations beyond the confines of India, and that troops from India may be called upon to fight in an area that extends from Egypt to Malay. As a whole, this area is undeveloped and, except in parts of India and Burma, barren and sparsely populated. Its States are large, but poor, their armies small, and places of economic or political importance few and far between . . . Physical conditions . . . are unfavourable to the movement and maintenance of large forces and, although at important focal points something approaching intensive conditions may develop from time to time, generally speaking conditions are favourable to manœuvre and mobile warfare. Warfare in these areas is extensive in nature.

The salient characteristics of extensive warfare are:

- (a) a theatre of war providing great scope for rapid movement and manœuvre,
- (b) small and mobile forces not continually in close contact and operating at great distances from rail-heads and undeveloped lines of communication which,
- (c) not being covered by the main army, are more exposed to interference by the enemy's land forces than in intensive warfare,
- (d) the heavier weapons are less prominent than in intensive warfare."—*Army Headquarters Training Memorandum No. 17, Appendix I.*

There is the situation in a nutshell. The future campaigns of the Army in India will be extensive, not intensive; conditions will be mobile, rather than static; and it will be possible to take full advantage of the ability to manœuvre, and to move far and fast. The Army in India requires, therefore, the greatest possible degree of mobility.

What is true of warfare in other Eastern theatres is equally true of internal security duties in India itself. In a country where internal trouble is liable to break out at short notice anywhere between the Khyber and Cape Comorin, the only way of ensuring security at a cost within the country's financial resources

is to maintain reserves at a limited number of focal points. In order that these reserves may be able to reach any threatened point as rapidly as possible, they must be able to move fast and far; and in order that they may be able to exert the requisite pressure on arrival, they must have the ability to manoeuvre. In short, internal security units, like units of the field army, must be as mobile as possible.

For both its main tasks, then, the Army in India needs the highest possible degree of mobility; and to give this increased mobility is the real object of mechanisation.

3.—MILITARY MOBILITY AND MECHANISATION

(a) *The Anatomy of Mobility*

Whether mechanisation, as described above, will in fact fulfil this object depends largely upon the kind of mobility which it is desired to achieve: in fact, upon the *detailed* answers to the questions "*Why* is mechanisation here?": "*What* is it intended to *do*?" and: "*How* is it intended to do it?" The first two have been answered above. Mechanisation is intended to increase the mobility of the Army in India. But what exactly is meant by the mobility that is to be increased and to what extent, and in what way, will mechanisation increase it?

Military mobility is a composite quality, made up of three elements: the ability to move fast, to move far, and to manoeuvre in any type of country in which the army may be called upon to operate. These are the three elements which, in a horse, would be described as "speed, staying power and handiness;" and the speed of the fighter aircraft, the radius of action of the ocean liner and the "handiness" of the cat are extreme examples of the sacrifice of two of these elements, in order to achieve pre-eminence in the third.

The degree in which any arm of the land forces needs or possesses each of these three elements depends first upon its general characteristics, including the employment, size and weight of its armament and equipment, and secondly upon its method of transporting its personnel and fighting gear. For example, heavy guns on railway mountings can move both fast and far, within the limits of the lines upon which they run; but they have no powers of manoeuvre away from these lines. To go to the other extreme, marching infantry, with pack transport, has the ability to manoeuvre over almost any kind of ground, in any part of the world; but its pace and radius of action are limited to what a

man can cover on his feet in a given time. To develop its maximum efficiency, each arm needs the blend of the three elements of mobility best suited to its peculiar characteristics; and it is only by attaining this blend for each separate arm that the army as a whole can achieve its maximum mobility.

The ultimate military objective in war is the overthrow of the enemy's forces in the field; and the method by which this object is normally attained is the concentration and application of superior force at the decisive time and place.

The *concentration* of superior force is intended to forestall the enemy at the decisive point; and this can seldom be achieved without bringing large numbers of troops speedily, and from a distance. The *application* of superior force, once concentration has been effected, necessitates deployment and manoeuvre. Thus all three elements of mobility are essential to the overthrow of the enemy; and no army which does not possess these three elements in the correct proportions can be said to be effectively mobile, in the military sense, for it is the combination of all three that enables an army to reach the decisive place by the decisive time, and there to apply the pressure requisite for victory. Superior speed and range of movement, alone, may bring the troops there; but, unless they also have the ability to manoeuvre, they will be unable to press home an attack, or otherwise take advantage of their strategical position. On the other hand, without speed and range of movement in the approach march, the troops may never arrive, or may arrive too late to use their ability to manoeuvre.

(b) *The Element of Speed*

The plan for concentrating and applying superior force must, like all other plans, be based on a survey of the considerations affecting the attainment of this object; and one of the main factors will always be time. "Time is the most precious element in war" (F. S. R., Vol. II, Section 11, 5); and the more time a commander has at his disposal, the more thorough can be his preliminary study of the situation, and the more complete his preparations for the action that he eventually decides to take. Joshua, the son of Nun, earliest of the Great Captains, once ordered the sun to stand still upon Gibeon, and the moon in the Valley of Ajalon, and so gained the time he needed to organise and complete a victory. Commanders nowadays have lost the art of successful interference with the laws of nature, and must be content with less startling, though not necessarily less efficacious, methods of saving time. The movement, "from A to B," of

individual officers on reconnaissance and liaison duties, or of units moving to rendezvous as part of the commander's plan of operations, have always taken and will always take time. But where communications are good, or the country is suitable for mechanised movement, mechanisation makes it possible to move more rapidly, and so to reduce to a minimum the time spent in movement; and obviously the more rapid the movement, the greater will be the saving in time.

It has been said that sweat saves blood. It is equally true to say that speed saves time; and that time saved in war will almost invariably mean a saving in both sweat and blood.

(c) Range of Movement

So much for the time factor: Another consideration that must be taken into account in almost every military problem is the range, or "reach," of the opposing forces.

The last century saw great increases in the range of individual weapons. These increases were, however, measured at most in hundreds or thousands of yards; and it remained for the internal combustion engine to multiply the reach and striking range of whole armies three and fourfold. Before the days of motor transport, the range of an army was limited first by the distance that troops could cover on foot in a given time; and secondly by the distance ahead of the base (or later the railhead), up to which it was possible to deliver supplies by animal transport. It is true that mobile detachments, and even small forces of all arms, could move self-contained, or live on the country, for short periods; but such operations could normally only be in the nature of raids. The deliberate advance of any large force, which intended to capture and hold ground, was limited to maximum stages of 25 to 30 miles in the day, generally much less; and a lengthy pause was necessary on each stage, to advance railheads or to build up new bases for the next stage.

The introduction of mechanical transport for third and second-line tasks increased the striking range of armies, by making it possible to reduce the pause on each stage to the few hours' rest required for the marching troops; while, more recently, the carriage of the troops themselves in mechanised vehicles has made it possible to increase the length of the stages.

The increase in speed and range made possible by mechanical transport has been exploited to the full by the German armies in Poland, Norway and the Low Countries; and the operations of these armies prove conclusively that mechanisation has conferred greatly increased strategical mobility.

(d) Ability to Manœuvre

There is, however, no form of land transport yet invented that can move both fast and far in every type of country, and over every kind of ground. Both speed and radius of action are limited by considerations of ground and communications; and mechanical transport, other than aircraft, can only reach its maximum efficiency where roads are good, or the ground is suitable for mechanised movement across country. Such mechanised movement is, of necessity, generally strategical rather than tactical for the points of departure and arrival will be predetermined; and both these and the route connecting them must be such as to suit the characteristics of the transport used. The ruling factor in such a case is the presence of facilities for mechanised movement.

Once contact is made with the enemy, however, the ability to manœuvre over any kind of ground becomes more important than either speed or wide range of movement. Movement is now tactical, not strategical. The point of departure is, of course, known, but it will be chosen for purely tactical reasons, and not to suit any particular form of transport; and the route and point of arrival will be at best a good intention, and at worst a pious hope. The ruling factor here, to which everything else must be subordinated, is tactical necessity; and transport which cannot accompany the fighting troops over the country most suitable for the exploitation of their characteristics becomes a liability rather than an asset.

To take an analogy from boxing: To win a fight, the boxer must first reach the ring by the time appointed. This might be called a "strategical move;" and provided that the boxer arrives in time, and in condition to fight, the distance from which he comes, the speed with which he travels, and the route and conveyance that he employs, are governed by no laws save those of his own convenience. Once he enters the ring, however, and the fight begins, his movements become "tactical," and are governed almost entirely by the immediate necessity of hitting his opponent or of defending himself. To do either, he depends as much upon his footwork (his "ability to manœuvre") as upon his punch.

Like the boxer, a military force can employ, during the approach march, the form of transport and the route which will bring it to its place of deployment with the greatest degree of speed, safety and comfort, thereby ensuring that it is in time,

and that it is fit to fight on arrival. Once deployment commences and battle is joined, all other considerations must give way to that of hitting the enemy as hard and as effectively as possible. Ground must be chosen for its tactical value, not for its suitability for any particular form of transport; and unless the transport for fighting equipment can accompany its parent unit over the ground chosen, it must be left behind, and the equipment manhandled.

This brings us to the third great factor, ground (time and space being the other two), which affects the solution of almost every military problem. The Army in India's potential theatres of war are described in Army Headquarters Training Memorandum No. 17, quoted above, as "an area that extends from Egypt to Malaya." In the light of developments since that Memorandum was issued, it appears possible that this area may have to be enlarged.

Generalities about such an expanse of territory are apt to be misleading, but the area described can, for purposes of this article, be roughly divided into the following three main types of country:

I.—"M. T. COUNTRY," where cross-country movement by mechanical vehicles is almost everywhere possible, at all seasons of the year. Such country is to be found in the plains of India, in the south-western portion of Afghanistan, in parts of Iraq, and in the Libyan Desert.

In this type of country, it is possible for an army to operate on a purely mechanised basis; though even here riding animals would be invaluable for reconnaissance; and, when in contact with the enemy, pack transport would provide a less conspicuous, and therefore less vulnerable, means of carriage, and one whose pace would approximate more to that of marching troops.

II.—"THROUGH-ROAD COUNTRY," where regular movement by mechanical transport is possible on certain through routes, but difficult or impossible off the roads. This type of country may be exemplified by Waziristan, where roads are now available to carry men and supplies by M. T. to within marching distance of any likely objective; but where the protection of these roads, and any subsequent advance across country, necessitate movement on foot, with equipment and supplies carried on pack, or manhandled.

Here mechanical transport is needed for third and second line tasks, and for rapid long-distance strategical movement by

road; but pack transport alone can accompany troops operating away from the roads.

III.—“PACK COUNTRY,” where roads are non-existent, and cross-country movement is only possible on foot. This includes the greater part of Malaya, Burma and Assam, and the hill country on India's North-East Frontier generally.

Any operation larger than a small “burn-and-scuttle” punitive expedition will necessitate the improvement of communications in this type of country, which will then gradually approximate to “through-road country.” Until the through roads are ready, however, the only possible transport will be pack or porter, used in conjunction with a rail or river L. of C.

The area from Malaya to the Balkans includes a large proportion of each of these three types of country. In all, mechanical transport will be needed for third and second line tasks, either from the start of operations, or very soon after. In “M. T. country” and “through-road country,” the mechanisation of unit first-line transport will increase the speed and range of strategical movement of all arms, and therefore of the army as a whole; and will not reduce in any way the power of manoeuvre of the heavier, “vehicle-bound” arms. In all, however, except those areas where mechanical vehicles can move freely, everywhere and at all times, the absence of riding animals and pack transport will greatly reduce the infantry arm's power of manoeuvre, and therefore its fighting efficiency; and, even in the most perfect M. T. country, a proportion of animals will be desirable for reconnaissance and the carriage of infantry fighting gear, when contact with the enemy is established, or likely.

When it is considered that the infantry is still the only arm capable of occupying and holding ground for any length of time, of fighting its own way forward in ground unsuitable for the other arms, and of consolidating gains and confirming victory, this reduction in the infantry's power of manoeuvre is a serious matter for the army as a whole, and does much to offset any gain in strategical mobility.

(e) Summary of Deductions from the Analysis of Military Mobility.

It follows that mechanisation as at present projected, with its corollary of the elimination of animal transport, will increase the speed and range of strategical movement of the Army in India as a whole; and that it will not greatly affect either way

the power of tactical manœuvre of those arms which are inseparable from their wheels or tracks. It will, however, undoubtedly rob infantry battalions and other marching troops of "the little something that the others haven't got:" the ability to manœuvre in any sort of country; to operate over ground, suited to their particular characteristics, where mechanised movement is impossible; and where the ground favours this form of operation, to fight their way forward unassisted by the other arm. It is obvious that the opportunities for this kind of action will be greater in extensive warfare than they ever will be in an intensive campaign.

It also follows that neither mechanised first-line transport alone nor animal transport alone will give forces of all arms the most suitable blend of speed, range of action and ability to manœuvre, in any but a small portion of the Army in India's potential theatres of war. The Army in India can, therefore, neither afford to retain its first-line transport on a purely animal basis, for by so doing it will sacrifice speed and range; nor can it afford to make a clean sweep of its first-line animal transport, replacing it entirely by mechanical transport, for thereby troops that march and fight on their feet will lose their ability to manœuvre. In the case of the heavier arms, mechanisation can only be beneficial; but infantry and those portions of other arms which normally work in close conjunction with infantry need a practical combination of mechanical and animal transport: mechanical transport to "get them to the ring," and pack transport to ensure that their "footwork" is adequate when they engage the enemy. And since it will be necessary, on occasions, to embus infantry, it will also be necessary to have the means of delivering their animals at the debussing point in time to take over their loads from the lorries, and accompanying the marching troops on their further advance.

4. COMPOSITE FIRST-LINE TRANSPORT FOR INFANTRY

(a) *The Weakness of the Present Mechanisation Scheme*

The ultimate purpose of unit first-line transport, as of all other administrative components of the army, is to assist the fighting man in his mission of delivering shells, bullets, bayonets, etc., where they will do the enemy most harm; for, reduced to its simplest terms, it is only by lethal weapons that superior force can be applied. This is the ultimate object of that increased mobility, which is itself the immediate object of

mechanisation. But mechanisation that entails the manhandling of heavy weapons and other fighting equipment for long distances across country will help little towards achieving this object. In such a case, much of the time saved on the road will be wasted in slow and painful cross-country movement; and men will reach their initial battle positions late, and too tired to handle their weapons effectively. If this is to be the result of mechanisation, then mechanisation will defeat its own object.

In the delivery of destruction to the enemy, each link, from the factory to the man behind the gun, has its own part to play and each is essential to the effective waging of war. A weak link, or an unsuitable transportation agency, at any point in the chain, will impair the efficiency of the whole; and will cause shortage of vital stores with the fighting troops, and the vicious circle of congestion in the back areas. Unless unit first-line transport is so designed that the fighting troops can carry their essential fighting equipment with them in any type of country in which they themselves can operate, the whole complicated machine may be brought to a standstill, and destruction remain undelivered, for want of an efficient link between the second-line transport and the fighting man. In the present provisional infantry organisation, this link is missing.

*(b) The Cure: Composite First-line Transport for
Infantry and other Marching Troops.*

The solution appears to be a composite first-line transport organisation, designed to give individual units, and so the army as a whole, balanced mobility, tactical as well as strategical, in any theatre of war where the Army in India may be called upon to operate. The materials out of which this composite organisation must be evolved are obviously mechanical vehicles and pack animals; for animal-drawn wheels have no advantage over mechanical transport in ability to manœuvre, and are vastly inferior to it in speed and range of movement; while only pack transport can go almost anywhere a man can go on his feet. This composite transport will, therefore, only be needed for units whose essential fighting equipment is light enough to be carried on pack: that is to say, infantry battalions, and those portions of other arms which normally work in close conjunction with infantry. Units whose fighting equipment is too heavy to carry on pack need wheeled or tracked vehicles at all times and in all circumstances. They have, therefore, no use for pack transport; and, within the limitations imposed by their heavier

armament, mechanical transport will give them maximum mobility at all times.

In the case of those units which need, and can use, pack transport for tactical movement, the mule will normally be required to take over its load from the lorry at the point where troops leave the road, or are called upon to traverse ground unsuitable for mechanised movement. The mules themselves must arrive at this point as soon as the troops; so if the troops are to be embussed, the mules must also be carried in mechanical transport.

At two mules to a 30-cwt. lorry (and most of our infantry first-line transport lorries will only carry *one* mule), this may appear at first sight to necessitate a large increase in mechanised vehicles, stores and technical personnel, with no corresponding reduction elsewhere. But need this be so? It is suggested that here, as in other matters, we may learn from the military experience of others, and from current civil practice. The French Army tows a proportion of animals behind its lorries, in trailer horse-boxes; most large racing stables use trailer horse-boxes to transport race-horses to fulfil their engagements; and fox-hunting, described by Mr. Jorrocks as "the h'image of war," has now this further similarity, undreamed of in Jorrocks's time, that the fox-hunter, like the infantryman, may come to his "road-head" in a car, and, again like the infantryman, would then be completely at a loss without his "animal transport" for "cross-country movement." Many fox-hunters have solved this problem, which is identical with that of the infantry arm, by adopting the same kind of "composite transport" used by the French Army. They use their "M.T." for its normal load, themselves, and bring their "animal transport" to "road-head" in trailer horse-boxes, towed behind their cars.

In spite of these known examples of an efficient and economical composite transport organisation, provisional establishments ordain that the infantry of the Army in India is to be entirely deprived of its vital pack transport; and, at the same time, the importance of this pack transport is tacitly admitted by the encouragement of experiments in transporting pack animals in lorries which are not only quite unsuited for the purpose, but are actually required for other loads. For want of a better organisation, the British infantry in Palestine has been compelled to resort to this same uneconomical method. It works—after a fashion, and for small detachments—but only by dumping

essential loads, and by employing an immoderate proportion of the available M.T., thus immobilising the bulk of the available troops. With the elimination of animal transport, the infantry will be reduced to the expedient of manhandling all its fighting gear, with the consequent restriction of cross-country manoeuvre and waste of trained fighting manpower. In this connection, one of the earliest handbooks on the Lewis gun laid down that "the gun should be carried by a mule or an intelligent N.C.O." Of the two, the mule is the more suitable animal for the purpose—and the mule is not called upon to think and fight, in addition to carrying a load.

The inclusion in unit first-line transport of an adequate number of trailer horse-boxes, which are comparatively cheap to produce, and both cheap and easy to maintain, would enable infantry units to carry with them a proportion of animals; and would also make it possible to reduce appreciably the number of expensive lorries now needed for first-line transport tasks. Mules, like infantrymen, will normally move on their own feet; and when they do so, the trailers would be available for a proportion of the loads now carried in lorries. Admittedly, this would necessitate dumping a proportion of the unit's stores when animals are to be carried; but the necessity of dumping is now accepted when it is desired to embus men, so why not when animals are to be carried?

If these trailers were designed for traction by either a lorry or a team of mules, they could be used, when not otherwise employed, as G. S. waggons, thus making the animals earn their keep, even in peace, and saving petrol and mechanical wear and tear on short carries, both in peace and war. Even in London, the animal-drawn milk-cart and brewers' dray can still compete successfully with motor transport in what might be called "station duties."

5. CONCLUSION.

The military object of mechanisation is to increase the mobility of the army.

Real military mobility is a balanced blend of the elements of speed, range of action and ability to manoeuvre; and an army, as a whole, can only achieve its maximum mobility when each arm and unit of which it is composed possesses each of these three elements in the proportions best suited to its own peculiar characteristics.

An increase in mobility implies an increase in one or more of the elements that go to make up mobility. Where such an increase, in any of the three elements, can be attained without any corresponding sacrifice in the other elements, the result will naturally be an absolute increase in the mobility of the arm or unit, and consequently of the army as a whole. In the case of the heavier, "vehicle-bound" arms, the present scheme of mechanisation gives this absolute increase in mobility; for it gives these arms increased speed and range—and that without any sacrifice of their somewhat limited ability to manoeuvre.

Where, however, an increase in one of the elements is made at the expense of another element, the resulting gain or loss in mobility to the arm or unit concerned, and therefore to the army as a whole, can only be assessed by weighing the gain in one element against the loss in another. Those units whose fight-equipment, suitably carried, should be little hindrance to them in manoeuvring over any sort of ground, and which in consequence should possess the highest degree of ability to manoeuvre over any kind of country, will have their long-distance strategical mobility increased at the expense of their tactical mobility, and therefore of their striking power and range *on the battlefield*. In short, they will lose their handiness, and their footwork will not be what it used to be. Such units will not only fail to achieve the blend of mobility best suited to their characteristics, but they will actually lose in that element of mobility required for the successful exploitation of those characteristics; for they will now be denied the use of ground where the characteristics of the infantry arm once did, and still might, make it most valuable—ground generally quite unfit for mechanised movement. And the infantry's loss of balanced mobility will be a grave loss to the army as a whole, for infantry is still the arm that sets the seal on victory.

On balance, it would appear, therefore, that while mechanisation as at present projected will increase the mobility of a large part of the army, and particularly of the supporting arms, it will do so at a price which will more than offset any advantage gained; for, with its pack transport, the infantry will also lose its most valuable asset: the power of tactical manoeuvre, and the ability to make full use of "infantry country," either offensively or defensively, unassisted by the other arms. No army can gain in effective mobility by immobilising its infantry on the battlefield.

Even in the case of the infantry, however, it is not the principle of mechanisation that is at fault; for greater speed and range of action are as essential to the infantry as they are to the other arms of which the army is composed. The fault lies in the method of application, which is based on the fallacy that the motor lorry and the pack mule are incompatible, and cannot be combined in a single transport organisation. In fact, each should be complementary to the other, for the infantry role provides each with an essential task which the other is incapable of performing.

The damage done is not yet irreparable; nor does its correction involve any great outlay, or any sacrifice of the undoubted increase in speed and range of movement conferred by mechanisation. The adoption for infantry battalions, and for units working in close conjunction with them, of a composite first-line transport organisation, on the lines suggested in this article, would in no way diminish the strategical mobility of these units, and would restore to them their lost tactical mobility; and not only is this establishment a better article for its purpose than the one it would replace, but it is probably also a more economical article, both in first cost and in upkeep.

MORALE OF THE INDIAN ARMY

BY LIEUTENANT J. L. A. BELL

INTRODUCTION

A dictionary defines morale as "the moral condition of troops as regards discipline and confidence." This definition, though very concise, is quite clear and it shows plainly that the fruits of a good morale are confidence and discipline. It is surely more logical to say that discipline depends on morale than to say, as does Part 1 of M. T. Pamphlet 23, that "morale is primarily dependent on discipline."

There is no need to stress the overwhelming importance of a high morale in time of war. But it may well be stressed that the frightfulness and strain of modern war demand a higher standard of discipline and more confidence and faith than ever before. This is the more important in the Indian Army where the knowledge and experience of modern methods are necessarily limited. Yet in few armies can there be so little an effort made to build up morale.

Also it is an undoubted fact that nations cannot easily be flung into war in these days, except in self-defence. In other cases long preparations are necessary to persuade the people of the inevitability of war and of the justice of the cause.

The fact that this has nearly always been found comparatively easy to do does not make it less of a necessity.

THE TEACHING OF MORALE

The basis of morale can only be the existing beliefs and spiritual roots of the people. For instance, it would be useless in Switzerland to base morale on pride of Empire or in Germany to base it on love of democracy. Either one must build up on existing foundations or else build new ones. This building anew needs time and much care. It took nearly 15 years to spread the Nazi philosophy over Germany. Yet in a small and compact nation this may not be very difficult, for in the 20th century an energetic and well-conducted propaganda is capable of almost anything.

The British Empire is neither small nor compact. It comprises many races all over the world each with ideas and outlooks of its own. It is inevitable that world events are seen from

many angles inside the Empire, and it is also inevitable that their interpretation is affected by such factors as geographical position, self-interest and race.

Thus to evolve a common and vital war morale throughout the Empire may be extremely difficult.

Here the morale of the Indian Army only will be discussed.

MORALE IN THE INDIAN ARMY TO-DAY

As a corollary to the fact that morale must necessarily be built up on existing spiritual foundations, it is necessary, before setting out to instil a high morale, to search out the foundations on which to build.

The Indian soldier is a simple person. He is not much swayed by the fierce ideals which rush across the world of to-day; in most cases he never hears of them. His religion, his family, his plot of land, his race, in the narrowest sense of the term, his regiment, these are the limits of his horizon. And so long as he fights for these things only, and realises that he fights for them, his morale is unlikely to be called into question.

In parenthesis, it is worth while mentioning that the Indian is not, by nature, a mercenary. He joins the army less for economic reasons than for family reasons, or because he loves honour; and he seldom joins because of an inborn love of fighting or adventure. These feelings may exist to a certain degree but deeper still lies a love of family and home.

The bases of the sepoy's morale, mentioned above, are good enough for peace or for small Frontier Campaigns but will they sustain him in a long and terrible world war? The love of adventure, even if it was a deep sentiment, soon fades away in modern war. We seem to expect miracles from his great loyalty, but a sense of loyalty itself is thin armour against the sacrifices he will be expected to make. He must have an unshakable belief that that cause will prevail and that it is worth dying for.

THE PRESENT WAR

This war, we have been told many times, is being fought to maintain freedom and democracy and individual self-respect and the sum of culture which the world has up to now achieved or, as Lincoln puts it, for our conception of liberty and the proposition that all men were created equal.

Does the sepoy know this? Does he even understand these high phrases? How many regimental officers are able to give a passable definition of either democracy or freedom to their men in Urdu?

The sepoy is often told that in this war the security of India is threatened; that in the event of a German victory she will be dominated by new and ruthless rulers. But it is very hard for him to imagine all this. Firstly, he does not know what democracy really means; he himself has had very little experience of it. Secondly, he does not see India as a whole and has no Indian patriotism. His allegiance is to the Punjabis, or Madrassis, or Pathans, and sometimes it is even narrower than this. Thirdly, the break-up of the British Empire does not occur to him. And if it did, his knowledge of it is so vague that it would stir him to no great resolve. The great British Ráj is, to him, a material force and nothing else.

There is no intention here to make out that the expressed war aims are wrong. The idea is to show that the average Indian soldier is not yet "in" on this war. It is easier for us with our background of European and world history to understand it all. But he looks at European upheavals from his background of family quarrels and fights over land. The tension over the Italian invasion of Abyssinia was comparatively simple. It was looked upon as an attempt to jeopardise the prosperity of Egypt by controlling the headwaters of the Blue Nile. That was the sepoy's interpretation of the trouble and with such trouble he was quite at home and could sympathise with the victims.

In this war it is much less easy. From his slender sources of information he learnt of German rearmament and of the growth of an aggressive spirit, of the absorption of Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, and to him these were merely events. He then learnt of our guarantee to Poland and to other States and eventually of our entry into the war because of a German attack on the former. Before they were mentioned in newspapers or talks he had never heard of these places; still less did he know where they were, or how and why they affected us. Least of all did he and does he understand the real underlying causes of this war. He is fighting because he has been told to, for a cause he does not understand. As such he is little better than a mercenary.

He has no feeling of insecurity to urge him on, no ideals to inspire him, no patriotism. It will not be surprising should he show less enthusiasm and staying power than is expected of him.

Faith is needed in a long war; faith and a conviction that the cause is just and an inner strength to withstand the many inevitable calamities.

Instead, the sepoy gropes about, unaided, in a strange and incomprehensible world, in the midst of slogans and mottoes and 'isms about which he knows nothing.

Inevitably the conclusion is reached that the Indian soldier of to-day is totally unprepared spiritually to fight a war which may well turn out to be more fierce, more prolonged, more exhausting and more terrifying than anything of which he has even dreamed.

REMEDIES

To change such a situation, radical alterations are necessary. To begin with, the Indian soldier must be brought out of the isolation in which he lives. His ideas and thoughts now are little different from those he held after the Mutiny. In a changing world he has stood quite still.

It is essential for him to be brought face to face with the modern world and what is happening in it. And it is exceedingly important that we should do this for him of our own free will, through recognised educational channels, in which are included, of course, the military schools.

There is a spirit over India to-day which has been gathering force for many years. As a result there are demands for equality of opportunity and even independence. At present it appears to be the policy to divert these irksome currents from the martial classes, but we have as yet invented no kind of segregation that can prevent the passage of ideas. The demands are, fundamentally, so natural that, without a true knowledge of the facts, subversive propaganda is bound to have an increasing ill-effect on the Indian soldier. It is quite useless to say that he is loyal and leave it at that. It would be unfair to him and disastrous to us if we thus blindly traded on his loyalty. Nor is it any use trying to persuade him, as is so often attempted, that the various political parties of India are evil things which must be distrusted and avoided at all costs. If we expected success that way we should be very presumptuous. There is nothing in the desire for Independence or for Indianisation, that is fundamentally wrong. But from the way these subjects are brought before the Indian Army, it would seem that there is something very shameful in our policy for meeting these desires. With a great war on us, it is extremely probable that Indianisation will increase and that there will be changes in the political situation. Yet the Indian soldier is very hazy about these great currents which are passing through India. It is essential that he should know of

them and equally essential that he should not learn of them from sources which may poison his mind. He should be told exactly what is happening, with reasons. We must have confidence in him so that he can have confidence in us. Secondly, there is the question of Indian unity. At present the Indian soldier is extremely narrow-minded. The village or the district are the limits of his vision. His loyalty does not coincide with political boundaries and he has hardly any provincial loyalty, much less has he any loyalty to, or understanding of, India as a whole. It is surely unnecessary to stress how much the spread of a feeling of unity and oneness is important for the armed forces of India. Feelings such as these are important for any nation but much more so in India where the contribution of the various provinces to the armed forces is so unequal.

It is not suggested, by any means, that pride of class and sub-class should be ignored. On the contrary, great use can be made of such local loyalties. The attempt to dilute classes puts the cart before the horse and begs the wider and more important question. It inevitably causes disappointment and dissatisfaction. But it is suggested that side by side with these narrow prides there should be fostered that wider feeling of Indian unity without which a national army, as opposed to a mercenary army, is not possible.

The great traditions of the English County regiments have shown that the two are not incompatible. In fact these traditions provide a most useful outlet for the strivings of local nationalism.

The third remedy suggested is that the Indian soldier be given a more inspired view of the Empire with which he is fighting. His knowledge of it at present is limited to a few of the larger countries, strategic ports and air or shipping routes. He can usually point out New Zealand on the map, but turn the map upside down and he still points to the bottom right-hand corner.

He needs to know something about the ideals and aims of our Empire. He needs to know what we stand for and what we are fighting for. He should have some idea of what, with Indian help, the future can have in store. It is not enough for him to know that we are the strongest, richest and most widespread Empire the world has seen. After a few defeats he might begin to question our strength and perhaps his confidence will begin to fail him. Napoleon, surprising as it may seem, said that

there were two great forces in the world: the spirit and the sword. And, he added, in the end the spirit always won. The sepoy is as well able to dream dreams and see visions as any of us. But unless he has faith in his cause, and in our causes, the visions will pass and the last state of disillusionment will be worse than the first state of disinterest.

This article deals with aims rather than with methods. It is well realised that the remedies suggested are not strictly military but, when dealing with the morale of what should be a national Army, non-military elements are bound to play their parts. Also the martial races of India have, inevitably, become somewhat insulated from the rest of the population.

We have the choice, either of letting them be and finding their own level, or of teaching them ourselves with the means at our disposal. The former method, when thought in India is so little crystallised and when so many cross-currents sweep over India, is unsatisfactory.

We, as the leaders of the Army, should first of all do as much as possible ourselves.

In the *Fauji Akhbar* there is a method already to hand. It has immense possibilities. Before the war it was often a rather unimaginative publication in which the same features appeared year after year. It is still, sometimes, too objective. It should have a tremendous and decisive effect on the education and morale of the Indian soldier. It should be a live publication with a live message to galvanise its readers. Lastly, every effort should be made to make its circulation as wide as possible so that it reaches not only serving soldiers, pensioners and reservists, but also those who may be called upon to serve in times of special need. Money spent in developing such a paper, which would give a lead to the Indian Army, would repay a hundredfold.

That the officers, as leaders of the Indian Army, should help, has been already mentioned. In order to do this they themselves need a lead, and need help and guidance from the authorities. The whole subject of morale is a difficult one, and one that needs much study. Mistakes, through ignorance, are easy and can do much harm. Adequate help from the highest authorities can do much to avert these.

CONCLUSION

The reason for this article was the conviction that the morale of the Indian Army was not such as it ought to be at the beginning of a long war. Active steps must be taken to improve

it, for it is no good expecting that morale improves of itself. It is just as susceptible to a lack of care as any other military virtue.

The state of the Indian Army as it stands to-day has been described. Already there are signs that a large expansion lies ahead. As a result, sources will be tapped that are less imbued with loyalty and high traditions than existing sources. It is likely also that the new sources will be more infected with undesirable and mischievous propaganda. All the more necessary will it become to go deeply into the state of the morale of the Indian Army so as to make it unshakable.

The martial classes of India can no longer be segregated from the rest of India and kept as a people apart. Not only is it undesirable but it will eventually prove impossible. They constitute the national army of India, and must learn to love their India. They must share in, and have a pride in, the common Empire. To do less would be unfair to them and dangerous to us. If we do not believe in them they will not believe in us. We must take them out of their narrow and outworn world and show them the new one. And from that new world they must be able to draw the faith and the resolution to fight, for only the spirit will overcome the sword.

Lastly, we must give them of our absolute best; so shall we in turn continue to get the best from them, who have served us so brilliantly in the past.

MESSES AND CLUBS

BY BALU

How often has one heard the senior officer say "Mess life nowadays is not what it was when I was young" and that same senior officer is inclined to blame this state of affairs on the present occupant of the Mess, namely, the young officer of to-day, and to label him as an undisciplined, bumptious young pup, who has no respect for his betters, no sense of decent behaviour and a general blot on the military and social landscape.

Our senior officer does not perhaps realise that it is his insistence on the spirit of "Mess life when I was young" that has helped to make the average Officers Mess the unpopular institution that it is to-day. For there can be no doubt that it is unpopular with the young officer who is compelled to live there and also with the more senior officer who has to use it when hot weather moves or other domestic upheavals reduce him to grass-widowerhood while for the rest of the year he pays out considerable sums for the upkeep of a building he seldom uses and for a staff he seldom sees.

It is certain that quite a number of those young officers, who rush into early matrimony, would, if asked, give as one of their reasons that "they are fed up with Mess life and want to have a home that they can call their own." And why are they fed up with Mess life? That old friend of ours, the senior officer, likes to say that the Mess is the home of the subaltern and a very comfortable home he made of it when he was a boy. *Autre temps, autres mœurs.* Formerly the Mess was popular because the young officer of the day was not accustomed to great personal comforts and as long as the Mess provided him with reasonable food and a man to answer his call of "Koi hai," he considered it the height of luxury and elegance. The young officers' quarters at that time consisted probably of a bare barrack of a room with the minimum necessities of furniture, when it was considered rather soft and effeminate to confess to anything in the way of frills like carpets or easy chairs. Living as he did, the luxury of Mess armchairs, cold drinks and other comforts was all he required. In those days, too, the young officer was brought up on and content with the rather rigid discipline, the uniform, the clicking of heels and the excessive deference due to the seniority of rank.

Nowadays, while discipline on parade and on duty is probably as good as it ever was, a more democratic atmosphere has arisen when off parade and in some regiments it has been for many years the practice to drop rank and titles in the Mess and to treat that institution more as a common meeting ground, where "A" can talk to and argue with "B" without interspersing the conversation with "Yes Sir," No "Sir." The upholder of democracy might wonder why it should seem necessary for the younger members to wait kicking their heels until the more senior officer has finished his second short drink before they can go into dinner, which is eaten and paid for by all in equal proportion. The more enlightened and far-seeing commanding officers have realised this and permit dinner jackets and a movable feast on most nights of the week and do not expect all to wait on the whim of one. There are, however, still a number of the old school who consider that a very strict Mess discipline is the hall-mark of a good regiment.

Next comes the all-important question of expense and it is this question that has prompted the writer to embark on a proposition which may have many opponents.

Mess subscriptions throughout the Army vary according to the number of officers in the unit and their tastes. Even in the most economically conducted Messes one will find that, by the time Mess Subscription, Furniture, Books and Papers, Lighting, Entertainment and other smaller cuttings have been made, the total probably comes to sixty rupees a month for a subaltern. On top of this comes the upkeep of Mess and Garden Staff, replacement of crockery, donations on promotion and other odd items, all of which accumulate to make a big hole in an officer's pay, before he starts to pay for what he eats and drinks. This affects the junior officer as much as the senior, while the married man has to contribute equally with the bachelor, irrespective of whether he is living in his own house or not. Some Messes like to keep up greater state than others, some have a very enviable reputation for great hospitality and it is obvious that all such extra expenses must create a bigger hole in the pockets of the officers contributing.

In some cases Mess expenses are so heavy that junior officers just cannot afford to join the Station Club, while in others the Commanding Officer, fully realising the inroads made on the subaltern's pocket, does not encourage—if he cannot actually

forbid—him to become a Club member but to confine his exercise to hacking, to the Mess tennis court and to games of hockey with the men. All this makes for great insularity and the officers of one regiment are thrown too much together. They see only each other all day and every day; on parade, in office, at their games and in the Mess. On all sides one hears the remark "What do those fellows in the So and So Regiment *do*?" One never sees them about the place." Poor devils, they probably can't afford to be seen about the place. With increasing Indianisation and lower rates of pay the problem of combating heavy Mess expenses is becoming more pressing every day.

This brings us to the question of the Station Club. It should be made clear that we are referring to the smaller military cantonment, ranging from two to five major units, where the club is largely a military officers club with a few other government servants and civilians as members. Big towns with large civilian populations are not within our scope nor are the one-unit stations where probably a small gymkhana is maintained as an offshoot of the unit mess.

On all sides one hears complaints that military clubs are dying of inertia. They usually comprise big buildings with a heavy ground rent and require large staffs to keep them even reasonably clean. They belong to the times that are gone, when it was the habit of *tout le monde* and his wife to congregate there of an evening, to play bridge or billiards, to sit about and gossip and to drink. Later came the era of cocktail dances and gentle poodlefaking. Nowadays there is a very different story. The average member uses the club purely as a "gymkhana," possibly has a soft drink after he has finished his exercise and returns to his own bungalow. Once a week the club springs into rather forced life and the "Saturday Dance" takes place. In the majority of stations this is a sad affair; the large ballroom looks singularly empty with a few couples dancing to a band that is dispirited and dull. This dance has cost the club a considerable sum of money with the hire of the band, the lighting and the overtime for the staff, all for the benefit of a few bright souls who are keen enough—or dance-mad enough—to turn out in a forlorn endeavour to keep up the party spirit and to keep the club alive. For ten days or a fortnight in the year, when the local "Week" is on, the club really *does* liven up, dances are well patronised and the Secretary can rub his hands and announce a decent profit on the sale of drinks.

The reasons for the above gloomy picture are not far to seek. Firstly we must consider the bugbear of expense. As we have seen, a number of officers, both married and single, cannot afford in these hard times the club subscriptions or, while they can afford to pay them, they do not consider the outlay commensurate with what the club has to offer in the way of social entertainment. There are a number of good souls who pay their club subscriptions because they think it is "up to them to set a good example" and "not to let the place down." Such philanthropists seldom use the club and often cannot really afford such altruism.

Secondly there is the modern trend to make your bungalow or quarter as comfortable as possible and to enjoy its comforts. There you can entertain whom you want (and not buy a round of drinks for people you hardly know and possibly dislike), you can be comfortable, if you wish, in dressing gown and slippers in a warm room (instead of in a large barrack of a building), you can read, write and, if you want to, drink (without adding club profit to every sip you take).

Thirdly there is the vogue of throwing cocktail parties instead of more normal entertaining to dinner. The reasons are again partly financial, as it is much cheaper for the young marrieds to work off a number of people to a cocktail party than to have a series of dinners. The bachelor gains considerably (in pocket if not in conscience) as he is asked out to a number of such parties in the course of the year and has few opportunities of returning hospitality to those who have entertained him.

Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that military clubs are dying fast and the less the custom at the bar the higher the subscriptions need to be raised to keep the show alive. The general exception to such decay is to be found in clubs which are residential as well as social.

They have enough permanent residents to justify the club staff; more drinking is probably done in the club (or anyhow of club liquor) and their very presence gives a certain amount of life and gaiety to the building.

And what of the solutions to relieve the frightful gloom that has so far pervaded our survey. Some will say that the Station Mess gives the answer. The larger numbers of dining members allow overhead expenses to be reduced, the argument of insularity is automatically refuted and the Mess itself becomes a species of military club, allowing probably of squash and tennis courts

and a more communal life. The objections, however, are also cogent. In the first place the Mess discipline Gorgon raises her head; Lieut. Blank of the Blankshires does not appreciate the "old-Mess-life" attitude of Major Dash of the Malabar Lancers. In a Station Mess cliques are bound to be formed, cliques arising out of the differing interests, dislikes and incomes of the various members.* One shudders to contemplate the atmosphere of the quarterly Mess meeting in such a mess. Premeditated objections, heated words and sullen apathy will render any meeting abortive and will only tend to make breaches where none existed before or to widen those that did. With an unwieldy heterogeneous crowd as one would find in the Station Mess, formulation of Mess policy, acceptable to all, would, to say the least of it, be difficult and one could imagine that after a short while all the various members, units and cliques would be crying out to "d—n the expense and get back to our own Mess."

No! The solution must be to *Scrap the Mess*. (It is feared that the old senior officer who featured at the start of this article is due for an apoplectic fit.) It is suggested that the Government Mess Allowance be reduced by half and that the new allowance be devoted by units to the upkeep of a "Field Mess." By this it is not intended that only canvas chairs, rickety tables and enamel plates shall be maintained but that a certain amount of stout furniture, crockery and decent cutlery such as can be used, and is used, when a unit is located in one of the frontier stations, where families are not permitted and when all live in a smallish mess building, where exigencies of space and service conditions do not permit of any great state being kept up. Such stations as Razmak and the Khyber are good examples of those where such Messes are suitable. This field Mess furniture would also be of use in training camps and for hot weather moves. Alternatively this Government allowance could be utilised for the hire of furniture in any of the above circumstances if, by chance, the unit did not maintain its own.

In peace stations—and we are still referring to the smaller military cantonment—there are two answers to the problems arising from the abolition of the Mess. Firstly that the club can be persuaded to sink money for the erection of residential

*As is usual, an exception is to be found in the "Piffer" Mess in Kohat. There, however, the community of interest and the general level of incomes permit of a happy and tolerant brotherhood.

quarters—and by so doing put their own finances on a sound footing—and bachelor officers be asked or persuaded to live in the club. Here we can make no objection on the plea of insularity nor of “oppressive” Mess discipline, nor of failure to support the club. Nor can the residential member be accused of “never being seen about the place.” To his advantage is a reasonable charge for quarters and messing without large overhead expenses and without double subscriptions. In stations where the club is not prepared for the venture of residential quarters, there may be an hotel which will make reasonable charges for long periods of residence.

To this hotel all the arguments of the club quarters apply equally well, except that the alcohol will be a trifle more expensive, as the average hotel hopes to make its profit on all wines sold.

The second solution and one which can be adopted if the club cannot provide quarters and where no decent hotel exists, is to permit officers to live in “chummeries.” This is done throughout India by young civilians, young I.C.S. and young Policemen, so why should it not be copied by the young army officer and by his senior also, if he happens to be a bachelor? Three or four young officers can club together and run a bungalow very inexpensively. The extra “staff” required will only be a cook and a *chokra* and the necessary dining room furniture and crockery can be hired, while the running expenses can be curtailed to suit the pockets of the members. A chummary *can* be treated as a home, while the only discipline enforced would be that of not grousing at the menu chosen by the catering member, where officers, young and old alike, would have companions of their own age, interests, tastes and incomes, and where they can, if they be so minded, indulge in mild entertainment of their friends. As is obvious, the real great advantage is the saving of expense and with the saving thus effected the young officer can afford to join the club, to use the club and be seen about the place.

To summarise, therefore, it is suggested that the solution of our problem is:

- (a) To abolish all but field messes (and, in doing so, to save Government half the present mess allowance).
- (b) To permit unmarried officers to live and have their social being as they wish, be it in residential clubs, in hotels or in “chummeries.”

It is considered that if the above suggestions were put to the vote to-day, there would be an overwhelming majority in its favour *amongst regimental officers* and, after all, *they* are the ones that are affected.

LEARNING PERSIAN

BY KARSHISH

Most people know that what Europeans used to call "Persia" is now called "Iran" and that the people of the country are now known as "Iranians." Iran is what the Iranians themselves have always called their country, but they call their language "Fārsi" and it is still, therefore, correct to speak of the Persian language which is also spoken to a great extent in Afghanistan. The "Iranian Language" is an incorrect term as are also "Iranian Gulf" and "Iranian Cat." Something, after all, must be conceded to usage.

Having settled the not-unimportant matter of the correctness or otherwise of my title, I must go on to say that there exist, especially in India, some grave misapprehensions as to the nature of the Persian language as spoken by the Iranians, for it is Iran and the Iranians of which I propose to treat in this article.

The Persian taught in Indian universities and spoken to-day in Afghanistan differs widely from the Persian of Iran. The former can be described as the Persian of Akbar and in construction bears a closer relation to classical Persian than the latter. It is legitimate to believe, however, that the pronunciation and intonation of the ancient Iranians finds to-day a closer counterpart in Iran than elsewhere.

It is only comparatively recently that the Board of Examiners in India awoke to the fact that a knowledge of classical or Indian Persian was almost, if not quite, useless in Iran itself. Even after the war when the inadequacy of the standard of the Higher Proficiency Examination had been abundantly demonstrated, the old ideas persisted for a time. Even now, though the Interpretership Examination has been greatly modernised, some of the set books are out of keeping with modern ideas, and the recent suggestion to include in these the *Gulistan* of Saadi must be regarded with astonishment and alarm. On the whole, however, the General Staff has accepted fairly good-humouredly the axiom that modern Persian, as spoken in Iran to-day, is a useful language for officers of the Indian Army to know. They have even, in my opinion, gone too far, for Afghan Persian is still of considerable importance and Interpreters should give evidence of a familiarity with the distinctive Afghan idiom and syntax. I

understand, however, that the Interpretership Examination may be modified to meet this obvious requirement.

I shall now slip into that slovenly and discursive style which has so much irritated some of the readers of my previous articles. I shall try and tell of my own sporadic attempts to learn one of the most polished languages in the world, in the hope that my obvious mistakes and general "leichtsinnigkeit" may be a lesson to my more prudent readers.

I began my Persian studies in Istanbul and my teacher was a curious old man who had been in turn Moslem, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Roman Catholic and again Moslem. I do not quite know whether he really knew Persian but he had a pleasant daughter who sang Persian *ghazals* very nicely. The daughter had a most beautiful Turkish friend who was a professor in the University for Girls. She knew English and obligingly translated the *ghazals* for me. I sometimes even learned a little Persian during my visits to old Daud's house, but I fear I had only the merest smattering when three years later I found myself in India with four months to go before I took up the post of Military Attaché in Meshed. In Rawalpindi I found a *munshi* who had taken "Honours" in Persian at Lahore University, and with him I read "The Shah's Journey to Europe" and "The Narrative of Mrs. Horteste." We spoke together in Persian and I left India in May 1926, feeling that I could at any rate speak and read Persian with some address. I was completely mistaken.

I discovered the full extent of my ignorance on my journey from Zahidan to Meshed. I had been a little dashed to find myself quite unable to understand the passport officials at Mirjawa and as time went on I realised that I should have to start almost from the beginning. I was, however, somewhat heartened to find that I could carry on a fluent conversation in Turkish with some Azerbaijanis who like me were on their way to the shrine of Imam Reza.

Travelling in Iran in 1926 was no light matter. I hired a Dodge $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton truck and took 6 days to cover the 600 miles between Zahidan and Meshed. We travelled the whole day and seldom exceeded 15 miles per hour. In the middle of the waterless tract between Hormuk and Safedawa we broke a back-axle. The spare proudly produced by the owner proved to belong to another make of car, but in four hours we had filed it down with rasps until it fitted, and proceeded on our way.

In 1926, Iran was beginning to change but when I arrived in May, everything seemed very backward and inefficient. The post of Governor-General of a province was still open to the highest bidder and financial abuse was rife, though the American Financial Mission was beginning to get busy. There was a low state of security in the country generally, the army was ill-clothed and ill-equipped and the men's pay about three months in arrears. Communications were in a deplorable state and there were constant rumours of imminent Soviet aggression. Religious fanaticism was still at its height and an American Consul had recently been lynched by a member of a Muharram procession which he was attempting to photograph. The *mujtahids* and *akhunds* wielded enormous influence, especially in a place like Meshed. In spite of this unpromising background I began to enjoy myself almost at once. Few residents in India realise how completely life in an Iranian city differs from that of an Indian cantonment. One of the best ways to realise this difference is to take, as I did, an Indian servant to Iran. He was a good type of man but a bad mixer and he was a total failure in an Iranian household. My Iranian visitors looked aghast at his clumsy manners and I very soon had to send him back to India. He regarded the ceremonies of Iranian society with the deepest suspicion and I must admit that it took me considerable time to grasp the intricacies of Iranian etiquette.

I had been selected as Military Attaché partly on account of my knowledge of Ottoman Turkish and had been told that this was largely spoken by all Iranians in North-Eastern Iran. This I found to be a most misleading notion. A great number of the inhabitants of Khorasan speak dialects of Turki and many Iranian officers and civil officials had a smattering of it. But to speak to an army officer in Turki gave the same impression as a French Consul in India conversing with British officials through the medium of Hindustani, and I soon found that Persian was quite essential. One of my successors in Meshed succeeded in existing for three years in Iran without learning any Persian. I am afraid I do not at all understand how he managed to get on.

Although I had difficulty in learning Persian in India, I had not the smallest difficulty in learning it in Iran. To my shame I recall that I hardly took any regular lessons, but I did talk it on every conceivable occasion. There are two very obvious reasons why English people pick up Persian in Iran so much

more quickly and so much better than they learn Hindustani in India. Persian is, in the first place, a far more complete and crystallised language than Hindustani. It is also far easier to pronounce, especially for the British. The short "a" is pronounced almost exactly the same as in "hat" and this is a sound which presents grave difficulties to other foreigners. I have met many British business men who, after only a few years' residence in Iran, could speak Persian with a fluency and accuracy very rarely achieved in Hindustani by officials of long standing residence in India. The other reason is, of course, that Persian is spoken with only slight differences all over Iran and the language of society is, as a matter of course, Persian.

Before I had been many weeks in Meshed a mutiny broke out among the Iranian troops in Bujnurd in the Turkoman country and not far from the Soviet frontier. As is, or was, customary in Iran, wild and alarming rumours began to reach Meshed and these included the report that 40,000 Turkomans had been armed by the Russians and were marching on the city. The local Iranian commander informed us that this last was certainly true and that the whole affair was the result of a long-standing Soviet intrigue. The Governor-General, on the other hand, was sceptical of the reports which were being received and refused to commit himself about the Russians. The *tertium quid* was Mr. John Loomis, the American financial adviser, an experienced man brought up in a hard school of *pronunciament* in Cuba, Mexico and elsewhere. He informed me that the cause of the mutiny was simply that the local commander had been putting the troops pay in his pocket. The stuff about Turkomans and Bolsheviks was, he affirmed, all hoey, and the sooner the Central Government were informed of the real situation the better. About this time I received word of an individual who had just returned from Bujnurd and who was persuaded to visit me late at night. He was some sort of minor official and it was some time before he could decide whether I wanted to hear invented stories of prodigious battles in Bujnurd or simply the truth. At last, aided with copious potions of a villainous brand of whisky known as "Blue Diamond," he chose the latter course and I learned that an officer called "Salar-i-Jang" had crossed the Soviet frontier with about 40 men as a protest against the non-arrival of their pay. There had been no casualties. Meanwhile, a mixed force was being rushed from Tehran in lorries many of which were driven by British drivers, one of whom I interviewed on his

arrival. The force which arrived was not very well equipped or disciplined, but it did arrive quickly and it seemed almost a pity that there was nothing for it to do. It was closely followed by the Shah himself who was determined to settle this discreditable affair in person. This he did by summarily reducing the local commander to the ranks, by appointing in his place General Prince Amanullah Mirza with a new staff and by replacing the Governor-General. The Shah received the staff of the British Consulate-General and made himself very agreeable. One could not fail to be impressed by his commanding presence and strong intelligence, and by the awe in which his subjects stood of him.

The rapid progress which has been achieved in Iran must be entirely attributed to the remarkable personality of Reza Shah Pahlevi. He has shown firmness and moderation as and when each was required. There is no comparison between the local administration, communications and security of the Iran of to-day and that of twenty years ago, and critics of the present Government's policy cannot but admit that its achievements have been little short of miraculous.

Under its new commander the Eastern Division began to make considerable progress. Very shortly the troops were uniformly armed and provided with boots instead of *givehs*. Proper training programmes were worked out and the general discipline and turnout of all ranks very greatly improved. I remember being invited to a regimental "gaff" given by the Shahpur Regiment, and I still recall it as one of the best shows of its kind to which I ever went. We were received in the officers' club and given tea. We then went into the theatre to see a play which was entirely performed by soldiers and began with the singing of the regimental march. The play was extremely well acted and the actors, especially the female impersonators, received huge applause. In the interval we were given an excellent champagne supper. The play was followed by fireworks, after which we gave three cheers for the Shah and left. Any soldier could see that this was a happy, well-disciplined regiment, and it presented a striking contrast to the slipshod rabble of a few months back.

It is popularly believed that the Azerbaijani Turk is the backbone of the Iranian Army. This is quite untrue. The Turk is simply the Scot of Iran: his accent is a joke and his justifiable reputation as a redoubtable fighter has been greatly exaggerated. Purely Iranian regiments acquitted themselves very well in the Kashgai campaign of 1930-1931. Their physique is quite as good as of the Turks and their intelligence considerably superior.

There is to be found among the British, and especially in India, an unreasoned prejudice against the Iranians. Travellers complain of obstruction and discourtesy and speak disparagingly of Iranian methods. My own experience is entirely different. Two things are essential in Iran—a knowledge of Persian and a sense of humour. The Iranians are almost always sympathetic to people who have troubled to learn their language and they can seldom resist a joke. I never met a people with a more subtle sense of the ridiculous than the Iranians and genial fooling is one of the surest roads to their hearts. It is, I believe, perfectly true that officially there is a strong feeling of xenophobia in Iran at present. This results in officials of all sorts being forbidden to associate with Europeans. Regrettable as this is, the impartial critic must admit that there is some justification for it. During the century which ended in 1920, Iranian history was little more than a catalogue of the rivalries of Iran's powerful neighbours. What the country suffered during the Great War from the presence of Russian, German, Turkish and British forces can hardly be described, though a good dispassionate account of it can be found in "Jang-i-bein ul Milleli" published in Tehran last year.

During my stay in Iran there were none of these irksome restrictions on intercourse between foreigners and Iranian officials, and I spent a considerable time each day in visiting them. No Iranian will readily miss a chance to talk, especially with any one who is also ready to laugh. One official in Meshed I remember as by far the most humorous man I have ever met. We had a number of private jokes which he used to work into conversation with other people in a way which made me almost choke with laughter. There was a certain Turkish proverb which I told him and which is, I regret, unrepeatable here. He was enchanted with this and was always referring to it. For some reason, he liked to pretend that I had strong Bolshevik sympathies and always addressed me as *tovarishch* even in front of Soviet officials who did not know whether to be amused or scandalised. On one occasion I visited him to protest officially against the accidental arrest of a British subject. I was surprised to find him sitting cross-legged on a sofa with an extraordinary expression of pompous gravity on his face. He immediately began to speak in sonorous tones, using long, resounding periods packed with Arabic phrases. After a few minutes of this he broke off with a roar of laughter to explain that he was imitating an Iranian

official of fifty years ago. He added that he had already given orders for our subject to be released and we spent another delightful half hour of light conversation.

A less pleasant side of life in Iran was the continual atmosphere of suspicion and intrigue, a regrettable result of the rivalries to which I have just alluded. I remember once at a dinner party sitting next to a high official whom I engaged in conversation on the subject of fruit. In the course of the discussion I asked him whether he had noticed the remarkable orchard in the Soviet Consulate-General. He said: "No" and changed the subject abruptly, but the next morning he sent his confidential man to see me. This individual, after interminable circumlocutions, told me that his master had been gravely disturbed by my oblique references to his alleged pro-Soviet sympathies. With perfect truth I disclaimed any such intention, but it was fairly clear that he did not believe my protestations of innocence.

One of the best ways of getting to know the Iranians is to travel through Iran taking care not to be in too much of a hurry. Almost all Iranians are experienced road travellers and servants enjoy the road as much as their masters. Nowadays most travel is, of course, by car. In the days of the leisurely *Kalishkeh* it was customary to leave one's house in the early afternoon and proceed to the road house which is still to be found about five miles from the main entrances to most towns in Iran. Here the night was spent before starting the journey in earnest the next morning. The object of this quaint process, known as "nagl-ul-magam," was to soften the blow of parting with one's friends, who always accompanied one on this first easy stage, and also to afford an opportunity of sending back for all the things one had forgotten.

When I went from Meshed to Tehran in September, 1926, we went in the greatest comfort. A touring car carried the three of us and one servant while the remainder of the servants with our considerable luggage went in a lorry. The Governor-General had advised all the local officials along the 600-mile route of our journey and at every stage we were met outside the town and entertained most royally. Iran is a country of exaggeration, but there is no exaggeration in the fame of Iranian hospitality. That hospitality forms an important part of the Iranians' social code is proved by their kindness and indulgence to the many refugees who have sought asylum in their country, but what always

attracted me about Iranian society was the obvious pleasure which entertaining even complete strangers gave the hosts. Their whole houses were turned upside down and the delight of the servants in serving the guests was all the more astonishing when, as most frequently happened, they refused to accept any tips. The first thing on arrival was always tea, for the Iranians are among the world's great tea drinkers. This sometimes went on rather too long for the jaded traveller who longed to remove the stains of travel, but due time for this was always allowed before the elaborate dinner, always served European fashion with a profusion of good food, drink and polished conversation. By this time, I could take a full part in this and could appreciate most of the subtle wit and about half of the apt quotations and proverbs with which our hosts regaled us. Iranians, who in those days had not travelled much outside Iran, always displayed a naive and gratifying curiosity about "Landan" (London) which is, or was, the usual way of referring to England. When they are not wrangling over stupid matters of finance and politics the Iranians and British get on extremely well together principally, I believe, because of their close affinity in the matter of humour. Iranian sayings such as "He sits on the moustaches of the Shah and plays the drum" (cheeky aplomb) and "He puts horse-shoes on flying mosquitoes" (adroit cunning) find a ready appreciation in the British mind. The conversation, in Persian, of the educated Iranian gentleman reminds one forcibly of the brilliant, ironic wit of Congreve and Steele.

Sabzevar, Shahrud, Damghan and Semnan were the stopping places on that memorable journey. Each seemed to vie with the other in hospitality and when we finally reached Tehran over the beautiful and mountainous Firuzkuh road we felt that the capital could offer little that could be more agreeable than that six days' journey.

At the time of which I am writing, Mr. Harold Nicolson was Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran and Major W. A. K. Fraser (now Brigadier) was Military Attaché. The latter put me up and I had the privilege of talking at some length to one whose practical and unprejudiced knowledge of Iran and the Iranians I have never seen equalled. Years later I read the monthly letters which, over a considerable period, he had written to the War Office describing the military and political situation and was deeply impressed with the balanced judgment and sane and reasoned foresight which they displayed. I met Harold Nicolson

several times. Apart from his intellectual and professional reputation he was well known for his kindliness and good humour. I doubt if there can be many pleasanter places to live in than the summer residence of the British Legation in Gulahek. It is a beautiful and richly wooded park in which the sound of running water can be heard almost everywhere. The weather in September was quite perfect and there was on all sides that debonair atmosphere of leisurely and gently organised enjoyment which is such a feature of life in Iran. I went to many lunch and dinner parties and met several interesting people among whom were Dr. Millspaugh, Chief of the American Financial Mission, Count Schulenburg, the German Minister and now German Ambassador in Moscow. With the latter I played poker one evening. He was a remarkable player and his gifts in this respect must have stood him in good stead when he was negotiating the Soviet-German Pact.

In 1926, Iran was still the happy hunting ground of the concession seeker and the business adventurer. Tehran was full of foreigners of every description, many of whom were in government employ. Financial control was in the hands of Dr. Millspaugh's mission. The departure of this mission was abrupt and premature, but most Iranians admit that its work was highly beneficial and of lasting value to the country. The Belgian-controlled Customs was another institution which contributed to the wealth of the country. This too was sharply criticised by the Iranians and exists no longer. The only two concessions of importance which remain are the Imperial Bank of Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the scope of both has been considerably curtailed. It has been my fate to live in three middle-eastern countries, Turkey, Iran and Iraq, just before European financial control was removed. On each occasion, business men of great experience have prophesied immediate bankruptcy which has however always failed to materialise. I do not by this mean to suggest that the repeated charges of "exploitation" which have been made against foreign concessionaires in the Middle East can by any means be fully substantiated. On the contrary many, if not most, of the British concession holders in Iran contributed greatly to the prosperity of the country. The Imperial Bank of Iran and the Indo-European Telegraph Department (now abolished) were held in great respect by the vast majority of Iranians. I do believe, however, that the belief still held by the majority of Europeans that the peoples of

the Middle East are incapable of administering modern institutions is a grave and dangerous exaggeration. It argues an ignorance of the greatly changed conditions in these countries and especially of the genuine growth of nationalist feeling.

I have spoken of business adventurers in Iran. It was my lot to meet a number of these gentry but I do not ever remember a more curious case than that of Mr. Herbert Collinson. One very hot afternoon in Meshed I was informed by my servant that a "Farangi" wished to see me. An elderly European was shown in. He was unshaven, extremely dirty and obviously completely exhausted. He told me he had just arrived by road en route to Tehran, was a Canadian geologist named Herbert Collinson and could I tell him where he could put up. There was nothing like a hotel in Meshed in those days so, moved by Mr. Collinson's appearance of fatigue, I offered to put him up in my house and ordered a room and bath to be got ready for him. He reappeared shaved and well-dressed and sat down to tea. He soon told me that he was representing a firm of oil prospectors and was going to Talriz on behalf of the Sinclair oil concession. He also said that he had lost his passport in Paris and had been issued with a temporary one which was marked "Renewable on production of further proofs of identity." We were unable to renew this in Meshed but I thought they might do it in Tehran where, he said, the "further proofs" would be available. Mr. Collinson stayed with me four days and a very pleasant guest I found him. On the day before his departure he suddenly said: "Look here, you've been decent to me and I've not played square with you. Now I'm going to come clean." Mr. Collinson then told me a strange story. Besides being a geologist he was also an osteopath. He had heard that Amir Amanullah of Afghanistan was suffering from an obscure complaint which he believed he could cure. He proposed thus to ingratiate himself into the Amir's favour and to obtain a concession for working the ruby mines in Afghan Turkestan. He had letters of introduction to important Afghans which he showed me. To further his plan he had decided to become a Moslem. This he had done in Lahore and showed me papers to prove it. Mr. Collinson thought he might be useful to me in Afghanistan whither he proposed to go on his return from Tehran.

I thought Mr. Collinson's story true but suspicious. My suspicions increased when he came back from Tehran with a story that they had not renewed his passport but had advised

him to tear out the page with the endorsement on it! This I recognised as a lie and made him put the page back again. A few days after he left ostensibly for Afghanistan. I never saw him again. Many months afterwards I read in the *Continental Daily Mail* a long account of a well-dressed man who had been apprehended by the police in Hampstead having completely lost his memory. In a mental home it was learned that some years previously he had suffered a severe injury to his head and, after apparent recovery, had travelled extensively in the Middle East. He was, it appeared, very wealthy but had in his possession many cheque books on Banks where he had no account. There was a photograph at the bottom of the report. It was an excellent likeness of Mr. Herbert Collinson.

I left Iran in 1928 but before the end of the year I had taken up an appointment in Iraq which involved frequent visits to Tehran, Kirmanshah and other places. Occasionally I travelled by road but more often by Junkers Air Line. Many and frequent at this time were the stories of Iranian incivility and obstruction to travellers but I am bound to admit that I never encountered any such thing. I remember once travelling by air to Tehran in company with a minor British official of the Iraq Government. At Kirmanshah where we landed for Customs examination this individual positively refused to open his suitcase for inspection. The officials were polite but adamant and he was told that he could not proceed. For a time he blustered in bad Arabic which was quite as unintelligible to the Iranians as it would have been to Arabs, and eventually gave in. With pardonable glee the Customs officials then laid out the entire contents of his suitcase on the aerodrome and examined each article with meticulous care.

Though incidents of Iranian hostility towards foreigners have no doubt been exaggerated it cannot be denied that Iran's attitude towards all her neighbours is one of intense suspicion. Her apprehensions at the present time can be more easily imagined than described. What the British Government is doing to counter possible anti-British propaganda in Iran I am not in a position to say, but it is to be hoped that the extraordinary so-called Persian Broadcasts from Delhi do not form an important part of any plan of fostering goodwill towards the British Empire in Iran. These Broadcasts may not be intended for Iran, but the Iranians certainly listen to them with mingled sensations of amusement and disgust. It is hard to understand why this

peculiar state of affairs cannot be remedied. With a very small effort and financial outlay it would be possible to arrange for daily broadcasts in both Iranian and Afghan Persian which would not at all events be open to ridicule and contempt and might even, at long last, give the impression that we at least took some cognisance of our neighbours.

Faithful to the plan of my previous articles, I will now endeavour to give such advice as I am able to give on the subject of learning Persian. First and foremost, it is essential to draw a firm line between "Iranian" and "Afghan" or "Indian Persian." An important point to grasp is that while the latter is despised and laughed at in Iran the former is regarded with great admiration by Afghans. There is a great lack of suitable books for the study of modern Persian. The only book which can be called at all comprehensive is "Modern Persian Conversation Grammar" by St. Clair Tisdall (Otto Saner Method). This is now somewhat out-of-date and the exercises are stilted and unpractical. Still, it does present Persian Grammar in a fairly logical way and deals well with the large Arabic element in Persian.

In my opinion, by far the best way of studying the language is to buy the Linguaphone Course. This course, which comprises a succinct and practical grammar, consists of 30 lessons clearly declaimed in a perfectly correct Persian accent. The student is quickly introduced to a good representative vocabulary and a wealth of idiomatic expressions. Unfortunately, the course is entirely in the Latin character, so it is little use for learning the written language. Unless a fully competent Iranian teacher is available, the best plan is to work through the Linguaphone Course and St. Clair Tisdall at the same time. Indian teachers should be avoided, however high their Indian University qualifications. They not only very rarely know modern Persian but are obstinate about even admitting the existence of such a thing. Others, who claim to have a thorough knowledge of Iranian Persian, persist in using such words as *taklif*, *sust*, *istiglal*, *tajwiz* and many others in their Urdu or Afghan-Persian sense.

An extremely full though deplorably arranged book is Higher Persian Grammar by Philott. It contains a vast amount of information if one can only find it.

For reading I recommend the standard school books issued by the Iranian Ministry of Education. They are up-to-date and remarkably well arranged and contain sufficient extracts from the

classics for practical purposes. For advanced reading, students (especially those who know Russian) are advised to get *sovremennaya Persidskaya Pressa v Obraztsakh* (Extracts from the Modern Persian Press) published by the Leningrad Oriental Institute. This contains a remarkable collection of leading articles, news telegrams, parliamentary reports, advertisements, law reports and other matter. The vocabulary is unfortunately in Russian only, but the extracts themselves are well worth having.

The best dictionaries are those by Haim (Persian-English and English-Persian) published by Beroukhim, Tehran. Old dictionaries such as Steingass are extremely expensive and quite out-of-date.

One of the main difficulties of modern Persian is the number of new words which are constantly being introduced by the government. List of these are issued from time to time but they are not easy to acquire. The best way of keeping abreast of the new vocabulary is to read the newspapers. For military terms a most useful book is *Jang-i-Bein Ul Milleli* (published in Tehran in 1939) in which the new words are sedulously employed.

THE WAR IN EAST AFRICA

A Role for the Indian Army

BY CAPTAIN S. G. D. JONES 2/2 PUNJAB REGT.

[A sketch map is at the end.]

"Before the Germans overran their victim countries they trained their troops for those specific operations. They thought out the best technique and then practised it with every soldier who was to take part. It was a different technique for each country."—Editorial J. U. S. I. of India, July 1940.

Public attention is becoming more and more focussed on Italian overseas possessions, and my six years with The King's African Rifles spent largely on the Kenya-Abyssinian, and Kenya-Italian Somaliland borders, convinces me that East Africa is eminently suitable for the employment of the Indian Army. It is considered essential, however, that any Indian Forces which may be sent there should first be conditioned and rehearsed by special training for such operations.

THE THEATRE AS A WHOLE

The Sudan separates Libya from Italian East Africa by a distance of nearly 1,000 miles and has a frontier with Abyssinia of 800 miles. Lake Tsana which largely controls the waters of the Blue Nile is less than 100 miles from this frontier, and Maji the capital of S. W. Abyssinia which was the last district to hold out against the Italians and is the focal point for starting an insurrection against that country is within 50 miles of the Sudan Frontier.

Eritrea possesses the ports of Assab and Massawa on the Red Sea, and is the gateway for the best line of advance into Abyssinia. This line namely Asmara-Adowa-Makale-Magdala and thence to Addis Ababa was that originally chosen by Napier and copied by the Italians for their campaign. Khartoum and Kassala based on port Sudan are conveniently situated for an attack on Eritrea.

French Somaliland is now presumably in Italian control, it is of little value except for the port of Djibouti on the railway from Addis Ababa.

British Somaliland is easily re-enforced from Aden, it has a useful port in Berbera, and is of some political importance because the Italians recruit their Askaris almost exclusively from Somali tribes.

Italian Somaliland possesses the strategically important port of Mogadishu near the Webbe Shibeli river which was the second line of advance in the Italian attacks on Abyssinia.

It is perhaps of interest to mention here my visit to the Italian post of Lugh on the Juba river in 1933. Jubaland was ceded to Italy by us in recognition of her 'gallant services to the Allies' in the last war. Taking with me a small escort I motored from Moyale to Mandera, crossed the Dawa river at Dolo, and was met at the Juba by an imposing guard of honour of Italian troops. Lugh stands in a loop of the river and magnificent barracks and bungalows have been built in place of our former grass and mud huts. Conversation on both sides was rather of the 'school-boy' French variety but a measure of fluency was attained later in the evening. So much so in fact that the *Commandante* tapping me on the knee said with marked interest "What did you do to be sent out here?" Being very young and rather taken by surprise (at that time there was a waiting list of some 400 names for the K. A. R.), I stupidly replied that I had volunteered. This was greeted by a most expressive Italian gesture of horrified amazement, and most unfortunately stopped some interesting disclosures as to the reasons why my hosts had been banished from Le Roma. I. E. A. being at that time a punishment station for Italian officers. Throughout I. E. A. the Italians used to listen in to all our wireless messages, for which they used chiefly their Naval personnel. Their armed forces include regular Italian troops (all arms), Somali Askaris, and Bandas. The last are similar to our Khassadars and equally trustworthy.

Italian administration, and this is similar in Abyssinia, is through native chiefs and very corrupt native police. There is little or no direct touch between the Italian administrator and his natives, nor are their districts often visited. Italian officers take little interest in shooting or in the Somali tribes and their customs, very few take the trouble to learn the language.

On my return from this visit I asked my escort commander a Sudanese 'shawash' (sergeant) what he thought of the Italians. He replied in Ki-Swahili "Tell me Effendi, are the Italians a slave race of Europe?"

The above digression helps one to assess the psychology and morale of our opponents, and it is illuminating to note that as late as 1934 the greatest insult it was possible to make to a lazy Askari was to say that he drilled like an Italiano.

Abyssinia is a triangle 900 miles wide by 760 miles long with an area of 350,000 sq. miles. The inhabitants number some four to five millions, of which the true Amharic provides only one-fourth of the population. Of the conquered tribes who compose the remainder, mention must be made of the Gulubba and the Bume, who live round the Northern shores of Lake Rudolf and are magnificent fighters. Naked save for a cartridge belt, they carry a rifle and a spear and are the Pathans of Africa. The country of Abyssinia consists of high plateau, mountain ranges and deep ravines. The main rivers are the Blue Nile, Hawash, Takkaze, and the Webbe Shebeli. Prior to its conquest by Italy there were no roads and most of its rivers were unbridged. The one railway was that of Addis Ababa to Djibouti. The highlands may be said to be self-supporting in regard to meat and crops but only for a low density of population, such as existed before the Italian occupation.

Much has been written about an Abyssinian rising against the Italians but it must be remembered that of the four to five million inhabitants, only one-fourth are of the true Amharic race; the remaining African tribes were treated as slaves by the Abyssinians and although they have little liking or respect for the Italians, they are likely to remain apathetic in any struggle between their old and new masters.

Lake Rudolf discovered by an adventurous Hungarian, named Count Teleki, owes its discovery to an affair between the Count and the Crown Prince's wife. Challenged to a duel on this account which he accepted but was not permitted to fight Teleki was banished by the Emperor and set forth to explore Africa. Traversing Abyssinia from the North he eventually arrived after a long and thirsty march at a delightful lake with sweet waters set in a surrounding of cool and shady trees. This he named Stephanie after his lover. A few days later when he encountered another lake without a vestige of vegetation the waters of which were bitter and alkaline, he named it Rudolf after the Crown Prince. Lake Rudolf has an area of 2,004 sq. miles but is rapidly drying up. Its shores are shallow and shelving for several hundred yards, the water full of crocodiles and alkaline. This last unpleasantness was overcome by a party of scientists exploring the Southern end by neutralising the effect for drinking purposes by acids.

The strategic value of this lake is that the Kenya-Abyssinian border runs through the Northern end, and its possible use as a seaplane base in a region unsuitable for landing grounds.

TURKANA AND THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF KENYA

West of lake Rudolf lies Turkana the tribesmen of which are very hardy and were described by the old explorers as a race of giants. They grow no crops and their staple food is a mixture of fresh milk and blood, the latter is 'tapped' from the veins of the living beast which is duly marked as having been bled on such and such a date.

Except where roads have been made, Turkana is not suitable for M. T. the ground being rocky and intersected by innumerable nullahs. There is a military post on the Labur hills at Lokitung connected by a laboriously constructed motor road with rail-head at Kitale in Kenya.

East of lake Rudolf the following posts are encountered; Moyale, a mud fort with a tower, situated on the Abyssinian border on a low range of hills. It was recently the scene of an action against Italian forces in which the small K. A. R. detachment holding this post was surrounded by a numerically vastly superior force and forced to retire, which it did by cutting its way through the Italian lines. Mandera, a similar post, is situated on the Dawa river which constitutes the boundary with Abyssinia and is about a mile from the Italian Somaliland border.

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER PROVINCE

This province comprises an area of 93,568 sq. miles and a population of some 75,000 which, except for certain tribal Retainers, has been disarmed as regards rifles. The country is largely desert and thorn bush intersected by dry sandy nullahs in some of which water, in small quantities, may be found by digging. There are few crops but abundant game, and in the dry season it is suitable for M. T. provided sufficient water can be carried; in the rains, which start in April, considerable areas are impassable for M. T.

The Post of Wajir lies some 130 miles South of the Abyssinian border and is, on account of its abundant well water, the focal point in the Eastern half of the province. This post consists of a sand-stone fort and is indefensible against modern arms. The map shows the fair weather motorable roads which radiate from Wajir. It should be noted that it lies within 70 miles of the Italian Somaliland border. In the Western half of the province a similar post but of less importance is situated on Mt. Marsabit which has a large and deep crater lake. A certain American cinema producer lecturing to a bored audience in Nairobi, rashly claimed to have been the first white man to have set foot on the

shores of this "mysterious lake," whereupon a tired voice asked him if he had also discovered the concrete pier built by the questioner in 1900. The tactically defensive line for the N. F. P. is that of the Uaso Nyiro river based on Meru, Nanyuki, and Thomsons Falls, with a comparatively good line of communication to Nairobi.

THE KING'S AFRICAN RIFLES

A brief sketch of this famous Regiment is not out of place here as any Indian forces sent to this theatre would have to co-operate with African Askaris. It is probable that a platoon of the K. A. R. would be attached to each Indian Brigade, and if possible to each Indian battalion. Raised in about 1895 these battalions have been almost permanently on active service ever since. They are magnificent fighting material and quite unbeatable in their own country. Recruited from many different tribes they are about 30% Mussalman and the rest Pagan. Every man is a natural hunter with fully developed senses of sight, hearing and smell. Extremely loyal, not to a vague Government but to their own British officers, they will endure great hardships. It is necessary to emphasise this point as to them there is no distinction with the exception of the Italian, the Portuguese, and the Greek, between the white races which they class together as "Wasungus." Many of the Askaris of the K. A. R. 2nd Battalion, disbanded in 1913, formed the nucleus of Von Lettow Vorbeck's famous force which he describes so well in his book, and which fought so bravely against us in the last East African Campaign. These Askaris, months in arrears of pay, almost in rags, up against vastly superior forces, and given 'paper' decorations, remained loyal to their German officers until ordered by them to lay down their arms.

One of the wisest gestures of the British Government was to honour all these 'chits' for pay and decorations, with the result that the majority flocked back to the K. A. R., and as late as 1928, a number of men in my battalion were in possession of Iron Crosses as well as our African G. S. Medal. It is unlikely that they would serve their Italian masters as loyally especially as there was considerable resentment in the Italian Abyssinian campaign over Askaris always being used as 'shock' troops, and Italian regulars for the triumphant entry into conquered territory.

A ROLE FOR THE INDIAN ARMY

Mention has been made of specialised training required for operations in East Africa. It is suggested that the Indian Army with its experience of fighting on the North-West Frontier of

India, would be especially adaptable to the conditions in Africa. Of this special training required the following suggestions are made:


The importance of all transport in any one column being wholly pack or motorised, a mixture of the two such as marching infantry and mechanised first line is quite unsuitable. Note that the Germans in France with their "dull brute mass of marching infantry" with horse-drawn transport, following behind their armoured and motorised formations, have avoided this unhappy partnership which on account of the difficulties of terrain is of far greater importance in Eastern theatres of war especially in Africa. If this view is accepted then the problem must be considered separately, *i.e.*, the special training required for columns on an all-pack basis, and that required for a wholly mechanised force.

In considering pack transport it must be remembered that there are many parts of East Africa, which owing to tsetse fly are impossible for horses and mules. Camels, however, are immune and porters are always available. The inference is that such columns must be lightly equipped and trained to move as Light Infantry. Although adopting guerilla tactics they should be highly trained, of great endurance, and conditioned to operate as self-contained units without an L. of C. or base for at least three months. This was the normal training for K. A. R. patrols and is not nearly as difficult as it sounds. The essential rations for Indian troops as for Africans are easily carried in bulk, fresh meat is always available (wild game), and the British Officer soon gets accustomed to living on tinned food and marching his 20 to 30 miles a day.

Similar endurance is required of mechanised forces which would have to carry large supplies of petrol and be prepared to maintain themselves for long periods away from their base. Not necessarily on the move all the time, they could provide most useful 'floating' patrols, lying up by day under cover near oases and wells, and moving mostly by night.

Co-operation between the above types of forces is of course essential, but the point is made that they must not be tied to each other. Bush, desert, and mountain warfare only differ in application not in principle; they all require a high degree of adaptability and resource in junior commanders and a readiness to accept responsibility.

It must be remembered that in Equatorial Africa night is as long as day and there is practically no twilight. Advantage of



Scale of Miles.

Miles 100 50 0 100 200 Miles

this may be taken by making midday and evening attacks with lighter armed forces than those of the enemy, breaking off the action on the sudden fall of darkness, and by a wide night movement, undetected by aircraft, be in position for another lightning raid the next evening from a fresh and unexpected direction.

Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland are cut off from Italy, their frontiers provide few geographical difficulties, and are open to deep raids by small independent self-contained columns, operating on a co-ordinated plan.

The rule of life is to adapt or die. The Germans, and to a lesser extent the Italians, have been adapting themselves for a decade to the system they planned to impose on Europe. We have one great advantage in that for years most of our officers have practised for pleasure the very qualities which our enemies have had to instill and teach by a rigid and boring regime. The East African theatre with which we are far more familiar than our opponents, and in which we are already more suitably trained to fight, offers us the chance for a bold offensive before the African's "Slave race of Europe" can be stiffened by German personnel and equipment.

THE FUTURE OF THE TRIBAL AREAS

BY B. BROMHEAD

This paper is an enlargement on a previous article written in regard to policy and control in Waziristan, and is an attempt to take a broader view of the same problem as well as to touch on that of the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province, in general.

The writer owes much to a great deal of helpful criticism of his previous paper and admits that in consequence he has changed some of his former ideas on this subject.

The outbreak of war has intensified the need to solve the problem of the tribal areas. The rhythm of political progress in India and the world has quickened, strong currents of unrest have been released, and the future cannot be foreseen. All this must have its effect on the tribes who, if the struggle is long and their uncertain loyalties are strained, will need strong inducement and firm handling, otherwise they may become a real danger. After the struggle, war-weariness and the inevitable crusade against militarism and army expenditure will occur. Such are my excuses for again writing about this subject.

THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

It is difficult to describe briefly a country which varies so greatly in different parts; but here is a picture which may be applied to much of the border, and which may give those not familiar a background to the problem.

A traveller approaching tribal territory from many parts of the administered districts of British India leaves cultivation and enters on a stretch of barren plain rising to a line of broken foothills. These foothills and belt of desert mark roughly the limit of tribal territory. The plain may be scrub-covered or bare, level or undulating, the general monotony broken seldom by any definite feature, though in winter nomadic tribesmen with their scattered groups of black tents and grazing flocks bring life to the scene. The line of foothills is cut at intervals, where the main watercourses from tribal territory have broken through, scarring the belt between hill and cultivation with deep ravines, and these with others of smaller origin give numerous covered ways for raiders between the plains and the hills.

Spaced so as to watch the chief routes following the water-courses, occasional small forts manned by Frontier Constabulary stand sentinel along the line of cultivation to protect villages in their neighbourhood from tribal raids. The main gateways into the hills, cut by water, are few, but in between them other smaller paths mostly fit only for men and unladen animals zigzag steeply over the foothill barrier. From here in general the country rises towards the Afghan border, the foothills changing from bare ridges to higher hills overgrown with scrub and holly oak, culminating in various parts in tree-clad mountains. In many places the sudden level of a plateau or broad plain breaks into the tangle of precipitous hills and valleys. The levels and valleys are cultivated where water and the will to work are sufficient, but both are scarce and undeveloped.

The country in most parts produces insufficient crops. Timber cut for firewood or into planks and poles is taken to the bazaars in the plains for barter. The reserves of timber are being gradually eaten into without replanting, and ere long this source of trade will be extinguished. Dwarf palm made into ropes and matting is also traded. These, together with the flocks and camels of the tribesmen, represent almost solely their means of living.

Certain of the poorer tribes are saved from semi-starvation by their tribal allowances paid by Government in the form of wages to tribal police or 'Khassadars,' in allowances to 'maliks,' and in money earned by work on roads. These 'maliks' are the leaders or headmen of the various tribes and their subsections and for the most part are hereditary.

The climate varies as greatly as the country. In winter, snow falls at an altitude of three to four thousand feet, and the cold is intense. In summer the heat in the lowlands is indescribable. The tribes about whom I write live in this belt of independent territory which lies between the administrative border, following roughly the line of the foothills, and the Afghan border or Durand line.

They are Pathans of the same race as their neighbours in the Frontier Province and in Afghanistan, and are separated from them by the arbitrary lines of these two boundaries which in places cut through the territories of individual tribes. Numerous families of these tribes are semi-migratory within their own limits, moving according to the seasons with their flocks, and living partly in caves or in goats' hair tents and other shelters, near the

foothills in winter, and in their villages in the highlands in summer.

The Pathan is very jealous of the freedom of his barren hills, his feelings perhaps being best described by his own proverb to the effect that everyone considers his own country to be like Kashmir, and he resents the tactless breaking of his tribal privacy as much as that of his own home and of his women's purdah. His bad characteristics, such as treachery and greed, are largely due to poverty and to a public opinion which condones murder, the bloodfeud, faction feeling and revenge. His ignorance leads to a foolish conceit and intolerance towards those who do not believe in the Muslim faith, a religion about which he sometimes knows little, but of which he is a fanatical follower. These characteristics combined with a liking for excitement and trouble make him an easy dupe for the religious firebrand and agitator. The picture is dark, but in many cases it is difficult to paint it dark enough to do justice to the grown-up generation of certain tribes who have, in addition, been further spoiled by our own uncertain dealings with them. Kindness is mistaken for weakness by such people, who only understand stern justice and strong control.

The other side of the picture shows that many, when freed from the shackles of environment, are able to put aside these characteristics. This fact, together with their sense of humour, courage, their hospitality and intelligence, make them an attractive people.

Tribal fighting values vary considerably from the good tough fighting spirit of people such as the Mahsuds to the poor but fanatical fighting qualities of tribes such as the Lower Dauris. Sufficient rifles and low cunning, combined with endurance, marvellous speed across country and inbred tactical sense make even tribes of little courage potentially dangerous.

These tribes are not subject to the laws of British India, and pay, with few exceptions, no revenue. The greater part of the tribal territory is divided into Political Agencies, and the Political Agents concerned carry out their duties under the orders of the Governor of the N. W. F. P. and the A. G. G. in Baluchistan who are responsible to the Governor-General for these tribal areas. To complicate affairs, certain tribes are controlled in the same way by the Deputy Commissioners of the adjoining settled districts.

Control where possible is exercised by the political authorities through the 'maliks' and the tribal council or 'jirgah.' The

'maliks' are numerous and are paid allowances for their services varying from small amounts in most cases, to larger sums in a few. These 'maliks' are not necessarily great leaders, but may be weak men occupying hereditary positions. The Pathan is exceedingly democratic, as is shown at these tribal councils or 'jirgahs' where any man may voice an opinion. The tribal 'maliks' lead such opinion as far as they are able, but having no dependable organisation behind them other than their own individual followings, and being the slaves of faction feelings, they are generally unable to exercise wide control. Decisions of 'jirgahs' or orders of the political authorities with which strong public opinion disagrees often cannot be enforced. Such hostile opinion is generally centred in the natural leaders thrown up in times of war and raiding. These men attract to themselves the more adventurous and discontented elements and through personality, ruthlessness and courage often gain a leading position in the councils of the tribe. Such men, unless they be induced by acceptance of 'maliks' or 'Khassadars' allowances to co-operate, or unless their influence is crushed by force, remain a menace. Tribal law which is based upon Islamic law is enforced only when public feeling demands it, and normally the law that might is right supersedes all others.

Behind all looms the power of the mullahs or religious leaders. These have produced a succession of turbulent priests who have kept alive the fanatical spirit of the tribes, and whose drums throbbing and echoing across the hills may still suddenly lure a peaceful tribe to war, and render the 'maliks' powerless to restrain them. In fairness it should be said that certain mullahs do exercise a wholesome restraint and are a good influence, but others, whose religion is a cloak for self-seeking, hatred, intolerance and fanaticism, fill the pages of frontier history with tales of bloodshed.

These then are some of the difficulties with which we must contend. A hard country breeding poverty with its attendant evils. Ignorance and a misguided public opinion breeding treachery and fanaticism. Collectively a picture of democracy at its worst with a many-tongued tribal council, unable to enforce its decisions through lack of unity and any organised force to back its authority. This does not apply to the Northern 'Khanates' such as Dir, Swat and Chitral, whose rulers are virtual dictators, and who generally possess the forces necessary to impose their authority, or to some extent to a few of the tribal leaders of Baluchistan.

I have attempted to describe the country and people so as to give some background to the problem, and further, before suggesting a solution, must make a short excursion into recent history; for "where there is no knowledge of the past, there can be no vision of the future."

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Some hundred years ago the British took over the riverain tracts of the present North-West Frontier Province, and from that time a gradual infiltration into the bordering hills has taken place. This infiltration has been caused partly by the need of tribal control, partly to protect trade, and partly by the old siren 'strategy' ever beckoning from the horizon. The salients thus occupied were held for the most part by regular troops who together with those along the foothills, were engaged continuously in a life of raid and counter-raid with the neighbouring tribes. During the last years of the nineteenth century, however, there occurred the birth of certain Corps of locally enlisted tribal levies and militias, trained and led by British officers, who were entrusted under the orders of the Political officers concerned, with the duty of maintaining law and order in their own tribal limits.

Such Corps were the Zhob Levy Corps, the Kurram Militia, and the Khyber Rifles, and it is with these, and similar corps that my story is largely concerned.

It is a story of patient endurance, hard work and loyalty, stained at intervals, in areas such as the Khyber and Waziristan with infidelity and treachery, and it is a purpose of this essay to try and show the reasons for such weaknesses when they have occurred. The first picture of these Corps is of the Khyber Rifles, all local tribesmen, who were garrisoning the Khyber Pass in isolated posts, when the great tribal rising of 1897 occurred. There were no regular troops in the Pass, and their British officers had been recalled to Peshawar when the rising threatened. The Khyber Rifles were attacked by very large bodies of their own tribesmen, and the smaller garrisons, some of less than twenty rifles, evacuated their posts in face of superior opposition. Ali Masjid with a strength of some 100 rifles, put up a short defence until ammunition became scarce. The garrison of Landi Kotal, some 370 strong, but completely isolated and unsupported, defended their post for a day and a night against heavy attacks by their own kith and kin, and inflicted over 200 casualties on the attackers. The garrison ceased fire on hearing of the capture of the smaller forts and on being told the false news that regular

troops had evacuated Jamrud, and that the British were in danger in Peshawar itself. It seems that, if in those days it had been possible to make known the true situation by wireless, and if Air support had been available, the story might have been different.

Before leaving this incident, it is interesting to note some of the reasons which led to the rising. The tribes were worried by the recent delimitation of the boundary with Afghanistan, and saw in it a threat to their independence. In this they were supported by the mullahs, ever jealous of any curtailment of their power and influence. Again the garbled accounts which were spread of the original outbreak of the rising at Maizar in the Upper Tochi, and of the Turkish victories over the Greeks, show the ease with which fanaticism can be aroused amongst ignorant tribesmen, and their interest in world as well as tribal affairs, and also show the vital need to counter rumour and false propaganda by every means possible.

HISTORY FROM 1900—1920.

The twentieth century opened with an orgy of raiding and other outrages which were the work of that irrepressible tribe, the Mahsuds. These offences had been gaining momentum since 1898, and on 1st December 1900 a blockade of the tribe was commenced. After nearly a year of blockade, raids and outrages still continued, so that beginning in November 1901 operations were varied with a series of sharp counter-attacks by mobile columns into the heart of Mahsud country. These succeeded in breaking the spirit of the tribe for a while, and in January 1902 they sued for peace.

This third blockade of the tribe since the first campaign of 1880 had again shown them to be less sensitive to such an operation than tribes like the Afridis which are dependent on the adjoining settled districts economically and for winter grazing. As an example of this, as also of the danger of weak discipline in small isolated posts, here is a brief account of the capture of the South Waziristan Militia Post at Kashmir Kar during the blockade in 1901. Kashmir Kar lies well inside Zilli Khel Wazir grazing limits south of the Gomal river, bordering Baluchistan. Mahsuds grazing their flocks in this area on account of the blockade noticed the slackness of the Militia garrison who left but one sentry on the main gate of the post during the afternoon siesta. The leader of a gang of Mahsuds bent on mischief gradually made acquaintance with the garrison, and frequently passed the post

with his sheep. Collecting his gang in dead ground near the fort one warm afternoon, he approached the sentry at the main gate with a request for a drink of water. As the sentry turned to draw the water, he was throttled from behind, whereupon the gang entered and attacked the somnolent, taking thirty rifles. One follower, feigning death, alone survived to carry the news to Kajuri Kach.

This most unfortunate incident, typical of a frontier the seeming peace of whose sleeping hills has so often hidden sudden attack, must serve as an introduction to the North and South Waziristan Militias, raised in the summer of 1900. Their duties were to relieve the Regular Army, as far as possible, of police work in Waziristan. This work, carried out in a country whose inhabitants were armed, requires correspondingly suitable armament, military training and tactics. These corps were composed largely of local and other transborder tribesmen, and did good work in co-operation with the military columns during the winter of 1901.

Mention of these militias brings us to the subject of the new era in frontier policy and administration, which was the work of Lord Curzon whose Viceroyalty had just begun. This great Viceroy separated the Frontier Province from the Punjab under whose distant and somewhat unsuitable administration the country had been governed from Lahore. At the same time, as already mentioned, the duties of 'watch and ward' were handed over as far as possible to tribal militias, whilst the occupation by, and operations of, the Army in tribal territory were correspondingly limited. These reforms were later followed by military reorganisation in which the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force, previously responsible for 'watch and ward' along the border, became absorbed into the Regular Army.

The reputation of the South Waziristan Militia suffered from time to time through the murder of various British officers at the instigation of the notorious Mullah Powindah, which led to the disbandment of four hundred Mahsuds in this corps. Apart from these incidents and an occasional minor disaster such as the capture by Mahsuds of Tut Narai Post in North Waziristan, the militias successfully carried out their duties of policing tribal territory until 1919. After the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon ended the policy of sympathetic control once more swung back to that of the more frequent use of punitive, burn-and-scuttle military operations.

In the course of this paper it is not possible to mention the many minor operations which occurred along the border before and during the period of the Great War, but suffice it to say that thanks to the attitude of the Amir Habibullah during the war the Indian Government was faced with no major adventure. Despite this, tribal unrest brought about by minor Afghan intervention and World chaos, locked up considerable numbers of troops for frontier control.

Habibullah was murdered in 1919 and was succeeded by his son Amanullah who, encouraged by reports of unrest in India and the Punjab, invaded British territory, declaring a 'jihad.' From a military point of view the Third Afghan War showed how a war-weary and hastily trained army with one hand tied behind its back by finance and caution was more than a match for the ill-equipped and ill-trained Afghan forces of that time.

The Afghans were defeated, but in the peace that followed were granted full political independence. In tribal areas, the campaign threw into high relief the weaknesses of our political policy and control. The militia system in the Khyber and Waziristan broke down. The Khyber Rifles, being considered unreliable were disbanded at the outset of the war, whilst the threat of General Nadir Khan's invasion of the Kurram, followed by the evacuation of the Upper Tochi militia posts caused the subsequent desertion of the transborder elements. This was followed by the tragic happenings at Wana and the evacuation of it and other posts in South Waziristan accompanied by wholesale desertion and treachery on the part of the Afridis and Wazirs in those posts. As a result, although the Third Afghan War was quickly ended, Waziristan went up in flames.

Then followed the fierce and bloody campaign of 1919-20, in which a force in part ill-trained, sometimes dispirited and badly mauled, eventually beat the tribesmen to their knees after fighting its way into the heart of Mahsud country. This victory was in great part due to the fine leadership of a man who knew the frontier as intimately as he understood the feelings and capabilities of his troops.

What are the lessons that can be drawn from this period?

One perhaps is the difficulty of solving this frontier problem when policy is changed before it has a chance to accomplish its aim. Another is the difficulty of military control owing to the fact that the enemy cannot be driven back against a wall, and seldom can be ringed from behind since they can so easily slip

across the Durand line when hard pressed. This fact makes the problem an entirely different one from that of the French control of the Atlas tribes in North Africa.

Again, we learn that the militias as then organised and constituted, could not stand the strain of invasion followed by the evacuation of forward posts and of a religious 'jihad,' although they had shown themselves capable, with minor setbacks, of carrying out their work of watch and ward in tribal territory. What were the reasons for this breakdown? and can the shock of major invasion be expected to be borne by such corps?

It seems that despite a large proportion of local enlistments the system was not sufficiently incorporated in the tribal life and was looked upon in peace as a fairly tolerable yet 'foreign' organisation, and therefore fair game for occasional mischief. In war, owing to this 'foreign' element, every blow to the militia was a blow to British prestige, and therefore the militias were a target for tribal attack. Isolated posts of such corps where communications are vulnerable, and when out of harmony with tribal life, prove a danger and merely useless commitments in the event of major operations and increase, instead of ease, the problem. Is it not possible to use a system more in touch with tribal life, not meant rigidly to take the strain of invasion, but sufficiently elastic to give before the force of such opposition without loss of prestige?

HISTORY 1920—1939

Shortly after the campaign of 1919-20, and the subsequent months of occasional fighting, a new half forward policy was started in Waziristan. Regular troops occupied Razmak, the Lower Tochi and later occupied Wana. To supplement these and provide civil control, two new corps of South Waziristan and Tochi Scouts were raised from the ashes of the old militias. 'Khassadars' or tribal police were also put at the disposal of the political authorities for escort duty, road protection and, in limited ways, the maintenance of order.

The two new corps of Scouts differed in composition from the former militias in that a much larger proportion of the strength was enlisted from the cis-border tribes of the North-West Frontier and a smaller proportion was enlisted locally and from other trans-border tribesmen, a composition which gave added reliability. The Gomal and Wana were not reoccupied by permanent Scouts posts; but most of the remaining larger posts

were again occupied, and gradually new ones were built extending control over a considerable area, though leaving the outer belt of country adjoining the Durand Line, the Ahmedzai Salient, and a larger bloc in central Waziristan, including Bhattani country unpoliced.

The tendency was to occupy larger posts, and patrol in greater numbers than hitherto. These new corps soon showed the tribesmen that they were fully capable of carrying out their normal duties of patrolling, protecting roads, arresting individuals or surrounding villages and encampments to arrest gangs or levy fines on livestock, and whatever other task they were required to do to enforce control in the areas occupied. Later, they showed themselves to be equally formidable in war when they more than fully maintained the good reputation earned in more peaceful times, acting either independently or in co-operation with regular forces, whose backing they require, in the face of very heavy opposition. In peace the Scouts were tolerated, on the whole good humouredly, by the inhabitants of those areas that were in reach of patrols, they far preferred their presence to that of troops; but still the fact remained that they were 'foreign' and, in war, fair game.

Much lower down the scale, are the 'Khassadars' so much in harmony with tribal life that they very closely reflect it, and who particularly in war and time of tribal unrest are in large part not dependable, being totally without training or discipline, occupying small posts, mostly unsupported and indefensible.

With the increase in strength of the regular army of occupation, and of the scouts, and the number of posts and forts, came the roads. These, together with the supply and tactical bases formed by posts, eased the problem of military or scouts' control; but it cannot be said that they have proved to be roads of peace. Roads assist control, but they do not in themselves solve the problem of the causes which necessitate control. They should however, given settled conditions, eventually increase trade with the tribal areas.

I have wandered from the story, and will return to history. In 1929, the Barakzai dynasty suffered temporary eclipse, at the hands of Bacha Saqao, the water carrier; who, carried high on the wave of indignation which swept Amanullah and his unpopular reforms out of Afghanistan, found himself a king. This impossible regime was quickly and skilfully ended by Nadir Khan, the uncle of Amanullah who, thanks largely to the help of the

Waziristan tribes, fought his way to Kabul. This is only one of the recent occasions on which our tribesmen have taken a leading part in attacks on the existing regime in Afghanistan—attacks which have, with the exception of King Nadir Khan's, fortunately been failures. This potential menace of attacks by our tribes largely dictates frontier policy, and except in the case of tribes over which we have large economic control, entails some form of occupation in order that we may prevent such attacks from recurring.

This failure on the part of Amanullah to bring about social progress throws an interesting light on the dangers of reforms tactlessly introduced into a Pathan country. The strength of mullahs and other enemies of progress is great, and they see in it a danger to their own powers and interests. The problem if approached must be approached with tact, backed by good propaganda and education.

Returning to our own frontier after the post-war lull, unrest swept through the border again in 1930. The old trade winds of trouble from the west and north had been added to by more frequent gusts from the east. Little matter that these eastern gusts were as yet chiefly 'wind'; to the ignorant mind they bore the semblance of reality. Political changes backed by lying and unscrupulous propaganda, giving to the ignorant tribes the impression that the British were weakening, at first led to somewhat half-hearted repercussions, involving the Mahsuds, Afridis, Mohmands, and Utam Khels in trouble.

Embarrassment to the British through unrest among the Border tribes must increasingly be looked upon as an asset by those who in open enmity or with hatred concealed by the cloak of political freedom wish to see the downfall of the British. The ignorance of most of the people, worked upon by the unscrupulous propaganda of agitators, makes possible the belief of any lie.

In 1932, the North-West Frontier Province was brought into line with the remaining provinces of India, becoming a Governor's Province, with its own legislative council. In the same year the Frontier Crimes Regulation was withdrawn, and with its withdrawal, the brakes on violent crime were weakened. In 1935, the Government of India Act followed with its wide powers conferred upon an elected Provincial Government. These events in the administered districts caused a deep impression in tribal territory, the belief that the British were on the run, being strengthened by speeches, some openly seditious, made during

elections by agitators in the guise of politicians in the bazaars adjoining tribal territory. To the ignorant tribesmen such license of speech could only be a sign of extreme weakness, and wonder gave way to contempt.

In 1935 the Afridis had agreed to certain roadmaking and educational projects in Tirah in exchange for enlistment being reopened in the army. As a result of agitation by the 'Sarishta' party, or faction which was opposed to the 'maliks,' and those of the tribe in favour of this road, the project had to be abandoned. The 'Sarishta' party were encouraged by agitators from British India, and naturally by men in tribal territory such as the mullahs, who saw in these activities for the good of the tribe, a weakening of their own authority. The maliks were unable to overcome this formidable opposition.

In Waziristan, apart from the unrest of 1930, there was a long spell of comparative peace from 1922 onwards which was finally broken in November 1936. The causes of this peaceful period seem to be first that the Mahsuds and Wazirs had in 1919-20 been very badly hit and required a long period to recover from loss of blood. Secondly, money flowed into the country on a scale unheard of before the war: money for allowances, for construction of roads and forts and for contracts in connection with supplying the army. Again, Britain had shown her strength after the stern struggle of the Great War. Combined perhaps with these reasons was the less tangible one that the tribes could occasionally be controlled by men with strong personality and sympathy backed by understanding, and these prevented unrest in their own time.

In 1930 the tide began to turn. Political agitation from British India had its repercussions which gradually gathered in strength with the years.

As a result of political reforms the influence of the District Officers and headmen in the settled districts adjoining tribal territory was much weakened, and therefore the high degree of co-operation necessary between the settled districts and tribal areas, to deal with the problems of outlaws and mischief makers, and also of defence against tribal raids, was made more difficult.

The stream of money weakened, and the tribes forgot their punishment, as a new generation which had not been castigated grew up. Following this and the growing feeling that the British were weakening came the cry of "Islam is in danger" so that once more the drums began to speak. The ostensible reasons for this religious outcry were the Shahidganj Mosque dispute

with the Sikhs in Lahore, and the Islam Bibi case in which a Hindu girl from Bannu was forcibly abducted by a Muslim and later returned by law to her Hindu parents. Violent propaganda on account of these and other incidents calculated to rouse fanaticism continued through the summer of 1936. The chief instigator of this agitation, the Faqir of Ipi, remained at large. After some months of violent propaganda, the tribes became angry, and eventually lost their temper and slender stock of reason. Two columns which advanced into the lower Khaisora where the Faqir of Ipi had collected a lashkar, were strongly opposed. The rest of the story is well known.

After three years of war and minor skirmishing, Waziristan still remains unsettled. A lull through tiredness, winter migration, and other reasons may occur; but the symptoms of unrest in the shape of raids and small attacks continue. With firm and tactful handling, and with favourable outside conditions, a period of peace may ensue. In certain ways peace may be bought; but the past has shown that once cupidity is aroused it must be kept satisfied and ever becomes more rapacious. Peace cannot permanently be maintained by these methods, for the root causes of trouble remain and it only needs a sufficient jolt to these causes for the flimsy structure on top to collapse.

Therefore until a policy is evolved which will deal with these root causes troubles must recur. Much has been done in the past three years in strengthening the machinery of control by construction of roads and posts; and this is not a criticism of the measures taken, both military and political, which have succeeded in restraining the tribes to a great degree, despite lack of a policy, and perhaps with only cautious backing from an oft-bitten Finance.

Before ending this historical survey, mention must be made of the recent Afridi troubles in which an Afridi lashkar, stirred up by agents of Amanullah, entered Afghanistan to be driven back by Afghan troops and tribesmen. The incident once more shows the inability of the 'maliks' to exercise control. It also shows once again the necessity for control in some form or other in order to prevent such attacks by our tribes on the present Afghan government. History has shown that Waziristan is not very sensitive to the weapon of blockade, being as yet insufficiently dependent for grazing and for trade on British India. The Afridi is more sensitive, as the recent successful blockade has shown. In winter especially, the tribe depends to a great extent

for its grazing on the Khajuri plain which was occupied by us in 1930 in retaliation for the disturbances of that year. This does not mean that some degree of internal control is not wanted. Without such control, the unwieldy and unpopular system of exacting tribal responsibility must be more often enforced, bringing punishment on the just and unjust alike.

THE FUTURE

In order to profit from looking into the mirror of history it is essential to be unbiassed. This, whatever its faults is an attempt to look without prejudice.

The main lesson appears to be that the root cause of the trouble has never been cured. This is, the weakness of the 'maliks' and other influences working for law and order in the face of an intense democracy and against the power of the mullahs and hostile elements. The latter are aided by ignorance, poverty and a low standard of public opinion. Discontent through possibly uneven distribution of allowances and the repercussions of events in the outside world distorted by lying and unchecked propaganda also help the trouble-maker. A strong sense of freedom and dislike of foreign control, more pronounced in certain regions than in others, is also a factor to be reckoned with. Into some of these regions we may have been drawn by strategy as well as for reasons of control, and it seems that if other means of control can be substituted in such places the demands of strategy should be modified as much as possible.

There are tribal areas such as the Khaiber which it is strategically necessary to occupy. Such areas, partly because they are recognised trade routes, are not so sensitive and the strategic necessity of occupation is recognised. Again, we see the lack of continuity in any strong policy and that the only policy which showed signs of success was partly based on a militia system which broke down in war. We see the weaknesses of such a militia system to be the danger from fanaticism and the fact that it was still sufficiently 'foreign' to be a target for tribal attack in war. We also see the dangers of small isolated posts in peace and war. Lastly we see that the building of roads in itself will not solve the problem of the tribal areas, though roads are necessary for control and for this reason the more we can afford the better.

These then are some of the lessons which history can teach. The question remains how can they be applied to the problem of Waziristan and to other tribal areas. The writer put forward certain proposals for the control of Waziristan in a recent article.

These were briefly as follows: Political control was to be strengthened by an increase of scouts posts, and the formation of a Bhattani Militia to police the areas at present unpoliced. The new units would be found by transferring the strength of the present Frontier Constabulary to the Scouts and Bhattani Militia and by increasing the numbers available for 'gashting' by the formation of a Reserve Wing, armed with light automatics and mortars, who could take over the duties of post defence. When control had been established, the posts in the centre of the controlled zone would be handed over to a tribal militia, eventually leaving the outer arc of the controlled zone protected by scouts and regular troops against invasion from outside.

As already stated, thanks to criticism and further thought I have changed some of these ideas. From a study of past history and also from the lessons taught by recent happenings it would seem that a 'foreign' army, and in a lesser degree scouts, are an irritant and sometimes a dangerous commitment when stationed deep in tribal territory at the end of vulnerable communications. I think my previous ideas of protecting the outer arc of the controlled zone by regular troops and scouts to be wrong and suggest the eventual withdrawal of the army and scouts to positions governed by three factors. These are: reasonably secure communications, the need for economic and political control, and lastly, the control of raiding. The forward zones would be policed by local forces or properly trained tribal militia. This would not prevent scouts from occupying occasional camps in the forward zone which could be evacuated when not required without loss of prestige.

An increase in the number of automatic weapons of scouts would obviously increase the safety of posts, especially of small posts and picquets, and decrease the number of men required for their static defence. Again, although realising the dangers of small posts and the disadvantages of dispersal, it would seem that a few small posts for the protection of dangerous places on communications or for blocking raiders' paths would prove a further economy of force. Such posts would not only act as bases and as pivots for 'gashts' operating in their area, but would also decrease the numbers required for patrolling in their neighbourhood, and decrease the number of calls upon the army for the assistance of scouts, possibly at a time when their action was required elsewhere.

A small post armed with a gun on the Tabai Narai between Mir Ali and Spinwan might reasonably have prevented the numerous incidents and operations which have taken place on that road.

I realise that it would not be possible to transfer the entire strength of the Frontier Constabulary to scouts as a certain strength is necessary for gaining contact with raiders and for the protection of the settled districts. It still appears however that a proportion of the present strength of the Frontier Constabulary on the borders of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu could be better used by increasing Scouts, so as to obtain complete political control inside the whole tribal zone adjoining the administered districts, including Bhattani country and the Lower Shaktu, thus blocking the gateways along the whole foothill barrier.

Lastly, it is essential that the 'Khassadar' system be maintained until a more efficient tribal force can be evolved, chiefly as the system is in harmony with tribal life and is elastic enough for the members of a hostile section to be dismissed without the breakdown of the whole organisation.

Tribal militias might possibly be trained and administered through Scouts Corps, at any rate to begin with, and in part taken from their strength; but naturally such militias could not be expected to maintain the same high 'foreign' standards, especially of drill and discipline, as scouts nor their level of training be kept at unnatural heights.

The duties and location of a trained tribal militia would be as follows. They would occupy those posts which police forward and sensitive areas and areas difficult to support by ground troops in case of war. Their duties would be to carry out the work now done by scouts in those areas. They would form a tribal police at the disposal of the tribal 'jirgah' with the sanction of the political authorities, to enforce authority and form a rallying point for sane tribal opinion. Further to build up a sane public opinion, education, especially of the future leaders, must be encouraged, and propaganda spread against anti-social habits such as faction feeling and the blood-feud. Such propaganda can only be spread with good effect through men of tribal religion and race, and for this and other reasons the officering of the militia must eventually be made entirely tribal, thus also obviating the danger of fanaticism, and the feeling that the organisation is 'foreign.' It is possible that in the course of years a small and really educated class might be formed which would gradually be-

come the leaven of sanity for the whole tribe. Further, the militia would have a number of trained artificers and masons, so that in times of peace, apart from police duties, they might work on the improvement of irrigation, etc. Posts garrisoned by the militia should be if possible large ones to obviate the dangers attendant to small posts, and they should be equipped with wireless and be allowed to call on Air support, but would naturally not be given automatic weapons or guns. Finally the distribution of pay on the wide basis of the militia would much assist the economic problem, and the provision of pensions might prove a sheet-anchor when their loyalties were strained.

The duties and location of the Scouts would be as follows: They would occupy posts reasonably easy to support in war and with strong Lines of Communication. Their duties would be to act as an escort to the Political Authorities, to form a small mobile striking force which could be carried in armoured M.T., to support the Tribal Militia Wing, and lastly to prevent raiding and dominate winter grazing areas. The armament of Scouts would be improved to include a few four-wheel-drive armoured cars and armoured vehicles carrying mortars or small guns, thus enabling them to keep open their line of communications without army support unless against very heavy opposition. As already mentioned Light Automatics would be provided for static post defence and possibly a small proportion for 'gashts' or patrols.

The tribal Militia system could possibly be extended, as opportunity allowed, into sensitive areas like the Shaktu, and to the outer belt, bordering the Durand Line, to include tribes such as the Madda Khel.

Concurrent with the formation of Tribal Militias the Scout Wings and Regular Garrisons must gradually withdraw. The Scout Garrisons to posts as already mentioned; the Army, with the exception of small forward posts in such places as Manzai and Mir Ali from where they give a moral backing to the Scouts, could go back to the settled Districts.

This is not an advocacy of any withdrawal at a dangerous period leading to the results of 1919. Isolated incidents might occur where the difficulties of defence and of support outweigh the dangers of withdrawal, but as a general rule it would seem that the policy of Lyautey in North Africa during the last war, of holding the forward posts where possible, is essential. Owing to the recent use by tribal forces of guns and the possible improvement of tribal armament, isolated posts must have the necessary armament, including guns, to resist organised attack.

Next we come to the problem of raiding. This is caused partly by poverty but is chiefly the result of disturbed conditions in tribal territory. Such conditions are encouraged by the fact that in long stretches of territory adjoining British India there is weak political control, owing to a lack of police forces in these territories. The interception of raiding gangs is largely a problem of time and space, and it is considered that the present Frontier Constabulary posts are sited so as to give the raiders an unnecessary start, built as they are for the most part some miles from the foothills barrier or base line of the raiding gangs. It is considered that the duty of intercepting the raiding gangs must be primarily that of Scouts posts, sited to watch the main gateways from inside the foothill barrier where the gateways are fewer and tactical positions are stronger than in the plains. The duty of a smaller and more mobile Frontier Constabulary would be to gain contact with gangs and transmit news of them by pack wireless. They would naturally, where possible, also intercept gangs.

At the beginning of this paper an attempt was made to describe the country bordering the foothills, in which the Frontier Constabulary operates. This is largely featureless and lacking in tactical positions which give good command. On the other hand it is for the greater part reasonable country for mounted troops, and across which tracks suitable for mechanical transport can be found or made. There are exceptional tracts, such as the Bhain Pass, which are suitable only for infantry.

It is possible that a larger proportion of the Frontier Constabulary should consist of Mounted Infantry than at present. A few Frontier Constabulary posts, garrisoned by mobile groups of Mounted Infantry backed by motorised forces concentrated at Bannu and Tank, would seem sufficient to police the border, provided that the foothills and belt of adjoining tribal territory were strongly held.

Before leaving the subject of Frontier Constabulary, would it not be an eventual economy to amalgamate the separate organisations of Scouts and Constabulary? The specialised police work of the Frontier Constabulary in the settled districts could be supervised by police officers attached for this duty. Better opportunities for training would be afforded to units engaged in areas at present policed by Frontier Constabulary by taking their turn in policing tribal territory, and occasional relief from continuous service in tribal areas would be afforded to Scouts. The breaking down of water-tight compartments between civil armed Forces should lead to the more fluid use of reserves, and might make economies in total numbers possible.

The proposals have not mentioned other tribal areas. Is it possible that the Militia idea could be extended to certain tribes such as the Afridis and Lower Mohmands? For instance the old Khyber Rifles might be reformed, and when sufficiently strong might give the friendly maliks the backing necessary to extend the road into the Bazaar Valley, protected by their own posts. They might also eventually take over the Khajuri plain posts, releasing garrisons of Regular Troops for more normal work. A sufficient nucleus of trained men exists to form such Militias in many tribes. For instance the Mahsuds can draw on their company which was serving with the Regular Army, and those serving with the Kurram Militia for, although they have done good work at times, their reliability as yet is not sufficient to warrant retention in service outside their own tribal limits. The Bhattanis could draw on the South Waziristan Scouts and Frontier Constabulary, and the Afridis on the Scouts and numerous ex-soldiers.

CONCLUSION

The idea of raising locally enlisted Tribal Militias may seem Utopian, but the writer believes some such solution the only hope of real peace. As has been shown by the examples quoted from History, the records of such local Tribal Militias have been stained by treachery and lack of discipline. On the other hand it seems that in the past we did not handle them always with a full understanding of their weaknesses, not only did we expose their loyalties to exceptional strains, but failed to support them when in need of support. There are great risks involved in the raising of such forces, but if the record of good work which such corps have performed be remembered, and the lessons learnt from history be applied, the risks seem worth taking.

A considerable time must elapse before any such scheme can be completed. We must look years ahead, into an unknown new world in which Militarism will be detested and Air bombing condemned. If we are to be ready for such a time the foundations must be laid now and the training, and above all the education, of the younger generation, on whose shoulders such a scheme will rest, must begin at once.

As already stated earlier in this paper, the clouds are gathering and it is hard to see clearly how and where they will break. We have seen that the tribes take an immense interest in world events, and although to a fair extent they are shrewd judges, their ignorance makes them a good target for any propaganda. There are signs that many may be with us in this struggle; this

may be, but money also speaks, and there are many strange cross-currents of hatred and self-seeking let loose to bewilder and carry away ignorant men.

War aims are as necessary for the tribes as for other men, and perhaps the inauguration of some scheme such as that proposed might harness their energies and their thoughts to the exclusion of more harmful ideas. This is a plea also for the many men at present employed in the control of Waziristan, working in uncomfortable and unfriendly surroundings. If control can eventually be accomplished without locking up troops in such places, then no question of prestige or waste of money should be allowed to stand in the way of their withdrawal. That they will be necessary for a time is self-evident, as any scheme such as this needs time to develop, and the forces of reaction backed by the ignorance of the grown-up generations will possibly make the latter fight for their threatened powers.

Eventually if regular troops are withdrawn, and if this withdrawal leads to better relations with the Tribes, prestige will not have suffered, and, eventually also, the tax-payer may get some value for his money.

"MORE THAN FIFTY YEARS AGO"

*Extract from a Memorandum by the Duke of Wellington
on Sir W. H. Macnaughton's letter of
26th October, 1841*

(THE RETREAT FROM KABUL STARTED ON 6 JAN. 1842 AND
THE WHOLE FORCE PERISHED.)

But Mr. Macnaughton has discovered that the Company's troops are not sufficiently active personally, nor are they sufficiently well armed for the warfare in Afghanistan. Very possibly an Afghan will run over his native hills faster than an Englishman or a Hindoo. But we have carried on war in hill countries, as well as in Hindostan and the Deccan as in the Spanish Peninsula; and I never heard that our troops were not equal, as well in personal activity as by their arms, to contend with and overcome any natives of hills whatever. Mr. Macnaughton ought to have learnt by this time that hill countries are not conquered, and their inhabitants kept in subjection, solely by running up the hills and firing at long distances. The whole of a hill country

of which it is necessary to keep possession, particularly for the communications of the army, should be occupied by sufficient bodies of troops, well supplied, and capable of maintaining themselves; and not only not a Ghilzye or insurgent should be able to run up and down hills, but not a cat or a goat, except under the fire of those occupying the hills. This is the mode of carrying on the war, and not by hiring Afghans with long matchlocks* to protect and defend the communications of the British army.

Shah Soojah Khan may have in his service any troops that he and Mr. Macnaughton please. But if the troops in the service of the East India Company are not able, armed and equipped as they are, to perform the service required of them in Central Asia, I protest against their being left in Afghanistan. It will not do to raise, pay, and discipline matchlock men, in order to protect the British troops and their communications discovered by Mr. Macnaughton to be no longer able to protect themselves.

WELLINGTON.

29th January, 1842. At night.

* Nowadays called Khassadars.

POLITICAL COMMISSARS IN THE SOVIET ARMY

By CAPT. G. H. NASH, 16TH. PUNJAB REGIMENT

I—REVOLUTIONARY YEARS 1917—20.

Although in process of disintegration, even before February 1917, the Imperial Russian Army still maintained some semblance of cohesion under Kerensky's Provisional Government. However, in almost every regiment, soldiers' committees were set up, and whilst the Provisional Government—which can hardly be said to have governed—gave lip service to the policy of continuing to fight, its War Minister, Sokolov, published the famous Order No. 1 "The declaration of soldiers rights," which gave further impetus to the process of disintegration.

"Delegates" of every socialist political shade visited the front in large numbers and addressed the troops. They attacked the authority of the officers and advised the soldiers to return to their villages in time to share in the redistribution of land.

In a welter of personal and party rivalries the Bolsheviks alone were an organised and disciplined political party and, unlike the rest, they knew what they wanted. They concentrated early on securing predominance in the soldiers' and sailors' committees, and special Bolshevik Military Commissions were established for this purpose at Petrograd, at the front, and in the Baltic Fleet.

In some units the officers were simply dismissed and the soldiers chose their own leaders and decided to go home. In other units soldiers' committees arrested the officers and sent them to the Bolshevik Military Commissions. Finally, there were units in which all the officers were shot. These soldiers' committees formed the first link between the Bolshevik Party, and the Armed Forces, and were the forerunners of the appointment of Political Commissars. At first their role was purely destructive, but after the October (1917) Revolution, in which the Bolsheviks seized the reins of Government and were faced with the urgent necessity of creating a Red Army, these committees were given the task of controlling, rather than undermining, the authority of the officers. Even before the October Revolution Bolshevik agitators were given some form of military training before being sent to the Army and a desperate effort was made to form a new army out of the demoralised red units of the old. It was soon seen that

this effort was foredoomed to failure, so the Bolsheviks demobilised what was left of the old Imperial forces and began to raise the Red Army in February 1918. Before this, they relied almost entirely on the Red Guards, who were workers armed and organised on military lines.

With the growth of the Red Army the need for experienced commanders became acute. Tzarist officers were soon employed in large numbers, and in order to maintain the revolutionary character of the Soviet forces, Political Commissars were appointed to the headquarters of all units and formations.

Armies were commanded by Revolutionary Councils of War which consisted of the Army Commander and the commissars attached to him. Friction was inevitable, and although Commissars were not supposed to interfere in purely military questions, they often did and the fighting efficiency of a unit or formation suffered gravely in consequence. In August 1918 Trotsky published the following Army Order:

"I note that quarrels between commissars and military leaders have lately been increasing. From the evidence at my disposal it is apparent that commissars often take a directly wrong line of action, either by usurping operative and leadership functions, or by poisoning the relations between officer and man by a policy of petty quibbling carried out in a spirit of undignified rivalry. At the same time it not infrequently happens that the presence of the commissar does not prevent the military commander from deserting to the enemy. In view of these circumstances, I must bring the following facts to the notice of all commissars:

- (1) A commissar is not there to give orders, but to watch. He must watch carefully and sharply.
- (2) A commissar must behave respectfully to military experts who fulfil their duties conscientiously, and must protect their rights and human dignities by all the means of the Soviet authority.
- (3) A commissar must not seek quarrels, but if he finds it necessary to intervene, his intervention must be effective.
- (4) Offences against this order will be subject to severe penalties.
- (5) A commissar who fails to prevent the desertion of a commanding officer will have to answer for his negligence with his own life."

So much for the shortcomings of these early political commissars. Besides preventing the desertion of the commanding officer they had many other responsibilities. They had always to be by the side of the officer commanding when orders or instructions were received or issued, during an inspection, or when the regiment went into action. During an engagement they were required to set an example to the troops by taking a part in the fighting. All orders issued by the commanding officer were scrutinized and countersigned by them, and besides "procuring and managing all supplies needed by the regiment"—no mean feat in 1918—20—they were required to direct and supervise all departments of the regimental staff. Each regiment had an assistant commissar, who was also quartermaster and transport officer. Last, but not least by any means, the commissar was responsible for organising and conducting political work. How a commissar could direct and supervise all departments of the regimental staff without coming into constant and violent collision with the regimental commander is a question which perhaps not even Trotsky could answer.

II.—THE YEARS BEFORE THE PURGE OF 1937

In the next fifteen years the role of the Political Commissar underwent considerable change. It must have been assumed that during this period the Workers and Peasants' Red Army had become a component part of the Bolshevik life and thought, and that the political views of those officers of the old army who still remained were now in complete harmony with those of the Soviet Government. Indeed, at least one writer maintains that Tuchachevsky, "at one time Commander-in-Chief designate for the Red Army in war," went to the other extreme; he refused to denounce Trotsky and regarded Stalin as the betrayer of the Revolution.

In the Soviet Field Service Regulations issued in 1936 the duties of the Political Commissars were given in great detail. Although still concerned with supply and transport, by far their most important work was that of educating the troops politically and morally, and inculcating in them a high sense of discipline, and a spirit of patriotism and self sacrifice.

"Political work," to quote these regulations, "must be directed to maintaining the fighting spirit of the troops and strengthening and raising the fighting efficiency of the Red Army, at the same time closely uniting the troops around the Party of Lenin and Stalin and the Soviet Government.

Political work must create in every commander and Red Soldier love of his country and the will to carry out to the end his sacred duty of defending the Socialist Fatherland.

"Political work will be directed to creating in every soldier and commander a high sense of discipline, determination, self-sacrifice, military enthusiasm, initiative, decisiveness, steadfastness in battle, and the will to bear the privations of active service conditions"

After demanding that Commissars should set a high personal example at all times and that they should, in battle, "be where an individual example of self-denial and heroism is demanded," the regulations enumerated their administrative duties. These may be roughly divided into two: supply and transport duties, which have already been mentioned, and what may be summarised as "humanitarian and welfare duties" calculated to endear the political commissar to the hearts of Red Soldiers and prisoners of war alike. "Political Commissars," went on the regulations, "must continually interest themselves in the material needs of the troops." They were ordered to see that the troops get their food in good time and to test its quality. They were responsible for good relations between the Army and local populations and therefore took part in billeting arrangements.

The Commissars were required to take special care of their own and enemy wounded, gas-contaminated, or sick, and to ensure that arrangements were made for their evacuation and feeding. With regard to prisoners, they were further required to carry out political work amongst them to secure their protection from enemy air or gas action, and to arrange for their early evacuation from the front.

Besides ensuring that the troops were kept in touch with their homes, political commissars had also to organise their recreation. In addition to political lectures this included concerts, folk dancing, community singing, listening-in and entertainment by mobile cinema units.

Finally the commissar was made responsible for counter-espionage and for combating all that is summarised to-day in the phrase "fifth column activities."

The main point of interest in this long list of duties is that they all possessed some political significance, either as direct party action, such as lectures on political themes, or indirect action, such as the various welfare activities, calculated to endear the commissar—and through him the Bolshevik Party which he represented—to the hearts of the soldiers.

Although required to supervise supply and transport, it appears from these regulations that political commissars no longer occupied a position in which their duties might clash with those of a commanding officer. Quite a workable balance had been achieved between Party and Army interests.

III.—THE PURGE AND AFTER

In June 1937 Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven Soviet Generals were shot. "For dogs—a dog's death" said a leading article in "Pravda," and added that "eight military spies have been smashed on behalf of a people of many millions." The men executed were for the most part men who had made the Red Army; but the Red Army, having reached a high state of efficiency, began to slip away from the Party and to become a law unto itself; then Stalin destroyed its high commanders, and this was merely a prelude to wholesale shootings both of commissars and executive officers in all the services, the purge also extending to the civil administration and to industry.

The drive to bring the Army back to the Party was bound to influence greatly the status and activities of Political Commissars, indeed their status was at once enhanced and they became the superiors of the officers to whom they were attached.

Since the purge big changes have been made in the curriculum at the Lenin Military Political Academy, which is the training centre for commissars of all the services. The Academy was moved to Moscow in 1938. In the same year, Voroshilov made a speech in which he said: "Commissars have more responsibility than anyone else in the Army. The commander and the commissar are together the unit of leadership in military and political training and in the education of a military unit. They are both responsible for the military, political, moral, administrative and domestic state of efficiency of their unit. They will both lead their unit or formation into battle. It is most necessary therefore that every effort should be made to develop qualities of leadership in every commander, commissar and chief in the Red Army. The commissar has a special responsibility in this respect."

A system of dual command had been introduced and henceforth the military commander was to do nothing without the approval and co-operation of the commissar. Whereas the commissar had formerly been the father and spirit of the regiment he was now also to be at least an equal partner in its training and leadership. This new role demanded a high standard of

military as well as political training, and the Lenin Military Political Academy was expanded to meet the new situation. Little has been published in the Soviet Press regarding its purely military activities, but there is enough to indicate that military training is extensively studied; even tank driving and maintenance is taught, and the commissar is continually reminded that he must take an active part in all regimental work, including the drafting of orders by the Regimental Commander.

It is clear that after the purge the powers of Commissars became almost unlimited, but a new development has recently taken place with regard to their status. By a decree published in August 1940 the appointment of Political Commissar has been abolished, and the Seconds-in-Command will, in future, be responsible for the political education of their units. This would appear to explain the insistence on a detailed study of military duties which has, in recent years, characterised the training of Political Commissars trained at the Lenin Military Political Academy, they have now become an integral part of the Commanding personnel, and the party has thus established itself even more firmly amongst the leaders of the Fighting Forces. Finally the Red Army is no longer threatened with the dangers of dual Command.

PROPAGANDA PROBLEMS

BY PROCRUSTES

The currency of two flatly opposed deductions from the same evidence would suggest in the matter concerned a certain complexity. This is very notably the case with propaganda. That "we are doing nothing about propaganda" is one commonly heard view. That "everything you read or see or hear is propaganda" is another, equally easy to meet.

The existence of this latter attitude is worth preliminary notice. Its strength in the United States was exploited with considerable skill by the Nazis in "anti-propaganda propaganda," until the German invasion of the Low Countries and the subsequent march of events swung American opinion more strongly than any British propaganda could have done—an example (the Italian occupation of Albania was another) of the way in which the most expensive propaganda campaign can be nullified by a political act.

To large numbers of people propaganda is not only a suspect word but a suspect fact. As a weapon, it has the peculiar property, unless handled with extreme skill and with a knowledge of psychology which is by no means common, of setting up resistance by its own action. In Germany, which has been in many respects a closed field for an elaborately prepared experiment, newspaper circulations have markedly decreased—and this among a people naturally avid for factual knowledge.

At a certain level, propaganda-resistance can actually be turned to propaganda purposes. For example, the highly exaggerated and often contradictory statistics for British sea and air losses put out by the German radio have among their effects the probably intentional one of inducing in the listener a disbelief of *all* published figures—including, of course, British ones. The resultant state of mind is suitable for the building up of the picture which the Nazis wish to present. The victim flatters himself that he believes nothing that he hears from either side. But such a mental vacuum must be filled: and the total effect of reiterated German propaganda does in fact fill it, though individual broadcasts may be suspect.

The man who denounces as propaganda everything which assails his senses has this to support him historically: that long before the invention of moveable type, causes and castes and individuals have sought and kept and lost power through the influence of communicated ideas. More recently both Napoleon and Bismarck made deliberate use of propaganda. But the emergence of the word itself from an innocent designation covering the activities of Roman Catholic Foreign Missions, to the name of an instrument of politics and warfare, dates really from the last war—and indeed from the last year of that war, when Northcliffe took over the direction of British propaganda. Since 1918 two factors have sharpened and polished the weapon. One is the development of important new media—the radio and the cinema. The other is the growth of political systems exercising detailed control of large populations.

There is a certain fascination in the blatant exposure by the Nazi leaders of their own methods of propaganda and the ends to which they have been applied. When Goebbels writes of the necessity “to arouse outbreaks of fury, to get masses of men on the march, to organise hate and suspicion with ice-cold calculation” (*Der Angriff*, 18-2-29), we may turn the phrase against him, but we may consider at the same time how far it is valuable to the general technique of a new weapon. When Hitler declares that “in the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility” (*Mein Kampf*), his opponents may easily be tempted to follow the hint. “These tactics,” says Hitler in another passage, “based on an accurate valuation of human weakness, must lead almost mathematically to success, if the opposing party does not learn to meet poison gas with poison gas.” And there lies the force of the argument that “we are doing nothing about propaganda.” Are we in fact meeting poison gas with poison gas?

Before dealing with special problems arising in India, we must consider British propaganda in general in relation to that of the enemy. The obvious question arises whether poison gas is the only or the best antidote to poison gas. Though our own preparations for chemical warfare may be conducted under the label of an “Anti-Gas School” there is, after all, a matter of forty million gas-masks distributed by Government. The retaliatory Blenheim is not the whole answer to the Dornier. There are the Hurricanes and Spitfires. In other words—and however justified in certain cases may be the critics of the “defensive attitude”—there is a distinction to be drawn between two equally

necessary instruments, functioning differently towards the same end: between offensive and defensive propaganda.

If we are to follow, as many urge and as Hitler appears to have feared, the Nazi principles of offensive propaganda, it follows first that we must make similar use of the means of dissemination, and secondly that our general aim must approximate broadly to that of those who developed and perfected the instrument.

The first consideration is comparatively simple. "When we agree that propaganda control is necessary," writes Captain Rogerson in his study *Propaganda in the Next War*, "we shall impose it instantly, and label our control machinery 'democratic' or 'voluntary' in large letters." To some extent this has already been done. But propaganda control of the kind to which the label 'democratic' will stick convincingly is not the propaganda control which has forged the German weapon. That is far more rigid, far more complete. The *Reichsministerium für Propaganda und Volkserklärung* is not merely a Ministry of Information more efficient than our own. It is an organisation controlling, directly or indirectly and in either case absolutely, the Press, the radio, the theatre, the cinema, education, religion, literature, even village festivals and hotel advertising. Questions of labour, health, diplomacy, war itself, are affected by its policy. There is no doubt that we could have such an organisation if we wanted it. But we should have to drop 'freedom' and a number of other words from our propaganda vocabulary, and at the same time from our political vocabulary, as the Nazis have largely done. That is the whole issue, and those who hold that we can win the war by taking this about-turn are entitled to press for a British Goebbels.

The second important consideration gets less attention than it deserves. If we wish to adopt an instrument we must understand its purpose. It is a mistake to suppose that Nazi propaganda is primarily a means of obtaining converts to the Nazi "philosophy" or "system," and that we therefore require a similar means of propagating our own political faith and way of life. For a start there is precious little philosophy in Nazi-ism, however it may be dressed up for special purposes. Hitler's book was not called *My Faith* but *My Fight*. The affirmations of belief to be found in its pages are unimportant besides the frank analysis of the technique of power. It is not social development along one theoretical line or another that interests him and his

confederates, but simply and solely domination. Any political ideas which can be exploited towards this end will serve. A dozen political or religious ideas in a dozen different countries may serve at the same time. German broadcasts to India frequently pay fervent lip-service to *ahimsa*. One of the main items in the long and elaborately devised propaganda programme which really broke French resistance was the encouragement of Communism.

The German propaganda successes abroad have been successes for a system of disruption, dislocation, the spread of mistrust and confusion. Nazi Germany can profit, and has made careful arrangements to profit, by disturbances in almost any part of the world except her own territory. The British Empire, spread across two hemispheres with extended lines of communication, has no use for this sort of trouble, except in enemy-occupied territory, and only then at the moment when it can be successfully exploited. British leaflet-raids were successful in the last war because they were made at the right moment, when the German Army had three years of trench warfare behind it and German civilian morale was already cracking.

It appears, then, that for certain specific purposes Britain can make use of a propaganda technique which the Nazis originally copied from Northcliffe's Ministry and adapted to their own ends. An obvious task for this technique—and on the face of it it should not be difficult if the means of dissemination can be perfected—is the splitting of the Italian people from their German masters. Other propaganda campaigns, similar to those carried out efficiently in 1918, should be planned for each of the subject European nations, and timed to reach their peak in conjunction with other factors—the eventual military counter-attack and the maximum effect of blockade. We may also take note of Hitler's very sound principle that mass-antagonism should be concentrated upon one enemy. Hitler himself chose the easiest "enemy" of all for propaganda purposes. All his many and various opponents have been denounced before the German people either as Jews or in Jewish pay—Churchill, Hore-Belisha, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Reynaud, Mandel, Benes, Roosevelt, Negrim, Stalin (up to last summer), even Gandhi, have been tarred with the same brush. It should be a cardinal point in British war-publicity that however many enemies enter the field, all of them do so at the instigation of the Nazi arch-enemy of mankind.

In the main, however, it must be clear that a Power interested in preservation and construction cannot profit by an instrument designed for destruction and disintegration. "Valuable as an agent of war," says Capt. Liddell Hart of propaganda, "it is a dangerous ally for the cause of human progress." An outstanding example of a highly effective war-time propaganda exploit turning mercilessly against us in peace is the promise of a Jewish National Home. The fact is that Nazi-ism, which is essentially not a positive creed but, as Rauschnigg called it, a Revolution of Destruction, need look no further than at the immediate objects of conquest and disruption. Britain must look further. Every consideration compels her to do so, and the peace is going to be no easier to win than the war. The dissemination of trust is a very different matter from the dissemination of fear. Quite aside from any sort of idealism, Britain simply cannot afford to rule the world by military occupation. Germany is apparently prepared to do so, or to rule as much as she can get for as long as she can keep it.

Those, therefore, who advocate total propaganda warfare on the Nazi model as a temporary necessity, should remember the fable (a German one, by the way) of the Sorcerer's Apprentice. The Poltergeist will prove difficult to dismiss when his work is done.

In spite of the changes in weapons and tactics that have rendered anyone who talks in terms of the last war suspect as a Fifth Columnist, I do not yet see any reason to abandon the three main postulates laid down by Mr. Wickham Steed, Professor Seton-Watson and Mr. H. G. Wells at Crewe House in February 1918:

- (i) Propaganda operations must not be started until general lines of policy have been clearly established.
- (ii) Propaganda must never have recourse to distortion of the truth.
- (iii) It must steer clear of inconsistencies and ambiguities.

These are not principles which can be carried out simply by occupying an office and pinning them up on the wall. They vitally affect organisation. They are being observed at present in India in face of difficulties which can and should be removed.

Some of the special problems of propaganda in India are those which confront administration of any kind in this country. On these there is little need to dilate. They are the problems of centralisation and distribution in a sub-continent of many

different peoples living in varying circumstances, according to varying beliefs, and under varying forms of government. For the general unification of policy, propaganda requires to be centralised. It also demands throughout the whole country full-time and properly trained officials with reliable means of assessing opinion in their districts and in constant touch with the central office. The organisation of the army and of civil administration provided a basis on which to begin operations. Results so far achieved have depended largely on individual efficiency and enthusiasm throughout these channels. That is not enough.

In India the terms "offensive" and "defensive" propaganda have their own application. There is at present no obligation for India to carry propaganda into enemy territory. The problem is entirely an internal one. It may accordingly be more appropriate to speak of "propaganda" and "counter-propaganda"—the latter term denoting all steps taken to refute and discredit enemy propaganda, the former covering positive publicity in India independent of enemy attacks.

Counter-propaganda, as a means of defence of the population of India against enemy propaganda, has only one line of attack to face (or possibly two if we include "whispering campaigns" started in neighbouring countries and spreading to India). This line of attack is the radio—primarily at present the German radio, for Italian broadcasts directed to India are still a pale reflection of the vigorous Nazi campaign. Although the enemy, by reason of efficient censorship, is restricted to the ether as a medium, counter-propaganda in India can make use not only of the radio but also to some extent of the Press, the cinema, and (an important medium if it were thoroughly developed) verbal communication. There is, of course, a further way of treating the attack, and that is to run away from it by attempting to prevent all listening to enemy broadcasts. Public dissemination of these broadcasts has already been forbidden as a means of checking the spread of rumours detrimental to commercial confidence and public morale. This step is said to have been effective. Its extension to include private listening would be disastrous.

German short-wave programmes directed to India and the Near East cover most of the day, either in English, Hindustani, Arabic or Persian, and the technical excellence of their transmissions is such that any listener idly twiddling, or even searching for another station, is likely to get Germany strongly and clearly. Italy broadcasts irregularly a news-review in Bengali, but apart

from this the principal choice offered by the enemy to the 103,000 Indian licence-holders is between the Hindustani broadcast at 8 p.m. and the main English broadcasts at 12.30 p.m., 5.30 p.m., and 7.30 p.m. All India Radio, on the other hand, puts out its news service in nine languages.

Opinions on the effect of the broadcasts from Berlin upon Indian listeners appear to be strongly held but are not infrequently conflicting. The impact of a standard broadcast in two languages upon the varied populations of India is not to be decided by the exclamations, however significant, of somebody's bearer, nor yet upon reports, however methodical, from army units. Although reaction-analysis undertaken in Germany by the Propaganda Ministry provided in some instances exceedingly interesting data (notably in election-campaigns), the perils of over-organisation to which German methods seem subject are to be avoided; nor is a Gallup poll in any way practicable in India. At the same time it would be wrong, until some roughly workable system of observation is developed, to generalise on Indian reactions either to enemy or A. I. R. broadcasts.

What can be determined with some accuracy is the purpose of German propaganda and the extent to which that purpose is being achieved, though it will still remain to be decided what part in the result is played by the propaganda itself, and what by other factors.

German broadcasts to India are of course not so much pro-Nazi as anti-British. This is no doubt due partly to the fact that Nazi-ism itself is nourished by antagonism to other creeds and systems rather than by any positive convictions, and partly to the futility of attempting mass-conversion to Nazi-ism in India. With the exception of isolated groups and individuals, most of whom sooner or later come within the reach of security legislation, it may be asserted that at the outbreak of war there was in India considerably less partiality to Germany than there had been in 1914. If that position has been in any way modified in Germany's favour during the past twelve months, it can only have occurred through one agency: fear.

"The effects of fear," records Dr. Serge Chakotin in his valuable book, *The Rape of the Masses*, "are greater in a man if he is hungry or thirsty, ill or tired, or already depressed on account of some earlier trouble; this explains the fact that propaganda based on fear always takes effect more easily with men whose economic situation is precarious, or who are worked too hard or have

been made apprehensive by other influences." The application of this paragraph to India requires no emphasis.

Despite the broadcast assurances of German sympathy with India's struggle for freedom, fear and hatred are undoubtedly the keynotes of Nazi propaganda. Germany is represented as successful rather than beneficent. Britain is the tyrant, but an effete tyrant, a crumbling monster. Sometimes there are direct threats of ultimate revenge upon Indians who persist in a pro-British attitude. Climb aboard the Nazi band-waggon, is the moral, before it is too late. The warning has been repeated again and again, and now there is a note of sorrow and reproof that it has not already been accepted.

After the first year of a determined Nazi propaganda-campaign, the widespread panic and civil disturbance at which it aims have not been brought about. There have been, and will continue to be, harvests of harmful rumours, though here it may be mentioned that not all the rumours confidently attributed to enemy broadcasts are actually to be traced to that source. If the effects of hostile propaganda cannot be precisely estimated, neither can the effects of counter-propaganda, and in the present position there are certainly no grounds for complacency. We have a long war to fight.

The psychologist, required to combat the effects of fear-propaganda, would recommend external or internal inhibition—the stimulation, that is to say, either of a brisk new excitement or of an effort of will. The counter-propagandist, exercising the limited functions at present permitted him, must see that correct information, encouragingly interpreted, reaches the public, and reaches it quickly. In the absence of effective organisation, the Crewe House stipulations Nos. (ii) and (iii) must prove a handicap. It is easier and quicker to invent a lie than to arrive at the truth. Moreover, the truth is not always particularly exciting. During the relatively "quiet" months of last winter and spring, Germany could always make news, true or false, of the sinking of Allied shipping. British blockade activities, on the other hand, were seldom the stuff of headlines. It is news that a ship has been sunk. It is not news that a ship has failed to leave port. In war the propaganda-advantage is distinctly with the aggressor, and accordingly as the military and political role of Britain develops along offensive lines, so will the effect of enemy panic-propaganda be more effectively offset.

As it is, the question arises, whether enemy broadcasts to India should be "answered" immediately and directly by the same medium, rather than indirectly by several media, as at present. An argument against direct procedure is that denials suffer in effect by comparison with the original allegation, which by such methods may be given a wider circulation than it would otherwise obtain. Another argument is that dog-fights are to be avoided on the ether, for the same reason—the fear of retaliation producing chaos—that jamming has for the most part been avoided by the belligerents.

But whether counter-propaganda is carried out directly or indirectly, there is one vital necessity if it is to avoid inconsistencies and be based upon the truth; and that is that the truth should be available. There have been, and will continue to be, cases where an enemy allegation calls for instant refutation or explanation before it has taken effect. Sometimes this can be done. More often (it would perhaps be imprudent to quote specific instances) silence has been the only answer to a statement later proved to have been damaging, simply because the appropriate source of information could not or would not release it. It seems moreover that in cases where responsibility for release is refused in India, a cabled appeal to London cannot be answered in less than two days. The German propaganda service, which lays so much less store by the truth, has ironically enough, by its superior status and organisation, far easier access to it.

On the actual eve of the Allied evacuation from Namsos, the B.B.C. broadcast a very interesting talk setting forth the numerous natural advantages which favoured the Allies for a campaign in the Trondheim sector. If the high prestige and organisation of the B.B.C., *plus* a Ministry of Information with a staff of 1,700, are insufficient title to confidences in the matter of current or pending operations, what has counter-propaganda in India to hope from departmental obscurantism?

This question of status is by no means one of dignity. It is necessary to efficient organisation. It applies still more to positive, "offensive" propaganda than to counter-propaganda. No commercial advertising manager would be expected to launch a campaign without a reasonable view and specification of the goods he was asked to sell. He might even, if the product appeared bogus or unsaleable, refuse to handle it. In the same way the first of the Crewe House requirements, that "propaganda

operations must not be started until general lines of policy have been clearly established," applies with its full force to India.

I am aware that this proposition implies a violation of the sacred mysteries. Those of whom propaganda is expected in India have access to the full text of what are still, probably, the most important pieces of publicity in the country. They have the same access to the declarations of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State as has the remainder of the public, and no more.

The first step that Northcliffe took after becoming Propaganda Minister in March 1918 was to press for a clear definition of Government policy. He got it, and used it with great success to give the European minorities under the domination of the Central Powers something to fight for. We have no Northcliffe in India, but propaganda cannot for ever remain static. It is a far more difficult task to keep people quiet than to rouse them.

The word "crusade" is now creeping into the English newspapers. It is argued that the dictatorships have given their people a clarion-call to which the democratic must compose a reply. The truth is, however, that so far both sides have only been offered something to fight *against*. The side that first presents something to fight *for*, and sticks to it, will win the propaganda war. And that is certainly no less true for bewildered India than for other parts of the world.

In the meantime, those who continually complain of the lack of British propaganda are not in themselves the best of propagandists.

A STUDY IN RUSSIAN STRATEGY

By JOSSLEYN HENNESSY

The friend whom I had come to visit at a Paris hospital was "not ready to see me," so I waited in a room usually reserved for out-patients. There I found three people with the depressed and somewhat furtive air of those waiting to see a doctor: a small, tired, elderly woman, shabbily dressed; a tall, slim, golden-haired girl in the twenties, who wore her inexpensive but smartly-cut clothes with Parisian chic and Russian distinction; and a taxi-driver; with a trim black moustache, grizzling hair and handsome features, he looked what he proved to be—an ex-guards officer. His ruthless mouth suggested a certain disillusioned, irresponsible gaiety; his sunken blue eyes, wrinkled skin and nervy manner gave him a prematurely worn look, but I guessed him well under fifty.

They were, I was to learn, all Russian refugees.

The bitter winter damp chilled the dilapidated room, dark, bare, uncarpeted. We huddled in silence on rickety cane chairs near a radiator with the brown paint peeling off it. I sat tortured by anxieties for my friend, suffering somewhere in this desolate building. Nor did a casual glance at the others suggest that their thoughts were any happier.

The old woman unfolded a battered copy of a sensational evening paper. A few seconds later she let it drop with listless disgust, observing half involuntarily:

"These train crimes! Luckily I don't take a train from year's end to year's end, otherwise I should feel quite afraid to travel!"

This remark offered what, it seemed, three of us were ready to welcome—a chance to end unpleasant thoughts. The two women and I began recalling train murders and robberies, examples of which were at that time particularly frequent in France. Cheerful chat would have jarred on the moment; our topic suited our despondent spirits; thus we tactfully consoled each other for our unspoken personal sorrows and as the moments slipped by, a subtle atmosphere of friendly confidence was created between us.

Only the taxi-driver remained silent, but he edged his chair into the narrow circle and looked from speaker to speaker in turn, nervously clasping and unclasping his knees the while.

"You mustn't forget," I remarked, "that a train crime presents the police with an impossibly difficult job—"

"Two years ago I bought a railway ticket for a dead man," interrupted the taxi-driver leaning forward with a queer intensity, his face drawn with suffering.

"Why did you do that?" asked the old woman patting him gently on the shoulder.

He began to speak, at first rapidly in low tones that we could scarcely catch, the words tripping over each other in slightly hysterical haste.

"We were so happy in those days, Michel, Igor, Paul and I," he said; "We'd been together in good times and bad since we first met as officers in Wrangel's army. . . . That was a grand adventure. . . . and we'd have driven the Bolsheviks off the face of the map, if the Allies hadn't let us down. We had wonderful material—fine officers, courageous, reckless, and men who would have gone anywhere for them! But no arms, no ammunition, no food."

Gradually he ceased to be aware of us as three total strangers and became conscious of our presence as an actor is conscious of an audience with whom he is in complete harmony; he slipped into the past; he relived the scenes which he described; he ceased to gabble; on the contrary, he varied the pace of his words and the tone of his voice, as he spoke now for one character of his drama, now for another.

The man had a streak of poetry in him; he slashed before his chance audience a series of extraordinary, clear-cut pictures; we saw the four penniless refugees—Michel, jovial, stout; Paul, unimaginative, dare-devil; Igor, tall and slender, dandy and courtier; and Alex, sensitive, imaginative, introspective—land up in Paris and become taxi-drivers. On the whole, times in those early post-war years were good; foreigners had money to spend on taxis; there was always a bottle of vodka somewhere in the two rooms and kitchenette which they shared in the Grenelle quarter. Their landlady, a down-at-heels owner of a noble French name, who lived in the flat's remaining two rooms, was flattered by her tenants' gallant ways with her.

"Not that she was unaware that there was self-interest in our pursuit, but she was a kindly old soul and we reminded her of the Faubourg Saint Germain salons of her youth. She called us her 'court.' We could always persuade her to wait for the rent with a flow of fine words."

"Madame!" Igor cried once, "the privilege of owing you a trifle is one that, even if we could, we would not forego. It increases the conviction of our virtue, since to be indebted to beauty is surely the proof of worth. . . ."

"Insolent!" chuckled the Countess, "Your virtue will ruin my reputation as well as my finances. Shall it be said when I am turned out penniless, that I was a keeper of four beautiful young men?"

"Rather will it be said that you sacrificed all to keep them virtuous and to endow them with the reflection of your beauty," replied Igor extravagantly.

We caught glimpses of riotous Russian parties at the house of a rare wealthy friend to which the four chauffeurs, their work done, would drive up in their own taxis. With malicious enjoyment they would startle the correct servants by stumping into the marble-pillared hall in their shabby oil-stained chauffeurs' uniforms, which they would peel off and hang nonchalantly among the opera hats and fur coats, revealing their faded but uncreased dinner jackets. Then they would stroll in to sing, dance, laugh and drink Russian healths till daybreak.

"Our whole existence was a gesture of defiance to poverty and misfortune," Alex declaimed proudly.

But stout, jolly Michel took to his bed with typhoid one January day. The doctor gave up hope. Michel became delirious.

To listen to his ravings was terrible for the three others; he laid bare his longings for what they had all lost—possessions, a home, an established place in the order of things; but especially did he talk to his sister, Nina, who had died from exhaustion on reaching Marseilles after the revolution. He played with her, quarrelled with her, defended her against his father's anger.

Towards the end he regained consciousness and saw Paul, Igor and Alex sitting there watching him hopelessly. He knew that he was dying and diffidently he asked them a favour.

"If it's possible. . . . only if it's possible, I'd like to be buried next to Nina at Marseilles."

"Of course," said Paul at once.

"See!" said Igor stretching out his hand, "We give you our word that you shall rest together."

Paul and Alex likewise stretched out their hands to comfort Michel with their promise.

Shortly after the doctor pronounced him dead.

Paul went out to arrange for a coffin and the railway transport. He returned with a long face.

"The thing's impossible," he announced, "Michel has got to be placed in a zinc coffin and loaded into an officially sealed railway wagon. It'll cost over 4,000 francs, besides which there seem to be half a dozen extras in tips and forms to buy, not to mention an authorisation to be obtained from the Prefecture of Police. How *are* we to raise the money?"

"I'm surprised at you, Paul, we gave our promise," said Igor coldly.

"How much money have we and how much can we borrow?" retorted Paul.

A search of Michel's belongings, as well as their own, produced a little over 1,000 francs of which 900 were earmarked for the quarter's rent. They estimated their credit as another hundred francs each.

The three friends went out to discuss the problem over lunch at a *bistrot*. The fruitless discussion was prolonged till half-past four by numerous glasses of vodka, which besides clinching their determination that Michel should be taken to Marseilles, induced a state of mind in which they were now profoundly serious, now seized with uncontrollable gaiety. Back at the flat, another bottle of vodka was opened.

"Michel, old friend, we'll get you to Marseilles even if we have to push you there in a hand cart," cried Paul, waving his glass to the corpse on the bed.

Alex contemplated Michel's once generous paunch, now sadly diminished after his illness.

"He looks like a deflated balloon; do you suppose if we inflated him, he would float there?" he asked earnestly.

"No," said Igor after reflection, "You couldn't depend on the winds—he might come down in Africa or be blown out to sea."

"Or he might get stuck in an air pocket for ever—that would be just like him," added Alex laughing bitterly.

"Don't joke about it," said Paul severely.

"I'm not," answered Alex, "and it would be just like him. Don't you remember when the Bolsheviks sprang that surprise attack and Michel was, of course, doing his morning's business and couldn't do his braces up in the hurry and his trousers kept on slipping down as he ran and he stopped to haul them up

again, lost his hold and down they fell once more and the Bolsheviks had to give up their attack because they couldn't run forward for laughing at the extraordinary sight? I tell you he's perfectly capable of being hung up for ever in an air pocket over Marseilles."

"More likely to be over Monte Carlo," suggested Paul with gloomy conviction, "He never gambled, but he liked watching it."

"He looks extraordinarily alive, poor old fellow," said Igor.

"Anybody who didn't know would think he was just sleeping off a 'drunk'," observed Paul, with a touch of envy.

There was a moment's silence as the three men gazed at Michel's face. Although the body in the untidy bed lay on its back, the head under its shock of dishevelled hair was propped up slightly by the pillow, making the chin rest at an angle, uncomfortable but curiously natural, which indeed suggested a drunken sleeper, unconscious or unable to deal with cricks in the neck.

Suddenly Alex's face cleared. He stood up.

"My God!" he cried exultingly, "Of course, he's dead—he is dead *drunk*! Don't you see! We'll dress him and—take him down to Marseilles with us by train—."

Igor and Paul looked at him uncomprehendingly, then Paul sank back in the only armchair, roaring with laughter.

"Of course!" he shouted, "We'll put him in a corner seat face to the engine with the window open. Nothing like fresh air for drink. We'll have a bridge four. Michel can be dummy—he always shone at dummy."

Alex and Igor were unable to resist Paul's prolonged mirth and within a few seconds all three were swept with gales of helpless laughter.

They staggered round the small room upsetting chairs and sweeping the mantelpiece clear as they slapped each other on the back; for five uncontrollable minutes they enacted the maddest moments of a nightmare slapstick comedy, in which the corpse alone preserved the unbroken dignity of death.

As they recovered their speech, the crazy plan took shape from their fevered imaginations. Each took a childish delight in contributing a detail, like schoolboys scheming some fiendishly illicit escapade.

"Three return tickets, *one single*," said Igor with the air of one announcing a profound scientific discovery.

"Travel by night," stressed Alex sagely, "People don't get drunk in the morning."

"A game of cards," chuckled Paul, pursuing his original idea, "No one would think of *playing cards with a dead man*."

"Pretend to be drunk *ourselves*," howled Igor, whose flushed face suggested the need of no special histrionic ability to sustain the role; "Sing dirty songs at all the stations, then people won't want to get in our compartment."

"Sing them *in French*, not Russian, otherwise people won't know they *are* dirty songs," amended Paul.

Alex rose.

"Michel, dear friend," he said gravely to the corpse, "We laugh, we drink, we are frivolous before your mortal remains, but we love you, you shall rest with Nina—in Marseilles."

Paul and Igor joined him at the bedside, swaying slightly.

"Amen!" they said gravely.

Then they dressed the corpse.

At the Gare de Lyons late that night, Igor slung Michel's right arm over his shoulder, Paul likewise took his left arm and swaying drunkenly from side to side, they staggered up to the booking office window, with Michel's feet dragging behind them. There were few people about, but Igor and Paul with their unconscious burden attracted some attention. They were not entirely sober and were therefore pretending to be drunk a little too realistically, so that Alex, who throughout had been somewhat more sober than his friends, became nervous and begged them not to sing so loudly.

"Keep your songs for the stops at stations on the line to discourage people from coming in with us," he turned round from buying tickets to urge.

An appalling sight met his eyes.

Paul and Igor, with Michel hanging lifeless between them, were raucously singing what they intended as the duet from the Third Act of *La Bohème*—*Ah! Mimi Tu Piu*. Carried away by thoughts of "Mimi, false, faint, fickle-hearted," Igor turned to address dramatic reproaches to the corpse and in so doing let go its hand. Instantly the right arm fell away from behind his neck and the corpse's full weight, dragging on its left arm round Paul's neck, nearly pulled Paul over. Alex rushed forward in time, seized Michel's right arm and took Igor's place. Beads of perspiration stood on his forehead as he forced Paul almost by sheer will-power to step out with him towards the platform.

Over his shoulder, he heard Igor observing confidentially to half a dozen grinning passengers and porters:

"Terrible resh—reshponsibility—being only shober fellow, to get whole drunken regiment into troop train. Wild fellows," he shook his head philosophically, "Wild fellows. . . ."

Then, drawing himself up to his full height and throwing out his chest, he followed Alex and Paul, shouting: "Left! Right! Left, that fat man in the centre there—!! Hold your head *up*! Shuffling along, gazing into the future like that! Pick up your *feet*!"

They secured an empty compartment. Alex lay the body at full length on the seat as if Michel were sleeping.

Paul and Igor stood at the door singing humorous, bawdy songs with expressions of the utmost seriousness. Paul produced a bottle of vodka with which they refreshed themselves between choruses.

Alex suddenly found himself seized with deep, body-shaking sobs. He slumped down heavily opposite the corpse, with his head in his hands.

The train moved off. Paul and Igor were jerked off their feet into a sprawling mass on the floor. Paul lay with his back to the door, with Igor's feet in his lap. They rose to sitting postures and contemplated their mingled legs.

"Funny thing," observed Paul, fingering Igor's left foot with concern; "My legs have got twisted back to front."

"I see *both* my boots need new soles," said Igor examining Paul's boots sadly.

Further efforts to rise to their feet were rendered fruitless by the narrow space, misapprehensions as to the ownership of feet and their elaborate politeness to each other.

"No engine need ever start with a jerk like that," said Paul firmly, "Shteam should be applied gradually. . . ."

"Or not at all," agreed Igor.

"Engine should be handled with discretion," Paul pursued.

"The way I handled the Colonel's wife's advances when I was a subaltern," observed Igor.

Paul thought deeply.

"Don't see any resemblance between her and the engine," he said at length.

"Reactions powerful . . . smell of oil . . .," Igor sketched an all-embracing descriptive gesture, "Cavernous. . . ."

The door opened and Paul, whose back was against it, disappeared into the corridor between the legs of a fat, jolly-faced conductor.

Standing astride Paul, he saw a sleeping figure stretched on one seat, a sobbing man opposite, and one obvious drunk regarding him with a certain sternness from the floor; incoherent sounds from Paul rose behind him.

"*Voyons, mes gars,*" he said cheerfully. With considerable difficulty he pulled Igor to his feet and pushed him into the seat next to the motionless figure; then he helped Paul next to Alex and shaking his head with good-humoured resignation continued on his way down the train.

Igor and Paul were sobered and touched to see Alex's distress, which recalled to them the object of their journey. They fell uneasily silent. Alex's sobs ceased. The three men looked at each other and then at the corpse, which seemed strangely alive as it was shaken by the train's rapid movements.

"Come. This won't do," said Alex, rousing himself, "We shall go mad if we sit and stare at him. Get out the cards."

The game was not a success. Michel's body oppressed them. The high tension at which they had lived throughout the day snapped; the fumes of alcohol which had kept them from thought began to clear, leaving them exhausted and face to face with the twin realities of their grief and their ridiculous position—three men with an inexplicable dead body. They began to see the risks to which they were exposed.

"I can't stand seeing him there any longer," Igor said abruptly, "Why don't we go and sit in the next compartment? It's empty; we can always come back as the train slows before a station."

Without a word they went next door, where they sat down glumly; first Paul dozed; then Igor; then Alex; then they slept. About four in the morning, Alex awoke with an agonising feeling of guilt. Paul and Igor were sleeping in a huddled heap opposite. Alex scrambled to his feet, went to Michel's compartment and opened the door.

There on the seat sat a living man—*alone*.

(Alex grabbed my arm convulsively and his breath came in quick gasps as in hoarse tones he described the scene.)

"It was a live man . . . fat like Michel, but much smaller. There was not a sign of the body. . . . It was clean gone. . . . The stranger looked up at me nervously as I clung for support to the framework of the door."

"'Name of God!' " I said after we had stared at each other for a full ten seconds, 'I beg pardon, Monsieur, but I—I've made a mistake in the compartment, I think!' But I knew I hadn't. I staggered back to Paul and Igor and woke them roughly. 'He's gone!' I yelled in their sleep-stupid faces."

They needed no further explanation but struggled to their feet aghast.

"He's gone—vanished," Alex repeated savagely, "and in his place we've got a ridiculous little henpecked bourgeois."

"Come on," said Paul.

They returned to Michel's compartment, where the fat little man received their irruption with unconcealed nervousness. Paul, Igor and Alex sat down opposite and gazed at him, stricken dumb by the horror of the inexplicable climax of a day whose least event had been grotesque. Fear whipped torturing, chaotic pictures through their tired imaginations.

What had happened to Michel's body?

The question hammered in their brains to the rhythm of the train's steady progress through the night to Marseilles—to the police—to a charge of murder. . . .

What had happened to Michel's body?

To ask would be to incriminate themselves. The fat little man's purple jowls turned to green under their strained, fixed stare.

"What's the matter?" burst from him.

When Alex spoke he did not recognise his own voice. "Monsieur," he said, "We had a friend travelling with us who came into this compartment to lie down, what have you—what—where is he?"

"How the devil do I know? He got up half an hour ago and went down the corridor."

Paul, Igor and Alex reeled where they sat. Paul raised clenched fists to his temples.

"But it's not possible," he cried in anguish.

"But why not?" riposted the little man with increasing nervous irritation, "He may have gone to the lavatory and still be there for all I know."

Pandemonium broke out.

"A dead man go to the lavatory!" shouted Paul and was seized with the same gargantuan laughter which had shaken him first of us all, in what seemed years ago, the previous afternoon in the flat.

"A dead man—" shrieked the little man, now obviously panic-stricken. "A dead man—Messieurs, I assure you—I—I—"

Alex looked at him closely; he decided that attack was the best defence.

"Name of God!" he shouted suddenly. He leapt to his feet and towered menacingly over the fat stranger, "I see it all—you killed him!"

"I did! I did! I confess it," sobbed the little man, "But I didn't mean to—Don't give me away."

"What—?" The word escaped from Alex like a pistol shot.

"What—?" cried Igor and Paul.

The three looked at each other in uncomprehending consternation.

Then Paul collapsed afresh in peals of uproarious laughter.

"You filthy murderer," he spluttered, "Not give you away! Why I'll hound you to the guillotine through every court in France."

Igor folded his arms and puckered his brows in a comically fierce frown; then affecting the hollow tones of a barnstormer in the Fifth Act, he said slowly:

"What—have—you—done—with—the—body?"

Tears ran down the little man's cheeks. "Listen, listen, Messieurs, for the love of God. It was an accident. I swear it. I've got a wife and two children," he wailed abjectly.

"Explain yourself," commanded Alex sternly, "Shut up you fools," he added under his breath to Paul and Igor who were rocking in each other's arms; "This is no joke, we want all our wits about us if we don't want trouble with the police."

Alex paused in his story. Then he said, speaking with slow effort:

"The first rays of dawn shed a lugubrious light over that beastly third class compartment. Paul and Igor seemed complete strangers to me. They were stubbly-cheeked and hollow-eyed and their expressions were those of madmen. I daresay I looked the same. I had exhausted the gamut of grief, fear and anxiety in the previous forty-eight hours. I felt I had got to the bottom of all possible feeling. I could feel no more. I merely thought in a detached way that all for the sake of Nina we were supremely ridiculous. Prison or, worse still even, expulsion from France, certainly awaited us."

The little man was gabbling his explanations. His name was Cachin; he was a commercial traveller in books; he had got

on the train at Lyons; his timid soul full of the train crime committed a few days previously, he had followed his wife's advice ("Two people are more difficult to kill than one") and sought a compartment with an occupant. He installed himself opposite Michel's body; unable to sleep, he got out his evening paper; it devoted columns to the murder, of which, in the fashion of French papers, it gave the most lurid details, with a photograph of the mangled corpse found on the line. He became thirsty; he remembered that his wife had put a bottle of mineral water in his heavy book-laden suitcase which was on the rack; he tried to open it without getting it down by balancing it on the edge of the rack, but before he could open it, the fast moving train changed direction with a jerk over some points; he lost his balance and fell, while his heavy suitcase shot across the narrow compartment striking Michel's head violently.

Cachin picked himself up and offered profuse apologies; his fellow traveller made no reply. Cachin, a naturally timid man, became frightened; evidently the traveller had been stricken unconscious; he might even be severely concussed. Cachin quakingly foresaw all his savings swallowed up in a suit for heavy damages; he sat down limply, bathed in perspiration, a prey to every kind of anxiety; minute after minute passed; still the figure opposite remained motionless; not even a groan escaped from it.

Cachin could not tell how long it was before he pulled himself together to see what he could do for his victim, but it must have been a long time. Finally he got up, bent over and touched his face. He shrieked. It was stone cold. The man was dead. He had killed him. He was a murderer. Worse, he was a *train murderer*! The long list of train crimes which had gone unsolved had aroused deep public indignation; no one would believe his story. The police, delighted at last to have caught someone, would put him through the French version of third degree; he had read all about that in the papers; shrinking, he felt that he would not be able to endure it; "they always confess under third degree, even if they haven't done it," he had read; he too would confess; he gave himself up for lost.

Then in a flash it came upon him that none of the train crimes had ever been solved; another sentence raced through his brain, an interview with a detective—"It's hopeless. It's like looking for a needle in a haystack; the murderer may have got out at a dozen stations; he may be hundreds of miles from the place where the body was discovered, hours before it was discovered."

With the fearful haste of a frightened, stupid person, who does not wish to give himself time to think, he had opened the door and with great difficulty forced Michel's body out into the roaring darkness, almost before he realised that he had done so. Then another horrible fear seized him; he had not bothered to see if there were bloodstains; he turned the dimmed lights on full; there was no blood. Nor had the dead man left any luggage behind. There was nothing to suggest that he had ever been there, except Cachin's beating heart and shaking hands; these Cachin had hardly begun to control when Alex looked in on him.

"That's the truth, I swear it," Cachin repeated tearfully. "Don't give me away, don't give me away!"

Alex, Igor and Paul looked at the piteous figure before them with disgust and contempt.

"You make me sick," Alex said at last.

That was the only comment made on Cachin's story. The three friends rose and left him.

Within twenty-four hours, the papers announced the discovery of another mangled body on the Lyons line. Reporters proceeded to build the most recondite hypotheses on the inexplicable fact, revealed by the post mortem, that the unknown man had died from typhoid. Alex, Igor and Paul did not care to read the papers; they never mentioned Michel between them again. The macabre adventure which they had shared broke up their friendship; they could not bear to meet each other's eyes when they were alone together. They parted company.

"I've never told anyone about this before," Alex ended, looking round at us with hesitating eyes. Once more the old woman patted him kindly.

"But we believe you," she said simply.

An unbearable weight seemed to lift from Alex.

"Thank you," he said.

O'REGAN PREPARES FOR WAR

By F. M. M.

[Being letters from 2nd Lieutenant Michael O'Regan the newest-joined subaltern of the 1st Bolton Irish (Territorials) to his brother Pat.]

MY DEAR PAT,

Our final exercise was designed to bring our training to a dramatic conclusion and General Sir Withering Blasting came over to see if we were ready to go to the war.

The Bolton Irish is part of the 122nd Brigade and the battle was between our brigade and a mechanised force.

The C. O. put me in charge of the battalion Intelligence Section and told me that he was giving me this command to keep me out of the way.

Little did he know that I was going to win the war for him!

At 2 P.M. I was ordered to go out and search for the enemy. So, I collected my army (eight men!) and we were on the point of moving off, when I received a wire from Micky that the bees looked like swarming any minute and that you were away.

I was in an awful quandary. Either I had to let the bees go, and I knew we couldn't afford to lose them, or I had to desert and make for home, because I knew there was no good asking for leave.

So, I issued orders to the men, sending them off in various directions and I took Tom Murphy with me, as he knows a lot about bees.

We boarded the first bus going to Lickserton and reached the farm at 4 P.M. Then we changed into mufti (Tom looked beautiful in your old blue suit!) and went out to look for Micky.

We found him next door with a kind man, who was helping him to collect the swarm. He turned out to be a Squadron Leader Ellis, who had flown down in his own plane for a dance in the village that night.

We got the bees safely home and I invited him in for a drink, in return for his kindness.

He talked so much that Tom and I couldn't get a word in edgeways and we were getting very bored, when suddenly he said: "Yes. Worse luck! I have to fly back after the dance

to-night, as I am going on manœuvres against the 122nd Brigade to-morrow."

He went on to tell us that the Tank Corps lads, for whom the dance was being given, were also due to set out early next morning. They had been ordered not to cross the starting line until then, so as to give the enemy, who were dismounted, 'twenty-four hours start.' At this Murphy gasped and I sent him off to feed the pigs, in case he gave the show away.

I pretended to be very interested and soon got the whole plan from the unsuspecting Squadron Leader.

The tanks were to move to Crapeton at dawn, to attack from the right flank. There were numerous small woods there, in which they were to hide and it was hoped that the G.O.C.-in-C. would be provided with a wonderful spectacle, when they suddenly issued forth and completely surprised the 122nd Brigade.

His squadron of aeroplanes was to leave Wottle, at first light, to locate the enemy.

"Indeed, Mr. O'Regan," he said, "you ought to join up yourself. You take such an interest in our work, that you would find life in the Army or Air Force most entertaining. But, I am afraid I have been talking too much and I must have bored you."

"Far from it," I replied!

"Of course, this is all very secret, Mr. O'Regan, and I am sure you won't mention a word I have told you, except to those you are sure are 'all right.' You know what I mean?"

"Trust me, Squadron Leader," says I!

With that we adjourned and I got hold of Tom and between us we devised a plan of action.

I got hold of Ellis at the dance and, after a few drinks, broached the subject of the manœuvres again.

I explained to him that the more I had thought about the next day's fun, the more I wished I could see it. My difficulty, however, was to get to Crapeton in time.

After a lot of hinting, he understood what I was driving at and offered to take me and Tom in his plane.

Actually, Tom had sworn that nothing on earth would make him go in an aeroplane, because a fortune teller had told him that he would end his life "by falling from a height and breaking his neck." But, eventually, I got him in by explaining that the fall might as well be from an aeroplane as from a gallows and

that he was certain to be hanged for "desertion in time of war," if he didn't come with me.

So, two hours later, we took off, with our uniforms packed in a small suit-case.

When we had got well away from Lickserton, I opened the case, took out my revolver and placed the cold barrel to Ellis' neck. Then I shouted in his ear, "Obey my orders, Ellis, or I'll blow your brains out. Fly to Hooperton aerodrome and land there."

Well, Pat, I meant to give Ellis a fright, but I had no idea he was so nervous. He was so surprised that he let go the stick or pushed it too far over or something like that. The first I knew . . . we were the wrong way up and tossing about like a dead leaf in a gale. We carried out the most astounding evolutions and I heard Tom reciting his prayers, as he thought the end was near. I did myself, for a bit, so I said, in a stern voice, "Hooperton, Mr. Ellis!" I just managed to get it out before I let out a second "hoop" and was violently sick.

It was so sudden that I must have pulled the trigger of my revolver (which ought to have been unloaded) and let off a blank within an inch of Ellis' ear!

That shook him and he made straight for Hooperton and arrived there an hour later. Ellis said it was too dark to land and we had to fly round for half an hour, until he could see.

Then I made him land in a field, about a mile from the aerodrome and Tom removed a part of the engine, so that he couldn't get away again.

Poor Ellis! He looked so frightened and depressed, but he maintained that true British attitude of "strong silence," as we marched him off to the main road. He probably thought he was in the hands of the I.R.A.!

Having given orders to Murphy to keep Ellis hidden, for another hour, and then to join me on the Crapeton field of battle, I went behind a hedge and changed into uniform and then boarded the first bus that passed.

I reached the regiment two hours later and found the C.O. He seemed furious, until I explained to him that I had discovered the whole of the enemy's plan. Then he rushed me off to the Brigadier and made me go through the whole thing again.

The Brigadier mistrusts me, ever since the day we watered him, and started to ask me all kinds of awkward questions. Thank Heaven, a few enemy planes flew over just then and,

while we were hiding, I implored him to act at once or it would be too late.

So he sent out a patrol to search a small copse and, when he had seen the whole lot captured, he believed me.

Hurried orders were issued to the Brigade and it turned right and marched to a position the far side of a small stream.

We had just got there, when the G.O.C.-in-C., old Blasting, arrived very annoyed. He is a small, fat man with a very red face and is known to all ranks as "Stop me and buy one!"

"Brigadier Smackit," says he, in a sarcastic voice, "may I ask why you have come here and what you propose to do?" You could tell, from the tone of his voice, that he was furious, because the battle, which he had been looking forward to, was not going to come off.

"I have located the enemy in those woods," replied Smackit, "and I am not going to be caught in the open by a mechanised force. If they want to attack me, let them come here and that stream, which is deeper and muddier than you think, will stop them. In fact, I hope to surprise them as much as they hoped to surprise me."

A smile came over Blasting's face and I heard him say, to a staff officer, "Tell the tanks it is about time they did *something*."

Then he turned and said, "Very good work, Smackit. You must have had good information to make such a sound appreciation of what the enemy intends to do."

"Indeed I had," replied Smackit, "and I have to thank the excellent Intelligence Section of the Bolton Irish for providing it."

What do you think of that, Pat?

Well, the tanks attacked, got stuck in the mud, and old Blasting was provided with a better spectacle than he could have hoped for.

Having won the war, we marched back to camp for food and a brush-up before the General's farewell speech.

We all assembled in the Pipeshires' gymnasium for the final pow-wow and it was amusing to see all our C. O.s looking so pleased and the Tank Corps C. O.s looking so depressed!

The two Commanders explained their plans and all they had done and then old Blasting got up to give his summing-up.

He explained how the battle had been won by the side which "sought and obtained information" and how much the

122nd Brigade owed to the Intelligence Section of the Bolton Irish. "In fact," says he, "their C. O. tells me that chief credit must go to a promising young officer called Mr. O'Regan." Unfortunately, he pointed at me and, at the same moment, there was a gurgling sound from the front bench, where the R. A. F. officers were sitting.

All eyes went round and there was Ellis, with a terrible look of hatred and aggression on his face, staring straight at me.

"That man's a spy," he shouted. "A dirty spy."

It was an awful moment, Pat, and I was only saved by Blasting's temper.

"Sit down at once," he bellowed. "Don't you know my order that there will be no interruptions when I am speaking? In any case, I was disappointed with the work of the Air Force this morning. They seemed to lack leadership."

Poor Ellis collapsed and I thought he was going to have an apoplectic fit!

"One question I wish to ask the Commander of the mechanised force," went on Blasting. "Why were they late in getting into position? Had they been ready to attack sooner, they might have secured success, before they were discovered by the 122nd Brigade's patrol."

"Unfortunately," replied Colonel Askwith, "we were afflicted by a bad attack of tummy trouble this morning, Sir, and simply couldn't get on the move any earlier. The doctor, who was affected himself, puts it down to bad water at Lickserton, where we spent the night."

"A very poor excuse, Colonel Askwith," replied Blasting, witheringly.

And indeed it was, Pat. You see the truth was that Tom and I had inserted castor oil into the ice-creams, and hoped that the heat of the dance would make them popular, even if a double dose of flavouring didn't make them too palatable!

Goodbye, Pat. I must go and find Tom. Heaven knows what's happened to him and I didn't like to ask Ellis where he left him!

Your loving brother,
MIKE.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

FINANCE

DEAR SIR,

In your July issue, an editorial, headed Finance, contains a grave misconception when referring to the question of pay cuts.

The pay of the Army in India is mathematically on a higher scale than Army pay in the United Kingdom if one converts the rupee to its sterling equivalent, *but* these are figures not facts.

The facts are that an income of £700 per annum in England is equivalent to £1050 approx. in India when essential costs of living are taken into account.

Any officer who has served for periods in both countries can substantiate this statement.

The war has not altered the comparison between the cost of living in India and the United Kingdom, admitted we have not yet had our increase in Income Tax, but Sea Passages, Rail Freights, Petrol and Imported Goods have all increased, and in particular childrens needs in respect of chemists stock, special foods etc. are already as much as 150% in excess for the same article as sold in the U. K.

In other words the "reasons which can be defended in peace time" to quote from your editorial, can equally well be defended in war time.

I would very willingly accept posting to the Home Establishment in present circumstances, knowing that I should be no worse off financially in England on British rates of pay than in India on Indian rates, and especially so, if unlike the U. K. a doubled income tax is to be accompanied by a cut in the means wherewith to pay it.

By all means let the Army pay its share towards war expenditure, but such contributions should be on a common community standard. Let us have a doubled income tax, and 100% excess profits tax as at Home.

The soldier fighting in the Libyan desert will not be inspired if he is selected for a special contribution in excess of that paid by those he is defending.

Yours faithfully,
J. WALSH, MAJOR (I.A.),
16-7-40.

REVIEWS

THE 25TH ARMY BRIGADE B. G. A.

On the Western Front in 1918

By C. S. B. BUCKLAND

Basil Blackwell—7s. 6d.

It is unfortunate that this book should have been published at the present time, for the events of the Great War of 1914—18 have been rather overshadowed by the fast moving events of the present war. But, in spite of this Mr. Buckland's book is of interest, more especially to those who fought on the Western Front in 1918.

The author was adjutant of the 25th Army Brigade, which consisted of a group of batteries of long range and super-heavy guns and howitzers, and he has written an accurate and straightforward account of its movements and experiences from Ypres in April 1918 until the end of the war, when the Brigade found itself east of Courtrai, overlooking the Scheldt.

During this time, the guns of the 25th Army Brigade were almost continually on the move. Mr. Buckland has given us the details of these moves and the reasons for them and he does not hesitate to criticise many of the latter.

The book is illustrated by two sketch maps of battery dispositions and by two entire sheets of the large $\frac{1}{100,000}$ General Staff map.

J. R. R.

A HISTORY OF THE UNIFORMS OF THE BRITISH ARMY (VOLUME I)

By CECIL C. P. LAWSON

(Peter Davies, Ltd., London.—12s. 6d.)

This is a delightful book, and it is hoped that Vol. II will follow soon.

In this book the reader is presented with much of the history of the weapons, tactics, organisation and life of the Army as well as the colourful dress of the period.

The author has presented his subject without the cobwebs which sometimes entangle the specialist in research.

Of great interest is the comparison of the Army of over 300 years ago with to-day. We read with reference to Artillery that "during the latter half of the 17th century the 3-pdrs. were attach-

ed in pairs to battalions of foot," to-day the German Infantry Gun, and our mortars fill the same role.

The pontoon of 1700, or the Mobile Workshop of Marlborough's Artillery Train, both illustrated, are still in use, though modernised; and when reading of the steel helmet, the grenade, and the underground fighting by mine and counter-mine at Tournay 1709, one might well be reading of the period 1914—18.

The illustration of the City Trained Bands of 1586 (page 189), has many counter-parts in the press to-day in the photographs of our Home Guards.

Though much remains the same, the colour has gone, the private soldier of 1699 who wore "a crimson coat, blue waistcoat and breeches, blue worsted stockings, a hat with gold orris lace, hat band of same," would think poorly of the private of 1940 in drab or dungarees.

J. W.

THE MARGARY AFFAIR AND THE CHEFOO AGREEMENT

BY S. T. WANG

(*Oxford University Press.* 7s. 6d.)

A description of Anglo-Chinese relations during the period 1861—85. Particular reference is made to the diplomatic negotiations which followed the murder, in Yunnan, of Margary, during his attempt to establish trade connections between Western China and Burmah.

The actual journeys of Margary are not described in any great detail. Mr. Wang's principal task has been to record the investigations made after the murder of Margary and the diplomatic negotiations which ensued. These negotiations were ably handled by Sir Thomas Wade, British Minister in Peking, who succeeded in obtaining, by means of the Chefoo Convention, the regularisation of trade between Western China and Burmah and the opening to British trade of additional ports in China. This China-Burmah route is now one of the main arteries by which China receives her war supplies; a motor road connects Lashio with Yunnan Fu, and the journey, which, fifty years ago, took two months, can now be accomplished within a week.

Mr. Wang has evidently been granted considerable access to official British records (except for the India Office papers, which are still considered confidential) and his thesis provides an authentic description of a lesser known period of Anglo-Chinese history.

H. K. T.

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United Service Institution of India

JANUARY, 1940

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I.—NEW MEMBERS

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st September to 30th November 1939:

Lieut. M. Azam Khan.

2/Lieut. A. E. E. Mercer.

II.—CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOURNAL

Preference is given to articles dealing with naval, military or air force matters likely to be of topical interest to the majority of readers of the journal. Historical articles should point a moral. A limited number of articles on travel, sport, or general topics may be accepted.

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and type-written, with double spacing between lines, on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 25 to Rs. 150 according to the value of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 333, and King's Regulations, paragraph 535, the Executive Committee of the Institution will take action, when necessary, to obtain the sanction of the Chief of the General Staff to the publication of an article in the Journal of the United Service Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit or amend any matter which they consider objectionable. Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

III.—READING ROOM AND LIBRARY

(1) The library is only open to members, who are requested to look on books as not transferable to their friends.

Books are only issued on loan to members who are resident in India. Members borrowing books from the library in person must make the necessary entry in the register and record their address in India.

(2) Applications for books from members at outstations are dealt with as early as possible and books are sent post free by registered parcel post. They must be returned, carefully packed, by registered parcel post within two months of the date of issue, or immediately on recall.

(3) A member may not have on loan, at any one time, more than three books or sets of books without the Secretary's permission. Papers, magazines and works catalogued under the headings of "Works of Reference," "Not to be taken out" and "Confidential" may not be removed from the Institution.

(4) No particular limit is set on the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council wishing to make the library as useful as possible to members. This rule is, however, subject to the following limitations:

(a) If, after the expiration of three weeks from the date of issue, a book is wanted by another member, it will be recalled.

(b) A member wishing to retain a book for a period over *two* months from the date of issue must notify the Secretary to that effect, otherwise the book will be recalled.

(5) If a book is not returned within fourteen days of the date of recall, it must be paid for, if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost or defaced books that are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the member will be required to pay the cost so fixed.

(6) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(7) The re-cataloguing of the library has been begun and it is hoped to issue a new catalogue during the course of the year. The existing catalogue is available at half price—Rs. 1-4-0 per copy plus postage.

IV.—OLD BOOKS AND TROPHIES

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

V.—HISTORICAL RESEARCH

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

VI.—THE MacGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor who founded the United Service Institution of India. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June:

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution of India, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. The following are eligible for the award, whether at the time of the reconnaissance they were in military or civil employ:

(a) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and of the Dominion Forces, while serving on the Indian establishment.

(b) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army, Indian Air Force and of the Indian States Forces, wherever serving.

Note.—The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Military Corps under local governments.

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.*

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has incurred the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the award.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or notice of it has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to deserve it.

VII.—GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1940:

"Discuss the value of mechanisation in assisting to solve the defence problems of India."

* Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

The following are the conditions of the competition:

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration in India and to all commissioned officers of His Majesty's Forces including Territorial Forces, wherever those forces have been raised and to officers of the Indian States Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1940.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 500, either in addition to, or in substitution for, the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October 1940 number of the Journal.
- (7) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (8) Essays should not exceed fifteen pages of the size and style of the Journal exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

VIII.—A.H.Q. STAFF COLLEGE COURSE PAPERS.

It has not been possible to obtain the full requirements of maps and the Institution has been advised that the papers are not now recommended for distribution. It has accordingly been decided to withdraw these papers from sale.

IX.—ADDRESSES.

The difficulties of tracing addresses are now very much increased. Members are earnestly requested to keep the Secretary informed of changes in their addresses.



By Appointment

To The Late King George V

RANKEN & Co., Ltd.

CALCUTTA, SIMLA, DELHI, LAHORE,
RAWALPINDI & MURREE

ESTABLISHED IN CALCUTTA 1770

CIVIL & MILITARY TAILORS
GENTLEMEN'S OUTFITTERS
AND BREECHES MAKERS

ESTIMATES SUPPLIED FOR
FULL-DRESS AND MESS DRESS
UNIFORMS OF ALL REGIMENTS

By Appointment to

His Excellency General Sir Robert A. Cassels,
G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O.,
Commander-in-Chief in India.

I.—NEW MEMBERS

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st December 1939 to 29th February 1940:

Air Marshall Sir J. F. A. Higgins, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.F.C.

O. K. Caroe, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Lieut.-Colonel G. Brunskill, M.C.

Major A. G. N. Curtis.

Major A. A. Dean, I.A.O.C.

Major R. A. Grant.

Major C. D. Hinds.

Major T. H. Travers.

Captain W. A. Barnes.

Captain L. W. B. Evans.

Captain Thakur Nahar Singh.

Captain D. W. Reid, R.E.

Lieut. D. Holmes.

Lieut. D. J. Tanner, A.I.R.O.

²/Lieut M. W. Chapman.

²/Lieut. Fazal Muqem Khan.

²/Lieut. Tehl Singh.

II.—CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOURNAL

Preference is given to articles dealing with naval, military or air force matters likely to be of topical interest to the majority of readers of the journal. Historical articles should point a moral. A limited number of articles on travel, sport, or general topics may be accepted.

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and type-written, with double spacing between lines, on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 25 to Rs. 150 according to the value of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 333, and King's Regulations, paragraph 535, the Executive Committee of the Institution will take action, when necessary, to obtain the sanction of the Chief of the General Staff to the publication of an article in the Journal of the United Service Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit or amend any matter which they consider objectionable. Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

III.—READING ROOM AND LIBRARY

(1) The library is only open to members, who are requested to look on books as not transferable to their friends.

Books are only issued on loan to members who are resident in India. Members borrowing books from the library in person must make the necessary entry in the register and record their address in India.

(2) Applications for books from members at outstations are dealt with as early as possible and books are sent post free by registered parcel post. They must be returned, carefully packed, by registered parcel post within two months of the date of issue, or immediately on recall.

(3) A member may not have on loan, at any one time, more than three books or sets of books without the Secretary's permission. Papers, magazines and works catalogued under the headings of "Works of Reference," "Not to be taken out" and "Confidential" may not be removed from the Institution.

(4) No particular limit is set on the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council wishing to make the library as useful as possible to members. This rule is, however, subject to the following limitations:

(a) If, after the expiration of three weeks from the date of issue, a book is wanted by another member, it will be recalled.

(b) A member wishing to retain a book for a period over *two* months from the date of issue must notify the Secretary to that effect, otherwise the book will be recalled.

(5) If a book is not returned within fourteen days of the date of recall, it must be paid for, if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost or defaced books that are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the member will be required to pay the cost so fixed.

(6) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(7) The re-cataloguing of the library has been begun and it is hoped to issue a new catalogue during the course of the year. The existing catalogue is available at half price—Rs. 1-4-0 per copy plus postage.

IV.—OLD BOOKS AND TROPHIES

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

V.—HISTORICAL RESEARCH

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

VI.—THE MacGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor who founded the United Service Institution of India. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June:

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution of India, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. The following are eligible for the award, whether at the time of the reconnaissance they were in military or civil employ:

(a) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and of the Dominion Forces, while serving on the Indian establishment.

(b) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army, Indian Air Force and of the Indian States Forces, wherever serving.

Note.—The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Military Corps under local governments.

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.*

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has incurred the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the award.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or notice of it has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to deserve it.

VII.—GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1940:

"Discuss the value of mechanisation in assisting to solve the defence problems of India."

The following are the conditions of the competition:

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration in India and to all commissioned officers of His Majesty's Forces including Territorial Forces, wherever those forces have been raised and to officers of the Indian States Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1940.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 500, either in addition to, or in substitution for, the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October 1940 number of the Journal.

*Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

- (7) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (8) Essays should not exceed fifteen pages of the size and style of the Journal exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

VIII.—ADDRESSES.

The difficulties of tracing addresses are now very much increased. Members are earnestly requested to keep the Secretary informed of changes in their addresses.

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Honorary membership of the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, S.W.1., is extended to commissioned officers of any military unit from the Dominions, India, or the Colonies, who may be visiting the United Kingdom during the war. They will be admitted to the Institution's premises on presentation of their cards.



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I.—NEW MEMBERS

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st March to 31st May, 1940:

H. E. Colonel Sir John (Arthur) Herbert, G.C.I.E., Governor of Bengal.

H. E. Captain the Hon'ble Sir Arthur Oswald Hope, G.C.I.E., M.C., Governor of Madras.

H. E. Sir Thomas Alexander Stewart, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., I.C.S., Governor of Bihar.

Major-General W. P. J. Akerman, D.S.O., M.C.

Wing-Commander M. C. W. Flint, M.C., R.A.F.

Major Bhagwan Singh.

Captain I. H. F. Boyd, R.E.

Captain R. Hill-Murray, A.I.R.O.

Captain J. P. Mason.

Flight-Lieut. L. E. Cryer, D.F.C.

Lieut. P. B. Richards.

2/Lieut. M. S. Ali Baig.

2/Lieut. Dil Mohd. Khan.

2/Lieut. I. M. Fraser.

2/Lieut. Gian Chand.

2/Lieut. Gurdial Singh.

2/Lieut. Indrajit Narayan.

2/Lieut. Mohd Hassan.

2/Lieut. Mohd. Zarif Khan.

2/Lieut. Nawin Chandra.

2/Lieut. Nepal Singh.

2/Lieut. Nur Hussain Khan.

2/Lieut. Shiv Charan Singh.

2/Lieut. Siri Ram.

2/Lieut. Zorawar Singh, Kanwar.

II.—CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOURNAL

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necessary, to obtain the sanction of the Chief of the General Staff to the publication of an article in the Journal of the United Service Institution.

Members who wish to remain anonymous will inform the Secretary of the fact and include a pen-name if they so wish. In such cases the real name of the author is known to nobody except the Secretary.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit or amend any matter; if such alterations effect the sense of the article, it will be referred to the author before publication.

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Note.—The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Military Corps under local governments.

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.*

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The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1941:

"The Defence Organisation of a Dominion India."

The following are the conditions of the competition:

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration in India and to all commissioned officers of His Majesty's Forces including Territorial Forces, wherever those forces have been raised and to officers of the Indian States Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
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- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 500, either in addition to, or in substitution for, the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the

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Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October 1941 number of the Journal.

- (7) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (8) Essays should not exceed fifteen pages of the size and style of the Journal exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

VIII.—ADDRESSES

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IX.—HONORARY MEMBERSHIP OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

Honorary membership of the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, S.W.1., is extended to commissioned officers of any military unit from the Dominions, India, or the Colonies, who may be visiting the United Kingdom during the war. They will be admitted to the Institution's premises on presentation of their cards.

X.—PROGRAMME OF LECTURES TO BE DELIVERED IN THE GAIETY THEATRE, SIMLA

The following lectures will be delivered in the Gaiety Theatre, Simla, at 6 p.m. on the undermentioned dates:

Date	Subject	Lecturer
Wednesday, 26th June ..	Archæology ..	Mr. H. Waddington
Wednesday, 17th July ..	Air Warfare ..	Air Commodore A. Claud Wright, A.F.C.
Wednesday, 24th July ..	Land Warfare	Brigadier E. E. Dorman-Smith, M.C.
Wednesday, 31st July ..	Naval Warfare	Commander J. Ryland, R.N.
Wednesday, 14th August	Economics ..	Dr. T. E. Gregory, D.Sc. (Econ.)

NOTE.—Tickets for admission to these lectures will be issued to Members of the U. S. I. only.

Each ticket will admit the member and two ladies.

Tickets should be shown at the door of the theatre.

Tickets will be sent to all members of the U. S. I. resident in Simla.

Members in other stations who wish to attend any of the lectures are requested to inform the Secretary who will send them tickets.



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By Appointment to

His Excellency General Sir Robert A. Cassels,
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Commander-in-Chief in India.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

1. The United Service Institution of India is situated at Simla and is open daily including Sundays from 9 a.m. to sunset.
2. Officers wishing to become members of the United Service Institution of India should apply to the secretary.
3. The reading room of the Institution is provided with the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines, and journals of Service interest that are published.
4. There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free. Members not resident in Simla may have books from the library sent to them post free. (See Secretary's Notes).
5. The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October which is issued, postage free, to members in any part of the world.
6. Members and the public are invited to contribute articles to the Journal of the Institution for which payment is made. Information for the guidance of contributors will be found in the Secretary's Notes.

Rules of Membership

1. All officers of the Defence Services, whether they belong to the Imperial Forces, to forces raised by the Government of India, by an Indian State, by a British Dominion or Colony, and all gazetted officials of the Government of India or of a Provincial Government shall be entitled to become members, without ballot, on payment of the entrance fee and subscription.
Other gentlemen may become members if proposed and seconded by a member of the Institution and approved by the Council.
2. Life members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of a lump sum of Rs. 160, which sum includes entrance fee.
3. Ordinary members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of an entrance fee (see para. 4) of Rs. 10 on joining, and an annual subscription of Rs. 10 (or 15s.) to be paid in advance.
The period of subscription commences on the 1st January.
An ex-member on rejoining the Institution will be charged a second entrance fee of Rs. 10 if since the date on which he ceased to be a member he has served or resided in India. In other cases no charge will be made.
4. British Service, Dominion and Colonial officers serving in India shall pay an entrance fee of Rs. 7 only.
5. Members receive the Journal of the Institution post free to any part of the world. Members in India may obtain books from the library which are issued postage free; the borrower will pay the return postage.
6. Government institutions and offices, military libraries, messes and clubs wishing to subscribe for the Journal shall pay Rs. 10 per annum. Non-members shall pay Rs. 10 per annum plus postage. Single copies of the Journal will be supplied to non-members at Rs. 2-8-0 per copy, plus postage.
7. If a member fails to pay his subscription for any year (commencing 1st January) by 1st June of that year, a registered notice shall be sent to him by the Secretary inviting his attention to the fact. If the subscription is not paid by 1st January following, his name shall be struck off the roll of members and, if the Executive Committee so decide, posted in the hall of the Institution for six months, or until the subscription is paid.
8. An ordinary member wishing to resign at any time during a year in which one or more Journals have been sent to him must pay his subscription in full for that year and notify his wish to resign before his name can be struck off the list of members.
9. Members who join the Institution on or after the 1st October and pay the entrance fee and annual subscription on joining will not be charged a further subscription on the following 1st January, unless the Journals for the current year have been supplied.
10. Members are responsible that they keep the Secretary carefully posted in regard to changes of rank and address. Duplicate copies of the Journal will not be supplied free to members when the original has been posted to a member's last known address and has not been returned by the post.
11. All communications should be addressed to the Secretary, United Service Institution of India, Simla.

I.—NEW MEMBERS

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st June to 31st August, 1940:

Major-General T. J. Hutton, M.C.
Lieut.-Colonel E. Bader, R.E.
Lieut.-Colonel I. S. Jehu.
Major H. T. Hewitt, K.S.L.I.
Captain K. C. Campbell-Meiklejohn.
Captain D. G. Harington-Hawes.
Captain H. K. Percy-Smith.
Squadron-Leader J. M. D. Ker, R.A.F.
Lieut. R. O. H. Carver, R.E.
Lieut. A. P. Lillie.
2/Lieut. Mohamed Hayat.
2/Lieut. F. B. Suter.
2/Lieut. J. D. Ward.
A. B. Awan, Esq., I.P.
A. D. Gorwala, Esq., I.C.S.

II.—CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOURNAL

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Articles may vary in length up to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten, with double spacing between lines, on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment up to Rs. 150 is made on publication according to the value of the contribution.

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Members who wish to remain anonymous will inform the Secretary of the fact and include a pen-name if they so wish. In such cases the real name of the author is known to nobody except the Secretary, who has been instructed to divulge it to no one.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit or amend any matter; if such alterations affect the sense of the article, it will be referred to the author before publication, unless the author has stated that the article may be edited as thought necessary without reference to him.

The January number of the Journal goes to Press on November 25th. Editing and selecting articles takes about ten days, so, as a general rule, articles should be submitted to the editor by November 15th. An article which may not be edited without reference to the author should arrive at least ten days earlier. From the Editor's point of view, November 1st is about the ideal date on which to receive articles. All these dates apply equivalently to the other numbers of the Journal.

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IV.—OLD BOOKS AND TROPHIES

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

V.—HISTORICAL RESEARCH

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

VI.—THE MacGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor who founded the United Service Institution of India. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June:

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution of India, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. The following are eligible for the award, whether at the time of the reconnaissance they were in military or civil employ:

(a) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and of the Dominion Forces, while serving on the Indian establishment.

- (b) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army, Indian Air Force and of the Indian States Forces, wherever serving.

Note.—The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Military Corps under local governments.

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.*

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has incurred the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the award.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or notice of it has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to deserve it.

VII.—GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1941:

"The Defence Organisation of a Dominion India."

The following are the conditions of the competition:

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration in India and to all commissioned officers of His Majesty's Forces including Territorial Forces, wherever those forces have been raised and to officers of the Indian States Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1941.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 500, either in addition to, or in substitution for, the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the

*Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

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Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October 1941 number of the Journal.

- (7) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (8) Essays should not exceed fifteen pages of the size and style of the Journal exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

VIII.—ADDRESSES

The difficulties of tracing addresses are now very much increased. Members are earnestly requested to keep the Secretary informed of changes in their addresses or if possible give a permanent address which will always find them, *e.g.*, a Bank.

IX.—HONORARY MEMBERSHIP OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION

Honorary membership of the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, S.W.1., is extended to commissioned officers of any military unit from the Dominions, India, or the Colonies, who may be visiting the United Kingdom during the war. They will be admitted to the Institution's premises on presentation of their cards.